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PR E FA C E

T here is a g re a t gap in the h isto ry of A m erican m onetary
politics betw een the y e a rs of Jackson’s ’’Bank W ar” and the lengthy
debate over bonds, G reenbacks, and silv er that occupied the energies
of the nation a fte r the Civil W ar.

While these y e ars w ere chaotic

and produced little constructive m onetary legislation, the money
issu e played an im portant ro le.

This study is designed to help clarify

the n atu re of the issu e s during this period and the ways in which the
p a rtie s reacted .
The study of these issu e s has usually been confused by
assum ptions derived from a projection of the p o st-w ar issu e s into
the p re -w a r period and by the tendency to view A m erican h isto ry in
term s of a continuous conflict between the party of conservatism
and the p a rty of lib e ra lism .

I have reje cted these assum ptions as

invalid and attem pted to re c o n stru c t the issu e s of the tim e as the
p a rtie s involved perceived them .

The rejectio n of these organiza

tional concepts has fo rced m e to m ake some conjectures based on
lim ited evidence which m ay ultim ately prove inaccurate.

I also have

no doubt that the situation in other a re a s a t different stages of social
and econom ic developm ent was different from that in the Old N orth
w est and m y conclusions would have to be a lte re d accordingly to
apply in those a re a s .

However, I hope that this study m akes c le a r
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the w eakness of in terp retin g A m erican h isto ry w ithin the lim ited
bounds of the lib eral* co n serv ativ e dichotomy which im p re sses
ideological continuity on the im m ensely com plicated convolutions of
p a rtie s and in te re s t groups.
E very student owes debts to countless fellow scholars,
lib ra ria n s, teachers* and frien d s.

The staffs of the Ohio State

H isto rical Society L ib ra ry , the Indiana State H isto rical L ib rary ,
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and the Wayne State U niversity L ib ra ry , w ere always friendly and
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In p a rtic u la r, I m ust thank Jam es Babcock and his staff at

the Burton H isto rica l Collection in the D etroit Public L ib rary .

A

g ran t fro m the Society of Colonial Dames m ade possible m uch of the
re s e a rc h .

M em bers of the faculty of Wayne State U niversity have

been a constant source of encouragem ent.

P ro fe ss o rs Edward L urie

and Sidney G lazer have re a d a ll o r portions of the m anuscript, m ade
suggestions, and offered c ritic is m a t various stages of the project.
My g re a te s t thanks m u st go to P ro fe ss o r Raymond C. M iller who
orig in ally suggested the topic and has guided the d isse rtatio n to com 
pletion.

One’s p e e rs a re always the m ost incisive and devastating of

c ritic s .

I have been fortunate to have such friends as Jam es K. Flack,

Ron P. F orm isano, and Lewis Gould who put aside th eir own work to
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of typist, editor, and c ritic as well as the m ore mundane of wifely
ch o res.

Her aid and encouragem ent have been indispensable.

CHAPTER I

BANKS AND POLITICS IN THE ODD NORTHWEST DURING THE 183 G*s

Daring the 1830’s, the Old N orthw est faced a dilem m a.
Its e arly experiences with banks had been unfortunate and dictated
caution. Yet, the demands for c re d it and cu rrency-*the sinews
of econom ic developm ent*-grew yearly. In the f ir s t y e a rs of the
decade old prejudices w ere laid aside, and the easy money s p irit
was allowed to dom inate. The num ber of banks was in creased in
ev ery state, and th ere is little evidence that "hard m oney"
attitudes gained m o re than a lim ited hearing. B efore Jack so n 's
veto, th e re was little opposition to the Bank of the United States,
and betw een that tim e and 1837, both p a rtie s struggled to estab lish
state banks in answ er to popular dem ands. State banking was not
a p a rty issue, and the D em ocracy of the Old N orthw est was not a
"h ard m oney" party.
Andrew Ja ck so n 's attack on the Bank of the United States
opened a period of m onetary debate in this country which lasted
through the Civil W ar.

The language of the veto and Jack so n 's

subsequent m essa g es stru c tu re d this debate by giving to the Demo
c ra tic p arty a sym bolism which was politically effective, but un*
re a lis tic in the face of the exigencies of an expanding economy*
This was p a rtic u la rly true in the Old N orthw est w here th ere was a
positive need fo r banks and banking services*

At firs t, the

D em ocrats in this a re a chose to in te rp re t the veto as a m anifesto
of em ancipation for local banks fro m dom ination by the Chestnut
S tre e t "M onster"? but gradually, they m oved tow ard acceptance of
Jack so n’s opposition to all banks* By the 1840*s this was the
orthodox position in the party.

This lim ited th eir action on the
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problem of providing an adequate cu rren cy to the ste rile negativism
of ’’h a rd money, ” C onstructive policy had to come from th eir
opponents, and those of the D em ocracy willing to b rea k with party
orthodoxy.

During the th ree decades of m onetary controversy it

was the Whigs, Republicans, and th eir few D em ocratic allies who
struggled to im plem ent and p erfect fre e banking as an answ er to
the economic needs of the Old Northwest.
W estern experience with banks in the decade following the
P eace of Ghent left an ambiguous legacy.

’’Soft m oney” and ’’hard

m oney” m en often stood side by sidej and those favoring local
priv ate banks often opposed those who favored banks owned eith er
wholly o r in p a rt by the state.

The Situation was h ard ly ever

eim ply ’’banks” v ersu s ”no banks, ”
F o r a tim e the m o st pervasive attitude was a d istru st of
and antipathy tow ard the Bank of the United States resu ltin g from
the p a rt the Bank played in the Panic of 1819 and the subsequent
dep ression.

This was aggravated by a parochial suspicion of the

d istan t institution.

During the dep ressio n which la ste d until 1822,

the ra th e r c ru sty doctrines of John T aylor w ere revived and found
th e ir way into the political b a ttles in the West.

1
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This is em phasized in: C harles G. S e lle rs, J r . , ’’Banking and
P o litics in Jack so n 's T ennessee, 1817-1827, ” M ississip p i Valley
H isto rica l Review, XL! (June* 1954), pp. 61*84; and Lynn
M arshall, ”The E arly C a re e r of Amos Kendall” (Unpublished
Ph. D. d isse rtatio n , U niversity of C alifornia, B erkeley, 1962),
pp. 195-240,
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In the Old N orthw est th ere was a broad vein of d istru st
of state banking institutions that was m ore rela te d to experience
than any environm entally determ ined conservatism .

The 1820* a

had seen the econom ic c ris is decim ate the Ohio banking system*
F rau d and m is -m anagem ent underm ined the experim ents with State
Banks in Indiana and Illinois.

Intended for relief, they brought

fu rth e r depreciation and failure.
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Yet, while the Panic of 1819 and its afterm ath left a legacy
of fe a r, a sc a rc ity of capital and an inadequate supply of cu rren cy
to conduct day to day tran sactio n s m ade som e kind of banking
n e c e ssa ry .

L ike any rapidly growing a re a , the West lacked the

cap ital n e c e ssa ry to finance econom ic growth.

The expansionist

policies of the Bank of the United States a fte r 1829 in the W est and
Southwest dispelled m uch of the e a r lie r anim osity tow ard that
institution.

2

P a rtic u la rly in the Old N orthw est, little opposition to

Logan E sa re y , ‘’State Banking in Indiana, 1814-1873, MIndiana
fln lv ersity Studies, X (A pril 13, 1912), pp. 221-2425 George
W illiam Dowrie, " The Development of Banking in Illinois,
1817-1863,” U niversity of Illinois Studies In the Social Sciences,
IX (December* 1913)* pp. 22-48; and C. G. Huntington, ”A
H istory of Banking and C urrency in Ohio B efore the Civil War, "
Ohio A rchaeological and H isto rica l Society Publications, XXIV
(1915), pp. 233-343.
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the Bank could be found.
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A fter 1830* a boom in econom ic activity sp u rre d by a wave
of im m igration and risin g land values caused anti-bank feelings to
be subm erged by the d e sire for expanded e re d it facilities*

Between

1830 and 1840 the population of this a re a n early doubled going from
1* 470, 018 to 2, 924, 728,

The m o st populous state, Ohio, grew by

n early seventy per cent, while Indiana doubled its population and
Illinois trip le d the num ber of its inhabitants.

P a rtic u la rly a fte r the

b rie f re c essio n , known as "B iddle’s Panic, " in 1834, land values
zoomed to unheard of heights,

A young Illinois law yer, Stephen

Douglas w rote one of his clients in e a rly 1836, "I am happy to inform
you that I can now s e ll your Dots a t fro m fifty to an hundred p er cent
a d v an c e.. . which by the by is p retty good interest* "

4

The growth of this a re a was so g re a t that even before the
Jack so n ian a ssa u lt on the Bank, that institution could not supply
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H arlan Scott White, "W estern Banking Ideas and P ra c tic e s
B efore 1840, M(Unpublished M. A. T hesis, U niversity of Indiana,
1942)5 F, C yril Ja m es, The Growth of Chicago Banka (Hew Tork:
H arp er and B ro th ers, P u b lish ers, 1938), X, pp. 70-117? and
Ralph C, H. C atterall, The Second Bank of the United States
(Chicago: The U niversity of Chicago P r e s s , 1903), pp. 132-63.
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U. S. B ureau of C ensus, H isto ric a l S tatistics of the United
States, Colonial T im es to 1957 (Washington P. C .» 19601p. 13?
Thom as Senior B e rry , W estern P ric e s B efore 1861 (Cam bridge,
M assachusetts: H arv ard U niversity P re s s , 1943), pp. 406-4505
and R obert W. Johannsen, e d ., The L e tte rs of Stephen A.
Douglas (Urbana, Illinois: U niversity of Illinois P re s s , 1961),
pp. 35-36.
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sufficient c re d it to answ er the a r e a ’s needs and the agitation for
local banks increased.

E xperience dictated caution* n ecessity de

m anded c u rren cy and cred it.

Such demands effected the entire

p o litical spectrum* and anti-bank feelings w ere laid aside.
The idea of a State Bank based on public c re d it gained a
wide hearing in the c ap ita l-sh y sta te s of the Old N orthwest.

A

State Bank was proposed in Ohio in 1829 to estab lish a sound
cu rren cy , low er the in te re s t ra te , and in cre ase available capital.
It was hoped th at this would lead to the growth of agriculture*
com m erce, and m anufacturing.

Although the le g islatu re responded

by in creasin g the cap ital of two of the sta te ’s leading banks, a state
in stitution was not established a t this tim e.

The demand for m ore

c u rre n cy and c re d it kept the idea of a State Bank alive.

Such an

in stitution was proposed in Decem ber, 1832 by G overnor Duncan
M cA rthur, an opponent of Jackson, and the following y e ar by
Jack so n ian governor* R obert Ducas,

Even though this was now

favored by the D em ocratic C entral Com m ittee, the com bination of
b a ck e rs of a national bank and the advocates of local banks was able
to bring about its defeat.

In the place of such an institution, the

D em ocratic le g isla tu re c h a rte re d ten new local banks and revived
two that had suspended b u sin ess.

At this point the le g isla to rs

balked and no fu rth e r c h a rte rs w ere granted, and an attem pt was
m ade to re p e al the c h a rte r of the m illion dollar Ohio Dife Insurance
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and T ru st Company. 5
While the demands for the repeal of the c h a rte r of this
financial giant and the passage of the law prohibiting notes below
five d o lla rs in 1836, rev eal the growing power of the “h ard m oney”
faction within the D em ocratic party, the developm ents of the
th irtie s do not lend them selves to a sim ple in te rp retatio n concerning
p arty position on banks,

n ationally the D em ocrats opposed the Bank

of the United States, but it was a D em ocratically controlled le g is 
latu re that c h a rte re d the ten (or twelve) new banks including the
Ohio Dife Insurance-and T ru st Company in 1834* At the sam e tim e
one of the leading Whig e d ito rs, who supported the Bank, C harles
Hammond, urged a conservative state policy:
Those who re c o lle c t the c reatio n of banks* from
eighteen to tw enty-four y e a rs back, cannot fail to see,
in the p re se n t conditions, a g re a t probability of
the evils from 1815 to 1822* in a ll th eir d istre ssin g
and d estru ctiv e vicissitudes* The sam e causes
m u st produce som ething like the sam e effects*
Banks a r put in operation, not by money len d ers,
but by money borrow ers* They can have but one
c a re e r, but one term ination* * *
Hammond1s advice seem s to have been heeded by the newly form ed
Whig p arty which following its su ccess in the election of 1884

5

Huntington, ’’Banking and C urrency in Ohio, Mpp. 343-363;
H arold E. Davis, “Econom ic B asis of Ohio P o litics, 1820-1840, “
The Ohio State A rchaeological and H isto rica l Q u arterly , KIAfll
(O ctober, 1938), pp. 311-314; and F ra n c is P. W eisenburger,
The P assin g of the F ro n tie r 1825-1850, Vol. Ill of The H istory
of the State of Ohio, ed. Oar I Wittke (6 v o l.; Columbus, Ohio:
Ohio State A rchaeological and H isto rical Society, 1941), pp.
277-285,
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dom inated the 1835 leg islatu re and refused to c h a rte r any additional
new banks. ^
Sim ilarly, the fight over the rep eal of the ‘'m onied
m o n ster, " the Ohio Life Insurance and T ru st Company, was an
in tra -p a rty feud ra th e r than an in te r-p a rty b attle.

The move to

rep eal the com pany's c h a rte r was backed by m ost of the D em ocratic
p re s s, and led in the le g islatu re by Cincinnati D em ocrat, R obert
T. Lytle.

However, among the d ire c to rs of the company w ere

four of the s ta te 1® leading D em ocrats! David Disney, Noah Swayne,
M icajah T. W illiam s, and Daniel K ilgore.
led the fight against repeal*

Disney, in p a rticu la r,

He was aided by a sm all group of

D em ocratic p ap ers headed by the C incinnati Daily Republican*

The

Whig p re s s joined the opposition to re p e a l hi the le g islatu re the
7
Whigs voted with the successfu l defenders of the institution*
In general, no c le a r cut dichotomy betw een the p a rtie s on
banking issu e s existed.

Economic in te re s ts and p ersonal o r sectional

am bitions dictated one's position on the bank question*

D em ocrats

tended to be m o re anti-bank than Whigs j and those m en who harb o red
a dislike fo r banks of any v a rie ty w ere usually found within the
D em ocratic fold* However, opposition to banks was hardly a te st
of p arty orthodoxy.

A rdent bank expansionists m arch ed side by side

6

Cincinnati Cassette, Apr il 14, 1834, quoted in B e rry , We ste rn
P ric e s , p. 422, ftn. 39*

7

W eisenburger, P assin g of the F ro n tie r, pp. 308-13.
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with "h ard m oney” re s tric tio n is ts under the colors of the Dem ocracy.
The Whigs, who advocated c re d it expansion through a m oderate
in cre ase of banking fa c ilitie s, w ere often caught between the factions
of the D em ocratic party .

Only on the question of sm all b ills was

th ere a neat p a rty split, with the Jacks anians favoring prohibition
and the Whigs opposing it.
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The sam e p attern se e n in Ohio was repeated in Indiana and
Illinois w here the demand fo r cu rre n cy and c re d it led to the e stab lish 
m ent of new State Banks.

The failure of the f i r s t State Bank in

Indiana left the sta te with a m otley foreign cu rren cy in which the
only stable elem ent was the issu e of the Bank of the United States.
Jack so n ’s veto of the re c h a rte r of the Bank led to demands in
Indiana fo r a state institution that would regulate the cu rren cy in the
state and fill the vacuum left by the re tire m e n t of the national
bank’s notes*

In 1834 the sta te leg isla tu re c re ate d one of the stro n g e st

and m o st su ccessfu l State Banks in the country.

Some Jacksonian

journals* such a s the W estern Sun, opposed the monopoly fe a tu res
of the bank; and D em ocratic le g isla to rs attacked the bill as e sta b lish 
ing the b a sis of a p olitical m achine.

In the legislature* Jam es

Raiden opposed the bank# a s s e rtin g that the ’’people, ” i. e* fa rm e rs
8

A soon to be published study by P ro fe ss o r H e rb e rt B rshkow itz
of Tem ple U niversity rev eals these tendencies in Ohio. F o r
sim ila r conflicts over in tern al im provem ents see: H a rry N.
Scheiber, "U rban R ivalry and In tern al Im provem ents in the
Old H o rth w e st,11 Ohio H istory, LXXI (October, 1962), pp. 227-39.
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arid laborers* did not need banks*

However* these views re p r e 

sented only a m in o rity of D em ocratic opinion.

The leading organ

of the Democracy* the Indiana D em ocrat backed the b ill and attacked
its opponents a s "low p o litician s11 who eith er p re fe rre d "wild cat"
banking o r w ere "hard m oney” m en.

This combination, which had

blocked such leg islatio n in Ohio, gave way in Indiana to "an over*
whelming sentim ent. *. in favor of ch arterin g a bank. "

9

Although the e a r lie r experience with a State Bank had
soured m any E linoisians on such institutions, the sam e fo rces that
had been a t work in Ohio and Indiana finally led to the ch arterin g of
the Illinois State Bank in 1835* A ttem pts in the e a rly th irtie s to
c h a rte r a sta te institution w ere defeated by very n arrow m arg in s in
the D em ocratic legislature*

The d is tre s s of 1834 and general demands

fo r extended c re d it fa c ilitie s led even .John Reynolds, who had been
elected in 1830 as an anti-bank candidate, to advocate a new State
Bank*

"By 1838 the Illinois speculator had ju s t reached the point

w here he was demanding the 'accommodation* which could not be had
without a c c e ss to a bank plentifully supplied with notes* " Two
defunct banks w ere revived! and in the leg isla tu re , Whigs and Demo*
c ra ts combined to c re a te a new State Bank*

Stephen Douglas

explained to his frien d Julius G ranger, *’. *. I am no frien d to the
9

E sarey , "State Banking in Indiana, M pp. 243*2 53; and W illiam F.
H arding, "The State Bank of Indiana, " The Journal of P o litical
Economy, IV (D ecem ber, 1895), pp. 1-10. The quotation is
fro m the Indiana D em ocrat, June 15, 1833, in E sa re y , p. 251.
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Banking System but on the co n trary am in favor of re a l B.entonian
Shiners; but under the existing circum stances a Bank m ay be
n e c e ssa ry in this State in self-defense. ”
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Throughout the W est optim ism g reeted this in c re a se in
banking fa c ilitie s as the economy continued to sp ira l upwards on the
wings of extended credit*

Although it was not the intention of the

Jackson adm inistration* the rem oval of the deposits to the pet banks
and the re tire m e n t of the debt neatly coincided with W estern
expansion and contributed to the speculative mania*
A ll of these tendencies affected* usually in an accentuated
way* the new est of these states* Michigan*

It was in. Michigan that

the f ir s t A m erican fre e banking experim ent was attempted*

An

an aly sis of the political and econom ic p re s s u re s which produced
this leg islatio n gives a c le a r p icture of w e stern needs and attitudes
tow ard banks in the 1830* s*
The population of Michigan was growing at a fantastic rate
as a steady stre a m of im m igrants poured into the W est drawn by
"the p ro sp ect of speedy and golden fortunes* ,f The fed eral surveys
had opened the lands of M ichigan to settlem en t and speculation at
$1* 25 p er acre*

To handle the new traffic* land offices w ere opened

a t Detroit* Monroe* and B ronson (now Kalamazoo).

The demand for

wild lands and the d e sire to exploit the virgin re so u rc e s of the West
10

Bowrie* nBanking in Illinois, H pp. 59-63, the quotation is from
p. 61; Johannsen, e d ., B e tters of Stephen A* Douglas, pp. 13-14*

seem ed insatiable*

C ities of the fixture w ere laid out on paper com*

plete with "H otels, w arehouses and b a n k s ,. , like places in fairy
land; p ie rs p rojected into harbors* and steam boats w ere seen
e n te rin g ,11 While som e of these expectations m ay have been overly
sanguine, M ichigan’s growth during the th irtie s was not ficticious.
F ro m 1820 to 1830 the population grew from 8, 896 to 31, 834, but this
was nothing when com pared to the next decade.

By 1834 the popu

lation was m o re than th ree tim es what it had been in 183G, and
th ree y e a rs la te r it had n early doubled again to 174, 600,

This

im m igration sw elled speculations to im m ense proportions and
boosted expectations even among the m o st conservative m en.

As

Stevens M ason’s biographer has w ritten; ’’Hope and enthusiasm
w ere in the ascendency. ” T here seem ed little reaso n to believe
that M ichigan with its excellent "w ater advantages” m ight not
becom e one of the ric h e s t sta te s in the Union*

U

The state governm ent was not unaware of this p ro sp ect and
acted to provide the n e c e ssitie s fo r such developm ent.
11

In the b rie f

See; the rem in iscen ces of B ela Hubbard, M em orials of a
H alf-C entury (Hew York: G. P» P utnam ’s Sons, 1887), pp. 93105; Thom as M. Cooley, "State Bank Issu es in Michigan; A
R e tro sp ec t of leg islatio n ,* ’ M ichigan P o litical Science A sso ci
ation Publications, Vol. I (np*, n d .), pp. 1-2,0; Joseph Gantz,
”A H isto ry of Banking le g is la tio n and C urrency in Michigan,
1835-1865, ” (Unpublished M. A. T hesis, Wayn© State U niversity,
1936), pp. 1-5; M ichigan le g is la tu r e . Joint Documents, 1854,
#12, and L egislative Manual of the Senate and House of R ep re
sentatives of the State of M ichigan, 1939, p. 7 &fo r population
fig u res. The quotations a re fro m Hubbard, pp. 94, 95~9&,and
Lawton T. Hem ans, Life and Tim es of Stevens Thomson M ason
the Boy Governor of M ichigan (Lansing, Michigan: M ichigan
H isto rica l Com m ission, 1920), p. 212.
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p erio d betw een the drawing of the constitution and the final acceptance
of M ichigan as a state* the leg islatu re organised fifty-seven townships*
provided fo r six ty -six state roads* c h artere d eleven railroads* and
gave p e rm issio n fo r the e re ctio n of th irteen dams to provide w ater
fo r m anufacturing.

The g re a te s t need was banks to provide the

n e c e ssa ry c u rre n cy to finance both speculation and development.
Looking back on the period* Thom as Cooley wrote*
M ore money was re q u ire d to enable people to c a rry
out the enorm ous tran sactio n s that from day to day
they engaged in, the m o st of them purely speculative;
but nevertheless* a t the tim e, seem ing to a larg e
portion of those who w ere p a rtie s to them* to be not
only substantial but altogether reasonable* since
the inflow of im m igration and the extensive system
of ra ilro a d s and canals planned fo r the State* and
then well underway, w ere expected speedily to m ake
M ichigan a populous as well as a properous / s i c /
commonwealth* 12
M ichigan’s f i r s t bank was sh o rt lived*

The Bank of D etroit

began in 1805 and la ste d without C ongressional approval until 1808
when it was closed by the law p assed that y e ar prohibiting unauthorized
banking*

In 1817 the Bank of M ichigan was c h a rte re d by the governor

of the territo ry *

The influx of population following the opening of

E rie Canal led the T e rrito ria l Council to c h a rte r eight m o re banks
betw een 1827 and 1835* In 1831 the c h a rte r of the Bank of Michigan
was extended, and subsequently it was allowed to in cre ase its capital
12

Thom as M cIntyre Cooley, M ichigan: A H istory of Governm ents
(Boston: Houghton* M ifflin and Company, 1885), pp. 254-256;
the quotation is from Gooley, "State Bank Issu es in Michigan, ”
p. 8.
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and estab lish a branch a t Kalam azoo.

In general these c h a rte rs

w ere Mfram ed to sa lt the corporations, if not by th e m .1113
Up to this point th ere was little anti-banking sentim ent,
and the s ta te ’s leading Jacksoaians w ere deeply involved in these
institutions.

Haring the twenties the presid en t of the Bank of

M ichigan was John R* W illiam s, a m em b er of the ’’lib e ra l faction”
of the Dem ocracy in. the next two decades*

W illiam s becam e

involved in an a lterc atio n with the d ire c to rs that resu lte d in his
rem oval and a su it against the bank which he eventually lost*

His

place was taken at the B ark of Michigan by P e te r Desnoyers,
another leading Jacksonianj and W illiam s took over as p resid en t of
the F a r m e r ’s and M echanic’s Bank of M ichigan which was c h a rte re d
on Novem ber S> 1829*

14

The Bank of M ichigan was m ade a governm ent depository
in 1831 and rem ained one throughout the th irtie s although its p r e s i
dency went from D esnoyers to Eurotus P* Hastings* and then
13

Alpheus Felch* ’’E arly Banks and Banking in Michigan, ”
P io neer C o llectio n s| R eport of the P ioneer Society of the State
of M ichigan*"' Voi*''Wj 'pp* 111-12^ and Cooley* ’’State Bank
Issu es in Michigan* ” a re the standard accounts of e a rly
M ichigan banking on which a ll w rite rs have drawn* Both w ere
w ritten by Jacksonian®* The quotation is from Cooley* p* 5*

14

C larence M* Burton* ed. * The City of D etroit Michigan* 17011922 (Detroit* The S* J* C larke Publishing Company* 1922)
2 Vols*, I* pp* 227-235* By D em ocrats and Whigs I m ean
people who w ere consistently in one p a rty o r the other in the
late th irtie s and fo rtie s when these affiliations a re easily
identifiable. Special c ase s such a s John Biddle will be fu rth er
explained. I will use ’’D em ocrats” and ’’Jacksonian®” in te r
changeably although m any people a t the tim e disputed this.
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C. C. Trow bridge who w ere Whigs.

Daring this period the g reat

m ajo rity of stock in the bank was held by out of state Whigs, how
ever, the la rg e s t local stockholder was G eneral C ass.

In 1834 at

the urging of John N orvell, lea d er of the 'lib e r a l D em ocratic
faction, " the F a r m e r 's and M echanic's Bank was also m ade a fed eral
depository.

According to N orvell, at this tim e 90% of the d ire c to rs

w ere D em ocrats.

Interestingly, John Biddle* b ro th er of Nicholas,

eventually becam e p resid en t of this D em ocratic "pet. "

15

The M ichigan State Bank was founded in 1835 by W illiams
with the aid of Albany cap ita lists Thomas Olcott and fSrastus Corning,
both m em b ers of the Albany Regency.

In the F a s t the stock of this

bank eventually fell into the hands of Whigs with Thurlow Weed being
one of the in v esto rs.

However, in Michigan, cash ie r John Norton, a

close frien d of Stevens M ason controlled the bank; and it num bered
among its b o rro w e rs m o st of the leading Jaeksonians in the state.
Eventually this bank becam e the center of Whig attacks as the "pet" of the
15

Ib id ., 633-634; H a rry N. Scheiber, "G eorge B ancroft and the
Bank of Michigan, 1837-41" M ichigan H istory, XLIV (M arch,
I960), pp. 82-90, gives inform ation on stock holding; all the
stock holders a re liste d in M ichigan L eg islatu re House Docu
m ents Accompanying the Jo u rn al, 1841, #61, pp. 219-20. This
also lis ts .Robert A. Forsyth* A. T. McReynolds, Epaphroditus
Ransom , T. C. Sheldon and Ju stu s Burdick, all D em ocrats, as
stock holders in this "Whig bank" along with G ass.

D em ocratic state adm inistration* 16
The debate over the constitution in 1835 showed little
antagonism toward banks.

The m ajo rity of the m em bers of the con

vention wished to elim inate any m ultiplication of banks; and the
provision from the New York constitution providing that bank
c h a rte rs m u st receive a tw o-thirds m ajo rity in the leg islatu re was
adopted unanimously*

An attem pt by P e te r F e r ry of Monroe to

outlaw all corporations wa$ lo st fi£ty**^ii5£ to nme iii the convexxtxon
that was dom inated by Jaoksoniams.

The nine# m oreover# w ere not

ail Democrats# and included John Biddle! John McDonell, a
D em ocrat from Wayne county# m ade se v e ra l attem pts to get the
Convention to sanction# o r a t le a s t to leave the way open for# the
estab lish m en t of a State Bank with branches such as that in Indiana*
These w ere unsuccessful* the final attem pt being soundly defeated
fifty -sev en to nineteen*

17

The m ost cru c ial question to come before the Convention
concerning banks involved the attem pt to re q u ire a ll future c h a rte re d
16

Burton* ed. * D etroit* pp* 636-640; Michigan L eg islatu re.
Senate Documents Accompanying the Journal* 1841# #42* ■
pp. 165-7Srlists stockholders and b o rro w e rs; Daily A d v ertiser
October 7* 1839» is a typical Whig attack on the M ichigan State
Bank; on the political affiliation of Olcott and Corning see
Lee Benson* The Concept of Jacksonian D em ocracy (Princeton,
New J e rse y : P rin c e to n U n iv e rs ity F r e s s r if ^ l K P* 91.

17

H arold M. D orr, e d ., The M ichigan C onstitutional Conventions
of 1835-36: Debates and Proceedings (AmArbor* Michigan:
The U niversity of M ichigan P re s s , 1940), pp, 392, 390, 336,
391. The ro ll call votes a re liste d in Appendix A.
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banks to provide m ortgages on M ichigan lands as secu rity for
redem ption of th eir notes,

This idea, which eventually becam e

embodied in the fre e banking act of 1837, was suggested in the Report
of the Com m ittee on Banking presen ted June 12, 1835* In o rd e r to
cure the ’’g re a t evil of the p resen t system* * * its insecurity* ” the
re p o rt proposed that bank d ire c to rs invest in bonds or m ortgages as
a ’’pledge” against th eir issues*

This would be of advantage to the

bank by allowing them to receive in te re s t on funds invested as well
as in te re s t on the discounts of the issu e s thus secured*

Such

se c u rity would allow the safe use of ’’the g re a te r convenience of the
paper medium* ” ’’This single provision would secu re every
advantage and preclude every evil of the p re se n t banking system* ”
In addition* those individuals in the society excluded from the benefits
of the banking business, because they were, unable to use sh o rt te rm
c re d it would benefit by this plant
By retaining* fo r m erch an ts * the fac ilitie s and
advantages usually derived from the c re d it* and giving*
on good security* to fa rm e rs and the producing classes*
generally* the loan of capital of such institutions* for
such periods as m ay be required* the different c la sse s
of the com m unity will sh a re m ore equally the advantages
of w hatever moneyed corporations m ay be granted* and
a t the sam e time* as has been shown* those institutions
w ill fee placed on a m o re secu re and stable foundation*
Men of intelligence and enterprise* w ill be enabled to
p ro jec t and com plete im provem ents that cannot fail
to be g rea tly to the advantage of individuals and the
country generally* esp ecially in the in te rio r of the

17

state* where fo r m aay years to come* there m ast
fee a want of capital for such p u rp oses.• • IS
This report was presented fey a predominately Democratic
committee chaired fey the leading “conservative” Democrat,, Lucius
Lyon, but the.com m ittee*8 proposal was lost forty-eight to twentyseven In a vote that defies sim ple class or party interpretation.

Of

the m em bers of the committee four favored the report and three
voted against it without reference to party.

Within the Democratic

party* there :was no discernible split between the so-called “lib e ra ls ”
and the “conservatives* ” John Barry# John Biddle# Edward Ellis#
Townsbend 0i& ey, Robert McClelland, Ross Wilkins* and William
Woodferldge* who represent practically every factional variation in
the subsection! party structure* voted together to defeat the motion*

to

IS “R eport of the C om m ittee on Banking!* is rep rin ted in. Dorr* ed* *
M ichigan Constifcutuonal Conventions* pp. $20«24» the quotations
a r e fro m pp* $31# 522, S23* M M . ’
If

The designations of “liberal*1 and “con serv ativ e” have been
applied to factions of the D em ocratic p arty fey H arold D orr and
Floyd Streeter* the two b e s t h isto ria n s of M ichigan in this
period* See Dorr* e d ., M ichigan Constitutional .Conventions*
p. 9* fin* I* and Floyd B enjam in S tre e te r, P o litical P a rtie s in
M ichigan (Lansing, M ichigan: M ichigan H isto rica l Com mies ion*
Iflijt pp.* 1*42. The n a rra tiv e should re v e a l som e of the
problem s in applying th ese te rm s to factional positions on
banking* If anything the M&sen-MorveR-W illiams faction r e p r e 
sen ts in M ichigan the position usually ealled'toonaervative”
and is dom inated fey “e n tre p re n e u rs. ” The faction that b e a rs
resem blance to the “ra d ic a ls ” in usual term inology is that
associated, w ith John B arry , Edw ard E llis and Alpheus Falch.

18

A sta te governm ent with Stevens Mason as governor and a
le g islatu re with a larg e D em ocratic m ajo rity in both branches came
into existence in late 1835.

Floyd S tre e te r argues that this governm ent

and the D em ocratic p arty fro m 1835 to 1839 was controlled by "the
poor and ra d ic a l elem ent" that was "hostile to m onopolies and vested
in te re sts and wished to b reak down the power of m onied m en in
politics. " The m essa g es of Mason seem to b e a r him out.

In a

s e rie s of vetoes of steam ^boat corporations he rep eated his argum ent
that a m ultiplication of m onied institutions underm ined individual
e n te rp rise .

Such "so u less bodies" w ere " a ris to c ra tic in th eir

tendencies" and a d ep artu re from tru e republican p rin cip les.

It

was M ason’s belief that "the le g is la tu r e should not in te rfe re unless
a b ran ch of business or e n te rp rise , useful and im portant to the
public cannot successfully be c a rrie d on and conducted by citizens
in th e ir individual capacity. ” In his f ir s t m assage as Governor,
Mason p ra ise d the provision of the new constitution requiring a twoth ird s m ajo rity for the passage of co rp o rate c h a rte rs and urged
that prudent c a re be taken in the c ase s of banking companies*

He

w arned of the difficulties in constructing pro p er banking legislation
and the evils of ex cessiv e issu e of notes.

However, the degree to

which Mason and the other "ra d ic a l" elem ents of the Dem ocracy
adhered to these ideas a s anything m ore than sym bols is open to
question.

In 1836 acting under the re s tric tiv e provision of the new

19

constitution concerning corporate c h a rte rs, this *’anti-m onopoly11
le g islatu re c h a rte re d nine new banks* and In no case did the
governor who w arned ag ain st the m ultiplication of such e n te rp rise s
re tu rn a c h a rte r with his veto.

The th ru st fo r c re d it was general

and w idespread; lim ited to no single p arty o r faction;

20

V arious attem pts to provide se cu rity for b ill holders cu l
m inated in the adoption of a Safety Fund law; M arch 28; 1836;

This

b ill was re p o rte d to the Senate on M arch 2; 1836 by D em ocrat Horace
Com stock and rep o rte d back from the com m ittee five days la te r
without am endm ent;

The ".Report" which accom panied the bill

recom m ended the passage of the law which was consciously patterned
on the e a r lie r New York Safety Fund law;

In this way Michigan could

receiv e "all the benefits to be derived from an extensive and well
conducted c re d it system ; " The "R eport" w ent on to say:
But the g re a t object contem plated by your com m ittee;
and which had g re a t weight with them in recom m ending
the adoption of a safety fund system ; were* in
addition to m o re p erfect se cu rity perhaps* on which
banks a sso ciated under such a system can be placed;
th at a ll the d e sirab le advantages of unity and feeling;
of interest* and of action* attainable by a single
m am m oth m onied co rp o ratio n with subject branches ^
/a s suggested e a r lie r in the se ssio n by John M cDonell/;
a re thereby attained* without the ris k of the
dangerous influence and tendency of such an over*
20

Streeter* P o litic al P a rtie s in Michigan, p. 5; George N. F u ller,
ed. *• M essages of the G o v ern o rs■{Dansing, •Michigan: The
M ichigan H isto rica l C om m ission, 1926-26), I, pp. 140-42,
174-76$ Cooley, "State Bank Issues in M ichigan," pp. 6-7;
F elch, "E arly Banks and Banking in Michigan, " pp. 113-14.

20

powering institution? and that* instead of su b 
jecting a ll the e n te rp rise and business facilities
of the country, to the whim and caprice or
fav o ritism of a few to be m anaged as inevitably
m u st and would be the case, to suit th eir own
views and in te re s ts , --u n d e r this system , the
benefits of independent banking stitutions, if
they sh all otherw ise be pro p erly guarded and
restricted* can be extended to all the various
p a rts of the state, req u irin g such accommodation* ^
On M arch 21 an attem pt was m ade by a group of Hco n serv ativ e ” D em ocrats including John C lark, Edward E llis, and John
B a rry to m ake bank d ire c to rs under the new law liable to the extent
of th e ir p ro p erty and stockholders liable to the amount of th eir
stock*

Yet, this failed in the Senate by a vote of ten to four*

While

the vote on the Safety Fund b ill was not recorded, it w as, like its
p re d e c e sso r in Hew York, a Jacksonian m easure* 22
About m id -1836 the D etroit D em ocratic F re e P re s s began
to pick up a rtic le s from Hew York papers advocating a rep eal of
the re s tra in in g law s, and to follow the Hew York argum ent over
fre e banking w ith som e consistency*

However, the a sse rtio n by

som e h isto ria n s that ”the poor c rie d out a g ain st” the banks and
demanded fre e banking seem s both contradictory and c le a rly out of
line with the facts.

Although som etim es c a st in loco-foco argum ents,

21

M ichigan le g is la tu r e . Senate Journal, 1836, pp. I ll, 232-33?
M ichigan L eg islatu re. Senate Documents Accompanying the
Jo u rn al, ’'IS&S-SA,' #9. '
' ' ' ' ~r~"'......

22

M ichigan JLegislature. Senate Jo u rn al* 1836, p« 243? Bray
Hammond, Banks and P o litics in A m erica (P rinceton, Hew
Je rse y : P rin ceto n U niversity P re s s , 1957), p. 600.
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the th ru st for fre e banking in Michigan came m ainly from the
e n tre p re n e u ria l d e sire fo r extended cred it fac ilitie s.

This can

c le a rly be seen in the choice of a rtic le s rep rin ted in the D em ocratic
F re e P r e s s which was not h e sitan t in m aking c le a r its opposition to
loco-focoism .

Although some of these a rtic le s came from the Mew

York Fo$t, the m a jo rity re p re se n te d the en trep ren e u ria l elem ent
in the Hew York argum ent,

In general these papers w ere D em ocratic

but a rtic le s from Whig papers w ere often reprinted*

The em phasis

was on the rem oval of the re s tric tio n s which lim ited banking to the
in v esto rs excluding ”the sm all capitalist* * ♦that is the m echanic
with his $100* * **ft While the exam ple of English joint stock banks
was often looked to# supposed ’'a g ra ria n ” d istru st of banks
” t ypical” of the fro n tie r was com pletely absent*

The clo sest se n ti

m ents to the trad itio n al conception of Jacksonian ideas cam e from
M ason who continued to m outh anti-bank rhetoric*

In his m essage

of Jan u ary £* 1837# the "Boy G overnor” w arned against a m u ltip lica
tion of banks and bank p a p e rs ’ that would only aggravate unfavorable
conditions*

The Whig# D etroit Daily A d v ertiser for once ag reed

with M ason and urged that no banks be c h a rte re d a t the coming
session*

”We believe the people a re opposed to it*

--A s fo r the

im portunate beggars of privileges# ” wrote the Whig organ# !'th ere
is no satisfying them*

They m ust be refu sed f ir s t to last*

Too

22

m any banks have been granted already. ” 23
The clam o r for banks would not be stilled.

Bach new town,

w hether actually established o r m e re ly "on paper, Mdemanded
banking fac ilitie s.

F u rth e r demands cam e from the people deeply

indebted by speculative and developm ental e n te rp rise s who hoped
that additional banking re so u rc e s would provide relief.

"The public

seem ed imbued with the idea that to reliev e them from the galling
burden of indebtedness# and to re s to re activity and p ro sp e rity to
the bu sin ess w orld, nothing was needed but extensive bank issues* M
In Jan u ary the le g isla tu re was faced with eighteen req u ests fo r new
bank charters*

This c ris is in the leg islatu re c re a te d by a flood of

demands fo r banking privileges led to the passage of M ichigan’s
fre e banking law* ^

. ,,

On Jan u ary 18, 1837 Edw ard Ellis* one of the leading "con
se rv a tiv e ” Democrats* introduced a b ill ”te regulate banking
associationsV through the establishm ent of "a uniform and equal
system* ” The m ain debate on the b ill concerned the m inim um and
m axim um am ounts of capital*

B a rry , McDonell, and Calvin B ritain

23

D etroit D em ocratic F re e P r e s s * August 21* D ecem ber 14* 1836*
Jan u ary 19* January 25, 1837 in particular* the quotation is
fro m the Hew T ork Evening S tar re p rin te d in the D em ocratic
F re e . F rogs, D ecem ber 14* 1836$ Fuller* ed* * M essages* I, p* 200$
D etroit Daily A dvertiser* January 13*. 1837*

24

Belch, "E arly Banks and Banking in Michigan, " p. 11% for the
quotation? M ichigan L eg islatu re. House Journal, 1837, pp. 30,
39, 41, 45, 55, 58, 61, 65, 67, 73, 77, 86, 87, 108, 137, listed
in Gantz, f’A H istory of Banking L egislation, " p . 6, ftn. 3.

a ll hoped to keep the m inim um capital a t le a s t $15(1000.
pointed oat the possible political consequences.

B ritain

He argued that they

did not want to be accused of uoverw helm ing” the country with sm all
banks, for the people w ere not p rep a red for this.

John Clark,

H orace Comstock, and Jonathan Davis believed that banking should
be open equally to all a re a s and those that could not ra is e the
n e c e ssa ry $150, 000 capital should not be deprived of the advantages
of credit*

Davis went So fa r as to a s s e r t that a s long as the p roper

se cu rity was given th ere was no reaso n to lim it capital even to
$50, 000 a s was proposed*

C lark, supposedly a "conservative”

D em ocrat, favored sm all banks because they facilitated the b u sin ess of the fa rm e r and the mechanic*

"It is when a m an com m ences

in the w orld, " argued C lark, "th at he needs assistance* " He fu rth er
advocated a m axim um capitalisation of $100, 000 ra th e r than the
suggested $300, 000 in o rd e r to le sse n the tem ptation to corruption
25
by larg e e a s te rn cap ita listsi
The b ill which eventually becam e the M ichigan fre e banking
law was introduced into the House on January 2? by Edwin Lothrop*
a Kalam azoo D em ocrat who was C hairm an of the Com mittee on
Banks and Incorporations*

It easily passed the House on F eb ru ary 14

by a vote of th irty -n in e to four, the m ain opposition coming from
25

M ichigan L eg islatu re. Senate Journal, 1837, pp. 61, 90, 150,
158, 178; the debates a re in the Daily A d v ertiser, M arch 2* 7,
and 9, 1837.
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‘‘co n serv ative” D em ocrat Alpheus Felch, who fea red its inflationarycharacter*

V arious attem pts w ere m ade in the Senate by McDonell,

M oore, Hough, E llis, and B ritain to lim it b ills to denominations
above five d o llars, but a ll such efforts w ere defeated; and the
Senate eventually accepted the House b ill on M arch 8 by a vote of
fourteen to one.

26

The lone vote c a st against the b ill was that of John McDonell
a m em b er of the supposedly “ ra d ic a l” M ason-N orvell faction.

He

constantly advocated the establishm ent of a sta te bank with branches,
and believed the fre e banking law a “hazardous experim ent” that
could only succeed if lim ited to larg e banks with m ore than $150, 000
27
capital which w ere prohibited from issuing b ills under five dollars*
Thus, the fre e banking law of Michigan was p assed with
little d isse n t by a le g isla tu re in which, according to S tre e te r, “a
m a jo rity of the m em b ers w ere D em ocrats rep resen tin g poor and
rad ic al constituents* ” The only opposition cam e from individuals
within the D em ocratic p a rty who fea red the inflationary consequences
of the bill* As in the constitutional convention of 1835 no consistent
p arty o r factional v ariatio n could be seen in the voting, and such
26

M ichigan L eg islatu re. House Journal, 1837, pp. 144, 200-201,
217; M ichigan L egislature* Senate Journal, 1837, p. 245.

27

Daily A d v e rtiser, M arch 2, 1837.
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future anti-bank D em ocrats as B arry , and that supposed ,!loco loco, "
Kingsley Bingham lined up in favor of the law* 28
While the Monroe T im es hailed the a ct as a ♦'killer of all
m onopolies, " its passage was a foregone conclusion. The D em ocratic
F re e P r e s s , long an advocate of such legislation, p ra ise d the
passage of this "Im portant M easure. " When considering the accom 
plishm ents of the leg islatu re , it included the "general banking law"
which by "giving equal rig h ts and priv ileg es to a il in re g a rd to
banking, * .. will save thousands of d o llars which would otherw ise be
expended in legislating fo r the c re atio n of p a rtic u la r incorporations. "
However, it did not devote a g re a t deal of space to the endless
p ra ise th at often accom panied p arty v icto rie s in the new spapers of
this period.
tion.

Nor was the a c t vociferously condemned by the opposi

The Daily A d v e rtiser which had been ra th e r non-com m ittal

while the b ill was being considered, announced the b ill’s passage
to its re a d e rs in an a rtic le that differed little from that in the
JOemocratio F r e e .P re s s although it noted, "the associations thus ■
au th o rised a re fenced around with such re s tric tio n s a s m ay, and we
hope will se rv e for the se c u rity of the public. " In the sam e issue an
a rtic le ap p eared favoring the d e sire of the people to change the
New York banking sy stem to rem ove "monopoly and other political
28

S tre e te r, P o litic al P a rtie s in Michigan, p. 9? Hem ans, Life of
Stevens Thom son M ason, p. 274$ Felch, "JSarly Banks and
Banking in M ichigan, " p. 115*
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abuses which have grown up trader it, n and p raisin g the suggestion
of the Albany Argus to e stab lish a " GENERAL SA FFTt FUND LAW. M
This was in essence what had been p assed by the M ichigan le g is29
latu re.
The law which received M ason’s signature on M arch 15,
183? was a prim itiv e fo rm of fre e banking which F r its Redlich has
aptly term ed a " s o rt of land bank open to all* •* The m o st im portant
provisions of the a c t w ere that any twelve freeh o ld ers in any county
m ight organise a bank with a m inim um capital of $50* 000* th irty
p er cent of which had to fee paid in specie before com m encem ent of
operations*

Discounts and circu latio n w ere both lim ited to two and

one-half tim es paid in capital* and total lia b ilitie s w ere not to exceed
th re e tim es paid in capital*

D irecto rs w ere m ade personally liable

fo r a ll debts of the bank and stockholders liable for an amount equal
to the stock held*

On com m encing operation* the d ire c to rs of the

bank w ere to deposit with the Auditor G eneral m ortgages on re a l
estate located w ithin the state or the perso n al bonds of resid e n t f r e e 
h o ld ers equal to the am ount of p e rm issib le indebtedness of the bank*
|n o rd e r to provide fu rth e r secu rity all of the banks organized under
this law w ere to be subject to the Safety Fund law passed the
previous year*
29

What had been constructed for M ichigan was a

M onroe Times* F e b ru a ry 23* 183?* quoted in S tre eter, P o litical
P a rtie s in M ichigan, p. 33; D em ocratic F re e P re s s , M arch 15,
M arch 29* A pril 5, 183?; D ailyA dve r t i s e r , ' M arch '15, 1837.

2?

Safety Fund law open to all with a provision to supply added secu rity
in the fo rm of m ortg ages and p ersonal secu rity as c o lla te ra l to
be applied against the bank debts in ease of failu re.

30

H istorians have usually explained this law as a product of
the fro n tie r o r as an exam ple of the d ire c t tran sfe ren c e of ideas by
migration*

A m o re adequate explanation would be one that em phasises

both idealogical borrow ings and the demands of the situation*

F rom

a ll sides th© le g islatu re was bom barded with demands for m ore
banks, and individual actions on these re q u e sts would have created
a leg islativ e bottleneck that the new and sw iftly developing state
could ill afford*
It w as only logical that the idea of a g en eral banking law
such as that being agitated for in Hew York be proposed*

However,

th e re a re indications th at m o st of the le g isla tu re in M ichigan had
little faith that the "law s of tra d e " would provide adequate p ro 
tection against the "in secu rity " of the banking system*

Convinced

that it was the governm ent's duty to reg u late the cu rren cy in such a
way as to p ro tec t the people of the sta te , the le g isla to rs added to
the idea of a general banking law every safeguard popular a t the time*
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F ritz Redlieh, The Molding of A m erican Banking (New York:
H afner pLfblishing^^ompany, 1947), Il, pp. 203-204; Michigan
L aw s, 1837, pp. 76*88, su m m arized in 0antz, f,A H istory of
Banking L egislation, " pp. 8*-11*
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S tre e te r, P o litical P a rtie s in Michigan, pp. 33, 26; Redlich,
A m erican Banking, p. 203.’
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M ason had w arned that f*Every guard sh o u ld .. .b e thrown
a ro u n d .. , bank c h a rte rs , which m ay have a tendency to satisfy the
public m ind of the solvency of the institutions and of th e ir ability
to ren d e r th eir paper a t the w ill of the holder, " All of the standard
lim itatio n s w ritten into bank c h a rte rs a t the tim e w ere p resen t in
the new law.

Discounts and issu e s w ere lim ited, and rig id (although

not rig id enough) req u irem en ts concerning paid-in capital w ere
established.

D irec to rs w ere m ade liable fo r the bankfs debts, and

stockholders w ere m ade liable to the amount of th eir stock.

All

of the new banks w ere re q u ire d to join the Safety Fund, and thus
w ere placed under the periodic inspection of the bank com m issioner.
Finally, in line with the p ra c tic e s of other w estern and southern
sta te s and the suggestion m ade in the constitutional convention of
1835, fu rth e r se c u rity was req u ire d in the form of c o llate ral
m o rtg ag es and bonds.

Given the environm ent, in which land was

plenty and capital s c a rc e , and the revival of A m erican Mland banking"
in the eighteen thirties* it was only logical that this form of
se cu rity a lso be adopted*

Thus, the M ichigan fre e banking law

stands as an eclectic attem pt to supply adequate se cu rity once
popular dem ands and considerations of tim e forced the le g isla tu re to
give up individual ch arterin g of banks.
32
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F u lle r, e d ., M essages, % p. 201? on e a r lie r c h a rte r provisions
see Gantz, "A H isto ry of Banking, " pp. 2-3; fo r evidence on
le g is la to rs 1 conception of th eir duty see re m a rk s by C. B ritain
in Senate debate reco rd ed in the Daily A d v e rtiser, M arch 2, 1837.
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The econom ic c ris is which began to appear in the B ast
during the w inter of 1836*37 continued to mount throughout the next
spring and finally led to suspension of specie paym ents by the
E a s te rn banks in May.

Although som e o b se rv ers believed that the

W est m ight benefit fro m this* the close com m ercial and financial
rela tio n with Hew York fo rced M ichigan banks to quickly follow
su it in o rd e r to p ro tec t th eir specie holdings. In reactio n to news
of the Hew York suspension receiv ed the previous day, a public
m eeting in the D etroit City H all p resid ed oyer by the m ayor resolved
th at the banks should suspend and that a req u e st be m ade to the
governor and the le g isla tu re to m ake provisions fo r the existing
c ris is .

A com m ittee of the tow n's political and econom ic lea d ers

was estab lish ed to see the governor and urge a special se ssio n in
o rd e r to leg alize the suspension*

M ason responded by issuing a

p roclam ation calling fo r a special se ssio n of the le g isla tu re to
convene June 12* and by instructing the bank com m issioner to p r e 
p a re a detailed re p o rt on the s ta te ’s banks to be p resen ted to that
, . 33
body*
M ason opened his m essag e to the special se ssio n with an
an aly sis of the ’’tru e s o u rc e s” of ’’the p re se n t c r i s i s ” which was
fram e d in typical Jacksonian te rm s and placed the m ain responsibility
33

C harles B utler to C harles C. Trow bridge and Eton Farnsworth*
D ecem ber 19# 1836, and Eueius Dyon to C* C* Trowbridge* May 1*
1837* in C* C. T row bridge MSS. Homans* Id ie of Stevens
Thomson Mason* p. 287,• D em ocratic F re e Press* May 24, 1837*
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on "overbanking. " While a paper cu rren cy was a n e c e ssa ry con*
venience, it m ust not be allowed to too greatly exceed the m etallic
b ase.

The rem ed ies which he suggested for the country as a whole

w ere gradual c u rtailm en t of bank issues# curtailm ent of trade,
cessatio n of ''m ad investm ents'* in unproductive land, and a re tu rn
to fru g ality and "honest industry* "

However, he followed the

an aly sis with a recom m endation that the le g isla tu re sanction the
adm ittedly "hazardous" suspension of specie paym ents by M ichigan
banks for one year or until the New York banks resumed*

In line

with this req u est, he asked the le g islatu re to fo rce the Safety Fund
banks to accept each o th e r's paper during the suspension, to pro*
M bit the banks from selling th eir specie at a prem ium , and to
r e s tr ic t the issu e s to the "reaso n ab le" needs of the p u b lic

F u rth e r,

the bank com m issioner and the chancellor of the state should be
given u n re stric te d authority to close any institution violating these
provisions*

34

One can c le arly see why Thomas Cooley m ight wonder, "How
fa r the governor* in what he was saying* was expressing settled
convictions in his own mind* and how fa r he was m e re ly repeating
the c u rre n t talk in the political c irc le s to which he inclined* **; "
Defenders of M ason have answ ered that he should not be held
resp o n sib le for the "ra s c a lity and crim in ality " that w ere prevalent
34

F u ller, ed*, M essag es, I, pp* 308-212.
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a fte r the s us pens ion, but they have not resolved the illogic of the
m essag e.

If M ason believed, as he a sse rte d , that the c ris is

re su lte d from an excess of bank issu e s, why did he recom m end
leg islatio n that would re s u lt in the fu rth e r m ultiplication of banks
and bank issu e s ? T here

is one possible explanation that m ost

h isto ria n s have over-looked when considering the dilem m a of why
som e Jacksonians who opposed banks also supported general laws
which led to the m ultiplication of banks.

35

It is quite possible that they believed that com petition under
fre e banking would lead not to a m ultiplication of banks but a
lim itatio n of banks to the "few** demanded by the "reaso n ab le" needs
of trad e .

It m u st be rem em b ered that in England the laws

sanctioning the establishm ent of joint stock banks had led to ju st
such a d e c rea se in the num ber of banks} and it was often this exam ple
to which Jacksonians favoring general banking laws looked.

That

such ideas affected M ason is quite likely since in the previous y ear,
the D em ocratic F re e P re s s , the paper which supported the "Boy
C overnor, " prin ted an a rtic le from the Mew T ork P o st p raisin g the
E nglish jo int stock system a s a m odel for A m erican "Bank Reform* "
However, while this explanation m ight supply ideological
consistency to the position of a Leggett* it does not re a lly rem ove
35

Cooley, Michigan, p. 265; Hem ans, Life of Stevens Thomson
M ason, p. 292, defends Mason.
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D em ocratic F re e P re s s , August 21, 1836.
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the confusions from M ason's m essage.

This argum ent, in any form ,

assum ed, in fact depended upon, a rig id enforcem ent of specie
paym ents.

Mason would allow these to fee suspended.

It is in c o rre c t

to p re s e n t M ason and the faction he re p re se n te d as anything lik e
loco-focos of the L eg g e tt variety*

Individually they w ere alm ost

to the m an, "m en on the m ake. " M ason's fath er, John T. Mason,
was a spoilsm an, a speculator, and an entrepreneurs a typical
"D em ocrat fey trad e . " W illiam s combined his bank adventures with
the p resid en cy of an insurance company and larg e land speculations*
H early a ll of the le a d e rs of this group borrow ed heavily from the
Michigan State Sank, and m any w ere involved with other banks.

In

the le g isla tu re they w ere responsible fo r the fre e banking law and
when th at failed, they attem pted to e sta b lish a sta te bank*

They

also form ed the spearh ead for the gigantic in tern al im provem ents
policy undertaken in 1837* T h ere is nothing very " ra d ic a l" (in the
usual use of the term ) about this group although som e of them did
support unlim ited white m anhood suffrage in the Constitutional
Convention of 1835.

They m ight b e tte r be called by S tre e te r's

a lte rn a te term , ■'the office -holding fac tio n ."
37
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The John R. W illiam s p ap ers include a le tte r from his cousin
Thom as W illiam s concerning th e ir uncle (probably Joseph
Campau a leading D em ocrat), "You undoubtedly rec o lle ct his
m axim (d --m a poor man)* Take heed nephew s-•incur not the
d isp le a su re of your uncle, m ake m oneyt m ake it honestly if you
can but by a ll m eans m ake m oney! " Thomas W illiam s to J. R*
W illiam s O ctober 17, 1836, in John R. W illiam s, MSS.

While advocacy for suspension has traditionally been
connected with the Whig party, this was not the case in Michigan.
Not only did a Jacksonian governor propose the leg alisatio n of s u s 
pension but it was c a rrie d through an overwhelm ingly D em ocratic
House by a vote of th irty -se v e n to eight with even F elch and the
Speaker C harles Whipple* both of whom voted against the original
law* favoring Suspension*

The vote was m uch c lo se r in the Senate

w here Barry* Clark* and E llis failed to block its passage nine to
six.

The Calhoun County P a trio t, an avid.Jacksonian paper* reco m 

m ended allowing suspension* ^Although w e a re no g rea t frien d of
banks* and a re decidedly opposed to the substitution of a rag m oney
currency* yeti * *we believe that the Michigan banks a re as solvent
and as well conducted as those of any other system* * **” Thus*
the suspension b ill like the fre e banking a c t itse lf was the work of
Jacksoniansi and the only opposition to eith er cam e from the
^co n serv a tiv e ’1 faction of that party*

38

T here is little indication that sta te banking policy was a
field in which p a rty differences w ere e ith e r c le a r o r im portant.

The

opposing p re s s e s echoed th e ir party positions on national banking
questions, but showed few differences on state policies*

The

p o sitio n of the D em ocratic Free; P re s s was-som ew hat ambiguous.
38

M ic h ig a n 'le g is la tu re .,. Senate-Journal* Special Session, 1837,
p. 430? M ichigan L egislature* House Journal, E x tra Session,
1837, pp. 44* -455*: 4.61; Calhoun County P a trio t in D em ocratic
F re e P r e s s , June 28, 1837.
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B efore the suspension it favored rep e al of the Specie C ircu lar
a sse rtin g that* "It is one of the g re a te s t illusions of the day; to
suppose that the business of this country can be c a rrie d on prosper*
ously, without an extensive and w ell guarded paper currency* "
A fter the suspension* they acknowledged the wisdom of the m easu re
and tra c e d the c ris is to an excess of banks and the distribution bill.
"In re g a rd to our own banking institutions it is to be hoped that
while the le g isla tu re a cts w ith ju stic e and equity tow ards them it
w ill a t the sam e tim e take good c a re that the rights and in te re sts
of the people a re stifficiently protected* "

30

t h e Whig Daily A d v e rtiser c o n trasted on national policy,
but h ard ly differed on sta te policy.

E arly the Daily A d v ertiser

w arned of a crisis* but while a scrib in g it to overtrading and
speculation* the paper laid the blam e on Jackson’s "wild" m onetary
policies*

Although it attacked various D em ocratic sta te leg isla tu re s

for establishing m onie d’’m ons te r s 11 and causing an over “extension of
bank issues* it did not extend this c ritic is m to the sta te banking
policy of the local D em ocratic party*

In fact* it com plim ented the

sta te le g isla tu re on its w ork including the fre e banking law which it
believed to be the body’s leading accom plishm ent*

Following the

suspension* the Daily A d v ertiser suggested leg islatio n to sustain
banks and to se c u re safety to the public which was virtu ally that
39

D em ocratic Free, P re s s , May 3 and 24, 1837.

enacted by the D em ocrats in the special sessio n in 1837*

40

These general attitu des w ere reflected in the party p lat
fo rm s w ritten in late July and e arly August*

While each reflected

its party* s position on national policy, n either m entioned the state
banking question*

The g u b ernatorial election of 1837 brought the

bank issu e into state, politics* but in ways hardly consonnant with
the g en erally accepted in te rp retatio n s of the p a rtie s and state
banking.

The situation was confused by a factional split in the

D em ocratic party* and the fact that the Whig p a rty rea lly only
em erg ed a s a p o litical fo rc e a t this time*

41

The charges and counter charges concerning banks and
bank influence grew out of the argum ent betw een the p a rtie s over
national policy*

The Whigs charged the D em ocrats with destroying

the positive controls on over*expansion exerted by the national bank*
and calling fo r a specie c u rre n cy while a t the sam e tim e sanctioning
the v a st in c re a se in unstable state banks.

The D em ocrats re to rte d

with a ttack s on Biddle and the idea of a national bank* and the charge
th at the suspension was a v icto ry fo r the Whig policy of an i r r e 
deem able paper currency*

Both p a rtie s adm itted th at an ove r - expans ion

40

Daily A d v e rtiser, Jan u ary 13 and 27* F e b ru a ry 28, M arch 15 and
22* and May 1* 1837*
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The p latfo rm s a re re p rin te d in F&ul Randall, e d ., "G ubernatorial
P latfo rm s for the P o litical P a rtie s of M ichigan (1834-1864)"
(Unpublished M* A. T hesis, Wayne State U niversity, D etroit,
19371 pp. 18-13.
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of state banking had been an im portant cause of the c ris is , and each
trie d to blam e this situation on the opposition.

The Whigs usually

m ade th eir argum ent by pointing to the m any banks c h a rte re d by the
D em ocratically controlled le g isla tu re s, and the D em ocrats responded
by pointing to those le g isla tu re s w here the Whigs had c h a rte re d
banks.

T h e ‘Democrats* perhaps because they saw the w eakness of

th e ir position* shifted to the m ore tenable charge that even if banks
w ere c h a rte re d by the D em ocrats, it was the Whigs who w ere the
b an k ers and speculators*

T his eventually led to another round of

ch arg es and c o u n te rc h a rg e s concerning the political affiliations of
M ichigan bankers*

42

In o rd e r to re p e l D em ocratic charges that m ost bankers
w ere Whigs* the Daily A d v ertiser liste d the officers of M ighigan's
banks showing that twelve bank p resid en ts favored Mason while
only th re e favored C harles C* T row bridge the Whig candidate*
Among the c a sh ie rs eight w ere Democrats* four w ere Whigs, and
the affiliation-of-two was unknown*

The D em ocratic F re e P re s s

rep lied that this was another Whig lie since A ustin Wing* Sidney ICetchum
and lo h n Biddle along with "half a dozen m o re" w ere erroneously
nam ed as Democrats*

43
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These argum ents can be followed in the D em ocratic F re e P re ss
and the Daily ■Adve r tia er«
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The affiliation of bankers is in the Daily A d v ertiser, August 11,
1837, and the reb u ttal is in the D em ocratic F re e Press*
August 16, 1837.

Since such estim ations have had g rea t weight with h isto rian s,
som e com m ent on the m eaning of these changes is in o rd er.

The

Whig estim ate was that roughly sixty-nine per cent of the bankers
w ere D em ocrats.

The D em ocrats charged that this was false and in

re a lity fifty-five p e r cent of the banker® w ere Whigs*

Both se ts of

sta tis tic s tend to confirm only that being a banker had little to do
with a m an1s choice of party.

Further* the problem is com plicated

by the unstable political situation that existed.

Weither p arty wished

to claim John Biddle although he was popular with both p a rtie s .

The

tru th is that Biddle was consistently with neith er p arty a t this tim e.
A fter 1839 he was a Whig, and in 1834 he had run on the opposition
ticket, but in the constitutional convention and the f ir s t sen ato rial
contest, he proved his popularity among the D em ocrats and his
w illingness to cooperate with them* A careful reading of the
D em ocratic F re e P re s s (as the A d v e rtiser pointed out) Shows that
its ed ito r believed Biddle to be a D em ocrat in 1836* In the election
of 1837 he could be attacked by both p a rtie s because he ra n with
Edward E llis on the sp lin te r ” Jefferso n ian D em ocratic” ticket.
Finally, such sim ple tabulations do not even rev e al what they a re
supposed to show, nam ely the re la tio n of the p a rtie s to the financial
power of banking institutions*

W hatever one m ay consider Biddle,

he was a t the tim e p resid en t of the ”p et” whose stockholders w ere
m ainly D em ocrats.

38

On the other hand, while the stockholders of the Michigan
State Bank w ere m ainly Whigs* and its p resid en t was a Whig* it was
actually run by its D em ocratic c a sh ie r and was the ’’pet" of the
State ad m inistration.

N early every m ajo r D em ocrat borrow ed

heavily fro m this bank with a Whig presid en t,

A lim ited exam ination

of the stockholders of D etroit banks rev eals that "dem ocratic"
banks had Whig stockholders* and that D em ocrats invested in "Whig"
banks*

C e rtain nam es appear again and again re g a rd le ss of party.

In terestin g ly the Daily A d v e rtiser tabulation of the politics of
M ichigan bankers showed that in six of the twelve banks in which
p o litics of both p resid en t and c a sh ie r w ere known, the presid en t
was fro m one party and the cash ie r fro m the other*

This is not to

deny the existence of predom inantly D em ocratic or Whig banks, but
to a g re e with F ro fe ss o r H a rry Scheiber "that personal in te r-re la tio n s
of e n tre p re n e u rs and politicians in the ’Age of Jackson* com plicated
what a r e too often d escrib ed a s s tric tly political divisions. " In
M ichigan th ere was an e n tre p re n e u ria l group that invested in and
borrow ed heavily from banks.

Many of these men* perhaps a sizeable

m ajo rity , w ere affiliated w ith the D em ocratic party.
44
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Scheiber, "O eorge B ancroft and the Bank of Michigan, " p. 90.
H isto rian s wishing to find a quantitative m e a su re of influence have
too often accepted p a rte sa n charges as proof. Even F ro fe sso r
Scheiber accepts unque3tioningly the figures of Samuel M edary as
a m e a su re of Whig control of financial power {Harry N. Scheiber*
"The P e t Banks in Jacksonian P o litics and Finance, " Journal of
Econom ic H isto ry * XXHI / June, 1963/* p. 204.) F u rth e r system atic
exam ination m ay prove D em ocratic charges* but thus fa r this has
not been done.

The Whigs w ere to a degree responsible for making state
banks a po litical issu e , because they nom inated as th eir candidate
fo r governor, C harles C* Trow bridge, the p resid en t of the Bank of
Michigan*

The D em ocrats could and did ra is e the spector of bank

influence $ but they w ere forced to tre a d ra th e r lightly, because of
the g en eral banking law*

The d e m o c r a tic A d d re ss” chided over*

banking and attacked the Bank of the United States declaring, "Our
m otto in rela tio n to the c re d it system is, DET IT BE PRESERVED
and LET IT BE REFORMED*" Even though in the Special Session
a lim itatio n on the size of b ills had been defeated, the "A d d ress'1
advocated as one "refo rm " laws lim iting circu latio n to b ills over
five dollars*

A second "re fo rm " would be the passage of general

laws by a ll sta te s such a s the M ichigan law which the "A d d ress"
p ra ise d as a system "based upon the soundest p rin cip les, and which*
with such fu rth e r provisions fo r the public secu rity as experience
w ill soon suggest w ill re n d e r it the m o st safe and popular system of
banking th at has e v er been adapted* " As fa r as the opposing candidate
was concerned* the D em ocrats also had a problem*

They argued

th at his nom ination was co n sisten t with Whig veneration of the
in co rp o rated m onied power*

However, they also attacked Trow bridge

as an apostate D em ocrat who had backed Van R uren in 1836; and the
Whigs for bringing banks into politics*
45
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D em ocratic F re e .F re e s, August 9, 1837.
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Up to this point the Whigs had generally denied Dem ocratic
ch arg es and had attacked Jack so n 's policies.

They denied that

Whigs favored an irred eem ab le paper currency, and countered with
the a sse rtio n that Jackson favored an exclusive m etallic currency.
They attack ed "T o ry C onsistency" that talked against a m u ltip li
cation of banks and leg islated them into existence.

However, the

Whig p latform did not m ention the state banks o r the fre e banking
law.

46
The f i r s t attacks on the fre e banking law evolved out of

the argum ent concerning the inconsistency of D em ocratic rh e to ric
and policy that led the Whigs to point out unethical p rac tic es of
D em ocratic b an k ers.

In July the Dally A d v ertiser called attention

to the Pontiac Sank which it charged was run by Van B uren m en to
lend to its own. stockholders*

The Ann A rbor Journal noted the

defalcation of the -Alan A rbor Bank which was run by leading Demo
c ra ts saying* "T his standing in the dem ocratic ranks won't- redeem
th e ir b ills in circulation*" The Daily A d v e rtiser com m ented that
the Ann A rbor Bank was "the f ir s t fru its " of the fre e banking law
which had been p assed by a "T ory le g isla tu re and charged fraud
a g ain st the people by the " T o rie s" who ra n the bank.

In November

the- Daily A d v e rtiser attacked the opposition as "the Bag P arty "
46

Daily A d v e rtise r, May 27, July 28, August 12, 1837. The Whig
platfo rm is in Daily A d v e rtiser, August 7, 1837 and rep rin ted
in Randall, e d .» " g u b e rn a to ria l P latfo rm s, " pp. 8-10.
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questioning how the D em ocrats could say they opposed paper
cu rre n cy and supported the fre e banking law "which” now tends to
fill our state with m ise ra b le rags*" 47
The D em ocrats took these attacks as an opportunity to defend
the fre e banking law and attack th eir opponents as the a ris to c ra ts .
T heir argum ent was c le a rly m ade in an a rtic le "The A risto c ra cy vs.
the d e a e ra i Hank Daw" which argued that " F e d e ra lis ts " w ere
agitating a g ain st the law because its anti-m onopoly fe a tu re s did not
Suit "the organs and re ta in e rs of the m onied aristocracy* " The
existence of the fre e banks would drive down the value of bank stock*
p a rtic u la rly that of Trowbridge* the la r g e s t holder of such stock in
Michigan*

The " F e d e ra lis ts " Were the a ris to c ra ts and the p a rty of

monopoly} the D em ocrats w ere the p arty which favored "giving
equal rig h ts to a ll c la ss e s of investing th e ir capital in that branch
of b u sin ess which had been h ereto fo re m onopolised by the few* "
F a r fro m being anti-bank the D em ocratic p re s s hailed the e stab lish 
m ent of each new bank*

The Fontiac Hajance p raised the Bank of

Oakland as a tru e "anti-m onopoly bank" which would bring to the a re a lib e ra l discounts and prosperity*

Pontiac had th ree banks for

le s s than one thousand people* and the Balance proudly d eclared
"few e a s te rn villages can b o ast of like m eans of enterprise* " Sim ilar
47

Daily A d v e rtise r* July 28* August 22, Novem ber 2* and Novem ber
28, 1837| Ann A rbor Jo u rn al in the Daily A d v e rtise r, August 22,
1837.

statem en ts cam e fro m the D em ocratic papers all over the state*

The

Grand R iver T im es, the Constantine Republican, and the Ann A rbor
A rgus ail joined in welcoming new banks se t up under the "anti*
monopoly" law.

This affluent p ra ise was even extended to the m o st

fam ous of the "wild cats, ” the Bank of Brest} and ira te ed ito rials
ap p eared in the T ecum seh D em ocrat and the Pontiac Balance
defending the soundness of the banking system ag ain st Whig "libel, "

48

M ason and the D em ocrats won the election of 1837 by the
close m a rg in of 5l4 votes, but th is could hardly be term e d as a
v icto ry of " ra d ic a l11 prin cip les concerning banks.

Throughout the

election, they had stood fo r a m ultiplication of banks in every corner
of the sta te .

It would a lso be in c o rre c t to te rm the fre e banking

law victo ry fo r a new er se t of c ap ita lists over an older one*

By

th e ir own sta tis tic s , that probably re p re se n te d an absolute minimum}
forty^fxve p er cent of the o fficers of the s ta te 's c h a rte re d banks w ere
D em ocrats, and n e a rly every lead er of the p a rty was involved in
the M ichigan State Bank*

They used the anti-m onopoly argum ents to

attack not the c h a rte re d banks in general, but th e ir p olitical opponent
who happened to fee p resid en t of one of them .
48

It appears to have been

D em ocratic F re e P r e s s , Septem ber 6, 1837; Font lac Balance in
the D em ocratic F re e F r e e 3, Septem ber 20, and Septem ber 27,
1837; G rand R iver T im es in D em ocratic F re e F re e s , O ctober 11,
1837; Ann A rbor A rgus in D em ocratic F re e F re s s , D ecem ber 20,
1837; Constantine Republican in D em ocratic F re e P r e s s , Jan u ary
17, 1838; T ecum seh D em ocrat in D em ocratic F re e F re ss^
Novem ber 8, 1837.
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a selectiv e use of p arty sym bolism ra th e r than actual attack by one
econom ic group upon another.

Nor can the Whigs be considered

defenders of the c h a rte re d banks.

They attacked D em ocratic banks

w hether c h a rte re d o r organised under the fre e banking law.

In

g en eral they m aintained a ra th e r consistent, position throughout 1837
urging m oderation in the creatio n of new banks.

A th ird party in

the 1837 ra c e could be m istakenly in te rp reted as a pro-bank "con
se rv a tiv e ” faction of the D em ocratic party like that in New York.
However* this was not the case.

While the group included Biddle*

John A. Wells* John &♦ W illiam s, and <3mliea Brown all of whom
w ere involved in.banks, its ticket was headed by Edward E llis, one
of the m en who had constantly voted like a "loco-foeo" in the
M ichigan Senate.

The Whig P re s s attacked this group as "loco-

focos, " while the D em ocratic P re s s called them "Whigs* " and they
r e fe rre d to them selves as "Jefferso n ian D em ocrats, " "Mechanics* "
o r "C o n serv ativ es/! While they certain ly w ere not mechanics* there
seem s to be little evidence to substantiate the charge that they w ere
financed by the .Whigs*

P robably they rep re se n te d resen tm en t

a g ain st the control of the p a rty by the M ason-M orvell faction.
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Democratic* F re e P re s s August 9, Septem ber 6, and November 8,
1837; 'Daily A’d ybrii's^rT May ?,?, July 28* August 16* and October
and Novem ber issu e s contain num erous re fe re n c e s to "E llisites* "
H em ans, Idfe of Stevens Thomson M ason, pp. 303-304, argues
that " E llis ite s " w ere financed by Whigs to sp lit the D em ocratic
vote. While this is certain ly quite possible, the evidence he gives
is v ery weak and hardly proves that the "E llisite s" v/ere not
what they said they w ere, opponents of the office-holding faction.

During the 1830* s, even a fte r Jackson10 defeat of the Bank of
the United States, th ere was v ery little opposition to state banking in
the Old N orthw est and the e n tre p ren e u ria l s p irit was dominant.
E very portion of that a re a joined in the demand for banking facilities.
N either p a rty was immune although th ere was a tendency fo r those
opposed to banks to congregate in the D em ocratic party.

B efore

1837 th is group was a m in o rity w ithin the p arty and the section.
Although the experiences of the 1820*s would have dictated d istru st
of bankSi " a g ra ria n ” sentim ents did not reap p ear until the political
and econom ic situation was a lte re d by the Panic of 1837 and the
d ep ressio n which followed in its wake.

CHAPTER II

PARTY PERCEPTION OF THE PANIC OF 1837

The Panic of 1837 and the subsequent d ep ressio n signifi
cantly a lte re d the attitudes tow ard hanks as each p a rty read its
own m eaning into the co urse of events. In o rd e r to exonerate
Jackson, the D em ocrats found it n e c e ssa ry --a n d logical given the
rh e to ric of t h e "Bank W ar"--to blam e the n ation's banking system
fo r the c ris is . The Whigs developed a c o n tra ry in terp retatio n of
the cau ses of the c ris is which em phasized Ja ck so n 's responsibility.
These in terp retatio n s originated with the national le a d e rs of the
party, but soon sp re a d to the Old N orthw est w here they form ed the
b a sis for the subsequent debate over banking in the sta te s.
In p ra c tic a lly ev ery sta te the banking boom was actively
aided by Jacksonians, and it was an unintended consequence of
Jack so n 's policy*

A larm ed by the e x ce sse s to which this policy had

given r is e , Jackson and his subordinates moved in the m id-1830's
to r e s tr a in the expansion and paper issues*

In 1834 C ongress p ro 

hibited governm ent agents fro m m aking disbursem ents in c u rren cy
th at was le s s than p ar value.

The following y e ar the T re a su ry

estab lish ed a policy of accepting no b ills under five d o llars fo r land
p u rch ases and indicated that in the future this prohibition would be
extended to b ills under ten dollars*

In 1836 governm ent d isb u rse 

m ents w ere lim ited to b ills over ten d o llars and M arch 3, 1837 was
s e t as a date at which this would be ra is e d to include all b ills
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under twenty do lia r 3.
In his annual m essage a t the end of 1836 Jackson p raised
this leg islation along with those state laws which elim inated sm all
notes for " re sto rin g to the country the sound cu rre n cy provided fo r
in the Constitution* ” He hoped that future salutory leg islatio n of
this type would be forthcom ing from both C ongress and the States.

2

Most im portant of the actions taken during these y e a rs to
lim it the expansion of the banking system and place the fed eral
governm ent’s tran sactio n s on a specie b asis was the Specie C ircu 
la r issu ed by S e c re ta ry of the T re a su ry Levi Woodbury on July 16,
1836* This provided that public lands m u st be paid for in eith er
gold o r silver*

In this way "frau d s” and "the monopoly of the

public la n d s” would give way to settlem en ts by "actual S ettlers, ”
and "the ruinous extension of bank issu es and c re d its ” upon which
speculation was based would be discouraged.
1

Jackson p ra ise d the

Scheiber, ”The P e t Banks in Jacksonian P o litics and Finance,
1833-1841, ” pp. 196-214, is an in terestin g and m is-n am ed analysis
of Jacksonian financial policies, ft, along with George Rogers
T aylor, The T ran sp o rtatio n Revolution 1815-1866, Vol. IV of
The Econom ic H istory of the United States, e d ,, ' H enry David,
et al. (10 'v o ls.''j Hew Y ork:1 Holt "Rinehart “and Winston, 1945-),
ppT*338-34S; Reginald C harles M cGrane, The Panic of 1837
(Chicago; The U niversity of Chicago P re s s , 1924), and R ichard
T im berlake, ”The Specie C irc u la r and the D istribution of the
Surplus, ” Journal of P o litical Economy, LXVIIX (A pril, I960),
pp. 109-11?, fo rm s the b a sis of m y analysis of the panic.

2 Jam es D. R ichardson, e d ., A Com pilation of the M essages and
P a p e rs of the P re sid e n ts (Washington; By A uthority of C ongress,
1900), m , pp. 236-260.
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Specie C ircu lar in D ecem ber:
it checked the c a re e r of the W estern banks and gave
them additional stren g th in anticipation of the p re s su re
which has since pervaded our E a ste rn as w ell as
European com m ercial cities* 3
Jackson did not note the ad v erse affects of the C ircu lar.
It had caused an in cre ased demand fo r specie in the in te rio r w here
the land offices could only be supplied by withdrawing specie from
the e a s te rn financial c en ters.

This d rain on the e a ste rn banks cam e

a t a tim e when they faced an unfavorable international situation.
England, A m erica’s m ain creditor* had undergone a banking expansion
sim ila r to th at of the United States*

As loans increased, a drain

on the gold re s e rv e of the Bank of England forced that institution
to ra is e its discount ra te in July, 1836, to 4 1/2%.

Eventually the

Bank m oved to c u rta il the activ itie s of the joint stock banks that
w ere deeply involved in the purchase of A m erican b ills.

This m ight

have caused little a la rm had it not been for the exceedingly larg e
balance of trad e th at had turned ag ain st the United States at this
tim e.

The boom of the th irtie s led to in cre ased purchases of

foreign goods by A m ericans; and the m ania fo r in tern al im prove*
m ents Hooded the E nglish m a rk e t with State bonds*

At the sam e

tim e g ra in cro p s, which m ight have balanced th is m ovem ent of goods
3

Ibid. , p. 249* The Specie C ircu lar is re p rin ted in H enry Steele
C om m ager, 'ed.-, Documents of A m erican H igfory (New York:
A ppleton#Century*Crofts, Inc*, 1949 fifth e d .), p. 283.

and capital, w ere so poor that wheat actually had to be im ported in
1836.
The Specie C ircu lar thus acted in two ways to bring on
the panic of 1837* It weakened e a ste rn banks at a tim e when the
international situation placed them under a sev ere s tra in disrupting
no rm al banking a rran g em en ts.

M ore im portant, the C ircu lar con

trib u ted to a general public d istru st of banks and fragm ented m utual
confidence w ithin the banking community.

In the W est, fa r from

strengthening the banks by giving them a b ro ad e r specie b a sis,
the C irc u la r stru c k a t the b a sis of bank circulation! the belief that
the notes would be a cc e p te d a t the land offices*

4

The problem s of the banks, both e a s te rn and w estern, w ere
accentuated by the Deposit Act of 1836 which proposed a distribution
of the su rp lus revenue of the fed e ral governm ent to the sta te s for
safekeeping*

At the tim e this a c t was passed, the stru c tu re of the

A m erican banking sy stem was inadequate to m ake the n e c e ssa ry
tra n s fe rs from the W est, w here revenues from land sa les w ere
collected, to the populous sta te s of the Bast; and within that section
fro m the co m m ercial cen ters to banks in m ore ru ra l areas*
4

The

Moat h isto ria n s like M cGrane and Taylor have acknowledged the
im portance of the Specie C ircu lar; however, T im ber lake, "The
Specie C irc u la r and the D istribution of the Surplus, " pp. Ill, 117,
disputes this. Scheiber, "The P et Banks, " and C a rte r H.
Golembe, "State Banks and the Economic Development of the
West, " (Unpublished Ph. D. D issertation, Columbia U niversity,
1952) uphold the trad itio n al view.

49

governm ent responded by trying to keep in tersectio n al tra n s fe rs to a
m inim um and was p a rtia lly successful.

However, enough specie

was m oved to cause a sev ere decline in re s e rv e s and a general con
tra c tio n was the re su lt. ^
The Deposit Act had been passed by a coalition of Whigs and
D em ocrats ag ain st the advice of Jackson and Woodbury and tended
to stim u late state investm ents in internal improvements*

Hoping

to aid Van B uren in the W est w here the b ill was popular Jackson
refu sed to veto it, but he p resen ted his objections to it in his
D ecem ber m essage*

His opposition was b ased on s tric t construction

of the constitution* s ta te s ’ rights* and an abhorrence of the m o ral
consequences of a national debt*

He showed little o r no aw areness

of the question of the tra n s fe rs o r the degree to which the w estern
banks w ere hurt*

Jackson m u st have been aw are of the problem*

because Chief Ju stic e Roger B. Taney had w ritten to him in October
th at the m e rc a n tile community* which was indebted to the deposit
banks* had been h u rt when these banks w ere forced to call th eir
loans to m ake the tra n s fe rs of governm ent deposits*

Taney also

added th at the m e rc a n tile c la ss e s would foolishly blam e Jackson’s
policies when it was in re a lity th eir own folly that brought on distress*
“The c u rre n c y w ill however be alw ays liable to these ruinous fiuctu5

T im berlake, ’’The Specie C irc u la r and the D istribution of the
Surplus, ’’ pp. 114*16, is a convincing analysis of the effect of the
d istribution. See also dolem be, “ State Banks and Economic
Development, ” pp. 207-209*

so
afcions while it continues to fee of paper, and nothing will cure the
evil h u t the success of your g re a t plan of resto rin g the C onstitutional cu rre n cy of Gold and silv e r. "

6

With the whole financial stru c tu re suffering under the
sev ere stra in s Brought on fey the Deposit Act, the Specie C ircu lar,
and the policies of the Bank of England; the collapse of the cotton
m a rk e t in e arly 1837 led to the com m ercial and financial panic
which p recip itated the suspension of specie paym ents fey the nation*s
banks in May of the y ear.
Although New O rleans and New York w ere h ard hit in 1837,
and b u sin ess was dull everyw here, a g ric u ltu ral a re a s and som e
m anufacturing a re a s w ere not badly-hurt. ■1838 saw conditions
im proving, and a resum ption b a se d on B ritish c re d it which was
again expanding.

However, the situation w orsened in 1839* A

re v e rs a l of E nglish c re d it policies* and the failu re of the attem pt of
the Bank of the B aited States to "peg" sagging cotton p ric e s led to
a second suspension of specie paym ents in October 1839.

D epression

had come to sta y and during the next four y e a rs, the whole economy
experienced one of the m o st se v e re setbacks in A m erican history*
6

R oger R. Taney To Jackson, October 27, 1836* in John Spencer
Bassett* e d ., C orrespondence of Andrew Jackson (Washington,
D. C .: C arnegie Institution of Washington, 1931), V* pp. 431-32.
R ichard M. Johnson to Jackson, June 21, 1836, Ib id ., indicates
th ere w ere m any D em ocrats who favored the act. See also
Thomas H art Benton, T h irty Years* View (New York: D. Apple
ton and Company, 1854), I, p. 658.
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Such financial d is a s te rs inevitably give ris e to conjecture
as to th e ir cau ses, and the d epression from 1837 to 1843 was no
exception.

The keenest com m entators of the day, including Biddle,

tended to em phasise the effect of the Bank of England*s c re d it
policies while they blam ed Jacksonian policies to a le s s e r o r g re a te r
degree in line with th eir general economic beliefs.

One such

individual, C harles F ra n c is Adam s, who voted for F an B uren in
1836, and who would la te r becom e a le a d er of the " re fo rm 1* elem ent
in the Whig and Republican p a rtie s, presen ted a relativ ely non
p a rtis a n analysis*

The c ris is of 1837 was, according to Adams,

the re s u lt of capital borrow ed from Europe*

This could only have

been handled adequately if the country w ere fre e from the burden
of a v a st speculative debt caused by an undue expansion of the state
banking system s*

Concerning the resp o n sib ility of the P re sid e n t

he wrote*
P erh ap s I m ay be in grievous e r r o r $ but to m e
G eneral Jackson ap p ears highly responsible* not fo r
the p re s e n t state of things, inasm uch as in this
trading country it is always m ore or le s s likely to
happen, but for the defenseless condition into which
the governm ent of the Union* in tru sted to him for
v ery different ends, has been thrown by it* It was
the voluntary w ithdraw al of the beneficial influence
of the national power over c u rren cy which threw
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away a ll control over p riv ate and corporate
cupidity* for which he m u st answ er. 7
However# m o st contem porary analyses w ere not as
balanced as that of Adamsj and two conflicting conceptions of the
Causes of the dep ressio n w ere advanced by the p a rtie s contesting
fo r power*

The Whigs had been warning that such a convulsion

would be a re s u lt of Jacksonian financial policies, in p a rtic u la r the
d estru ctio n of the Bank of the United States.

They successfully

exploited the issu e , laying the blam e fo r the d ep ressio n en tirely
on Jack so n ’s policies, and joining in a call fo r a national bank of
som e sort*

U sually they in te rp re te d th eir e le c to ra l su ccess as

repudiation of the policies of the D em ocrats.

On the other hand,

the D em ocrats defended the P re sid e n t’s policies and w ere forced
to fall back on a vague g en eral theory of business cycles which laid
the blam e on the speculative expansion of banks*

This in te rp re 

tation had been offered by W illiam Deggett and the loeo-focos of
New York in u m o ra l te rm s w ell suited to explain political defeats
7

G. F* Adams* F u rth e r R eflections Upon the State, of the C urrency
of the United sta te s (Bostons W illiam D* Tieknor, 18371, p. 5j
D eonard C. Hilderman* N ational .and State Banks s. A Study of
th e ir O rigins (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company* 19311,
pp, 2-8. M artin B. Duberman, C harles F ra n cis Adams 1807 1886 (Boston; Houghton M ifflin Company, 1961), pp. 56-61, '
a rg u e s th at Adam s was connected with n eith er p arty and that
his com m ents on the c ris is “countered’* p a rtisa n a sse ssm e n ts
of Jackson. While the b asic argum ent of the pam phlet shows
Adams to hold econom ic ideas that would be m o re eom fortable
among Whig® in the 1840’e, Duberm an is esse n tia lly c o rre c t.
The tone of “F u rth e r R eflections” differs g reatly from con
tem p o rary p a rtisa n pieces.

as the re s u lt of "bank influence” and corruption, ®
Both p a rtie s a s s e rte d that th ere was som e evil agent
co rrupting the p roper functioning of the econom ic system .

F or

the D em ocrats, it was the ”bank sp e c u la to rs” who sought to control
the supply of c u rren cy and to expand and c o n tra ct it fo r th eir own
advantage.

F o r the Whigs, Jack so n 's policies had been like ’’setting

a B lacksm ith to mending a watch with a sledge ham m er.
The D em ocratic conception of the causes of the " d is tr e s s ”
m ight be tra c e d to Condy Raq uet, W illiam Gouge o r Leggett, but
its m o st im portant and influential exponent was Jackson himself*
Taney had urged Jackson to attack the re c k le ss expansions of the
"paper m aking co rp o ratio n s and sp ecu la to rs;" and both the "F arew ell
A d d re ss” in M arch, 1837, and Jackson’s annual m essage in Decem ber
8

The debate on the resp o n sib ility of Jackson’s policies for the
d e p ressio n was rec en tly revived by two econom ists, b asically
in te re s te d in using the question to advocate th e ir own th eo retical
hypotheses. G eorge M aeesich, "Sources of M onetary D isturb
ances in the United States, 1834-1845, ” Journal of Economic
H isto ry , XX (Septem ber, 1960), pp. 407-26 arg u es that the
p rim a ry so u rce of the d e p ressio n was external. His th eo retical
m odel and resu ltin g conclusions a re attacked by Je ffrey G.
W illiam son, "International T rade and United States Economic
Development: 1827-1843, ” Jo u rn al of Econom ic H isto ry , XXI
(Septem ber, 1961), pp. 372-83. M aeesich attem pts an answ er,
"International T rade and United States Econom ic ^Development
R evisited, " Ibid. , pp. 384-5, W illiam son has m uch the b e st
of the argum ent.

9

W illiam W oodbridge to W illiam L. Woodbridge, May 19, 1837,
W oodbridge MSS.
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of the previous y e ar stru c k out a t the evils of the “paper system . ”
While co rru p tio n and political danger of the Bank of the United
States w ere emphasized* a ll banks received the P re sid e n t’s censure
as agents harm ful to the in te re s ts of the producing classes* “under
m ining the p u rity and com plicating the sim plicity of our virtuous
Gove r nme nt . .

His annual m essag e Set fo rth the indictm ent of

p aper issuing banks in its c la ssic form :
When thus, by the depreciation in consequence of
the quantity of paper in circulation, wages as well
as p ric e s becom e exorbitant* it is soon found that
the whole effect of the ad ulteration is a ta riff on our
home industry for the benefit of the countries w here
gold and silv e r c ircu late and m aintain uniform ity and
m o deration in prices* It is then perceived that the
enhancem ent of the p ric e in land and labor produces a
corresponding in c re a se in the p ric e of products
until th ese products do not su stain a com petition
w ith sim ila r ones in other countries, and thus
m anufactured and a g ric u ltu ra l productions cease to
b e a r exportation fo r the cost* This is the p ro cess
by which specie is banished by the paper of the
banks* T heir vaults a re soon exhausted to pay for
foreign commodities* The next step is a stoppage
of specie p ay m e n t--a total degredation of paper as
c u rre n c y --u n u su a l d ep ressio n of prices* the ruin
of d eb to rs, and the accum ulation of p ro p erty in the
hands of c re d ito rs and cautious capitalists* 10

ID R oger B* Taney to Jackson O ctober 27* 1836, in B a ssett, e d .,
Jacksbn C orrespondence, V, pp* 431-32} Richardson* ed* *
M essages and P a p e rs of the P re sid e n ts, HI, pp* 236-260*
292-308} the b rie f quotations fro m Jackson to R oger B* Taney*
O ctober 13, 1836, in B a sse tt, ed*, Jackson C orrespondence, V*
p. 430, and the longer one is fro m Richardson* 111* p* 2481
On g e n eral th eo ries concerning banking and the busin ess cycle
a t th is tim e see: H arry 32. M iller, Banking T heories in the
United S tates B efore I860 (Cam bridge, M ass: H arv ard U niversity
P r e s s , 1927), pp. 55-70, 187-208.

P erso n ally , Jackson ’s anim osity to Banks and the paper
sy stem was on a le s s sophisticated level*

The suspension and the

d ep re ssio n itse lf w ere p a rt of the conspiracy by the m onied in te re sts
led by Biddle to control the governm ent in their own in te re s ts and to
underm ine tru e Republicanism .

In tnid*1837 he w rote to his friend,

the Jacksonian ed ito r of the Cincinnati A d v e rtiser, M oses Dawson,
"ts it p ossible that any tru e republican of talents and experience
can have confidence in Banks as a safe rep o sito ry of the public
revenue a fte r w itnessing th e ir late t reach ero u s conduct to the govern*
m ent joining in league with Biddle and the B earings to B ankrupt the
governm ent, degrade its c h a ra c te r, both a t home and a b ro a d .. . . “
The only p ro p er regulation of the c u rre n c y could come from ?,a
11

s tr ic t specie policy.11

Although Van B uren h ardly m entioned Banking in his
Inaugural, he s e t fo rth the official p a rty position on the causes of
the d e p re ssio n in his Septem ber 4, M essage to the special se ssio n
of C ongress.

Van B uren asserted* Hthe p re se n t condition is chiefly

to be a ttrib u te d to overaction in a lt departm ents of b u sin e ss-* a n
o veraction deriving* perhaps, its f ir s t im pulses from antecedent
11

John J. Whealen* e d ,, "The Jackson*Dawson C orrespondence, '*
B ulletin of the H isto ric a l and Philosophical Society of Ohio*
XVI (January, 1958), 'pp**_3*So!,' The quotation is fro m Jackson
to Dawson* August 31, 1837, pp. 9*10* Other Jacksonian
e d ito rs had sim ila r exchanges with Jackson* for an exam ple
see the le tte rs to and fro m F ra n c is P. B lair in B assett, e d .»
Jack s on C or respondence, V, pp. 474*479.
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Causes, but stim ulated to its destructive consequences by excessive
issu e s of bank paper and by other fac ilitie s for the acquisition and
enlargem ent of credit* ” "Eedundaney of c re d it” and the s p irit of
speculation which it engendered led to an in creased foreign debt,
unwise investm ents in "unproductive public lan d s11 a t inflated
p ric e s, 11im provident" expenditures of "im m ense su m s” on internal
im provem ents, "the diversion to the p u rsu its of m uch of the labor
th at should have been applied to a g ric u ltu re ” m aking it n e ce ssa ry
to im p o rt grain, "and finally, *. ♦the rap id growth among all
c la s s e s , and especially in our g rea t co m m ercial towns of luxurious
habits founded too often in m ere ly fancied wealth, and detrim ental
alike to the industry, the re s o u rc e s, and the m o ra ls of our people*11IE
Van B ureips m essag e was m ildly worded and fa r from an
anti-bank d iatrib e, but he p resen ted a ll of the them es that w ere
c u rre n t in the D em ocratic literature*

B usiness fluctuations* in

g en eral, and the Panic of 1837, in p a rtic u la r, w ere viewed as the
re s u lts of the p aper m oney system*

Banks in th e ir g reed for

p ro fit expanded c re d it beyond a "n atu ra l” amount*

This led to a

g en eral r is e in the p rice level which engendered a false sense of
wealth*

The re s u lt was an in cre ase in the s p irit of speculation

which underm ined habits of thrift*

Once this had happened, the

m o ra l fib e r of society, was weakened* fo rm e rly virtuous young m en
12

Hi ch ar da on, e d ., M essages and P a p e rs of P re sid e n ts, IE*
pp. 334*346, the quotations a re from pp. 325, 336.
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left the p ro fessions of th e ir fath ers for the im provident life of the
sp ecu lato r and developed luxurious taste s that could only be s a tis 
fied by the products of a depraved Europe.

This caused a d ecrease

in the basic products of the United States and an adverse balance of
trad e which led to the withdraw al of specie and eventually economic
e m b a rra ssm e n t.
In each of the sta te s of the Old N orthwest, the D em ocratic
p re s s and the D em ocratic politicians developed the Jacksonian
view of the d ep ressio n although it som etim es led them to strange
contradictions.

In M ichigan, w here the .D em ocrats w ere intim ately

connected with banks and m ultiplication of banks re su lta n t from the
fre e banking act* the im m ediate reactio n of the p arty of Jackson was
to absolve the P re s id e n t’s policies by blam ing the ''p re se n t pecuniary
e m b a rra ssm e n t" on the p p irit of speculation fo ste re d by "the
excessive issu e s of paper m oney" by the banks, and to call for a con
tinuation of the ad m in istrativ e attem pts "to introduce a g re a te r amount
of specie into our circulating m edium . ” G overnor Mason had warned
ag ain st /overbanking in January, and in this m essage to the ex tra
se ssio n of the le g isla tu re in June, he a sc rib e d the " c ris is of the
m oneyed a ffa irs of the country" to the "one fatal e r r o r into which the
country has fa lle n .. *overbanking. "
13

13

The 1837 D em ocratic state platform is re p rin ted in Randall,
e d ., "G ubernatorial P latfo rm s, " pp. 10-11; F u ller, e d .,
M essages, I, pp. 200-212, the quotation is on p. 209.
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The D em ocratic F re e P re s s p raised the opening of the new
banks and attacked the Whig ’’panic m akers*1 in late 1836 and early
1837. On May 10* 1837 the paper som ewhat p rem atu rely announced
that the panic, which it believed had been caused by overtrading,
speculation, and the distrib u tio n bill, was over.

While continuing

to defend the state*s banks and p a rtic u la rly those se t up under the
fre e banking act, the D em ocratic F re e P r e s s slowly shifted its ground.
By m id -su m m e r it a s s e rte d "that a ll sagacious m en of both p a rtie s
have long been anticipating the difficulties in the m oney m ark et,
in consequence of the unwise leg islatio n of C ongress and the states
in re g a rd s to banking, ** In e a rly June the paper printed a re p o rt
of the D em ocratic m em b ers of the Hew York le g islatu re denying
the Whig ch arg es that the veto of the Bank of the United States and
the specie c irc u la r w ere responsible for the panic*

The re p o rt

blam ed o v ertrading, speculation, the heavy foreign debt* and the
m e a su re s of the Bank of England.

The following m onth a discussion

of the cau ses of the panic p resen ted the stan d ard dem ocratic in te r
p re ta tio n em phasising overtrading, overbanking, speculation in
land, and the d istrib u tio n of the b ill which caused specie to be locked
in sta te tr e a s u rie s and forced the state banks to co n tract.

Through

out the y ear attack s on Biddle and his "wild eat*1 bank w ere printed,
and attem pts w ere m ade to a sso c iate the Whigs with those banks
m o st resp o n sib le fo r the c ris is .

Both the D em ocratic F re e P re s s

and the C onstantine Republican w ere forced to adm it that the

D em ocrats played an active ro le in granting bank c h a rte rs.

However,

they both argued that the Whigs m ade up a larg e proportion of the
bank m en and sp ecu lato rs s ince they w ere wealthy m en while the
D em ocrats w ere fa rm e rs and workingm en.

“The tru th i s , 11

a s s e rte d the D em ocratic F re e P re s s , "the s p irit of stock-gam bling
and d esp era te speculation, in which the Whig a ris to c ra c y have
borne the p rin cip al sh a re , has been alm ost the exclusive cause of
the m u ltip lication of W orthless local banks without specie capital,
and without any substantial b a sis, fo r securing public confidence,
14
on prom pt redem ption of th e ir b ills. H
Much the sam e p ro c e ss o c cu rred in the other states* but
in no oth er was the D em ocratic situation so ambiguous*

Although

th ere was a sizeable faction of the Ohio Dem ocracy that was a n ti
bank in the thirties* the party, in general, had supported state
banking and m o st of the c h a rte rs fo r Ohio banks w ere secu red from
D em ocratic legislatures*

N onetheless, the p a rty accepted the

Jack so n ian in te rp re ta tio n of the causes of the panic*

In January

the D em ocratic m eeting of Delaware county blam ed the d ep ressio n
on the Bank of the United S tates and the sta te banks*

Two m onths

la te r the Ohio Statesm an re p rin te d an a rtic le from the Globe,
14

.Democratic. F re e ,.P re s s , Jan u ary 25, May 10, May 24, May 31,
June 7, Juhe 14, June 25, July 5, July 12, 1837, and the
C onstantine Republican re p rin te d in the D em ocratic F re e P r e s s ,
July 26, 1837, show the developm ent of the argum ent. The
quotations a re fro m the issu e s of June 14 and July 5.
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"D em ocratic C reed in R elation to Banks# State and National, ” which
blam ed the sta te banks fo r the depression.

In his annual m essage

in 1839, G overnor W ilson Shannon alienated the loco-foco faction
of his p a rty by his friendly attitude toward banks, but he presented
the p arty position on the causes of the c ris is .

An adverse balance

of paym ents resu ltin g fro m "the overgrow n system of banking"
that m ultiplied cu rre n cy beyond "the re a l busin ess wants of the
com m unity" and drove up dom estic p rice s m aking im portation
favorable*

The following y ear he fu rth e r developed this to include

the Standard argum ents concerning the relatio n betw een paper money
and speculation* unnecessary debts, and extravagance*

He em pha

sized the im portation of b rea d stuffs in 1836 by which the United
States was "m ade trib u ta ry to Europe for the n e ce ssitie s of life by
m eans of this artificial* an ti-A m erican system *" A paper cu rren cy
m ade a ta riff u se le ss and acted as a bounty to foreign m anufacturers
"thus operating so ass to prom ote the in te re s t of the foreign m anu
fa c tu re r a t the expense of our own* " Thomas W* B artley, who
se rv ed out Shannon1& second term* and was w ell liked by the locofoco faction of the p arty echoed this in terp retatio n in 1844* 15
15

Qhlo S tatesm an, Jan u ary 3, 1838; W ashington Globe rep rin ted
in the Ohio Statesm an, M arch 14, 1838; D ocum ents.. .o f the
State of Ohio* 1839, Document #1; Documents*. . of the State
of Ohio, ■1841, - Document #1; D ocum ents:. . of the State of Ohio,
1845, Document #1*
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Through this period the leading Jacksonian editors presented
Jack so n ’s in te rp retatio n of the depression to the people and attem pted
to a sso c iate the Whig p arty with the banks,

The Newark Advocate

charged th at ’’the Banks a re Whig children?” and the Ohio Statesm an
r e f e r r e d to G overnor Vance and his a sso c iates as a ’’knot of
B ankers, ” To prove these charges the editor of the Statesm an com 
puted that of 405 b a rk officials in the state# 341 w ere Whigs and
only 64 w ere D em ocrats,

16

In Illinois m uch the sam e p a ttern was repeated.

’’Dong

John” W entworth’s Chicago D em ocrat connected the banks with
the crisis# and the Whigs w ith the banks*

Governor Thom as C arlin

charged that the banks had brought ’’gloom and desolation” w here
’’p ro sp e rity and happiness had existed* ” The banking system which
w as ’’unsanctioned by any principle of republican v irtu e ” was the
only way to account fo r the ’’fluctuations” of the economy which
c re a te d ficticious value# engendered a s p irit of speculation and led
to ru in by turning the people fro m honest industry*

He had e a rlie r

attack ed the ’’pernicious and corrupting influence upon the m o rals
of the people” e x e rte d by the suspension of specie paym ents.

17

16

Newark Advocate re p rin te d in the Ohio Statesm an# October 24,
1837; Ohio Statesman# O ctober 27# August 9# 16 and 27# 1837.

17

Illinois. Governor# 1838-1842. C harles M anfred Thompson,
’’T he'W inois W
” U niversity of Illinois
Studies in the Social Sciences# IV (March# 1915), pp. 52, 83,
and Don Fehrenbacher# Chicago Giant (Madison, W isconsin:
A m erican H isto ry R e se arch Center# 1957), p. 27, a s s e r t that
Illinois b an k ers w ere Whigs.
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The situation in Indiana differed from that in the other
sta te s and gave ris e to som e local variations on the standard
p attern .

The Whigs had solid control of the state throughout the

1830‘s; and the State Bank of Indiana was one of the soundest and
b e st m anaged banks in the country.

In the state Senate, the

D em ocrats p resen te d th e ir in te rp retatio n in answ er to Whig charges,
defending Jack so n ’s policies and attacking those of the Whig state
adm inistration*

They denied that the g eneral governm ent was

resp o n sib le, but ra th e r that the "p re se n t collapsed s ta te ” was "a
n e c e ssa ry consequence of o ur fo rm e r inflated condition. ” This
condition could h ardly have been the re s u lt of Ja ck so n 's policies
since England as w ell as the United States was affected*

This

inflation was the re s u lt of the "vicious paper System ” and in p a rtic u 
la r the action of the Bank of the United States, which by contracting
its issu e fo rced the sta te banks to expand, m ultiplying the cu rren cy
extravagantly*

They thus placed the blam e fo r the expansion on the

Bank of the United States and the sta te banks (excluding th e ir own
State Bank)*

F ro m this point they developed the standard D em ocratic

argum ents that the banking expansion led to extravagant foreign
spending, and "induced m en of a ll c la ss e s to drop th eir lawful
callings and to tu rn out into the g re a t M aelstrom of re c k le ss
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speculation,
In addition the D em ocrats argued that Indiana had Its own
p ecu liar local c ircu m stan ces that aggravated the g eneral d istre s s;
and it was those they connected with the Whig party.

In p a rticu la r,

they attacked the in tern al im provem ents system e£ the Whigs that
provided fo r sim ultaneous construction of all infernal im provem ents.
To the D em ocrats it was na sy stem in fact conceived in sin, brought
fo rth in iniquity, and attem pted to be sustained fey deception* “
F u rth e r the sy ste m had underm ined the c re d it of the sta te and
crip p led the state bank.

They concluded:

Our d e p re ssed financial system in sh o rt has been
produced by our own unwise sy stem of internal
im provem ents, by our m o re unwise m anner of p e r 
secuting it, and by the m ost,unw ise course pursued
by our fund co m m issio n ers in tru stin g our state
bonds to so la rg e an amount in the hands of i r r e 
sponsible and swindling corporations /th e Mew 'fork
b a n k s/, and not as m odestly suggested by Governor
W allace is it owing to the m e a su re s of Andrew Jackson
o r M artin Van B uren. 19
The D em ocratic p re s s of Indiana was som ewhat le s s d e li
cate although it also avoided d ire c t attacks on the State Bank*

By

mid-1837 the stan d ard Jacksonian in te rp retatio n of the c r is is was
18

1'M inority R eport on Select Com m ittee of the Senate on the
Governor* s M e ssa g e ,” in Dorothy R iker, e d ., M essages and
P a p e rs Relating to the A dm inistration of David W allace,
G overnor pf Indiana, 1837-1840 (Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana
H isto ric a l'’B ureah,''' 19&3), pp. '376-SI, the quotations a re from
pp. 377, 378.

19

Ib id ., pp. 380, 381.

c u rre n t and Gouge the accepted authority on banking.

Bven Stevens

T. Mason, M ichigan’s young governor, was quoted authoritatively
on the re la tio n of over-banking to the crisis*

The Biddle-W hig

c u rre n cy of irred e em ab le paper was contrasted with the JaeksonianR epublican cu rre n cy of gold and silvers and the Whigs w ere attacked
as the bank party.

In its notice of the election, the Indiana Democ ra t

tabbed Whig David W allace as "The Speculator’s C andidate.,f
However, m o st attem pts w ere m ade to prove that the Whigs
nationally, not ju st in Indiana, w ere the bank party; and M edary’s
fig u res on the p o litical affiliation of Ohio bankers w ere reprinted. 20
The Whigs blam ed the c ris is and the bank suspension on
the policies of Jackson’s adm inistration.

Clay m ade the c la ssic

statem en t of the Whig in te rp retatio n in his speech on the S ub-T reasury
B ill.

" P r io r to th at s e rie s of unfortunate m e a su re s" instituted by

Jackson, "no people on e a rth enjoyed a b e tte r currency* or had
exchanges b e tte r regulated, than the people of the United States. "
But in 1837 the country was endangered by the p ro sp ect of an
irre d e e m a b le paper cu rren cy .

"Gan it be doubted that it is the

re s u lt of those m e a su re s to which 1 have a v e rte d ? When at the very
m om ent of adopting them , the very consequences which have happened
w ere fo reto ld as inevitable* is it n e c e ssa ry to look elsew here for
20

Indianapolis Indiana D em ocrat, May 3, July 12, June 7, June 21,
July 26, Septem ber 6, 1837. The Charlestow n Indianan did
attack the State Bank when it suspended, "We do not believe the
people d e sire a bank longer. JLet Indiana be f ir s t in the noble
w o rk ..» , " in the Ohio Statesm an, November 1, 1837.

th e ir cause ? Hover was prediction m ore distinctly made? never
was fulfillm ent m ore lite ra l and e x a c t.11 Clay attached to Van B uren’s
argum ent that the fact both Europe and B ritain also suffered
"em b a rra ssm e n t" showed it could not have been the re s u lt of
Ja ck so n 's policies*

"The degree of e m b a rra ssm e n t has been m arked,

in co m m ercial cou ntries th ere by the degree of th eir connection with
the U nited States. " The g re a t failu re s w ere among those houses
engaged in the A m erican trad e .

The suffering in those countries

showed that B rita in which was the m o st involved w ith the United
States w as w o rst h it followed by F ran ce "and so on in the o rd e r of
th e ir g re a te r o r le s s com m ercial in te rco u rse with us. " However,
the fact rem ain ed th at the intensity of suffering in the United States
exceeded that of any other country*

This, Clay argued, indicated

th at th is country suffered fro m "som e p ecu liar and m o re potent
cau ses than any which" operated in Europe? "1st*
bank*

2nd*

The veto of the

The rem oval of deposits, with the urgent injunction of

S e c re ta ry Taney upon the banks to enlarge th eir accommodations*
3rd*

The gold biil* and the demand for gold fo r foreign endem nities.

4th*

The clum sy execution of the deposit law? and Sih* The

T re a s u ry o rd e r of July, 1836* "

21

Clay* s speech included m o st of the them es that m ade up
the Whig in te rp retatio n .
21

The veto of the re c h a rte r of the Bank of

Thom as H a rt Benton, e d ., A bridgem ent of the Debates of
C ongress F ro m 178^ to 1856 (Hew York* D. Appleton and
C om pany,"1859),' XIII, pp. ^04-405.
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the United States rem oved its sa lu ta ry effects on the currency, and
abdicated fe d e ra l control over the banks.

The rem oval of the

deposits along with the encouragem ent of the S ecretary of the
T re a su ry led to the banking expansion of the m id -th irtie s .

However,

although expansion had been encouraged, the m ishandling of the
d istrib u tio n and the specie c irc u la r stru c k at the en tire banking
sy stem and led to depression*

It was a c le a r question of the m isuse

of power by the executive.
Throughout the Old N orthw est the Whig p re s s and the Whig
p o litician s echoed th ese charges*

Whig governors joined in

blam ing the c ris is on the ’’unhappy policy of the national govern
m ent. " Ohio’s G overnor Vance argued th at " it is not the amount
of c ircu latio n that produces these evils* but the want of power to
control, and judgem ent in the application of our m eans, by those
who have the m anagem ent of our financial system* " What was
n e c e ssa ry was a w ell reg u lated financial system capable of con
tra c tio n and expansion in line with the needs of a growing economy*
Duncan* the governor of Illinois* a g reed that C ongress should
’’reg u late the currency* and re s to re it to its fo rm e r sound condi
tion and beneficent action" ra th e r than try to escape the conse
quences of the D em ocratic policies “by am using the people with the
ab su rd and im p racticab le p ro jec t of an exclusive h ard money
currency* " In Indiana a lively debate over the causes of the d epression
was touched off by G overnor David W allace’s m essag e on Decem ber 3,

183 9 which laid the blam e fo r the "sudden blight which has come
over our p ro sp e cts" on the policies of Jack so n 's A dm inistration,
D em ocratic com m ittees in the state Senate and House answ ered
W allace denying the a d m in istratio n 's responsibility and urging the
governor to te ll the tru th and to accept the consequences of his
actions and those of his party .

In the p re s s C hristian C. Move

countered these re p o rts and a s s e rte d that the D em ocrats w ere
com pletely wrong in th eir in terp retatio n .
•with Jackson*

The resp onsibility lay

Samuel Judah also cam e to the defense of the Whig

sta te adm inistration*

He argued that the d is tre s s was a national

phenom ena and it could hardly be blam ed on the Whig policies in
Indiana* ^
Although the Whigs em phasised the responsibility of the
Jacksonian financial policies, they did not ignore the relatio n of
"overbanking" to the depression, and they w ere not u n critical of
the state banks.

In Illinois, the Whigs constantly rem inded the

D em ocrats that they had voted overw helm ingly for the State Bank,
and had trie d as b e st they could to disconnect them selves from the
22

F u lle r, e d ., M essages, I* pp. 371*72; D ocum ents., . of the
State of Ohio, 1838* Document #1; Illinois. G overnor, 1834-1838;
Indiana L eg islatu re . D ocum entary jo u r n a l,' 1839* P a r t II,
Document #9; "M inority R eport of Select Com m ittee of the
Senate on the G o v ern o r's M essage, " and "R eport of Select
Com m ittee of the House on G ov ern o r's M essage, " in R iker,
e d ., M essages*«. R elating to the A dm inistration of David
WallaceT pp. 376*81, 393*99; Indianapolis fodiana Jo u rn a l,
Jan u ary 14, F e b ru a ry 3, F e b ru ary 10, 1840.
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institution.

David W allace in Indiana told his constituents that

11experience teaches us the fearfu l lesso n that th e re a re lim its
beyond which if banking privileges and banking operations a re
c a rrie d , they c ease to do good, and becom e engines of incalculable
m isch ief. " In Ohio Thom as Corwin read ily adm itted that banks,
when not p ro p erly controlled, could cause dangerous fluctuations
in the cu rren cy .

It was in M ichigan, however, w here the Whigs

vied with the D em ocrats in th eir dam nation of banks.

The D etroit

D a ily A d v e rtise r believed that the s p irit of speculation and o v e r
trading helped to produce the c ris is , but that "the g re a t moving
cau se" was the Specie C irc u la r.

The Ann A rbor State Journal con-

nected "overbanking" to Jackson’s policies?
«Mffr

O vertrading and overbanking is /^sic/ then not the
cause of the p re se n t difficulties, but the effect,
the legitim ate and undeniable consequence of the
fatuifcous a c ts of a p arty adm inistration* 23
In m id **1837 the Dally A d v ertiser began attacking "T ory
C onsistency1’ which p ro d u ce d th e in cre ase in banks and turned the
Jack so n ian ch arg es ag ain st the party*

A run down on bank p residents

and c a sh ie rs showed a la rg e r num ber to be Democrats*
23

Concerning

Thompson, "Illinois Whigs# " p. 66; Indiana L e g isla tu re .
D ocum entary jo u rn a l, 1838, Document #1? D ocum ents.«. of the
State of Ohio. 1841* Document #76; D etroit Daily A d v ertiser,
Jan u ary 27, 1837; Ann A rbor State Jo u rn al rep rin ted in the
D etroit Daily A d v e rtise r, July 28, 1837.
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which p a rty housed the speculators the A dvertiser w rote:
The speculators a re of all p a rtie s, but of one m ore
than another, the m o st of the Van B uren party,
because these had control of the p e t banks, Who
fo rm the g re a t land com panies of New York and of
W ashington? Ask the B u tlers, ask Kendall, B lair
and a ll that rac e.
M ichigan was suffering from a bank m ania and the D em ocrats talked
24
"gold humbug" but gave the people "a U tter of infant m o n sters. M
All of the elem ents of the Whig in te rp retatio n w ere pulled
to g eth er in the 1841 platform in M ichigan th re e fourths of which
was devoted to banking and m oney questions.

It se t about to tra c e

how the country which had been in 1829 "generally prosperous and
happy" cam e to its condition of "u nparalleled e m b a rra ssm e n t and
d is tre s s " and arg u es th at this is the re s u lt of "the m ism anagem ent,
the im p ro p er and dangerous m e a su re s, the m isconduct and
co rru p tio n of o ur late r u le rs . " It then noted:
Our enem ies say that all these things have been p ro 
duced by the s p irit of speculation which has p r e 
vailed, and by and by the g re a t in c re a se of Banks,
and of a paper currency* But what stim ulated this
s p irit of speculation and brought it into existence*
and what caused the in cre ase of Banks and paper
c u rre n c y ? Who c re a te d these banks ? ** *m ore than
tw o -thirds of these banks w ere c re ate d by the loco
foco party* m ostly in the sta te s of New York*
Pennsylvania* Virginia* Ohio* Indiana* Louisiana*
Alabam a, M ississippi* Michigan* and a few
o th ers, * * the loco foco p a rty c re ate d m o re than one
hundred and fifty m illions of dollars of State Bank
capital* betw een the y e a rs of 1829 and 1838, and

24

D etroit Daily A d v e rtiser, August 11, August 12, 183? and
M arch 5, 1638.

claim ed to be the p a rtic u la r friends of State
Banks, in opposition to a National Bank, until
the general suspension and the g re a t shock of
1837, when they suddenly renounced th eir own
progeny, denounced all Banks and Bank paper,
and becam e advocates of the S ub-T reasury, and
specie currency.
What was needed w as ”a well regulated National B an k .. . to furnish
the people of the United States a sound and uniform cu rre n cy ; to
check the over issu es of local State Banks, and to regulate the
2K
exchanges of the c o u n try .. . . ”
Im plied in each of these in terp retatio n s w ere c ertain ideas
about banks and th e ir relatio n to the Good Society.

In the Jack*

som an’s view of banks, th e ir econom ic function was subordinated
to th e ir sym bolic ro le.

All of the stru c tu re of political sym bolism

th at had b een c re ate d during r?th@ Bank W ar” was extended in the
p erio d following 1837 to cover all banks until the sins of the Bank
becam e the sin s of banks in general.

The Jacks onians conceived

of the Good Society in te rm s of sim ple d ecentralized governm ent,
Mrepublican v irtue, H and the ultim ate m o ra lity of a g ric u ltu ral
labor*

In c e rta in cases the la s t elem ent was a lte re d to all "pro**

due live c la s s e s ” although th is was not lim ited to Jaeksonians*
United States re p re se n te d a ll of these values in th e ir minds*

The
How*

ever* they re a liz e d that the purity of th e ir ideal had been somehow
co rru p ted .

Banks functioned as a p e rfe ct symbol of the corrupting

influence in A m erican society*
25

The banks w ere the nsnake” in the

Randall, @d*, "G ubernatorial Platform s,*1 pp. 20*28.
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R epublican Eden.
Each of the positive values for which the Jaeksonians
stood found its negative in the banking system .

The “paper

a ris to c ra c y 1* was the constant ta rg e t of Jacksonian literature*
W illiam Gouge d eclared that “a paper m oney a risto c ra c y /Ts7 the
only kind of a ris to c ra c y that can possibly e x ist in the United States"
because of the im possibility of e c c le sia stic a l, m ilita ry , o r landed
a risto c rac ie s* 26 The only a ris to c ra ts the Jaeksonians saw w ere
b an k ers.
The p u rity of elections was soiled by ’‘bank influence. "
Jack so n ian defeats in the la te th irtie s and e a rly fo rtie s w ere
a sc rib e d to bank influence*

In particular* the supposed p arty

played by "bank influence" in the New York elections of 1827 and 1838
was echoed throughout the D em ocratic press*
N early a ll corruption had its genesis in the banking system*
By draw ing lab o r fro m a g ric u ltu re and oth er virtuous occupations
into the m o ra lly d estru ctiv e activity subsum ed under the general
ruberic* "speculation* " banks underm ined m o ra lity in the society.
The banks co rru p te d the youth of A m erica and forced the m ost
fe rtile land in the w orld to go begging among the potentates of
E urope fo r foodstuffs*
26

Gouge is quoted in the D utchess County* New York, Anti*Bank
Democrat* #4, April* 1842, p. 61.
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This g eneral se t of b eliefs led to the demand for the "divorce
of bank and state* " The pure sim plicity of republican governm ent
should no m o re be asso c iated with the schem es of the bankers than
those of the c le ric s .

And the funds of the people should no m ore

support the banks than the churches.

G overnm ent too easily could be

m ade to stand in the way of lib e rty when m ade su b serv ien t to c e rta in
c la ss e s o r in te re s t groups.

All such influences m ust be sh eared

fro m th e ir rela tio n to governm ent, and republican sim plicity resto re d .
"All com m unities a re apt to look to governm ent for too m u c h .. . the
fra m e rs of our excellent C on stitution.. .w ise ly judged that the less
governm ent in te rfe re s w ith p rivate p u rsu its the b e tte r for general
p ro sp e rity * "

27

The Whigs viewed banks as purely econom ic institutions
whose m ain function was to supply the c re d it n e c e ssa ry for economic
developm ent.

They functioned as valuable tools when p ro p erly used,

and the im p ro p er use was no argum ent that they should be discarded.
In g en eral th is coincided with the Whig conception of the Good
Society which m o re read ily accepted the function of business e n te r
p rise , em phasised the opportunity c re ate d by econom ic d iv e rsific a 
tion and developm ent, and saw the ideal e itise n in te rm s of the self-m ade
m an.

While sym bolic content was not absent, it w as le s s im portant

in the Whig conception of banks than in the D em ocratic conception*
27

R ichardson, e d ., M essages and P a p e rs of the P re sid e n ts, III,
p. 344.
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M ore im portant to the Whigs was the idea that governm ent bore
som e resp o n sib ility to aid e n te rp rise , and m ost could agree with
W ebster When he said in the debate on the Independent T reasu ry ,
“I feel as if I w ere on som e other sphere, as if I w ere not a t home,
as if this could not be A m erica when I see schem es of public policy
proposed, having for this object the convenience of Governm ent only,
and leaving the people to shift fo r them selves. **. "

28

Although these in terp retatio n s and conceptions played a
c ru c ial ro le in the struggle over the Independent T reasu ry , they
becam e m o re im portant when the Jacksonians succeeded in shifting
the cen ter of the banking struggle to what Van B uren called "the
p ro p er trib u n al* -th e people of the States* " The Dem ocracy of the
Old N orthw est had not opposed state banks; and while they read ily
accepted the Jacksonian in te rp retatio n of the causes of the economic
c ris is , they w ere also slow to em brace the cen tral program, of the
A d m in istratio n 's "h ard m oney" policy, the Independent Treasury*
The logic of the Jacksonian in terp retatio n of the d ep ressio n eventually
drove them to oppose a ll banks a s political and econom ic problem s
multiplied*

28

In co n trast, the Whig argum ent, which im plicitly accepted

W ebster is quoted in Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian E ra
(New Iforks H arp er and B ro th ers, 1959), p. 122.
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governm ental resp o n sib ility for econom ic p ro g ress and blam ed
m ism anagem ent for the c ris is , led the p arty into a s e rie s of attem pts
29
at re fo rm of the state banking systems*

29

B iehardson, e d ., l&es sages, and F a p e rs of the P re sid e n ts, 111,
p. 342} A rthur S c h f e s l n g e ^ fh c.A g e o f 'l’a ckson.fBoston!
L ittle Brown and Company, 19S©)#*T5>ri^
E varts
B. C reen e, ed*, ’’L e tte rs of CSustav K oerner, 1837-1863, H
tra n s a c tio n s of the Illinois State H isto rical Society F or the
f e a r 1907 (19081, pp. 224-26.

CH APTER III

THE REVUESION AGAINST BANKS, 1837*1845

During the d ep ressio n p erio d from 1837 to 1845, the logic
of the D em ocratic in te rp retatio n of the economic c ris is worked
itse lf out. The D em ocracy of the Old N orthw est becam e dedicated
to the extinction of banks and a re tu rn to the "constitutional
cu rren cy " of gold and silv e r. This tran sfo rm atio n took place in two
stag es. Between 1837 and 1839 anti-bank feelings grew# but the
p a rty stood for re fo rm ra th e r than abolition of the state banks.
A fter the second suspension in 1839* the D em ocrats m oved quickly-sp u rre d by p o litical re v e rse s* -to a com plete "hard money" po si
tion advocating abolition of all banks* In this they followed the
lead of the e a s te rn m em b ers of th eir party. The Whigs w ere not
u n c ritic a l defenders of a ll banks, but trie d to re fo rm the state
banking sy stem s in o rd e r to provide abundant c re d it and a well
secu red cu rren cy . By the mid-1840,s the D em ocrats conceived of
econom ic refo rm in te rm s of retren ch m en t and deflation} while the
Whigs hoped th at a m oderate Inflation would ra is e p ric e s and wages*
and, thus* quicken econom ic expansion.
The effects of the panic w ere not im m ediately fe lt in the
Old N orthw est because a g ric u ltu ra l prices* while falling* held up
fa irly w ell throughout 1837 and 1838* The c ris is of 1837* which was
b a sic a lly urban and com m ercial* forced a ll of the banks into s u s 
pension; but in each state, bank com m issioners affirm ed the sound
n ess of local banks and a s s e rte d that suspension was a defensive
m easure*

In the main* the W est was bothered by a shortage of

adequate currency* and th e re w ere m any individuals who believed
th at the m isfo rtu n es of the E ast would benefit the West*

Eucius

Byon* one of M ichigan1s se n a to rs, w rote C harles T row bridge in

75

76

May, 1837, ’I t is estim ated that 4000 m echanics w ere discharged
h e re on Saturday la s t, and m o st of these, together with sev era l
thousands previously out of em ploym ent will find th e ir way to our
country.

This will do som ething tow ard counteracting the effect of
i
the p re se n t sc a rc ity of m oney, so fa r as we a re concerned. M
The y ear 1838 brought w ith resum ption of specie paym ents,
an in cre ase in c re d it fa c ilitie s, and the trem endous expansion of
expenditures in a ll of these sta te s fo r internal im provem ents p ro jects.
Although land p ric e s never recovered, optim ism did.

Lyon continued

to p ra is e the p o ssib ilities of Michigan, and from Ogle bounty,
Illinois, T« ft. Smith w rote to a frien d in the E ast, ’’All hinds of
b u sin ess a re good /, and a_/ good m eehanik
of p ric e and cash down* ”

can get any kind

3

This resu rg en c e of the economy continued into 1839* However
the suspension of specie paym ents by the Bank of the United States
of Pennsylvania in O ctober, signaled a downturn into a full Hedged
depression*

By 1840 this was increasingly fe lt in the Old Northwest*

1 Lucius Lyon to C. C. Trow bridge, May 1, 1837, in the Trow bridge
MSS.
Z

N um erous le tte rs boosting M ichigan a re to be found in ’’L e tte rs
of Lucius Lyon, ” H isto rica l C o lle ctio n s.. . M ichigan P io n eer and
H i a to r l e a l S o c ^ ( L a n s in g , M ichigan: R obert Smith C o., 1897),
XXVII, pp. 412«604j Jr. H, Smith to David P o rta , May 27, 1838,
in ’’L e tte rs F ro m Ogle and C a rro l Counties, 1838-1857, ” T ra n s
actions of the Illinois State H isto rica l Society F o r the Year 1907
n
f
" B i o »
pp* 247-261.
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I h e banks of the a re a had again suspended specie paym ents; and by
1843 m o st of them had gone into liquidation*

Illinois was en tirely

without authorized banking fac ilitie s; and Michigan was left with
she ra th e r shaky institutions one of which closed voluntarily and
two of which failed in the next th ree y e a rs,

la Ohio, the m ost

econom ically developed of these sta te s, the c h a rte rs of fifteen banks
expired in 1843 and 1844, leaving the state with eight banks.

Only

the Bank of Indiana cam e through the period with its reputation
intact*

Hhe num erous exposures of fraud and m alp rac tic e during

these y e a rs along with the two suspensions of specie paym ents built
up a g re a t deal of d issatisfactio n with banks in general.
However w ell d eserv ed m uch of this censure was, th ere is
good rea so n to believe that banks and the banking sy stem w ere m ade
the scapegoat fo r the econom ic d is a s te rs of the period.

Men who

had stood in the fo refro n t of c re d it expansion in 1836 and 1837 shifted
th e ir allegiance to the "loco foeos" by 1841. flood banks w ere
attacked along w ith the bad, as the experience of the Bank of Indiana
shows * One student has very succinctly w ritten;
Mo m a tte r what the policy adopted, It was su re to be
criticized* An in cre ase in accom m odations was evidence
of " re c k le s s banking'1 while, if the bank attem pted to
reduce its c ircu latio n and called som e loans, it was
oppressive* " 3b a period of c ris is failu re to suspend
specie paym ents m ight m ean ruin, but the suspension
m eant that the bank was a "fraud, " issuing w orthless
prom ises* 3
3

Oolembe, "State Banks and the Economic Development of the West, "
p. 74.
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The political p o ssib ilities of such a flexible issu e w ere
c le a r, and the D em ocratic p a rty which was h u rt by the hard tim es
seized upon it.

The rh e to ric of the "Bank W ar" was easily, alm ost

logically, extended to all banks.

The policies of the Old Hero could

be defended ag ain st Whig ch arg es, and the e m b a rrassin g situation
of the "p arty of the people" being soundly trounced at the polls could
be explained by "bank influence. " In each of the sta te s of the Old
N orthw est banking becam e a political issu e of f ir s t im portance
during the d ep ressio n years*

Although th ere w ere c e rta in local

v ariatio n s, a p a tte rn em erged from this co n tro v ersy that was re m a rk 
ably sim ila r in each state.

At fir s t, the D em ocrats disavowed any

intention to "w ar on c re d it" or destroy all banks, and favored "bank
reform * " However, a fte r the second suspension of specie paym ents,
the D em ocracy becam e increasingly opposed to banks of any kind
so th at by the m id -4840*s this was a te s t of orthodoxy within the
party.
1
The suspension of specie paym ents which cam e in May, 1837,
encouraged the appearance of a w idespread hostility to banks within
the D em ocratic party.

The Chicago D em ocrat and the Jacksonville

(Illinois) News redoubled th e ir attacks against all banks} and fo rm er
advocates of the Illinois State Bank such as ex-governor Ewing
tu rn ed a g ain st that institution.

The Ohio Eife Insurance and T ru st
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Company was forced by its c h a rte r to resum e without re d re s s from
the leg islatu re .

In that state a num ber of ’’loco foco” papet*s de*

m anded th at all other banks eith er forfeit th eir c h a rte rs o r resum e. ^
However, anti-bank ideas did not yet dominate the party.
The Indiana D em ocrat defended the soundness of the State Bank and
argued that xt was com pelled to suspend for self-p ro tectio n ju st as
the M ichigan D em ocrats defended suspension in th eir state.

Even

Ohio’s Samuel M edary, who would becom e one of the m ost v irulent
opponents of banks, trie d to prevent h y ste ric a l reactions against
banks, and a s s u re d his re a d e rs that, ’’Our own a re stric tly solvent,
and ought not to be a slave for m any m isdeeds. H The leading Demo
c ra tic organ in Illinois, the Illinois State R e g iste r, joined with the
Whigs in supporting the bill to legalize suspension.

Sim ilar b ills w ere

p assed in M ichigan and Indiana with the support of both p a rtie s,
allowing the banks to suspend and requiring conform ity to certain
re s tric tio n s which it was hoped would in su re resum ption at an early
date.

5
Following the suspension the D em ocratic p re s s began an

attack on banks th at was m ore a re s u lt of th e ir attem pts to defend
4

P e a se, F ro n tie r State, pp. 307-308; W eisenburger, P assing of
the F ro n tie r, p. 336.

5

Indiana D em ocrat, May 31, 1837; W estern H em isphere (Columbus,
Ohio), May 17, 1837, quoted in W eisenburger, P assing of the
F ro n tie r, p. 335; Illinois State R eg ister, August 4, 1837; Jam es,
Chicago Banks, I, pp. 122-123.
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Jack so n ’s policies and the logic of the ‘'Bank W ar" than any deeply
ingrained opposition to banks#

The p arty p re s s blam ed the d epression

on the m ultiplication of banks and generally advocated refo rm of the
state banking system s*

Biddle was a favorite ta rg e t both in private

correspondence and in the p re ss.

The Indiana D em ocrat attacked

Biddle and the Whig bankers fo r saddling the country with an i r r e 
deem able paper currency*
B iddle’s b ills a re now a t two p er cent discount. The
New York City Banks refuse to fake them* while the
Jack son currency# the gold and silver# demands a
prem ium of ten p e r cent and th ere will always be this
rela tiv e difference betw een the Whig and D em ocratic
c u rren cy . 6
Throughout 1837 and 1838 p4a rty conflict revolved around the
question of the Independent T re a su ry system*

The Indiana D em ocrat,

3DtTiao.ois State R e g iste r, the Ohio Statesman# and the D etroit
D em ocratic F re e P r e s s a ll backed Van Huron’s plan while th eir
Whig counterparts# the Indiana Jo u rn a l# the Sangamo Journal# the
Ohio State Journal# and the D etroit Daily A d v ertiser opposed the
Independent T reasury*

State platform s and reso lu tio n s of county

com m ittees refle cted th is conflict and usually ignored state banking
problems*

In som e a re a s D em ocratic county com m ittees advocated

a "hard" currency*

The vigorously anti-bank C harleston -Indianan

declared# "T hat sta te which f ir s t c asts off h e r banks will be In the
■ "» « '"■

6

....... . '
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Indiana D em ocrat, June 7, 1837.

.......*

........................................................
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b e st financial condition--she w ill draw h er supply of specie from the
adjoining states* ” Still m o st county m eetings and the leading
D em ocratic papers denied that th eir p arty w ished to d estroy the
banking sy stem as the Whigs charged.

The nD em ocrats of Old

F ran k lin /p H io /” asserted* ft0 u r object is not to destroy* but to
p re se rv e * -to c o rre c t the e r r o r s of Banking* and p re s e rv e the
rig h ts of the people* is the d e sire of a ll tru e D em ocrats. ft Banks and
paper m oney w ere seen as dangers to Itcontest

1e e t Jrui s * ari^d ©^v^eri

freedom of the p re s s was th reatened by 'C o rp o rate power. " The
charge th at the defeat of the D em ocrats in Mew York resu lte d from
the in te rfere n ce of the m oney power was repeated in each state.

To

in su re "the m & R M M A & t OF TB'B PFO PBE, « the Dayton (Ohio)
H erald asserted* "TO'TAD AMD THOROD0H bank refo rm * . * " was
n e ce ssa ry .

7

The D em ocratic concept of bank refo rm a t this tim e seem ed
to involve th ree p rin cip les: an im m ediate re tu rn to specie paym ents;
individual liab ility of stockholders; and the prohibition of sm all notes*
The D em ocrats of Muskingum County* Ohio* explained that they
7

D em ocratic F re e Press* July 9 and IE, 1837; Newark Advocate
tbe Ohio S tatesm an* O ctober 24, 1837; Ohio Statesm an,
O ctober 27* and Novem ber 20* 1837; C harles ton Indianan in the
Ohio S tatesm an* Novem ber 1, 1837; Illinois State R e g iste r,
■A ugust 4*’111837; Ohio; Statesm an, Decem ber 2 and 12, 1837, and
M arch 13, 183.8; Democ ratio F re e B re e s* Novem ber 24, 1838;
Dayton H erald in the Ohio Statesm an* D ecem ber 4, 1837.
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d e sired a m ixed c u rren cy with larg e bills ’’fo r M erchants and T ra d e rs,
and Gold and Silver fo r the governm ent and the people. " The Indiana
D em ocrat was m o re specific about refo rm .

Throughout November,

1837, the paper suggested a num ber of ways to refo rm the banking
stru c tu re of the sta te .

A specie re s e rv e of 33 1/3% should be

estab lish ed ag ainst issues* deposits, and lia b ilitie s.

No notes under

$10 should fee issu ed a fte r 1840, and none under $20 a fter 1842*
such notes should not be received or paid out.

F u rth e r,

R esident stockholders

should be m ade individually liable and n o n -resid en ts asked to give
secu rity .

The sta te itself should be responsible to the amount of

its stock.

Suspension of specie paym ents was to lead to fo rfeitu re

of the c h a rte r.

Surplus p ro fits over 1/16 of the B ank's capital w ere

to be divided once every th ree y e a rs.

If the p resid e n t o r the

d ire c to rs owed the Bank o r w ere liable as e n d o rse rs, they w ere to
be removed*

A schedule of the debtors of the Bank was to be published.

Som etim es the paper suggested that the leg islatu re m aintain the right
to rep e al or am m end the charter* ®
The Whigs* in general* tended to be fa r le s s c ritic a l of the
sta te banking sy stem s and to justify suspension*
®

They ste e re d a

OhiqStatesmaa* Novem ber 26, 1837} Indiana D em ocrat, Novem ber I,
15, and 22* 1837? "D em ocratic A ddress" in M ichigan saw the fre e
banking law in these te rm s , D em ocratic F re e P re s s , August 9*
1837$ and by Septem ber 18, 1838, the D em ocratic F re e P re s s ,
accepted this concept of refo rm , favorably rep rin tin g an a rtic le
from die Indiana Democrat*
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m o d erate course.

In Indiana a num ber of re p o rts from the Whig

co n tro lled State Bank a ssu re d the le g islatu re of the soundness of
the institution* but recom m ended that no new branches be created
until sound b u sin ess conditions returned*

Samuel M errill* the

p resid en t of the State Bank, took note of the demand fo r in creased
currency* but w arned that m a tte rs be allowed to regulate them selves
and that an overabundance of cu rre n cy would only m ake things w orse.
He was not opposed to an in cre ase in capital and the num ber of
b ran ch es once the c r is is had passed! and, in fact, he recom m ended
such a m ove. 9
G overnor Joseph Vance of Ohio reflected a num ber of Whig
attitu d es in his m essag e in D ecem ber, 1837* B esides setting forth
the Whig in te rp re ta tio n of the c ris is , he looked upon econom ic
so ciety and m oney in ways that tended to be m o re comm on among
Whigs than Democrats*

He had a c o rp o ra tist view of society which

saw v arious econom ic in te re s ts as interdependent ra th e r than antago
nistic*
Agricultural* com m ercial, m anufacturing and
m echanical labor, a re linked together by a strong
com m on in te re st, and he who sh all undertake to
se v e r eith er b ran ch of b u sin ess from the others*
s trik e s a blow at the p ro sp e rity of the whole*
9

Sangamo jo u rn a l, August 19* 1837; G overnor Duncan!s M essage
of Ju ly ll, 1837# in Illin o is* G overnor, 1834*1838? D etroit Daily
A d v e rtise r, May 197*18377 W oodbridge fam ily to W illiam 3L.
W oodbridge, May 22, 1837, in the Woodbridge MSS? Indiana
L egislature* D octm entary Jo u rn al, 1837, Documents #3, #8,
and #29*

As fa r as money was concerned, he believed that the quantity had a
d ire c t effect on p ric e level*
E very m an conversant with the laws of trade* and
the effects of cu rre n cy m u st adm it that all a rtic le s
of m erch an d ise, and all descriptions of property,
m u st fall in proportion to the reduction of c irc u la 
tion*
An exclusive m etallic c u rren cy would thus co n tract the money
supply, low er p ric e s, the value of land, and wages*

He could not

see how anyone other than office holders could be helped by the sub
stitu tio n of "h ard m oney'1 fo r credit*

With c re d it the disadvantaged

youth of high m o ral prin cip les could com pete with the m ore fortunate
m em b ers of society.

"T hat the d e stru ctio n of c re d it will make the

ric h ric h e r and the poor p o o r e r ," was to Vance, n. . . too plain a
p ro position to be called into question*" It was not ju st individuals
who w ere aided by credit*
growth*

C redit was the dynamic elem ent in economic

The state of Ohio had been built on cre d it which serv ed as a

sp u r to enterprise*

Vet* neith er Vance nor the m any other Whigs

who a g re ed with this point of view could be d escrib ed as unbridled
in flatio n ists or advocates of fia t money*

Vance thought that the

suspension of sp ecie paym ents was "one of the g re a te s t calam ities
that can com e upon an industrious and e n te rp risin g people*" Hor
was he a thorough-golag advocate of taissez»faire«

He argued, in

c o n tra st to the dem ocrats* " it is not the am ount of circulation that
produces these evils, but the want of power to control, and judgem ent
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in the application of our m ea n sv by those who have the m anagem ent
of our financial system . ” What was needed was a well regulated
financial sy stem capable of contraction and expansion to comply with
co m m ercial and a g ric u ltu ra l needs. ^
The problem was seen by Vance as a national one, and he
urged a national solution, but the P re sid e n t and C ongress prom ised
no relief.

"Our only reliance then m u st be on the state institutions. rt

He suggested that the prohibition of sm all notes be rem oved on the
condition the banks resu m e specie paym ents and !,a relinquishm ent
of any rig h t they m ay p o sse ss /a s som e Ohio banks did/ to issue
notes tinder the denom inations of one dollar* "

11

The D em ocratic p re s s -viganoualy. opposed Vance.

The Ohio

.Statesm an thought his proposal would flood the state "with nothing
but trash* M The Norwalk E xperim ent attacked his idea of an elastic
c u rre n c y as "an absurdity. ” When the question cam e before the
legislature* the Whig m ajo rity , which included a num ber of bank
d ire c to rs and stockholders* c a rrie d through Vance*s plan by a s tric t
p a rty vote with every D em ocrat in the House and Senate in opposition* 12
10 Docum ents... . of- the State of. Ohio* 1837*38# Document #1, the
: quotations a re from pp. 24, 10* U, 14* and 12.
It

Ibid* *- p. 14. :■

12 Ohio Statesman,* D ecem ber 5, 1837* Norwalk E xperim ent in the
Ohio" Ita te sm a n ,' D ecem ber 19# 1837s Huntington* "A H istory of
Banking and C urrency in Ohio*11 pp. 289-290* W eisenburger,
F a ss mg of the F ro n tie r, pp. 343-346.
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It is in c o rre c t to a ss tame that all of the opposition to bank
suspension cam e from among the D em ocrats.

The Whig Indiana

State Jo u rn al, which usually defended the State Bank, noted that
opposition to the Bank was not confined to the "Van B uren P a rty . n
Such leading Whigs as O eorge P ro ffit and Samuel Judah w ere oppo
nents of the Bank.

Judah, an outspoken advocate of internal im prove -

rnents, was a constant c ritic of the State Bankfs policies and la te r a
le a d er of the fre e banking m ovem ent in Indiana,

In January, 1838,

he re p o rte d to the Ju d ic ia ry Com m ittee that the State Bank had
fo rfeited its c h a rte r by suspending.

The m ain object of the e sta b 

lish m en t of the Bank had been to in su re a sound cu rren cy redeem able
in specie.

He was not th eo re tic ally opposed to banks, but ra th e r

a staunch defender of a redeem able cu rren cy .

Judah was also the

leading m em b er of the Investigating Com m ittee that re p o rte d la te r
that m onth.

The re p o rt is critical* but not a tru e anti-bank document;

and it shows a su rp risin g aw areness of the problem s c re ate d by
the dual ro le of the State Bank as a public institution and a private
co rp o ratio n designed to yield profits*

The m ain argum ents of the

re p o rt w ere d irec te d tow ard supplying the le g isla tu re and the
public d ire c to rs with g re a te r control over the Bank* Judah believed
that as a public Bank it should be used to aid the public w elfare and
encourage the in dustry of the people*

The re p o rt p ra ise d the "cre d it
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sy ste m ” in general* but w arned against wild speculation*

13

Nor had the D em ocratic p arty been purged of bank advocates
by 1838. In Michigan* as one m ight suspect* the D em ocrats, who
w ere su ccessfu l in the 1837 elections, trie d to estab lish a State Bank.
M ichigan D em ocrats had allowed suspension in the special
se ssio n of 1837 to save the state*s banks.

As the y ear continued,

M ichigan cu rre n cy degenerated; and it was only taken in Buffalo
and C leveland a t a substantial discount.

B efore the fre e banking

sy stem had hardly been trie d and before its fraudulent operations
had been uncovered, suggestions that M ichigan estab lish a State Bank
w ere coming fro m the D em ocratic p re s s .

In January, 1838 Mason

p ra is e d the fre e banking b ill for rem oving "the odious featu res of
monopoly. ” Yet in the sam e a d d re ss he recom m ended a State Bank
to help pay fo r in tern al im provem ents.

It would also help sustain

public credit* have a "sa lu ta ry influence upon our currency* ” and
aid the co m m ercial comm unity.

M ason believed that such a bank

should be a m ixed e n te rp ris e with the sta te holding control.

It

should be lim ited in its circu latio n and issu e no b ills under ten
d o lla rs.

As added security* the p riv ate stockholders should be m ade

to place se c u ritie s with the sta te equal to th eir holdings.
13

P re fera b ly

In d ian a1Journal* - Jan u ary 20, 1838} Indiana le g is la tu r e . Docum e n ta ry 'jo u rn a l* 1837, Documents #30 and #32. The Judah rep o rts
a re exam ples of opposition to bank monopoly sim ila r to that I
a sso c iated with Seward in New York and quite in line with m y
g en eralizatio n concerning the Whigs and the "banking school. "
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these should be six p e r cent bonds of Michigan. ^
Although a g re a t deal of the sessio n dealt with the fre e
banking sy stem , a b ill to estab lish a State Bank p assed the Senate
and died in the House w here it failed to receive the n e c e ssa ry two**
th ird s vote*

The D em ocratic F re e P r e s s favored the establishm ent

of a State Bank and charged the defeat to the Whig insistence that a
m a jo rity of the d ire c to rs be chosen by the private stockholders.
T his, thought the paper* was a p e rfe c t example of Whig d istru st of
15
the people*
Whigs* if they opposed the State Bank, generally fea red
that if control w ere in the hands of the governor, the Bank would be
used fo r po litical purposes*

Trow bridge who was consulted by mem*

b a rs of both p a rtie s believed it was b e st to leave control with those
whose financial in te re s ts w ere involved, and suggested that all
o th er bank c h a rte rs be extinguished including that of his bank, the
Bank of Michigan*

Isolated Whigs even opposed the Bank on the

ground© that no m ore bank capital was needed*
was silen t on the issue*

The Daily A d v ertiser

lb

14

ICalamaaioo G azette in the D em ocratic F re e F re e s , Novem ber 29,
1837; F u lle r, e d ., M essages
PP« 227-232*

15

D em ocratic F r e e ,P r e s s , F e b ru a ry 7, 1838.

16

0* G. T row bridge to Woodbridge M arch 5, 1838, in the Woodbridge
MSS; C. C. Trow bridge to C harles M oran, M arch 27, 1838, in
the C. C. Trow bridge MSS* £ . P. H astings to Woodbridge,
F e b ru a ry 3, 1838, in the Woodbridge MSS opposed any new banks.
The Daily A d v e rtiser, M arch 19, 1838, believed th e re w ere too
m any banks*
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One student has a s s e rte d that it was a c le ar fight with
both p a rtie s holding firm , the Whigs favoring private control and the
D em ocrats favoring state control.
suggests this,
of the issu e.

The vote in the House hardly

JSqual num bers of Whigs could be found on eith er side
The failu re of the b ill resp ited from the fact that eight

of the twenty-two D em ocrats, including the defender of fre e banking
Mr. Gantt and the Speaker M r. Bingham, voted against the bill.
The tw o -th ird s clause in the M ichigan constitution ra th e r than
opposition fro m e ith e r p a rty killed the bill.

17

Throughout the sum m er of 1838 the D em ocratic papers kept
up dem ands fo r a State Bank in which the State m aintained control.
They a s s e r te d that it was a question of the D em ocrats favoring ”A
P eo p le’s Bank” the ’’fe d e ra lis ts ” opposing it because of th e ir d istru st
of the people.

They w ere the corporation p arty and f,tru e T o r ie s ,”

During th is period, the D em ocratic Free. P r e s s , attacked the Bank
of M ichigan, and a t the sam e tim e defended the M ichigan State Bank
fro m the ’’loco foco m alignity” of the Whig Daily A d v ertiser,

At

one point the D em ocratic F re e P r e s s argued that C, C* Trowbridge*
Thurlow Weed and the ’’bank w higs” defeated the State Bank bill,
because such an institution would endanger th e ir ”enorm ous profits, ”
By the late fall, although it s till was attacking the Whigs as ”loco focos, ”
17

Gante, ”A H istory of Banking L egislation, ” pp. 3 5-36; Michigan
L eg islatu re . House jo u rn a l, 1838*. p. 453.; Michigan L eg islatu re.
Senate Jo u rnal, 1838, p. 311,
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fche D em ocratic F re e P re s s becam e m ore vehem ent in its attacks
on bank influence and m o re rigid in its defense of Jackson and
’C onstitutional currency.
The Whig p re ss'm a in ly concerned itself with attacking'the
Independent T re a su ry system and the M ichigan State Bank.

When the

Daily A d v e rtiser dealt with the question of a new State Bank* it
w arned that control in the hands of the state would m ake the Bank
a ’’p o litical engine. ” Would it be a bank controlled by ’’the people”
o r one controlled by the ’’executive and his to o ls” ? The Whigs, the
Daily A d v e rtiser argued, wanted a State Bank not a political
m achine.

19
Again M ason opened the se ssio n calling for refo rm of the

banking sy stem through the establishm ent of a State Bank; and a
b ill was favorably re p o rte d out of the House Com m ittee on Banks.
Although the only opposition cam e from D em ocrats, the C om m ittee's
re p o rt and the overw helm ing vote indicate that anti-bank ideas did
not yet dom inate the D em ocratic party.

20

18

G ants, ”A H istory of Banking legislation* ” p* 36; jgalamaaoo
G azette in the D em ocratic F re e P re s s May Zf 1838; D em ocratic
F re e P r e s s A pril 18, A pril 25, May 9, May 16, Septem ber 5,
Septem ber 12* O ctober 17 and D ecem ber 19, 1838.

19

Dally.. A dyertia e r , August to Septem ber issu es attack the Sub
T re a su ry plan, August 18, O ctober 24, D ecem ber 27, 1838, and
Jan u ary 3, 1839, deal w ith the State Bank plans.

20

F u ller, e d ., Messages..,, 1, pp. 251*260, the quotation is from
p. 259. M ichigan le g is la tu r e . House Documents Accompanying
the Jo u rn al, 1839, Document #29, the quotation is from p. 578;
D em ocratic F re e P r e s s , M arch 27, 1839, rep o rte d the debate.

While Michigan was attem pting to solve its problem s by
setting up a State Bank* the idea of fre e banking sp read throughout
the 014 N orthw est.

C ertainly the attitudes n e c e ssa ry for an attem pt

at f r e e banking w ere w ell d istrib u ted during this period and had
invaded both p a rtie s.
Following the estab lish m en t of the M ichigan system* the
Chic Statesm an noted dero g ato rily that bank p ro jects w ere taking
on the new form of Hre a l e state banks. « Although the Statesm an
was not Im p ressed fey the land bank idea, it and the Cleveland
A d v e rtiser followed the defeats In Hew York during 183®. Hew York
e d ito ria ls w ere reprinted! and M edary p ra is e d the ,5locQ*focos* »
He advocated “fre e scope fo r ev ery th in g .H "The issue* H w rote
the ed ito r of the sta te sm an , 11Between Bank m onopoly despotism , and
flr^C tm bA and equal rights- had to fee m ade sooner o r la te r and we
a re rejo iced that the la s t stro k e has been stru c k and the standard
of freed o m has b een r a i s e d .. . »

*'* T h e

Cleveland A d v ertiser pro*

claim ed the Mew York law a s a trium ph of Hioco*foeo” p rinciples
and chided the Whigs who backed the law fo r having none of th e ir own.
S im ilar ch arg es w a rs m ade fey M ichigan D em ocrats who w ere busy
2i
defending th e ir own law.
ZX

Ofcjp .Statesman* -November %%, December 13* and §2, 1837?
C leveland A d v e rtise r In the #hio. Statesman* May 9* 1838;
.Detroit D em ocratic F ro e Press* A pril 18, 183S.
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Yet, m any Whigs w ere in favor of free banking.

Ohio’s

G overnor Vance noted in his 3.837 m essage that, "The g re a t amount
of local legislation, and bestow m ent of corporate priv ileg es, is
believed to be a growing evil in the State. " The following y ear he
d iscu ssed fre e banking as a possible way to refo rm the s ta te ’s
banking sy stem .

He rem inded the le g isla to rs that it had failed in

M ichigan, but was la rg e ly successful in Hew York.

He left the

question to the le g isla tu re and recom m ended ’la b o ro u s and careful
investigation. n In the 1839 se ssio n an unsuccessful free banking
b ill was introduced by a Whig* John G reen of Pickaw ay County.
The Ohio Statesm an did not h esitate to attack the b ill and re p rin t
an a rtic le fro m the Cleveland Gazette opposing the free banking m ania. "
We have felt the disasfcerous effects of the bursting
of one G eneral Banking experim ent in a s is te r
State, and we p re fe r that the experim ent Hew York
is working, should be fu rth er tested* before Ohio
em barks on a sim ila r one.
G overnor W ilson Shannon’s second m essag e in 1839* echoed doubt
concerning fre e banking*

?,It will not do to tr u s t e n tirely to the

co m m ercial law of supply and demand to regulate the amount of
p ap er circulation* ”
— v —i r — ■. j
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|>ocirments*. *of the State of Ohio, 1837-1838, Document #1, p. 24;
Tkmuments. . . of the State of Ohio, 1838-1839, Document #1;
Cleveland Cassette in the Ohio Statesm an, F e b ru ary 6, 1839*
D ocum ents.. . of the State of Ohio, 1839*1840, Document #1,
the quotation is fro m p. 12.
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U nderstandably the M ichigan experience m ade m em b ers of
both p a rtie s w ary of the secu rity of fre e banking system s.

D em ocrats

w ere usually a ttra c te d to the idea of freedom in the banking business.
The Whigs w ere a ttra c te d to this, and the idea that a cu rren cy based
on stocks o r m o rtg ag es would provide both se cu rity to the note
holder and a way to bring dorm ant capital funds into active use.
Illinois* G overnor Duncan had se v e ra l tim es proposed a plan by
which notes would be issued against m ortgages on Illinois land and
be used ’’with d isc re tio n ” as cu rren cy .

His plan which was very

m uch like th at suggested by the Lyon Com m ittee in the M ichigan
C onstitutional Convention of 1835 had the sam e ends.

Like the Lyon
23
plan it did not provide fo r freedom in the banking business.
By m id -1838 the Indiana D em ocrat had begun to agitate fo r
fre e banking in that sta te ,

In Svme it printed “M r. Young's R eport

on C urren cy and F re e Banking* “ and p raised it highly.

Commenting

on the Young Report* the editor a sse rte d :
We a re willing to be distinguished as u ltra * when
we can find authority for our c o u rse in the m essag es
of Andrew Jackson and M artin Van Buren* and in
the official re p o rts of Samuel Young* 24
The Indiana constitution prohibited the establishm ent of any
but a State Bank* and this caused a constitutional problem concerning
23

Duncan’s speech is in Illinois L eg islatu re. House jo u rn al,
1838-1839, pp. 18-17.

24

Indiana Democrat* Jfune 13, 1838.
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fre e banking,

t h e Indiana D em ocrat took the position that the con

stitu tio n did not prohibit private banking, but "private banking, if
c a rrie d on in d iscrim in ately by a ll men, would soon entail upon the
comm unity, unless controlled and regulated by the leg islatu re,
evils g re a te r than can be im agined. " t h e r e was no doubt, according
to the paper, that the le g isla tu re could not regulate private banking.
However, the Indiana D em ocrat did not come out positively fo r such
a re fo rm leaving the decision to the legislature*

25

The Whig Indiana State Jo u rn al took issu e with the argum ent
that a g e n eral banking law was constitutional* but it was not an out
spoken opponent of such legislation.

In his annual m essage G overnor

W allace asked fo r an addition of capital to the State Bank, but
could h ard ly be d escrib ed as a violent bank advocate.

He w arned

this should not be done re c k lessly , nor should the le g isla to rs
believe that banks can reliev e the people of taxation.

"E xperience

teaches us the fearfu l lesso n that th ere a re lim its beyond which
if banking p riv ileg es and banking operations a re c a rrie d , they cease
to do good, and becom e engines of incalculable m ischief*tT He also
w arned a g ain st the establishm ent of "swindling shops* " On the
question of bank investigations he argued that the bank as a public
institution m u st be open to the re p re se n ta tiv e s of the people, but he
25

Ib id ., Hovem ber 21 and D ecem ber t , 1838.
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also asked fo r a lim itation on the go v ern o r's ability to call an
investigation*
Is he anxious to secu re an election? What b e tte r
expedient can he r e s o r t to than to m ake w ar upon
the bank? Is it n e c e ssa ry to shield his conduct
o r the com plexion of his p rinciples from too sev ere
a scru tiny, how m ore successfully can he accom plish
this than to join in a cru sad e against the bank? The bank I
Why h o stility to the bank o r banks has becom e in
th ese la tte r days a kind of universal p an ac ea --a cure
fo r ev ery d isease of political p rin cip le --th e v ilest
lep ro sy of F e d e ra lism m ay even be m ade whole by it*
The re p o rt of the State Bank noted that business conditions
w ere im proving and specie paym ents had been resumed*

The bank

ing cap ital of the sta te was sm all and perhaps at this tim e the amount
of sta te owned capital m ight be increased*

While this was the

eventual re s u lt, SamueT Judah led an attem pt to pass a free banking
law in Indiana in 1839*
Judah had been an e a rly follow er of "the Old H ero, " but as
the Whig p a rty developed in Indiana, he becam e one of its leaders*
He was b e st known as a su p p o rter of internal im provem ents in his
state.

He was also a defender and a d m ire r of Biddle*

His position

on state banking w as one typical of m o re p ro g ressiv e Whigs*

26
27

27

Indiana Journal, Novem ber 10, 1838$ Indiana L eg islatu re * Documenfcary Jo u rnal, 1838, Document #!, the quotations a re from
pp. 10, 12-13.
Paul 3U Haworth, "Sam uel Judah, " in Dumas Malone, e d ., The
D ictionary of A m erican Biography (C harles S crib n ers Sons, 1946),
X, pp* 227-228? for Judah on Biddle, Indiana Journal, F e b ru ary
15, 1839.
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Judah som etim es sounded like an advocate of la iss e a faire.
in his re p o rt to the le g islatu re he w rote:
Banking# in all its rela tio n s, w hether dealing with the
p recious m e ta ls and in exchange, or em bracing the
production and distribution of a paper circulation, is
a m e re trade? a b ranch of com m erce; and as such, is
Open to all m en, to a fre e com petition, in all civilized
countries unless re s tra in e d by law.
But he did w ish leg islatio n to "regulate the e x ercise of private
banking" such as the fre e banking law of New T ork.

"The New Tork

regulations fo r private banking, a re the b e st yet devised, " he
argued, because the m ain p rinciple of the law was that notes be
b ased on am ple security*
If am ple se c u rity be given to the public for the
notes it is not easy to discover any well founded
objection to free-banking; none c ertain ly that can
be sustained on ju st p rin cip les; none consistent
with any approved system of P o litical Economy,
can be shown; none but such a s would sustain all
the long abandoned fallacies of tim es past; the
regulation of p ric e s and wages, the duration of
a p p ren ticeships, the prohibition of the exportation
of specie, sum ptuary laws and all those v aried
regulations, by which G overnm ents fo rm erly
attem pted to r e s tra in the freedorajof com m erce,
and to lim it the wants of society
/m *y ita licmms /.
*
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The law s of supply and demand would regulate banking, but they
m ight not p ro te c t the public.

This protection had to be supplied by

se c u rity of sta te o r national stocks.

As an additional bonus this

would c re a te a dem and fo r Indiana stocks, and hopefully it would
"induce m en of w ealth and experience to em bark in the business of

9?

Banking in this state* . . *
His argum ent was m ore thoroughly developed in the debate
on his bill, and its e sse n tia l s p irit was m ore c le arly revealed.

He

denied that his b ill was unconstitutional and a s s e rte d that "we ask
only a *^gtdation of the p re se n t undoubted rights of individuals. "
However, he introduced a new argum ent.

C ertain a re a s of the

state which d e sired banks w ere unable to obtain them under the p re 
sent sy stem .

He w arned that* nWe have no rig h t to expect m en to

a c t in opposition to the dictates of th eir own interest* and especially
this should not be expected from bank d ire c to rs . H An addition of
new b ran ch es in cre ased the risk to all other branches because they
w ere m utually responsible*

It was Judah* s b elief that the d ire c to rs

should hardly be expected to assum e such ris k s without some
29
hesitation*
Judah hoped that a fre e banking law would provide for ’' The
extension of bank fa c ilitie s to various p a rts of the state now d e sti
tute in our p re s e n t system* would encourage commerce* stim ulate
agriculture* and bring fo rth and su sta in m an u factu rers. u H ere was
28

Indiana L egislature* D ocum entary Journal, 1838, .Document #13,
the quotations a re fro m pp. 188* 191* and 192.

29

The debates a re in the Indiana Journal* F e b ru ary 15, 1839.
E xam ples of Whig argum ents against the Independent T re a su ry
using a sim ila r argum ent a re those of Lincoln in B a sler, e d .,
Collected; W orks of, A braham Lincoln* I* pp. 157-179* and of
Jacob M* Howard in M ichigan L eg islatu re. House Documents
Accompanying the jo u rn a l, 1838, Document #62.
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n e arly a rep etition of G overnor Sew ard’s stand concerning the New
York law.

Judah had no fe a r of banks* in fact, p a rt of his argum ent

was th at fre e banking would not^hurt the State Bank* He looked upon
c re d it and banking as positive elem ents of the economy which should
be reg u lated fo r the ultim ate good of the society* 30
In the debate on the b ill Judah received strong support from
R obert Bale Owen* the D em ocratic rep re se n ta tiv e from Posey
County.

Owen argued that Judah’s fre e banking law was republican

in its c h a ra c te r because it opposed monopoly.
It is founded upon the principle from which so
m uch that is good and useful sp rin g s--th e principle
of fre e com petition. It grants to a ll c ertain general
rig h ts --to none exclusive p riv ileg es. .And it r e 
g ard s, as every banking system ought* the secu rity
of the people f ir s t and the p ro fit of the stockholders
afterw ards* 31
The opponents of the b ill em phasised the constitutional
question, but they h ard ly took a position that could be term ed ’’p ro b u sin ess. ” B asil Cham per, a Whig fro m Owen County, believed
such a b ill c le a rly unconstitutional} yet* he acknowledged the n e c e s
sity fo r banking facilities* and urged his colleagues to f ir s t w ait
and see w hat would be the re s u lt of the in crease of the capital of
the State Bank* He was joined by R obert Cooper* a Whig from Henry
County, who believed that Owen was wrong in a sse rtin g the bill to
30

Indiana Jo u rnal, F e b ru a ry 15, 1839*

31

Ibid*
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be "a dem ocratic m ea su re " and that it was re a lly "a private
m ea su re ; a m e a su re for private speculation. . *. " He feared the
depreciation and the d estru ctio n of the State Bank should fre e bank
ing he instituted.

G eorge Cutter* the rep re se n ta tiv e from Wig©

County who was affiliated with neith er party, w arned that the good of
the sta te should not be subverted to sectional feeling o r local
interest*

" P a ss this bill and you put a dagger in the hands of private

32
p a rtn e rs to stab the d e a re s t in te re s ts of the sta te * 11
The m any re fe re n c e s to private d e sire s and local in te re sts,
including Ju d ah 's d isc la im e r of any such in te re sts, indicates that
these w ere fac to rs influencing the voting on the bill*
question h e re is p a rty position*

What is in

The D em ocratic paper in the state

supported the Judah b ill on the grounds that the b ill provided m ore
safety than the State Bank fo r the note holder*

The paper com m ented

on the se c u rity of the Hew Work sy stem and even m ildly defended
the M ichigan system*
say about the bill*

The leading Whig paper had v ery little to

It b riefly a s s e rte d in November that such a law

would be unconstitutional*

While the b ill was before the legislature*

i t p rin ted the .debates* but refrain ed from eith er an attack on the
b ill o r defense of the State Bank*

The Whig p arty "A ddress to the

People of Indiana" in F e b ru a ry acknowledged that perhaps the
State Bank c u rre n c y was not the b e s t possible, but since the system
32

Ibid*
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had been adopted, it was now in the b e st in te re s t of the people to
in su re p ro p er m anagem ent of the system .

In other w o r d s , the

p a rty p re s s does not seem to have fought on the issue with one side
b ittd rly opposing and the other defending the bill.

This am bivalence

of position is rev ealed in the vote which tabled the bill.

The State

Bank was a sso c iated with the Whig ad m in istratio n and seem s to have
been ru n by Whigs.

This would in its e lf go a long way in explaining

why the m a jo rity of Whigs voted against fre e banking and the m ajo rity
of D em ocrats voted fo r it.

Yet, fo rty -fo u r p er cent of the D em ocrats,

a sizeab le m in o rity, opposed fre e banking, and Judah, the Whig
sponsor of the b ill was able to get th irty p e r cent of his fellow party
m em b ers to back fre e banking.

33

In Ohio and Illinois D em ocratic bank refo rm candidates
succeeded in the 1838 elections.
as it m ight have been.

Yet, the p ictu re was not so c le a r

Illinois G overnor Duncan had been a supporter

of Jackson, but he stead ily m oved tow ard the Whig fold* He was
elected in 1834, before the r is e of p a rtie s in Illinois, and rep re se n te d
the R epublican d istaste for the s p irit of party that was coming to
dom inate sta te politics in the late th irtie s .

In 1838 the newly developed

convention sy stem brought the feuding D em ocrats together on a
ra th e r undistinguished com prom ise candidate, Thomas C arlin who
33

Indiana D em ocrat, F e b ru a ry 28, 1839? Indiana Journal, F e b ru ary
15 and 9 ,‘M39? ‘indiatta L eg islatu re. House Journal, 1838,
pp. 501-502.
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soundly defeated Cyrus Edwards* the candidate of the "P eople's
P arty . " The cam paign cen tered on the internal im provem ents
policy and the question of currency.

On the la tte r question the a rg u 

m ent revolved around the Independent T rea su ry plan with little
attention paid to the State Bank.

The D em ocrats b itte rly attacked

the idea of a national bank and called for the "divorce of Bank and
State. " F o r th eir p a rt the Whigs called fo r a sound and uniform
cu rren cy "so that a dollar in Illinois will be equal to a dollar in
New York o r new-a n y -p la c e -e lse . " It was the governm ents's duty
to " fo ste r e n te rp ris e " and ra is e p ric e s.

The V&ndalia F re e P re s s

and B linpis Intelligencer, a Whig journal, declared:
The Whigs would have the fa rm e r obtain $10 a b a rre l
fo r his F lour, and that in money, which would be
receiv ed by the governm ent for lands and other
dues--$ 20 a 'head' fo r his cows and for a s s e s heads
ju st what they a re worth.
Aside fro m low ering p ric e s, it was believed that the Independent
T re a su ry would enhance executive patronage and in cre ase govern
m en tal corruption.

Finally, it would "cre ate two species of currency,

gold and silv e r for the pam pered office holders and rag s fo r the
people, the la b o re rs, and p roducers of the country*

34

Conditions had m easu rab ly im proved in 1838 and specie
resu m p tio n had been c a rrie d out voluntarily by the Illinois State Bank
34

P ease, F ro n tie r State, pp. 136-149, 236-250; C harles M anfred
Thompson, "The Illinois Whigs, " pp. 59-60; the Vandalia F re e
P r e s s and Illinois Intelligencer, July 27, 1838, quoted in
Thompson, p. 60, ftn. 41; Sangamo Journal, October 11, 1839.

102

in August.

This tended to quiet D em ocratic attacks.

When the

question of state banking a ro se , the Whigs generally repudiated the
sy stem and denied resp o n sib ility for the passage of the law creating
35
the State Bank.
C a rlin 's Inaugural A ddress echoed D em ocratic party orth o 
doxy on the causes of the panic and the n e ce ssity of the Independent
T re a su ry to "dissolve the connexion between the Governm ent and
B a n k s--a connexion as unnatural and dangerous as the union of
church and s t a t e .. . . "

The State Bank was not d irectly attacked

by C arlin, but he gave indications of things to come a sse rtin g that
the whole banking system was "rad ically defective* " He chastized
the law s legalizing suspension as violations of m o ral obligations
and as a corrupting influence on the people.
be n e c e s s a ry in a w ell regulated system .

Suspension would never

He w arned against the

growing p o litical influence of banks and called fo r rep eated exam in
ations*

Finally, he exhibited the fe a r that any institutions which

could control the c u rre n c y w hether controlled by the sta te o r private
individuals w ere dangerous to freedom and liberty*

C arlin had

not m ade any specific Suggestions* and nothing was done to a lte r
the Illinois banking system a t that se ssio n of the legislature* 36
35

Ja m es, Chicago.Banks, I, pp. 126-127; Thompson, "The
Illinois Whigs, " p* 66,

36

Hlinois. Governo r, 1838-1842,
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In Ohio the cu rre n cy question also had a place in the
electio n of 1838. As in Illinois and the other states of the Old
N orthw est a g re a t deal of argum ent concerned the independent
T re a su ry question with the D em ocrats upholding the plan and the
Whigs attacking it.

On state hanks the D em ocrats argued that

banking re fo rm was the tru e issu e .

11An A ddress to the People of

Ohio” proclaim ed:
The D em ocratic p a rty one in favor of Bank R eform **in favor of com pelling banks to resum e specie
payment8*»*ia favor of m aking the holders of Bank
stock individually liable for th eir co rp o rate debts - a re in favor of im posing heavy penalties on Banks
and th e ir ag en ts, whenever guilty of usurious
p ra c tic e s; and in favor of annuling the c h a rte rs of
Banks when they have been violated.
G overnor Vance was attacked as an advocate of the "Bank m onopo
lis ts " and his opponent W ilson Shannon was p raised as a leader
of the bank re fo rm fo rce s.

Shannon m ade his position c le ar July 7

a t a speech a t Ravenna in which he called for stockholder liability,
la r g e r specie re s e rv e s , prohibition of sm all notes, and prohibition
of loans to stockholders and d ire c to rs.

37

The Whigs gen erally attacked Shannon for m aking too much
of the bank question.

However, they could hardly be term ed un

c ritic a l defenders of state banks.
37

In his final m essage to the

W eisenburger, P assin g of the F ro n tie r, pp. 347*351, Ohio
Statesm an, July 3* July 31, and July 20, 1838. The official
organ of the D em ocratic p a rty the Globe p raised Shannon’s
speech, Ohio Statesm an, August 14, 1838; and the Indiana
D em ocrat, D ecem ber 28, 1838, showed agreem ent with his
ideas as e x p re ssed in his inaugural.
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le g isla tu re Vance argued in favor of a national bank to control
currency*

The idea of allowing tw enty-six states to each regulate

the cu rre n cy was "totally im practicable and delusive. " Banks, he
believed, originally fulfilled a public function enabling sm all
in v esto rs to sh are in th e ir profits through the purchase of stock
and allowing "the e n te rp risin g c la ss, who have not been favored by
an in h eritan ce of wealth" to "wield capital not often p o ssesse d even
by our w ealth iest individuals* " But this system m ust be controlled
for public advantage not p riv ate p rofit and " subject to the control
of the people through th e ir representatives* " Something m ust be
done about the sta te banks "or a few g re a t bankers, doing business
e n tire ly on th e ir own account, irresp o n sib le to the people, and yet
a t c ritic a l m om ents, able, v ery seriously, to cripple th eir
r e s o u r c e s .. .V Will dom inate.

38

Following the election, Shannon embodied the D em ocratic
idea of bank re fo rm in his m essag e to the leg islatu re , and suggested
th at provisions be in se rte d in bank c h a rte rs allowing the leg islatu re
to am m end, a lte r, o r re p e al them in the public in te re st.

This had

been opposed by m any Whigs, but o th ers such as Vance believed
that such " u ltra ism " in favor of "vested rig h ts’1 only h u rt the party.
In e a rly 1839 the le g isla tu re c a r rie d p a rt of Shannon’s plan into
effect lim iting the issu e of sm all noted and following the example
38 W eisenburger, Fag sing of the F ro n tie r, p. 348; Documents*. *of
the State of Ohio, 1838-1839, Document #1, the quotations a re
fro m pp. 6, 7 and 8*
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of Illinois by prohibiting the issu e of notes to unauthorized e o rporations. 39
Thus was D em ocratic bank re fo rm in the period from the
suspension to mid-1839*

Constantly the party of Jackson denied

Whig ch arg es that it w ished to burden the country with an exclusive
specie cu rren cy .

R ather, it would refo rm the banking system by

prohibiting sm all notes, extending individual liability, and requiring
the resum ption of specie paym ents.

A few D em ocrats w ere out

spokenly opposed to banks of issu e , but as yet* they w ere in the
m in o rity in ev ery state.

The Whigs for th e ir p a rt opposed the

extension of liab ility and the prohibition of sm all notes, but agreed
w ith the D em ocrats on the im portance of the resum ption of specie
paym ents.
11

The events of 1839* p a rtic u la rly the ^second suspension of
specie paym ents in O ctober, signaled a shift in the D em ocratic
p a rty tow ard a fill fledged opposition to banks of issu e .

It was

a fte r 1839 that the anti-bank fo rc e s cam e to dom inate the D em ocratic
p arty .

A nti-bank feelings seem ed to ris e as the economy sank.
In May, 1839* John W entworth renew ed his attack on the

Illinois State Bank accusing it of financing pork and lead speculations.
39

Shannon’s inaugural is in the Ohio Statesm an, D ecem ber 14, 1838;
Joseph Vance to John Sloan, M arch 4, 1838, quoted in W eisenb u rg e r, P assin g of the F ro n tie r, p. 348; Huntington* MA H istory
of Banking and C urrency in Ohio, ” p. 390.
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Although the accusations la te r proved true* m uch of the e a rly
attack fro m D em ocrats was m otivated by the fact that Whigs ra n the
State Bank; and the attack its e lf accounted to a g re a t degree for
Whig defense of the Bank*

40

The second suspension in October led to a redoubled effort
of the anti-bank fo rce s.

Several D em ocratic County Com m ittees

in Illinois p a sse d anti-bank resolutions*

Indiana D em ocrats

attacked the State Bank and called fo r a "constitutional c u rre n c y .11
The Johnson County, Indiana, D em ocrats blam ed the fluctuations
of b u sin ess on the "se iz u re of banks by Whigs" who used them for
political purposes only*

Banks, they argued, w ere only needed to

fac ilitate the tra n s p o rt of the only tru e money, specie; and thus,
it was only n e c e ssa ry to have b ills of la rg e am ounts.

The Indiana

D em ocrat in sisted that it did not oppose banks established on
" c o rre c t p rin cip les" but rejo iced at the renew ed suspension.
It is not because any re lie f w ill be given that
we think the suspension a glorious event, but
it is because, that the tim e is now at hand when
a ll the evils of the p re se n t banking system can
40

P e a se, F ro n tie r State, p. 308; B essie Louise P ie rc e , A H istory
of Chicago (Hew York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1937), I, pp. 154-155.
Sangamo jo u rn al, August 23, 1839; Thompson, "The Illinois
Whigs, " p. 83; Thom as Ford* H isto ry of Illinois (Chicago!
S. C. G riggs and C o ., 1854), pi 22o; C harles M anfred Thompson,
"A Study of the A dm inistration of G overnor Thomas F ord, " in
Elvarts B. G reene and C harles M. Thompson, e d ., G o v ern o r^
L e tte r -B ooks, 1840 -1853 (Springfield* Illinois: Illinois State
H isto rica l L ib ra ry , 1911), p. x liii, a ll support this conclusion*
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be rooted out* *when unsound and swindling
institutions can be wound up--w hen paper prom**
is e s , b ased upon nothing, will no longer be seen,
and when the p re se n t v itiated and false c re d it
sy stem w ill be m ade to yield to a sound, safe
and p ro p er one*
Such a sy stem would be Msteady and prosperous** without the
fluctuations of the p re se n t one.
Ohio G overnor Shannon’s m oderate ’’bank re fo rm ” views
e x p re ssed in 1839 no longer sa tisfie d a la rg e segm ent of his party
and his ’’Whig view s” w ere attacked.

A Cincinnati D em ocratic

m eeting in D ecem ber denounced Shannon's views, proclaim ed gold
and silv e r as the only "constitutional c u rre n cy ” and called the
c h a rterin g of any m ore banks inexpedient.
Illinois b itte rly attacked a ll banks.

G overnor C arlin of

He opposed the legalization of

suspension as ”a fatal blow at the fundam ental law of co n tracts. "
He also believed th at "incorporation of com panies fo r the regulation
of the financial operations of the country, /w as? at w ar with the
genius of fre e governm ent. ” He repeated his e a rlie r charge that
the banking sy stem was defective and "unsanctioned by any principle
of rep u b lican v irtu e. ” The argum ents that the State Bank was forced
to suspend to defend its e lf and that its d estru ctio n would h arm the
people of the state w ere reje c te d by the G overnor.

"We indeed

lab o red in vain,” he said, "in overthrow ing the Bank of the United
S tates, if we should now draw to our em brace an institution above
41

Illinois State R e g iste r, N ovem ber 23, 30, and D ecem ber 25,
1839j Indiana D em ocrat, Novem ber 26, and O ctober 23, 1839.
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resp o n sib ility and capable of inflicting within its own sphere a
still m o re deadly sting* "

42

P erh ap s the g re a te s t shift in attitude cam e in Michigan.
Up to 1839# the D em ocrats often m outhed the standard rh eto ric
concerning banks, but had shown no reluctance to c a r r y through a
free banking experim ent and to attem pt to establish a State Bank*
On the other hand# the D em ocratic p re s s tabbed th eir opponents as
"loco focos* " The two p a rtie s sp lit not on banks as such but on
th e ir attitu d es tow ard specific banks.

The D em ocrats w ere m ost

clo sely a sso c iated with the Michigan State Bank# and it was the
constant ta rg e t of the Daily A dvertiser*

The D em ocratic F re e P re s s

defended the M ichigan State Bank and tra in e d its guns on the Bank
of M ichigan which was m o re closely a sso ciated with the Whigs
because of th e ir g u bernatorial candidate# <3. 0* Trow bridge.

When

the M ichigan State Bank failed in 1839 with $600# 000 of the s ta te ’s
m oney on deposit* the Dally A d v e rtiser g loried in exposing "Iroco
F rau d " revealing that n early ev ery leading D em ocrat in the state
owed the M ichigan State Bank money*

43

42

Springfield Republican in the Ohio State Journal, Decem ber 10,
1839} Bdgar A* Bolt, " P a rty P o litics in Ohio, 1840**1850, " Ohio
A rchaeological and H isto ric a l P ublications, XXXVII (July, 1928),
p. S0$| Ohio Statesm an, D ecem ber IT, 1839; 'W eisenburger,
S^ssing~'of'^ the'"frontier', p. 354; Blinoia* (Soyernor, 1838-1842.
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Daily A dve.rtlaer, August and Septem ber, 1838* and O ctober,
1839 issu e s; D em ocratic F re e P re s s , A pril 18, Septem ber 5,
Septem ber 12, 1838 and M arch 13, 1839; Daily A d y ertiser,
Novem ber 6, 1839*
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By the end of the y e ar a shift in attitude of the D em ocratic
p re s s could be seen.

The election of that y e ar resu lte d in the victory

of the HD em ocratic^W higs1’ led by W illiam Woodbridge.

Elan

F arn sw o rth , the D em ocratic candidate m ay have lo s t as a re s u lt of
opposition of the ‘'ra d ic a l11 elem ents of the p arty who had lo st con
tro l to the ’’conservatives* ” The re s u lt was that the D em ocrats no
longer w ere in power* and within the p arty the elem ent which was
m o re g en erally opposed to banks had control*

44

A ttem pts w ere m ade to a sso ciate the Whigs with the "Wild
Cat" system .

By Septem ber, 1839 the D em ocratic F re e P re s s was

a sse rtin g that the Whigs had a full sh a re in the passage of the fre e
banking law and had organized m ost of the banks under it* Now the
p ap er argued, "the whig p arty headed by th eir wild cat Whig bank
p re sid e n ts, d ire c to rs , and stockholders have the audacity and
hardihood to endeavor to throw upon the dem ocratic p a rty the re sp o n si
b ility of the irred e em ab le issu e of wild cat banks. " It also began to
re p rin t dem ands from other anti-bank D em ocratic organs such as
the Indiana D em ocrat, the Ohio Statesm an, and the Chicago D em ocrat.
The fa ilu re of the M ichigan State Bank cam e not as a blow to the
D em ocrats, but a s a kind of em ancipation which allowed them to be
consistently anti-bank.
44

The D em ocratic F re e D ress charged the

S tre e te r, P o litic al P a rtie s in Michigan, pp. 19-21, 35-37?
" L e tte rs of Lucius L y o n ,11 p* 525. It is my contention that the
"co n serv a tiv e s” such as B e rry w ere the opponents of banks,
while the " ra d ic a ls ” a sso ciated with K orvell w ere not.

no
fa ilu re to DeGarmo Jones and his "Whig frien d s, " and printed a
le tte r fro m the popular John Nor v eil m inim izing the amount owed
the bank by D em ocratic politicians,

The suspension of specie pay*

m eats finally pushed the D em ocrats into an anti-bank stand, seen in
the b latantly anti*bank a rtic le , "Bank C urrency, Min the D em ocratic
F re e P r e s s :
B e tte r be poor than the panders to vice; b e tte r
reduce our c u rren cy to com m odities, than o u r
selv es to be fleeced of our h ard earnings by
fa ith le ss banks and banking in stitu tio n s. . , .
Will the people tac itly p e r m it a bank clique and
p a rty to ru th le ssly e n /t^ /a il these m is e rie s
upon them again in continuous succession, while
ev ery other sta te is restra in in g , re s tric tin g and
guarding its bank issu e s. 45
In h is v aledictory G overnor Mason chastised suspension as
a re s u lt of the "false and pernicious system of banking, " The banking
sy stem m u st be changed to p ro tec t the public by perso n al liability,
a s tr ic te r c rim in a l code, and p riv ate banking.

"Take from them

to th is extent the c o rp o rate veil, which now encourages, and at the
sam e tim e conceals and p ro tec ts th e ir frauds and villainies. "
M ason a ssu re d his audience th at these sim ple re fo rm s would in su re
adequate cap ital and resp o n sib le m anagem ent,

All of these evils

could be tra c e d to the fre e banking law. 46
45

D em ocratic F re e P r e s s , Septem ber 18, Septem ber 25, October
16, 1838, and M arch 11, 1839, the quotations a re from Septem ber
18, 1838 and D ecem ber 11, 1839* DeGarmo Jones was the Whig
m ayor of D etroit and la te r a State Senator.

46

F u ller, e d ,, M essages, 1, pp. 287*289.
but p rin ted In the' Daily F re e P r e s s .

This was not delivered,

in

Revelations of fraud, and unbusinesslike a ctiv ities on the
p a rt of the banks added to the d istru st of banks.

In Illinois this

tu rn ed m em b ers of both p a rtie s against the State Bank.

The Whig

p re s s had tended to m o d erately defend the State Bank and charge
the D em ocrats with the d e sire to estab lish a new bank under th eir
control.

However, individual Whigs seem ed willing to le t the State

Bank die.

Lincoln w ro te John T. Stuart in Decem ber, 1839, that

the le g isla tu re had '*Suffered the Bank to fo rfeit its c h a rte r without
Benefit of C lergy.

T here seem s to be but very little disposition

47
to re s u sc ita te i t . '*
The re p o rt of the legislative investigating com m ittee con
firm e d m ost D em ocratic charges and silenced Whig defenders,
who had been a t b e st m oderate.

It showed that the Chicago branch

of the State Bank had been involved in pork speculation, and that
the b ranch in Alton had been deeply involved in the attem pt to m ake
that city the c e n te r of the lead trad e on the upper M ississip p i

The

State Bank was also c h astised for over lending to d ire c to rs and
m em b ers of the legislature*

O ther violations of the law w ere

rev ealed as w ere gen erally unsound m anagem ent practices*

A

m in o rity re p o rt was even m o re c ritic a l, and argued that an
ex cessiv ely larg e am ount of State Stocks w ere held in the Bank’s
47

Sangamo Journal, Jan u ary 7, 1940; Roy P. E a sie r, edu , The
C ollected W orks’ of A braham L incoln {.New Brunsw ick, New
Je rs e y : ' R utgers .U niversity P re s s , 1953), t, p. 159.
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portfolio.
The D em ocrats m ade as m uch political capital a s possible
out of the d isc lo su res and the suspension, but shied away from
killing the Bank.

The Illinois State R egister continued to urge

m oderation! and the le g isla tu re , which was dominated by Demoor a ts ,
decided that the in te re s ts of the sta te dem anded that suspension
be sanctioned until the close of the next se ssio n of the leg islatu re .
A num ber of Whigs, such a s Lincoln, w ere disgusted by the way the
D em ocrats used the bank issu e fo r p a rtisa n purposes, “detaching a
frag m en t from th e ir p a rty to help the Whigs pass a m ea su re and then
tu rn around and kick and cuff us fo r i t . . . . “ The Chicago A m erican
believed that the D em ocrats w ere adopting a “ru le or ru in '1 policy
ag ain st the State Bank.

Since it would not becom e th e ir “political

engine, “ the D em ocrats had “in a m o st unnatural m anner turned
ag ain st th e ir own bantling, because it had m ore honesty than its
49
fathers* "
During 1840 econom ic conditions im proved slightly, but the
rep u tatio n of the Illinois State Bank was im m easurably h arm ed by
the re p o rt of the investigating com m ittee, and the financial condition
of the state d e te rio ra te d .

A special se ssio n of the leg isla tu re was

48

The m a jo rity re p o rt is in B a sle r, e d ., C ollected Works of
A braham Lincoln, 1, pp. 185*195; Dowrie, “Illinois B anking,“
pp. 90-94; Barnes, Chicago Banks, 1, p. 136*
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Illinois State Beg is te r, D ecem ber 25, 1839; Dowrie, “Illinois
Banking, “ pp. 94-9Sj B a sle r, e d ., Collected W orks of A braham
L incoln, I, pp. 237-238; Chicago A m erican in the D etroit
Daily A d v e rtise r, Jan u ary 31, 1846.
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called to handle this problem ,
suspending*

C arlin again attacked the banks for

Such "u su rp atio n s” fo r w hatever seem ingly good purpose

led to "political slav ery , " "The idea that the people should look up
to /g o v ern m en t/ for a ssista n c e in tim es of pecuniary d is tre s s , is
m o st revolutionary in its tendency*.»* " E specially, when it leads
to aid fo r p riv ate in te re s ts and thus destroys equality.

"In the

pure republican days of the Revolution, m e r it and dem erit, virtue
and vice, alone drew the line of sep aratio n betw een one m an and
another; now the pam pered fed m onopolist sco rn s an asso ciatio n
with honest poverty. " The D em ocrats then chose to in te rp re t the
end of the sp ecial se ssio n as the tim e of term ination fo r the suspen
sion, and they w e re able to fo rce the banks to resu m e over the
p ro te s ts of the Whigs*

This fo rced resum ption m onths before the

o th er banks of the country had begun to pay specie had the expected
result*

The Sank was drained of $455, 000 in specie and fo rced to

c u rta il its b u sin ess d ra s tic a lly increasin g the p re s s u re on debtors
and causing a fall in the p rice level.

The policy of cu rtailm en t

was extended to cover loans to the sta te and this combined with
the Bank’s refu sal to cash sa la ry w a rra n ts caused a m in o rity of
D em ocrats to vote with the Whigs to legalize suspension*

Again

s im ila r provisions re s tric tin g the Bank’s activ ities w ere p a rt of the
b ill.

This tim e the Bank was allowed to issu e b ills in denominations

of one, two, and th ree d o llars to ease the cu rren cy shortage, but
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in exchange fo r this fo rced to take $50, 000 of six p e r cent Illinois
bonds a t p a r ev ery six m onths for the next two years*

B efore this

plan was w orked out Lincoln had w ritten a bank bill to ease the
tight c u rre n cy situation by creatin g a bank that would issu e notes
ag ain st Illinois stock, but this was not accepted. ^
Whig action in Illinois was gen erally in line with the policy
of c u rre n c y expansion through the use of the banking system s urged
by Whigs in the o ther sta te s in 1840 and 1841.
A sp lit in the Ohio D em ocracy over the bank question aided
in the v icto ry of Whig Thom as Corwin,

While not unaware of the

dangers of banking, he also proposed that Ohio eith er accept a State
Bank sy stem or th at the p re se n t banks be re c h a rte re d under the d i
rec tio n of a b o ard of control that issu ed a ll paper and exam ined
the banks.

He would also e stab lish a safety fund, lim it dividends,

and se t am ount of circ u la tio n in relatio n to capital.

N either suggested

plan w as su ccessfu l a s D em ocrats w ere able to block action on any
b ill without individual lia b ility of stockholders.

The Whigs in

M ichigan and Indiana w ere m ore successful, in th e ir p ro g ram of
"bank r e f o r m .fr^
50

Dowrie, "Illinois B anking," pp. 95-100; C a rlin ’s m essage is
in Illinois L e g islatu re . House Jo u rn al, 1840, pp, 18-30; Jam es,
O hlcago'Sanks, 1,''p p .' 137-140 ;~ 'e as e, F ro n tie r State, p. 311.
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W eisenburger, F a s sing of the F ro n tie r, pp. 404-406;
D ocum ents.. . of the State of Ohio, 1840-1841, Document #76.
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The Whig victory in 1859 in Michigan had been complete
giving them control of both houses of the legislature and the gave* Her*# chair. $t was obvious that one question with which the- m m
administration would have to deal: was that of currency and banking.
During the fall* the Pally Advertiser mainly contented itself with

attacks on the Michigan State Bank and assertions that the Democrat®
could only view banks as political machines run by party mem fa
October* it attacked Biddle *s bank for suspending and viewed this
as further failure-of "loco £&mn policy! "
The suspension of the U. S. Bank is'the climax of
the- assertion* that every financial scheme of the
present adm inistration is sure to fall. The pet
Bank system was the first. T h a t failed* The
Pennsylvania DV S. Bank scheme was next.
That has failed. -*Jf even the Sub*treasury goes
into' operation* that will fail. Equally unsuccessful
have been all the fiscal schemes of the loco focos
of this State. They gave us the wild cat system.
That*® gone. They took the State Bank to their
bosom and that sleeps. Tea o&a% make currant
jelly oat of calves heads. BZ
la December* 1839 the newly elected governor received a
series of letters suggesting various plan®. Eob-ert Stuart, a shrewd
Whig politician* saw the main problem as one of adequate currency.
He favored a State Bank* but feared it would either become a
"political engine" or fall into the hands of men who would m isuse it.
Private banks he believed were less likely to fail and less open to
fraud? thus* perhaps the state could take advantage of the Detroit
BZ Daily A dvertiser* October 7* 9 and 15* IBS9*
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banks by diverting in tern al im provem ent funds.

He, like other

Whig co rrespondents of Woodbridge, believed that a State Bank
could not be org anised quickly enough to give adequate relief.

He

was not p a rtic u la r about how it was done but believed that "the
Banks /m u s t/ be enabled to extend that re lie f that is so m uch needed. "
T here w as not enough cu rren cy even to pay taxes le t alone move
crops.

The th re a t of n e ce ssity to resu m e seem ed to Stuart the reaso n

that banks couldn’t provide needed currency.

He believed Woodbridge

should sanction suspension, but fo r political reaso n s c a st this in
te rm s of demanding resum ption a t som e future date,

Stuart had a

g en erally dynam ic view of money like m any Whigs and believed that
only adequate c u rre n cy could revive the economy.

He had no use

for retren ch m en t.
Iw a s p leased to h e ar you re m a rk the other day,
/h e w rote to W oodbridge/ that retren ch m en t alone
cannot reliev e u s, this is so se lf evident to m y
m ind, that 1 was amassed to h e a r a m an 1 had
taken to be w ise and experienced in business, say,
that a ll we needed, was refo rm and digging in the
e arth ; th is m ight answ er if we w ere p reparing for
our g rav es, but if we m ean to live, th ere is a
need of m uch m o re* *. 53
The view th at the leg itim ate function of banks was to
encourage in d u stry and facilitate tra d e , and that cu rren cy had a
dynam ic function in this p ro ce ss was refle cted in oth er le tte rs to
Woodbridge.
53

jn h n A. W ells, a D em ocratic banker turned Whig,

R obert S tuart to Woodbridge, D ecem ber 23, 1839, in the
W oodbridge MSS*

11?

ag reed b a sica lly with S tuart that the g re a te s t problem was a lack of
cu rre n cy and that a State Bank could not be easily form ed.

He

suggested the sta te buy the a lread y ex istent banks, refo rm them,
and m ake sta te o fficers th e ir d ire c to rs .

The m ost novel p a rt of

Wells* plan is his Suggestion (som ewhat like the Populist Sub*
T re a su ry plan) th at the banks lend m oney to fa rm e rs on deposits
of produce a t acc essib le points, with the proceeds of the sale m inus
shipping going to the fa rm e r. 54
Many of these ideas w ere echoed in Woodbridge*s m essage
in Jan u ary .

While he laid the blam e fo r the evils of the currency

a t the step s of the ad m inistration, he analysed the problem as had
S tu art and W ells.

"The m elancholy tru th is now brought home to

ua a ll, that fa r the want of /Sound currency?, the am ple products

of our soil*»the ric h e s t fru it of the toil of the husbandm an, a re in
im m inent danger of rem aining a m ass of u se less rubbish in his
y a rd and g ra n a rie s, because a safe and convenient cu rren cy can
alone fu rn ish the avenue through which an appropriate m ark e t can
be found, " The state was obviously lim ited and C ongress m u st act;
until then som ething tem p o rary m u st be done.

B ecause experience

has shown th e re was not sufficient capital for a State Bank, the
existing banks had to be used to give the re lie f the people demanded
54

John A. W ells to H enry Chapman, D ecem ber 30, 1839, in the
Woodbridge MSS.
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by in creasin g bank issu e s to facilitate m ovem ent of crops*

Wood-

bridge concluded with a suggestion that if the use of private banks
was attempted* they should f ir s t be thoroughly investigated. J
During the se ssio n the Whig p re ss suggested that a State
Bank like that of Indiana was probably the b e st way to supply the
additional two m illion d o lla rs needed to move crops.

"Hundreds of

thousands of d o lla rs w orth of wheat a re heaped up in counties w here
absolutely* th e re is not a sufficient circulating m edium if it w ere
a ll sc rap e d into one pile* to m eet the town, county and state taxes.
S£
This sta te of things is intolerable* and m ust be rem edied. "
The Daily A d v e rtiser was favorably disposed to a plan
p re sen te d to the Senate by a se le c t com m ittee headed by D em ocrat
Samuel E theridge.

This report* which was co n cu rred to by the

Whigs on the com m ittee, exam ined banking in various foreign
co u n tries and concluded that none offered a com pletely safe p re c e 
dent and in g en eral such exam ples w ere "not in accordance with the
genius of our po litical institutions. " A banking system m ust be
e re c te d that fits M ichigan's problem s and aids in re sto rin g prosperity.
Thus a State Bank like that of Indiana was suggested.

Concerning

the question of control, the officers of the state w ere to be m ade
d ire c to rs .

It was hoped that such a system could provide adequate

fa c ilitie s to a ll p a rts of the state and Investm ent opportunities to
55

F u lle r, ed. * M essages, X, pp. 320-324.
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Daily A dvertiser* Jan u ary 17, 1840.
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c a p ita lists * without the m ultiplication of weak institutions as tinder
the fre e banking law, and the costs of the c h a rte r system .

The

com m ittee also hoped that corruption of the c h a rte r system and
political domination as under the Safety-*Fund in New York would
be avoided,

By the com m ittee’s adm ission, it was an attem pt to

gain the advantages of fre e banking without the draw backs.

The

plan fo r such a State Bank never got out of the Senate where it was
opposed by the Whigs.

57

In g en eral the Whigs followed the suggestion of Woodbridge
to m ake use of the D etroit banks {the Bank of M ichigan and the
F a r m e r 's and M echanic's Bank). Dike Woodbridge the m ajo rity of
the com m ittee to consider this question (two Whigs) blam ed the
poor sta te of the c u rre n cy on the Jackson and Van B uren A dm inis
tra tio n s,

Now, " , . . the sta te s a re com pelled to r e s o r t to the m o st

available m eans in th e ir power to su stain th eir own c red it, and
m itig ate, if possible, the em fearassm ents of the people. 11 Thus,
M ichigan 11should not re je c t" the possible use of the already
e stab lish ed banks fo r relief.

To force them to resum e and wind up

a ffa irs would only fu rth e r accentuate the d epression,

Instead of

m in iste rin g to p e rv e rte d "p arty m adness" and "the c lam o rs of
h irelin g p a rtis a n s " the com m ittee hoped that the recom m ended
-U-t-Ui-ii um j i u h u M h m u ^ m w h w i
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Daily A d v e rtiser, January 17, 1840j M ichigan L egislature.
Senate Documents Accompanying Journal, 1840, Document #49,
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m e a su re s could secu re the "b est circulating m edium within the
power of the le g isla tu re to obtain, and to our citizens the m ost
am ple rew ard fo r the products of th eir labor and industry* " It was
a choice betw een this or leaving "the country wholly destitute of
the m eans of liquidating balances between our citizens. "

58

'Throughout M arch the Daily A d v ertiser defended the
"C u rren cy B ill” a s impending the Whig legislation was called.
Uveryone would be h u rt by a "n o -cu rre n cy " policy, and the "C urrency
B ill" would be the b e st way to augm ent the currency.
Without it, inevitable ru in would s ta re every m an
in the fac e--w h eth er m erch an t m echanic fa rm e r
o r la b o re r.
- - I t w ill give new life to every
dep artm ent of trad e . It will enable the fa rm e r
to se ll his produce a t a fa ir p ric e --th e m echanic
and la b o re r to find em ploym ent a t living w ages—
and the m erc h an t to se ll his m erch an d ise to pay
his debts. 59
On M arch 20, the "C u rren cy B ill" was enacted into law
authorizing the sale of the d rafts fo r the installm ent of M ichigan’s
in te rn al im provem ents loan.

These future d rafts would serv e as

the b a sis fo r a loan to the sta te .

In this way the banks w ere to

supply the state with cu rre n cy to pay its c o n tra cto rs,

hi exchange

fo r this the banks w ere allow ed to legally suspend until F e b ru a ry 1,
SB M ichigan jbegislature. Senate Documents Accompanying Journal,
1840, Document #50, the quotations a re from pp. 481, 482, and
483.
59

Daily A d v e rtiser, M arch 7 and M arch 9, 1840.
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1841 and in c re a se th e ir issu e to the amount of th e ir paid in capital.
To th is w ere added a num ber of re s tric tio n s to safeguard the
public,

in an unusual vote the m easu re was c a rrie d in the Senate

w ith every Whig favoring it and every D em ocrat opposing.

One

House D em ocrat joined the tw enty-nine Whigs who favored the bill,
and one House Whig joined the twelve D em ocrats who opposed it.
The C u r r e n c y B ill” was c le a rly a p a rty m ea su re .

The "Whig

L eg islativ e A d d re ss’' took full cred it.
Hot only w ill it enable the state to pay off its
debts, prom ptly, to its c o n tra cto rs on public
works**-and thus enable the co n tracto r to pay
off his la b o re rs --a n d thus enable the la b o re r
to feed and clothe his c h ild ren --a n d thus enable
the m erch an t to pay off his debts $ but w ill
c re a te a circu latio n fo r the purchase of the
fa rm e rs prod u ce--g iv e life to trad e and
c o m m e rc e --la b o r to m echanic - - c re d it to the
sta te a b ro a d --an d business energy and s p irit
to everyone. It w ill not only do a ll this, but
w ill give us, what is indispensable to the su c c e ss
ful p rosecution of b u sin e ss, a sound healthy,
redeem able currency* 60
While Whig confidence in mid-1840 was no m ore justified
than that of the D em ocrats the previous y ear, th e ir program
re v e a ls the e sse n tia ls of the Whig attitude tow ard banks*

They

tended tow ard a c o rp o ra tis t view of the economy with an em phasis on
cooperation betw een governm ent and business and the inter-dependence
60

Gantsa, "A H isto ry of Banking L egislation, " pp. 50-52; M ichigan
L e g isla tu re . Senate Journal, 1840, p. 441; M ichigan L eg islatu re.
House Jo u rn al, 1840, p. 393; Dally A d v e rtise r, A pril 4, 1840.
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of the v ario u s elem ents of the economy.

They favored an expansion

of the cu rre n cy supply to spur economic developm ent and, thus,
b rin g re lie f to the en tire population.

F earing an irred eem ab le

cu rren cy , they chose to base this expansion on bank currency, and
cam e to the aid of the banks they believed to be strongest.
S im ilar attitudes can be seen in the way Indiana Whigs
attem pted to bring about re lie f in th e ir state.

G overnor Wallace

u rg ed leg islatio n th at would provide as much uniform ity as possible
betw een specie and paper.

In late 1840 he c ritic ise d banks that

did not have p ro p er capital and p ra ise d the Scottish system for its
freq u en t settlem ents*

His su c c e sso r Samuel B igger m ade the

Whig position v ery c le a r in his inaugural a d d ress.
When p ro p erly regulated, banks e x e rc ise a bene
ficial influence on labor and e n te rp rise , alm ost
incalculable. When injudiciously or dishonestly
conducted, they a re pow erful in stru m en ts of evils
to the country* and ultim ately, of lo ss to those who
own th e ir stock* They should be w atched with a
jealous eye* not with view to th e ir d estru ctio n but
fo r the purpose of re s tric tin g them to th e ir
ap p ro p ria te sp h eres.
He then w ent on to in s is t that a convertible paper c u rre n cy was
" e sse n tia l to our p ro g re ssiv e im provem ent. "
In it is laid the foundation of the tru e c re d it
sy stem , which is o ur s u re s t protection against
actual m onopolies of c a p ita lists. C redit co n sti
tutes the capital of the poor man* bestowed upon
him a s the re w a rd of his e n te rp rise and in tegrity.
With it he can com pete successfully with w ealth in
a ll its fo rm s. Without it, labor and p ro p erty would
be brought e n tire ly w ithin the h e a rtle ss g rasp of
individual w ealth, whose operations can n ever be
brought under the control of legislation.
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B igger concluded by critic izin g those who would set in te re s t
against in te re s t and argued that the various branches of business
a re m utually dependent and it is the duty of governm ent to p ro tect
each fro m undue encroachm ent of the rest*
was c le a rly delineated.

H ere the Whig position

€>3

'

The State Bank in its re p o rt to the le g islatu re often m ade
the argum ents th at bank c re d it opened opportunity to the poor but
honest and thus kept business from the hands of a sm all group of
c a p ita lists.

T hese re p o rts also com plained that the le g isla tu re was

"m aking the b u sin ess of banking a m a tte r of p arty contest, H and
accu sed its opponents of wishing to rem ove the controls of the Bank
and ‘‘en g ro ss the profitable business of regulating the exchange of
the country. . . . !t^2
The Whigs generally defended the State 'Bank and backed
the leg islatio n in creasin g its stock and authorizing it to issu e sm all
b ills.

At the sam e tim e, they favored leg islatio n prohibiting the

issu e of irre d e e m a b le c u rre n c y by both the sta te and private
e n tre p re n e u rs.

C harles T est charged the D em ocrats with being

61

Indiana L eg islatu re. D ocum entary Journal, 1839, F a r t IJ,
Document #9? Indiana le g is la tu r e . D ocum entary Journal 1840,
F a r t t» Document #8; Indiana l e g is la tu r e . Docum entary Journal,
1840, F a r t I, Document #9, the quotations a re from p. 129*
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Indiana B egiglature. D ocum entary Journal, 1842, F a rt 1,
Document #8, r'p ritM r~ an d F a r t II, Document #?, pp. 168*69.
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in favor of irred e em ab le cu rren cy so that the public would eventu
ally rev o lt and demand a specie currency*

’’Our object, ” he

a sse rte d , ’’should be to give all pro p er encouragem ent to good
banking in stitu tio ns, and th ru st aside the m is e ra b le tra s h with
which the com m unity is threatened* ” He, Judah, and the Whigs in
gen eral favored the issu e of sm all notes by the State Bank in the
hope that these would drive out w orthless sh in p laste rs which they
connected with the D em ocratic party. 63
Although som e D em ocrats ag reed with the Whig views,
the official p a rty reactio n s to these Whig policies show a contrasting
se t of attitudes w ere coming to dominate in that party.

In general,

th e ir view of econom ic society was atom istic, with the various
elem ents of the economy in beneficial (for the whole) com petition.
To them , Whig attem pts to use the banking sy stem o r other c o r 
po ratio n s sm acked of sp ecial leg islatio n and a violation of equality
in econom ic a ffa irs .

In c o n tra st to the Whigs, they fea re d p rice

ris e s and believed that re lie f would only come with retren ch m en t
and the re tu rn to a redeem able currency.
63

They did not tr u s t bank

’’Introduction, ” of Hiker, ed», M essages and P a p e rs of W allace
A dm inistration, pp. 40-41} Samuel Judah to Noah Noble, Octo
b e r 26, 1039 in |h l d ., pp. 277*278; C harles H. T est to Editor
of the HichmoncTW Badimn, January 19, 1841, in Thornbrough,
©d., M essages and P a p e rs of Bigger A dm inistration, pp. 193195; Samuel Judah to E ditor of ’Vincennes Saturday Q azette,
Jan u ary 24, 1841, in Ib id ,, pp. 198-200; Samuel Judah to
E ditor of Vincennes Saturday Q aaette, F e b ru ary 8, 1841, in
Ibid*, pp. 226*228.

m oney, and m any turned to demands fo r a specie currency.

Most

of them d istru ste d governm ent, p a rtic u la rly leg islativ e in terferen ce
in the economy. As the dep ressio n grew w orse the party m oved
tow ard deflation, h ard money, and la isa e z fa ire .
The attack on the "C urrency B ill" by M ichigan D em ocrats
refle cted these attitudes.

A ccording to the hostile m inority re p o rt

on suspension and the use of the D etroit banks for relief, suspension
stru c k a t "the b a sis of civil lib erty " and was a "co rp o rate infringe
m ent of individual right, " What the people wanted was re lie f from
banks and bank frau d s.

Only by resum ption and the establishm ent

of the only "constitutional cu rren cy " could the state re tu rn to
p ro sp e rity .

The D em ocratic p re s s charged that the bill would

provide re lie f only to the b an k ers.

All the Whigs w ere doing was

using the public funds to save the totterin g Bank of Michigan,

Anti

bank a rtic le s charging th e Whigs with being the p a rty of speculators,
m onopolists, and su spensionists w ere printed in the various p apers.
The two them es m o st dom inant w ere that the Whigs favored an
irred e em ab le cu rren cy --"W h ig wild c at c u rre n c y "--a n d that the
Whig leg islatio n w as a trium ph of the "m oney power. " The only
altern a tiv e offered was a re tu rn to "constitutional currency. " To
the D em ocrats the idea that an in c re a se in cu rren cy , cred it, and
p ric e s could spur econom ic reco v ery was absurd,

C urrency was

only the re p re se n ta tiv e of w ealth and had no dynamic function.

The
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only Answer was econom y and retrenchm ent* ^
la the election of 1841 John Berry* an early and consistent
opponent of banks, won the governorship of M ichigan on a policy
of a re tu rn to s tr ic t economy.

In his m essag es of 1843 and 1844 he

b itte rly attacked banks and suspension.

These views w ere echoed

in the D em ocratic platform of 1845 which stated that the p arty was
11en tirely opposed to the fu rth e r in corporation of banks of issu e in
the state* *• * ” B e rry -s su c c e sso r Fetch and the D em ocratic p re ss
joined in th is anti-bank stance* ^
In Indiana the anti-bank attitudes such as those ex p ressed
by E beneser M. C ham berlain and his D em ocratic colleagues abated
a fte r they gained the g overnor’s ch air in 1843.

The new governor

Jam es Whitcomb took typical D em ocratic positions on the causes
64

Michigan L eg islatu re. Senate Documents Accompanying Jo u rn al*
1840, Document #51; D em ocratic F re e Press* January 29,
F e b ru a ry 5, F e b ru ary 19, M arch 11* M arch 18, and A pril 1,
1840; F re e P r e s s . * . Extra,* Jan u ary 24, 1840. It is significant
that on M a rch 11,"' 1840'the' paper re p rin te d an Ohio Statesm an
a rtic le charging that a ll Whigs cam e from the non-producing
groups in society: b ankers, office holders* law yers, doctors,
m e rc h an ts, and sp ecu lato rs.
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The 1841 D em ocratic platform is re p rin te d in Randall, ’’G uber
n a to rial P la tfo rm s, ” pp. 30*37;; S tre eter, P o litical P a rtie s in
M ichigan, p. Zt} Cooley, M ichigan, pp. 294*296} F u ller, e d .,
M essag es, 1, pp. 448-454, 467-68, 489, and 506-507} the 1845
D em ocratic p latform is rep rin ted in Randall, ’’G ubernatorial
P latfo rm s, Mpp. 64-70; Fuller* e d ., M essages, II, pp. 33, 81}
■Democratic F re e P r e s s Septem ber 22, 1845} M arshall Expounder
in the D em ocratic F re e P r e s s , Septem ber 11, 1845; Pontiac
J a c k s o 3 a n in the D em ocratic F re e P r e s s , F e b ru ary 6, 1846.
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of the d ep ressio n , the natu re of money, and the d e sire to ’‘again
seek the ancient land m a rk s of frugality and republican sim plicity
fro m which too m any have unwittingly strayed* “ However, a fte r
he rep laced Sam uel M e rrill as p resid en t of the 3tate Bank with a
D em ocrat, Judge Jam es M orrison, little was h eard about the bank
question in Indiana*

66

As in M ichigan w here m any of the Whigs turned anti-bank
a fte r the failu re of the Bank of Michigan, both p a rtie s becam e
in creasin g ly anti-bank in Illinois a fte r the failu re of the State Bank
in F e b ru ary , 1842* In the election of that year Duncan w as attacked
as “a B ritish Bank Whig’1} and he constantly rep lied by pointing to
his h o stility to banks as governor.

The question that rem ained

concerned how to wind up the a ffa irs of the State Bank.

The new

G overnor Thom as F o rd urged m oderation and was opposed only by

66

E benezer M. C ham berlain to the E ditor Goshen D em ocrat,
D ecem ber 11, 1841, in Thornbrough, e d ., M essages and P ap ers
of B igger A dm inistration, pp. 349-184} Ebeneaser M* C ham berlain to the E ditor Goshen D em ocrat, Jan u ary 15, 1842, in
Ib id ., pp. 395-398} Indianapolis Indiana State Sentinel, January
17, 1842, Indiana le g is la tu r e . D ocum entary Journal, 1843, F a rt
1, Document #8, p. 316} H arding, “The State Bank of Indiana, “
p. 12} B sarey , “State Banking in Indiana, “ p. 257, Throughout
the r e s t of the decade W hitcomb’s speeches did not m ention
the State Bank.
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U sm all m in o rity of ’’u ltra ’’ D em ocrats led by Lym an T rum bull. ^
The period betw een 1843 and 1851 in Michigan, Indiana,
and E linois was an anti-banking period in which the D em ocrats
controlled each of these states*

The governors of each argued

that the econom ic revival re su lte d from the policies of re tre n c h 
m ent u rg ed by th e ir p arty and took a consistently anti-bank line.
In E linois and M ichigan the D em ocratic •’ultras*'' seem to have
c a rrie d the day*

Throughout the decade Wentworth kept up his an ti-

bank b a rra g e , and the m o re m oderate E linois State R e g iste r in sis ted that it was unequivocably opposed to banks.

By the m id -

fo rtie s E linois D em ocrats reg u la rly included anti-bank planks in
th e ir p latfo rm s.
Only in Ohio which cam e under Whig control during this
decade was a sound banking sy stem established.

In the late th irtie s

67

R obert S tuart to W illiam Woodbridge, January 29, 1841, and
R obert S tuart to W illiam Woodbridge, July 16, 1841, in the
Woodbridge MSS; Sangamo Journal May 13, 1842; P ease, F ro n tie r
State, p. 312; Dowrie, ’’Illinois Banking, ” p. 113; Ford, H istory
of Illinois, pp. 297-304. The Whigs charged that T rum bull
had p u rely political m otives. F o rd (p. 304) a sc rib e d his action
to his w ish to aid his frien d s and to his h a tred of Shields and
M cC lernard. P e a se (p. 314) seem s to give credence to these
ch arg es. M ark Krug in .Lyman Trum bull (New York: A. $.
B arn es and Company, In c ., 1965), pp. 38-39, sees T ru m b u ll's
action as Ma m a tte r of principle, " but o ffers no evidence other
than refe ren c e to T ru m b u ll's future c a re e r.
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F u lle r, e d ., M essages, it, p. 81; Indiana L eg islatu re. Docu
m en tary Journal, 1847, F a r t $, Document^#?; Illinois (Governor,
1843-1846; E linois State R e g iste r, F e b ru ary 3, August 18, 1843,
F e b ru a ry 9, and O ctober 11, 1844; F ie rc e , H istory of Chicago,
t, p. 169; C harles H unter O arnett, State Banks of Issue in
Illinois (n. p. M P ublished by the U niversity /o f Illin o is/, 1898),
p. 43.
~
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Ohio went through the sam e p a tte rn that was seen in the other states
with the anti-bank faction withim the D em ocratic party growing with
each suspension as economic conditions w orsened.

As in other sta te s

the Whigs opposed the independent t r e a s u r y and tended to defend
the banks, but they could hardly be pictured as opponents of bank
reform*

Shannon's m essag e that the rad ical elem ents of his party

attacked was applauded by the Whig p re s s which som etim es taunted
the D em ocrats to reconcile the views of Van B uren with those of
Shannon.

By 1840 the leading D em ocratic ed ito rs M oses Dawson and

Samuel M edary w ere vehem ently anti-bank and opposed to Shannon.
This is also tru e of the Ohio congressional delegation.

However,

the m o d era te s retain ed control and re-nom inated Shannon.

This

factional bickering com bined with a larg e Whig turnout put Thomas
CSorwin in the g o v e rn o r's ch air. &9
Whig county conventions called fo r a p ro p erly re s tric te d
banking sy stem affording a convertible currency.
w ere in the Whig platform in 1840*

T hese demands

During the cam paign, the Ohio

State Jo u rn al p ictu red the Democrats* "W ar on c re d it” as a d ire c t
th ru st a t the poor who without the benefit of c re d it w ere a t the m ercy
of the wealthy.
69

It and o th er Whig p ap ers trie d to p ictu re the Whigs

Holt, " P a rty P o litics in Ohio, " XXXVII, pp. 456-5?, 501-503?
Ohio State jo u rn a l, O ctober 23, D ecem ber ?, 1839, and
Jan u ary 4, 1840} W eisenburger, P assin g of the F ro n tie r,
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as frien d s of the common m an, and denied that the party of Van
B uren had the rig h t to the name, 11Dem ocrat. " 70
Corwin suggested two possible plans: a State Bank, or
the re c h a rte r of the p re se n t banks under a safety fund like that of
Hew York*

While a m a jo rity of Whigs seem ed to favor the la tte r

plan, nothing was c a r r ie d through in the sessio n of 1840-41.

The

D em ocrats had in siste d on individual liab ility which the Whigs argued
would allow only the wealthy to invest in hank stock.

A standard

Whig argum ent was that the sm all denom inations of bank stock
opened good investm ents to the "little m a n .,f

71

Conditions w orsened during 1841. In two y e ars from 1840
to 1842 the am ount of specie in Ohio banks declined to alm o st half
of what it had been, and m any banks w ere failing.

The banks them 

selves often in cre ased suspicion by not reporting.

In the le g is 

lative elections of 1841 the D em ocrats w ere v ictorious, and the
county m eetings took violently anti-bank stands.

The defeat of 1840

enabled the m o re ra d ic a l elem ents to gain control of the party, and
attem pts by the banks whose c h a rte rs w ere expiring to obtain new
70

Holt, " P a rty P o litics in Ohio, " XXXVII, p. 510; Ohio State
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ones w ere rejected.-

The rio ts in January* 1342 against the

Cincinnati banks which resu lte d in the looting of th eir vaults received
sympathy fro m the Ohio Statesm an which b itte rly denounced the
b ankers as thieves and hoped "The p e o p le--a robbed, swindled,
and ruined p eople--w ill re s tra in th eir feelings under the outrages
72
of these sh in -p ia ste r g a m b le rs .!t
■Corwin-again suggested eith er a State Bank, which he
seem ed to favor, o r a safety fund to solve the problem .

The Demo®

e ra ts , who seem to have been under "loco-foco" control, although
they again nom inated Shannon in January, pushed a bill through
the le g isla tu re providing that all banks that did not redeem th eir
notes would lo se th e ir c h a rte rs .

They also p assed the Lapham

Act establishing a fre e banking system .

This law was b asically a

"loco-foeoMg en eral banking law that did not embody the principle
of a b o n d -secu red (or even a m o rtg ag e-secu red ) cu rren cy .

Safety

was to be provided by capital stock being paid in specie before
opening, individual liab ility of stockholders and officers* and a
safety fund.

Both of these a c ts w ere p assed by s tr ic t party votes

with the Whigs opposing them .

73
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However, no new banks w ere organized under the Dapham
law even a fte r it was a lte re d in re g a rd to lim ited liab ility in 1843.
The th irtee n banks whose c h a rte rs expired on January 1, 1843 chose
not to reo rg an ize wider the new law and closed th eir doors.

A y e ar

la te r two other c h a rte rs expired*
The Whigs voted solidly ag ainst the am endm ent to the
L»apham law.

They attacked the D em ocrats for playing politics with

the c u rre n c y issu e and suggested that th e re could be no sound
c u rre n cy until the D em ocrats w ere swept from office.

Some Whigs

believed that the c u rren cy question was hurting them and should be
dropped.

O thers hoped the issu e would split the D em ocrats.

C or

win wanted to se ttle the issu e any way practicab le on Whig principles
so th at the D em ocrats would be fo rced to fight on the tariff.

74

The D em ocrats continued to b ick e r among them selves
over the banking issu e .
74

While the ra d ic als seem ed to have control,

Huntingt on, ’’H istory of Banking and C urrency in Ohio, " p. 406;
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Ham lin, "Selections from the F o llett P a p e rs, HI, " Q u arterly
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th ere w ere c ertain ly enough conservatives to m ake that control
unsteady*

Shannon continued to advocate m oderation, and a s late

as 1844 som e conservative D em ocrats ■••including Samuel JLahm
who was p ersonally in te reste d in one of the banks--broke with the
p a rty to vote fo r the extension of the c h a rte rs of five hanks.

When

Shannon was m ade m in iste r to Mexico, his su c c e sso r was Thomas
B a rtley of the anti-•'bank wing of the party*

Me vigorously attacked

sp ecial leg islatio n and p ra ise d the Dapham law as a "general law
of joint stock partnerships* " His position resem b led that of Adam
Smith whom he quoted.

However, his faith in "the laws of trad e,

which regulate and control p ric e s and currency. . . /a n d / a re as
searching, as a ll pervading and as ir r e sis table as the law of
n atu re" seem s m o re than his m entor.

While he favored general

law s, he was opposed to a system with a b an k -secu red c u rren cy
a s "the m o st objectionable and d a n g e ro u s.. . to the independence
and p u rity of the governm ent, and the lib e rtie s of the p e o p le .11 It
would be "a union of bank and S ta te .. . and incestuous and unholy
coalition" like the Bank of England a danger to lib erty .

Only

"punctual conversion" and the use of sh o rt loans "on stric tly
co m m ercial paper" could secu re paper money and prevent its
depreciation.
doctrin e.

Dike Sm ith, he was an advocate of the " re a l b ills"

However, the Whig su ccess in 1843 p e rm itte d him only
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to m ake suggestions* 7 5
In January, 1844 the D em ocrats m et and decided on David
Tod and a strongly anti-bank platform .

The Whigs who had been

su ccessfu l in 1843 nom inated M ordecai B artley, the father of Demo
c ra t Thom as B artley, a s th e ir standard b e a re r.

Although m any

oth er issu e s intervened, Tod found himself':: caught in the conflict
betw een the factions of his p arty and consequently lo st to B artley
7*
who was an ad h eren t of fre e banking. °
B a rtle y 's inaugural a d d re ss carefu lly considered the
banking question.

Of the c u rre n t system s of banking he believed

that State Banks had showed them selves to be little b e tte r than
lo cal banks which gave ris e to corruption and special privileges.
The existing g en eral law w as im practicable*

Probably the New

York sy stem was b est, but it was liable to the objection that it
was controlled by Wall S treet.

T hus, he suggested a tightly r e 

s tric te d fre e banking sy stem with c u rren cy secu red by Ohio bonds
o r Ohio re a l estate*

se c u rity was to be pro tected by the m aintenance

of a 33 1/3% specie re s e rv e against circu latio n as well as the
stocks.

He attem pted to a s s u re his constituents that its fate would
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not be that of the Michigan law because Ohio land that could be used
as se cu rity was cultivated and saleable.

In the State Senate a bill

was brought forth by the Standing Com m ittee on C urrency under
the d irectio n of A lfred Kelley.

Kelley was a somwhat conservative

old Whig who had played a m ajo r role in the sta te ’s canal policies
and was la te r im portant in the fight over taxation.

The K elley bank

b ill bore the pragm atic stam p of the type of w e stern developer
Daniel B oors tin has term ed the "booster.
It was c le a r that the purpose of the bill was both to provide
"a safe and convenient cu rre n cy " and to aid in providing capital
for "co m m ercial and m anufacturing operations. " The Com m ittee
found that a system of a sso c iated banks was m o st popular in a re a s
w here th ere was local capital, and that in capital shy a re a s free
banking s im ila r to New York was favored.

"To reconcile these

conflicting opinions and to extend to the different sections of the
State that re lie f which the people so generally demand at the hands
of the G eneral A ssem bly, " the Kelley bank b ill proposed to estab lish
a State Bank of Ohio and to provide for fre e o r, as they w ere
called, independent banks.

In th is way secu rity fo r the b ill holder

could be guaranteed, while p ro p er inducem ents would be offered
c a p ita lists.
77

The State Bank was not a cen tral bank but ra th e r an

D ocum ents. . . of the State of Ohio, 1844-1845, Document #2;
Wieisenbur'ger,"1P assin g of the F r o a tie r, pp. 420-422. On
K elley see the le s s than adequate biography, Jam es L. B ates,
A lfred K elley: His L ife and Work (Columbus, Ohio: P riv a te ly
P rin ted , 1888).
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a sso ciatio n of twelve branches with capital between $100, 000 and
$500, 000 su pervised by a B oard of Control.

They w ere req u ired

to red eem th e ir notes a t all tim es, and the amount of notes was
lim ited in ration to specie.

As added secu rity each branch was to

contribute ten p e r cent of its notes to a safety fund which was to be
invested in Ohio stocks, United States stocks, o r Ohio re a l estate.
The independent (free) banks could be sm a lle r with capital of
$50, 0G0* The se c u rity for th e ir notes was provided by the deposit
of stocks of e ith er Ohio o r the United States equal to its capital
with the State T re a s u re r who issu ed the currency.
tions w ere also provided for.

Y early exam ina

The Lapham Act was specifically

rep ealed by the new law* 78
Although the K elley b ill included a fre e banking provision,
it re su lte d from the dem and fo r w ell secu red banking facilities in
capital poor a re a s ra th e r than any b elief in the efficacy of the "laws
of trad e . H K elley specifically w arned that the belief that banks
should be fre e a s any other business stre tc h e s an analogy which
too often fails.

A w ell re s tric te d system ra th e r than fre e com peti

tion was the only way that the com m unity could have the benefits of
banks without the dangers of inflation.
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The Kelley bill was a Whig party m easu re that c a rrie d
through the Senate afte r seventeen days of debate by a s tr ic t party
vote.

It was before the House nine days a fte r which a party vote

p assed the m ea su re .

Although som e Whig papers such as the

Xenia T o r c h l i g h t w ere not satisfie d with the bill, m o st Whigs
saw it as a m e a su re n e c e ssa ry to the w elfare of the state.

Most

c a p ita lists m u st have also looked with favor upon the bill, because
tw enty-one new banks w ere organised by the end of the y ear.

In

his annual m essag e B a rtley p raised the new system and credited
the risin g p ro sp e rity to it.

T ru ly a c re d it system was e sse n tia l

to a fre e and e n te rp risin g people*
In those countries w here despotism p rev ails to the
g re a te s t extent, and w here the laboring c la sse s of
people a re m o st oppressed, Banks of issu e a re not
known. Hence it is, in these countries, that the
m an who in indigent in e a rly life, w hatever m ay be
his native ability and energy of c h a ra c te r, ends a
tedious existence as he com m enced it, SO
The D em ocrats, both in the leg islatu re and outside it,
attacked !,The M onster Bank B ill. ” As soon as it was p assed the
Ohio Statesm an demanded its repeal, but such an attem pt led in
the House by C harles E eem elin was defeated by the Whig m ajority.
Statesm an fea red that with the b ill’s passage “a few old bank
80
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hunker nabobs*1 would rule.

The Ham ilton County D em ocratic

m eeting saw it ass "a m onsterous and dangerous system of p a p er”
as did the Cadix Sentinel which equated Kelley with John Law.
It is a m istak en idea that a flood of bank paper will
add to the p ro sp e rity and happiness of the people.
Idleness and vice, speculation and rasc a lity , a re
n e c e ssa ry attendants upon the excessive em m ission
of paper money.
In the Senate, David T» Disney an e x -d ire c to r of the Ohio Life
Insurance and T ru st Company now seem ed to see the true Jacksonian
light.

He believed the b ill m uch too com plex for the people to

understand.

"No w ise, no pure, no sound legislation requires**

the com bination of these two different system s.

It could only lead

to the ru le of the m oney power and the 11ru in of a fre e and independent
people** by flooding the country w ith paper money.

81

When rep eal efforts failed the D em ocrats c a rrie d the
issu e to the people.

Through the use of fed e ral patronage, and

because the K elley b ill was a Whig m easu re, the "h ard s" w ere able
to finally control the p a rty and didicate it to a "h ard m oney*1
co u rse.

The vociferous D em ocrats of Ham ilton County resolved:
* .. that m etalie c u rre n c y has been teste d by the
experience of the ages. On the co n tra ry a ll s y s 
tem s of paper c u rre n c y ev er yet contrived have
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failed* and in th eir inevitable overthrow have
entailed m o re d is tre s s and lo ss, and perpetuated
m o re robbery and fraud than would colonize a
continent with convicts and paupers. Nor have
we seen in the Whig leg islatu re of la s t y e ar any
sym ptom s of a wisdom su p erio r to the p ap erm ongers who have gone before th em --b u t a
compound ra th e r of all shallow schem es of th eir
p re d e c e sso rs. 82
The Whigs defended the Kelley bill, and a s s e rte d that
c re d it was n e c e ssa ry to the p ro g re ss of civ ilisation while ’’h ard
m oney” was m onarchial, savage, and a d etrim ent to the laboring
c la ss e s,

P o r the tim e being the people agreed, and the Whigs

w ere su ccessfu l a t the polls throughout the rem ain d er of the
decade.

83
In each of the sta te s of the Did N orthw est a sim ila r p attern

ap p eared in the banking argum ent.

G radually the D em ocrats m oved

fro m acceptance of banks to bank re fo rm to the opposition of all
banks of issu e.

T heir outlookiwas constantly re g re ss iv e searching

fo r purity, sim plicity, and v irtu e.

When they advocated free

banking, it was generally out of a faith in the “n atu ral laws of tra d e ”
and a d e sire to sim plify and purify the governm ental p ro ce ss.

T heir

opponents did not stand in d ire c t c o n tra st to these ends, but ra th e r
82
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em phasized what we today call economic development.

Banks and

bank c re d it could serv e a dynamic function in this p ro cess.

T heir

outlook tended to be forw ard looking and em phasized opportunity
offered by an expanding economy.

They m oved gradually tow ard

acceptance of the idea of free banking based on stocks.

Such a

system could provide a safe currency, adequate accom m odations
fo r business e n te rp rise , and draw capital into developing a re a s .
The contrasting attitudes of the two p a rtie s tow ard banking revealed
slightly d ifferent views of the Good Society which w ere m o re fully
developed in the constitutional debates of the m id-nineteenth century.

CHAPTER IV

THE DIALOGUE OF PARTIES: FREE BANKING IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 1846-1851

The banking issu e was debated at length in these state con
stitutional conventions at m id-century. These debates reveal crucial
differen ces betw een the parties on the issu e of currency which w ere
connected with contrasting conceptions of the proper econom ic
base for republican governm ent. The Dem ocrats w ere dominated
by the ’’radical" faction of their party which wished to return to the
"only constitutional currency, " sp ecie. This was in line with
their d esire to insure purity and sim p licity in government. Their
opponents, the Whigs, continued to argue than an adequate currency
was n ec essa r y to stim ulate econom ic development. They generally
advocated free banking as the m eans by which this purpose could be
achieved without the danger of an unsecured currency. In each
convention "hard money" proposals w ere defeated by the Whigs and
a faction of the D em ocratic party which was unwilling to give up the
benefits of bank fa c ilitie s.
During the period of recovery following the depression, the
Dem ocracy p ressed in creasin gly for alterations of the constitutions
of the states of the Old Northwest.

Between 1846 and 1851 conventions

m et in Illinois (1847), Indiana (1850), Michigan (1850), and Ohio
(1850-51) to rev ise their fundamental law, and two conventions m et in
W isconsin (1846 and 1847-48) to w rite that sta te’s fir st constitution.
H istorians have gen erally seen the documents produced by these
conventions as the embodiment of Jacksonian governm ental reform .
The agitation for such reform was carried on m ainly by the Dem o
cratic p ress; and when the conventions m et, they w ere dominated by
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the follow ers of Jackson who appealed to the sp irit of the Old Hero
at ev ery turn.

In general the principles se t forth in these con

stitutions represented the ideas of the "radicalMwing of the Dem ocracy
which had com e to dominate the party.

The '‘radicals" lim ited the

function of governm ent, particularly in the econom ic sphere, and
whittled away the positive powers of the legislatu re.

These a lte r 

ations sought to sim plify and make m ore econom ical the governm ental
p ro cess by restrictin g the se ssio n s of the leg isla tu res and su b sti
tuting general law s for the wide variety of specific leg isla tiv e enact
m en ts.

H istorians have too often failed to see that many of these

restrictio n s, the resu lt of the common experience with burdensom e
state debts and cum bersom e demands for special legislation , were
supported by Whigs as w ell as D em ocrats.

For that m atter, both

parties favored universal white manhood suffrage although Whigs
tended toward som e relationship between citizenship and voting
while the D em ocrats w ere blatantly anti-N egro.

Thus, on m ost of

the m ain iss u e s to be settled the parties w ere reasonably clo se .
The a r tic le s on banking rem ain the m ost m isunderstood aspect
of th ese constitutions.
defeated.

H ere Jacksonian principles w ere generally

Everyw here in the Old Northwest the Dem ocracy stood

forth on platform s firm ly dedicated to the extinction of banks and the
return to a "constitutional currency. " Yet, only the 1846 constitution
for W isconsin, which was soundly defeated at the polls, included this
demand.

In every other ca se the Whig idea of free banking prevailed.
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The heated debates on this issu e give a unique insight into the party
differences on the banking issu e, and the way this crucial issu e
functioned within the "persuasion” of each party.
Initial attem pts to ca ll constitutional conventions in the
early fo rties m et with little su c c e ss.

W isconsin voters who feared

in creased taxes and governm ent interference rejected statehood
p roposals four tim es before 1846.

The advocates of statehood w ere

the politicians and businessm en, anxious to build up the territory*
In the 1830"s, the D em ocratic governor, Henry Dodge, had been an
advocate of statehood, but in the 1840’s the Whigs and Governor Jam es
Doty led the campaign.

By 1846 when the issu e was finally decided,

the D em ocrats had swung behind the m ovem ent.

The fir s t con

vention m eeting in 1846 was dominated by Dem ocrats and produced
a "radical" document in line with D em ocratic doctrine.

Leaning on

the experience of Texas and Iowa, this constitution included a pro
hibition of all banks and a gradual elim ination of notes under $20.
The banking a rticle, and one guaranteeing the property rights of
m arried women, m et with general disfavor and the constitution was
defeated.

Later that year a second convention, s till dominated by

the D em ocrats, but with a stronger Whig contingent, m et and drew
up a new constitution that was accepted in 1848.

This document pro

vided that a free banking law m ight be passed if it was subm itted to
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the people. *
V oters in Illinois and Indiana showed a sim ilar hesitancy.
In 1842 th e I llin o is v o t e r s d e m o n s t r a te d a g e n e r a l in d if f e r e n c e b y

voting down a proposed convention to rev ise the constitution.

By

184-6 sufficient in terest had been aroused so that a convention was
sanctioned by the voters.

A se r ie s of unsuccessfu l attem pts to call

a convention to r e v ise the Indiana constitution preceded the narrow
acceptance of the idea in 1846.

Fewer than half the Indiana voters

who voted for the governor registered an opinion on the question.

2

While the Illinois convention m et in 1847, constitutional
problem s and p olitics delayed Indiana’s for nearly five y ea rs.

The

public had exhibited little in ter est in the question, but constitutional
rev isio n was pushed by the Dem ocrats and their organ the Indiana
State Sentinel.

About this tim e the national Dem ocracy, through

the agency of the Dem ocratic Review called for the revision of the state
constitutions and laid down the lin es to be followed.

Although revision

1

L ouise Phelps K ellogg, "The A dm ission of W isconsin to State
hood, n and F red eric L. Paxson, ” W iscon sin --A Constitution of
D em ocracy, *' in Milo M. Quaife, e d ., The Movement for Statehood,
1845-46 (Madison, W isconsin: the State H istorical Society, 1918),
pp. 18-29, 30-52.
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stitution Making in Indiana (Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana
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had not been a party issu e in 1845, the calling of a convention cam e
to be looked upon as a D em ocratic m easure and drew opposition
from the Whigs.

In 1846 the W hig-controlled Indiana legislatu re

refused to support the call for a convention on the ground that
legitim ate doubt existed as to the w ish of the people and the con
stitutionality of such a convention.
Dem ocrats pushed the issu e .

During the next two years the

Twice in 1848 Governor Jam es

Whitcomb advised calling a convention in order to rid the state of
the ev ils of sp ecial leg isla tio n and cut the expense of government.
The D em ocratic State Convention which m et in early 1849 echoed
this demand.

The opposition from the Whigs was m oderate.

G enerally, they argued that there seem ed no indication the people
wanted change.

Here and there w ere indications that the Whigs

feared the convention m ight perm it slavery in the southern counties.
Finally, a new call for a convention passed the legislatu re in early
1849 with little opposition, was accepted by the people, and the
convention m et in 1850.

3

While the Indiana convention m et, sim ila r bodies convened
to a lter the fundamental law of Ohio and Michigan.

The D em ocratic

governor of Michigan, Alpheus Felch, led the agitation for reform of
the constitution, but the question of a convention was not really a
party issu e .

3

In the election of 1849, which returned the tigh t-fisted

I b id ., pp. x x v i-b a aciii.
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John B arry to the governor’s chair, the voters favored the calling of
a convention by a large m argin.

What opposition the question received

cam e from Whigs, but it appears that m ore Whigs voted for the
convention than against it.

4

The fight over the calling of a convention in Ohio was
m ore a clea r cut party contest with the Dem ocrats again leading
the demands for revision .

In 1843 Governor Wilson Shannon

suggested the calling of a convention, and after the passage of the
K elley Daw in 184-5, the Dem ocrats increased efforts to get the
leg isla tu re to act on constitutional revision .

The Whigs, who feared

D em ocratic "ultraism ” and the p ossib le destruction of the banking
system , w ere able to block such attem pts in 1847 and 1848.

Certain

Ohio Whigs w ere w orried that the Dem ocrats m ight institute Negro
suffrage as w ell as elim inate banks, but the Whig governors,
W illiam Bebb and Seabury Ford, better represented the m ajority
of the party when they attacked the '’Black Daws” and accepted the
idea of constitutional revision .

Both the Dem ocratic and F ree Soil

platform s in 1848 endorsed the idea of a convention.

Throughout

the year Samuel M edary’s Ohio Statesman and a w eekly sp ecial The
New Constitution kept up the demand for a convention.

The following

year the Whigs gave up their opposition and the voters of the state

4

F red erick W. Stevens, M ichigan Constitutional Convention of 1850
{n. p ., n. d. ).
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endorsed the calling of a convention.

5

Within the m atter of four years six conventions had m et
and rev ised the constitutions of the five states of the Old Northwest.
The "radical" or as they called th em selves " P ro g r e ssiv e s1' within
the Dem ocracy led the battle for reform..

Most Whigs took a

"conservative" position on the question of change, and agreed with
the Indiana State Journal:
A change in the fundamental law should not be made
for triv ia l ca u ses. It ought to be made only to
abrogate som e great wrong resulting from its pro
v isio n s. Frequent changes impair the resp ect in
which a constitution to be valuable ought to be held
by the people. 6
The dichotomy of the " P rogressive" Dem ocrats and the "con
servative" Whigs is alm ost universal in the h isto rica l literature on
the period.

Too often these lab els have been allowed to take on

twentieth century connotations, and content in the context of the
1840's is ignored.
The Dem ocrats who took the initiative in the m ovem ent for
constitutional reform had a fa irly w ell defined program in which
banking reform played a central role.

This set of reform s made

up the content of " P r o g re ssiv ism ” in its ante-bellum form.

5

W eisenburger, P assin g of the F rontier, pp. 478-79; Roseboom,
Civil War Era, pp. 124-35.

6

Indiana Journal, January 5, 1847.
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M edary's Ohio Statesm an carried on its m asthead the basic
principles of the " P ro g ressiv e” Democracy: "The Sovereignty of
the P eo p le--T h e Rights of the States, and a Light and Simple Govern
m ent. " The general principle that "that governm ent governs b est
which governs least" was accepted as the only sure guard against
encroachm ents on individual liberty.

In the m id -forties Medary

em phasized this in terest in the individual:
The true dem ocrat wars against the existing state of
so ciety which is built upon the supposition that men
are of le s s value than property. The real character
of the contest of which this country is the scene is a
war betw een man and money. The dem ocracy
advocate the right of revolution, of universal suffrage,
of freedom of trade, of overthrow of banks, of the
establishm ent of a constitutional currency. 7
In this there was a m oral im perative which equated m oney
with power, and power with corruption.

E ssentially, it was a se c u la r 

ized v ersio n of the conflict between Christ and the anti-C hrist.

All

virtue emanated from the people, all corruption from the "money power. "
The Milwaukee Courier a sse rted that m en w ere "able to trace the
a r tific ia l inequality of wealth, much pauperism and crim e, the low
state of public m o ra ls, and many of the other ev ils of society d irectly
to this / paper m on ey/ system . " Experience with broken banks and a
debased currency, and the stru ggles to repay the huge internal im prove
m ents debts seem ed to dictate sim p licity and econom y as the only

7

W estern Review, 1846, p. 208, quoted in Henry C. Hubbart,
The Older Middle West (New York: R u ssell and R u ssell, 1963),
p. 11.
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proper course.

Indiana’s governor, Jam es Whitcomb, warned

against sw elling porsperity that might induce another ’’orgy” of
speculation.

"The sure and only sure rem edy against this threatening

evil, is, the observance of econom y and industry, and above all, to__
O
r e s is t the allurem ents of credit. "
This outlook dictated a certain number of reform s which
the Dem ocracy agitated for in all of the w estern states.

On the

question of universal suffrage Medary was somewhat at variance
with his Negrophobia party.

In reality the "Progressive" Dem ocracy

stood for universal white manhood suffrage and they w ere w illing to
extend this right to resident a lien s.

Although there was som e

deviation within the party, particularly among the "Old Hunker"
faction, the D em ocracy a lso advocated the election of all state officials
including judges.

This would reform the government to m ore nearly

rep resen t the people.

9

In addition to making the governm ent m ore rep resentative, the
" P rogressive" D em ocracy w ished to check the tendencies toward c o r 
ruption and governm ental intrusion on individual rights.

The target of

8

Milwaukee C ourier, Novem ber 18, 1846, reprinted in Milo M.
Quaife, e d ., The Struggle Over Ratification, 1846-1847 (Madison,
W isconsin: The State H istorical Society, 1920), pp. 200-202;
Indiana L egislatu re. Documentary Journal, 1847, Part I,
Document 7, em phasis in the original.

9

The following gen eralizations are based on numerous iss u e s of
the D em ocratic new spapers, the ad d resses of the Dem ocratic
governors, and speech es made in the conventions. Only sp ecific
quotations or referen ces w ill be cited.
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of this agitation was the leg isla tu re which was held responsible for
the ev ils of debt, banking, and sp ecial p rivileges.

In m ost ca ses the

Dem ocrats advocated a strong veto and viewed the executive as the
representative of the w ill of the people.

As the em phasis on the veto

indicates, the ex ecu tiv e’s functions w ere conceived in negative term s.
His duty was to protect the people's rights from violation by the le g is 
lature.

The D em ocrats looked upon the legislatu re as a center of

corruption rather than as a representative body.

It was the arena

in which the power of m oney and in terest held sway.

It was responsible

for the ruinous internal im provem ents projects and the depreciated
currency.

It saddled the people with a com plex and confusing body

of "unnecessary law s, " and fostered special privilege.
done at a trem endous expense to the taxpayer.

All this was

In order to make the

leg isla tiv e p ro cess cheaper and rid the states of the in eq u ities of
sp e cia l leg isla tio n , the Dem ocracy advocated general law s.

If this

reform was im plem ented}the leg islatu re would be able to conduct its
n e c e ssa r y b u sin ess in m uch shorter tim e making biennial or even
triennial se ssio n s p ossib le.
to the taxpayers.

This would m ean a tremendous saving

By substituting general laws for the numerous instances

of sp ecia l leg isla tio n , equality, sim p licity and econom y could be
achieved.
.Even with this reform , the tendencies toward corruption had
to be blocked in certain sp ecific instances.

Constitutions w ere thought
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to protect the people from the e x c e sse s of legislatu res and, in
particular, should set a lim it on the siz e and nature of the public
debt and elim inate banks of issu e.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer spoke

for m ost of the "P rogressive" Dem ocracy when it said,
It m ust not be left to the corrupt cupidity or caprice
of future L egislatu res to say whether this State shall
be dotted over with Bank Corporations or cut up
with Plank and R ail Road Corporations, with such
tyrannical and exclu sive p rivileges as shall make
them m a sters, we their sla v es. 10
While som e Dem ocrats seem ed w illing to support a w ell
guarded banking sy stem , everyw here the party as such stood solidly
opposed to any banks.

By the m id -forties the Dem ocracy of every

state in the Old Northwest except Indiana had written into the party
platform a demand for the elim ination of banks of issu e and a speedy
return to the "constitutional currency, " The Dem ocratic governors of
Michigan and Illinois echoed these demands in ad d resses to their
leg isla tu r e s.

11

In Indiana a ll of the standard demands for biennial se ssio n s,
general law s, and lim itations on the state debt w ere aired by the
governors and the State D em ocratic convention,but the banking issu e

10

Cleveland Plain D ealer, February 27, 1850, quoted in Roseboom,
Civil War Era, p. 127.

11

For exam ple see: Ohio Statesm an, January 8, 9» 1846; Illinois
State R egister May 5, 1848; Randall, "Gubernatorial Platform s, "
p. 66} Milwaukee Courier, Decem ber 30, 1846, in Quaife, e d .,
Struggle Over Ratification, pp. 204-207; F uller, e d ., M essages,
II, pp. 173-5; Illinois L egislature. House Journal, 1846-47,
pp. 8-17.

152
was sidestepped.

However, by the late 1840* s the liard m oney elem ent

bad considerably in creased their power.

A lengthy lis t of Dem ocratic

demands urged by the Goshen Dem ocrat in late 1848 included the r e 
vision of the banking system .

By 1850 the Indiana State Sentinel was

listin g the abolition of banks of issu e and a return to the "constitutional
currency" as b asic principles of the D em ocracy.12
The m ajority of the party favored the com plete abolition of
banks of issu e and the use of an exclu sive specie currency, or at
le a st one with no b ills under $20.

This was the view put forth in the

party*s platform s, adhered to by Democrat governors in their ad d resses
to the leg isla tu re, and championed as the "true te st of Democracy!'
by the leading party organs in every state.
B ecause the Dem ocrats favored general laws in m ost c a se s,
their attitude towards banking should not be confused with an advocacy
of free banking as it is being considered here.

Their ideas are

vehem ently opposed to any type of inflation and are, in fact, harshly
deflationary.

They w ere opposed to banks of all kinds, not m erely those

created by sp ecia l ch arters.

Leading Dem ocrats like John Barry of

M ichigan and Augustus French of Illinois made it clear that free banking
was no better than any other system .

Barry b elieved the argument

for a stock secu red currency was "as indefensible as others that have

12

Indiana L eg isla tu re. Documentary Journal, 1845, Part I, Docu
m ent 4, and 1848, Part I, Document 6; Indiana State Sentinel,
March 19, May 28, 1846, and January 11, 1849; Goshen Democrat,
D ecem ber 27, 1848, in Indiana State Sentinel, January 31, 1849;
Indiana State Sentinel, January 1, 1850.
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preceded it. " While French's 1846 m essage seem s to have been m is 
understood by som e people as favoring free banking, he made it quite
clea r that along with a few, sim ple, general laws he advocated the
com plete prohibition of banks.

In 1849 he saw nothing "to recom m end

the new sy stem j/free banking/ over the old chartered institutions. "
Two years later he told the leg isla tu re that free banking was only a
way to cover up the "odious features" of banking by "show. " It would
seem that the m ajor sou rces of Dem ocratic thought agreed with the
Ohio P r e ss which b elieved that the D em ocracy would "reform banking
by the entire abolition of all chartered and special p rivileges and by
a return to the constitutional currency of gold and silv er. "

13

B ecause of the two party nature of Am erican p olitics, it is
seductive but dangerous to conceive of one party as the antithesis of
the other.

This tendency is encouraged by party rhetoric which

attem pts to picture the opposition as antithetical to the in terests of the
people which they claim to represent.

In the argument over constitu

tional rev isio n the Dem ocrats charged that the Whigs opposed the
in ter ests of the people by resistin g universal suffrage, advocating an
irred eem ab le paper currency and generally defending the in terests of
the p rivileged m onopolies.

13

Since the Whigs w ere after all a political

F u ller, e d ., M essa g es, II, p. 173; Orlando B. F ricklin to A.. C.
French, Decem ber 30, 1846, in French MSS; Illinois L egislatu re.
House Journal, 1849, pp. 8-17; Illinois Governor, 1846-1853;
the Ohio P r e ss , July 23, 1847, quoted in Huntington, "History
of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " p. 434.
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party contending for power and would hardly admit to these charges,
the Dem ocrats generally charged that the Whigs tried to fool the
people.

The Daily Lafayette /^Indiana? Courier said of the Whig

prin cip les, "In relation to the great subject of constitutional reform ,
there appears to be a studied effort to deceive. " While it is not
hard to see why the Indiana Dem ocracy would make such a charge,
it is rather surprising that m ost historians have believed th em .14
While the Whigs w ere on the defensive in the fight over
constitutional rev isio n and spent a great deal of tim e denying the
D em ocratic charges, they did present a program for reform .

It is

this program which m akes up the content of Whig "conservatism . "
When exam ined in detail, it proves hardly to be the antithesis of
D em ocratic " p rogressivism . ”
On m ost of the m ajor questions concerning dem ocratic
governm ent the Whigs and their opponents w ere very clo se.
parties advocated electin g state officials including judges.
parties favored universal white manhood suffrage.

Both
Both

A m inority of

the Whigs w ished to extend suffrage to the Negro population and there
w ere probably as many Whigs as Dem ocrats who favored fem ale
suffrage.

In any ca se the number was very sm all in both parties.

The only rea l difference on this question was that the Whigs usually

14

Daily Lafayette Courier, March 1, 1850, reprinted in Kettieborough,
e d ., Constitution Making in Indiana, pp. 212-13. The Dem ocratic
point of view is ex p ressed in the h isto ries of W eisenburger, Holt,
Roseboom , E sary, Kettieborough, P ease, Cole, Paxson, Streeter,
and Hubbart.
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w is h e d to l i m i t s u f f r a g e to n a tiv e a n d n a t u r a l i s e d c i tiz e n s .

T he

p a r t i e s a g r e e d o n is s u e s c o n c e r n in g s o c ia l d e m o c r a c y lik e th e e l i m i 
n a tio n of im p r is o n m e n t f o r d e b t a n d th e e x e m p tio n of h o m e s te a d s
a n d to o ls in b a n k r u p tc y p r o c e e d in g .

B o th p a r t i e s f a v o r e d p u b lic

s c h o o ls a lth o u g h th e W higs w e r e m o r e e n e r g e tic on th is is s u e an d
s o m e h a d o p p o s e d th e c a llin g o f a co n v en tio n , b e c a u s e th e y f e a r e d
th e D e m o c r a ts m ig h t do a w a y w ith th e p u b lic s c h o o l s y s te m .

On one

s u c h is s u e , th e D e m o c r a ts w e r e s i l e n t w h ile th e W higs took the lead
in a tta c k in g la n d m o n o p o lie s .

In W is c o n s in th e y w is h e d to r e s t r i c t

th e o w n e r s h ip o f la n d to 640 a c r e s so “ th a t th e s o il of th e s ta t e m a y
n o t p a s s f r o m th e m a n y to th e few . a c c o m p a n ie d w ith a la n d e d
«

a r i s t o c r a c y a n d o p p r e s s e d te n a n tr y . n

IS

The W higs d iffe re d f r o m t h e i r o p p o n e n ts on th e v e to p o w e r,
a n d te n d e d to s e e th e l e g i s l a t u r e a s th e tr u l y d e m o c r a tic e le m e n t of
th e g o v e r n m e n t.

T h is d o e s n o t m e a n th a t th e W higs d id n o t a d v o c a te

s o m e r e s t r i c t i o n s on th e le g is la tu re * ® p o w e r,

T h e y u s u a lly jo in e d

t h e i r D e m o c r a tic o p p o n e n ts in w is h in g to s e e a li m it a ti o n p la c e d on
th e s ta te * s p o w e r to in c u r d e b t, s p e c ia l l e g is la t io n g iv e w ay to g e n e r a l
la w s , a n d b ie n n ia l s e s s i o n s in o r d e r to s a v e th e ta x p a y e rs * m o n e y .

15

T h e M a d is o n E x p r e s s , J u ly 28, 1846, rep rin ted in Quaife, ed*,
T h e M o v e m e n t f o r S ta te h o o d , p p . 1 5 4 -5 6 . A s w ith th e D e m o c r a tic
a r g u m e n t, th e g e n e r a liz a tio n s a r e d ra w n f r o m a w id e v a r i e t y o f
s o u r c e s a n d o n ly s p e c if ic q u o ta tio n s o r r e f e r e n c e s w ill b e c ite d .
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Where the two parties cam e into direct conflict was on the
question of banking.

H ere the Whigs took a positive stand that was

cle a r ly at odds with D em ocratic anti-bank Mhard money, ,r positions.
By the m id -fo rties the free banking elem ent had come to dominate
the Whigs and, in every state, they stood for expansion of cred it and
the establishm ent of a secu re currency through free banking.

A

typical Whig editorial reported, "We voted for a Constitutional con
vention b ecause we wanted the following changes: Biennial sessio n s;
electin g of judges and all other officers; a general /Tree/ banking law;
a hom estead exem ption law; fines to go to the school funds of the
township.
State conditions caused som e variations in the argum ents.
Where there w ere no banks, as in M ichigan and Illinois, the Whigs
w ere cle a rly and alm ost unanimously in favor of free banking.

Ohio

Whigs stood solid ly for retention of the K elley Law which combined
free banking and a State Bank with branches.

In Indiana the party

sp lit betw een groups wishing to retain the State Bank which had p er
form ed so w ell and those wishing credit expansion through free banking.
As the convention showed, these factions of the Whig party w ere not
en tirely at odds.
The situation in 'Wisconsin was com plicated because the Whigs
in powerful Dane County--the county in which the capital, Madison,
is located --p a.ssed a resolution in favor of "a direct and positive prchi-

16

Quoted in E sary, H istory of Indiana, I, p. 513, ftn. 10.
Indiana Journal, January 7 and March 23, 1850.

See also:
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bition against the granting by legislatu re of any charter for banking
purposes, or the passage of any law whereby any monopoly or any
sp ecial ex clu siv e rights and p rivileges m ay be conferred for private
purposes. " Several days later the Whig paper, the Madison E xpress,
explained that they agreed with the rest of the Whig party that a
m ixed currency was essen tia l to national prosperity and that it was
only at that particular tim e that su ccessfu l banking in W isconsin faced
a number of o b sta cles.

The situation was com pared with that of

Michigan in the 1830’s and banking should wait until the public was
secu red against a sim ila r failu re.

Other Whigs in the state took a

m ore p ositive attitude toward free banking.

In particular the dynamic

young John H. Tweedy urged the adoption of a free banking system
like that in New York.

The Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette also took

this position, and in the 1846 convention it was the Wliigs who attempted
u n su ccessfu lly to have free banking principles written into the con stitution. 17
Failing in their attem pt to have free banking accepted by the
convention, the Whigs organized the opposition to the constitution and
defeated it.

17

During the fight over the 1846 constitution one of the m ost

Madison E xp ress, July 28 and August 4, 1846, and the Milwaukee
Sentinel and Gazette, October 9, 1846, in Quaife, e d ., The M ove
m ent for Statehood, pp. 154-56, 157-59, and 209-10; Paxson,
nW isco n sin --A Constitution of Dem ocracy, pp. 38-40; Milo
Quaife, e d ., The Constitution of 1846 (Madison, W isconsin: The
State H istorical Society, 1919), pp. 185-186, for Tweedy's attempt
to include free banking, and Appendix 1, roll call #17, for vote
defeating this m easu re.
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avid opponents of banking, Edward Ryan, wrote a fellow Dem ocratic
leader:
The opposition m ay talk about m arried women and
exem ption, but here along the Lake shore, at all
events the real opposition is to the restriction s
against banks, internal im provem ents and state
debt. A new convention, elected as it would be by the
opponents of the present constitution if they succeed
now, would give us the old brood of corruption.
Another Dem ocrat b elieved that the opponents of the constitution in
the ea stern part of the state w ere openly "declaring and preaching
for banks. " The Whig p ress spoke clea rly in favor of free banking.
When the second convention m et the Whig influence was in creased and
a free banking provision was accepted in the new constitution which in
other ways did not alter the 1846 document.

It seem s clear from the

preconvention agitation of the question that the Whigs stood for free
banking against the D em ocratic demand for the com plete prohibition
of banks of issu e .

18

In the cou rse of the convention debates the appeals of the
two parties w ere fu lly developed and the strength of the various
factions within the parties revealed.

The Dem ocrats had m ajorities

in a ll the conventions, and nearly com plete control of those of W isconsin
and Michigan.

As a consequence of this, m ost of the oratory came

from the Jacksonians and not a little of it was directed as m uch to

18

E. G. Ryan to M oses Strong, February 8, 1847, and J. G. Knapp
to M oses Strong, March 21, 1847, quoted in Paxson, "W isconsin-A Constitution of Dem ocracy, " pp. 46, 47.
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their constituents as to their fellow convention m em bers.

However,

the issu e gave r ise to intra-party feuding which caused John Palm er,
an Illinois Democrat, to p raise the Whigs for having 11shown so much
judgement and d iscretion as to keep silent, and leave this war entirely
in the hands of the ‘harm onious' d em o cra cy .. . . ”

19

R egardless of the intra-party strife it engendered, the
banking debate did reveal the ideas of the D em ocracy on the subject.
If one had to pick a sin gle document embodying the m ost widely
accepted D em ocratic view s it would be the M ajority Report from the
Com m ittee on Banks and Currency in the Ohio convention.

This

report was presented by John Harwell, a m erchant from Wayne County
and an avowed "hard m oney” Dem ocrat.

It was signed by the other

three D em ocratic m em bers of the com m ittee with the only dissent
20
com ing from the Whigs.
This report suggested that the constitution prohibit the form a
tion of any new banks of issu e, and forbid the "circulation /_ of_/ any
bank notes or paper of any d escription ” by any corporation or a s s o c i
ations then in ex isten ce.

In defending this total prohibition of banks

19

Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 169-70.
quotations and referen ces w ill be cited.

As above only sp ecific

20

J. V. Smith, reporter, Report of the Debates and Proceedings
of the Convention for the R evision of the Constitution of the
State of Ohio, 1850-51 (Columbus, Ohio: S. Medary, Printer to
the Convention, 1851), I, pp. 707-708. This w ill be referred to
as Debates of Ohio.
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and paper m oney the Report m ade five argum ents which had been
p ressed by D em ocrats in every state.
According to the Ohio Report, "The great objection to the
policy of the paper m oney banking system , co n sists in its corrupting
and dangerous p olitical tendency and the stupendous frauds, and the
occasion al exten sive d isa ste rs fco which invariably, sooner or later,
resu lt from it. " In establishing the m oral case against banks of
issu e , the Dem ocrats appealed to the authority of Jackson, whom
one ca lled "a man of as rem arkable sagacity as ever lived, 11 and
built upon the argum ents and rhetoric which had evolved in the course
of the previous decade.

To the fie r y editor o£ the Detroit F ree P r ess,

John S. Bagg, the issu e was clear:
Our governm ent is based upon equal rights--banks
upon fraud and corruption; and no man dare deny
that they are unequal in their p ractices; a bundle of
ab su rd ities, of hypocrisy and incongruity, from
their com m encem ent ot their death; and in justice
to equal rights let us have no banks. 21
In the destruction of equal rights, the banking sy stem p er
m itted the growth of a m onied a risto cracy with no productive econom ic
function.

Most Democrats: b elieved that, "All wealth is the resu lt of

Debates of Ohio, I, p. 70S; H. Fow ler, reporter, Report of the
Debates and P roceedings of the Convention for the R evision of
the Constitution of th e . State of Indiana. 1S50 (Indianapolis, Indiana:
A. H. Brown, P rinter, 1856), p. 221; Report of the Proceedings
and Debates in the Convention to R evise the Constitution of the
State of Michigan. 1850 {JL-ansing, Michigan: R. W. Ingals,
State P rinter, 1850), p. 692. These w ill be referred to as
Debates of Indiana and Debates of Michigan*
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labor, yet, strange enough the m an who does the labor never has
the wealth. " This was because "the whole system of paper m oney
is a tax upon labor, produce and com m erce. " Wealth created by the
producing c la s s e s was shifted "to a cla ss who produces nothing* " the
m o n ie d a r i s t o c r a c y .

22

However, this m onied a ristocracy was not sim ply destructive
to republican equality*

It rep resented the source of corruption of

the entire p olitical system .

In every convention the Dem ocrats

brought forth the argum ent that the constitution had to prohibit banks
and paper m oney in order to protect the people from the reck less
actions of leg isla tu res e a sily corrupted by the "money power, " In
W isconsin Edward Ryan* the leading "hard m oney” Dem ocrat declared:
Constitutions are made to r e str ic t and restrain
le g isla tu r es, as w ell as to protect the c itiz e n .. .
who can tell when there w ill be a ‘so ft1 le g is la 
ture ?. . . I fear the 'so fts. 1 They cannot be
k illed. The hundred heads of the hydra m ight be
lopped off, but the 'softs' have no heads. They
spring up at every hand; they sway and govern
le g isla tu re s.
Zadoc Casey, a lead er of the Illinois Dem ocracy and president of
his sta te's convention defended his demands for a sm a ller legislatu re
with the biennial s e ss io n s lim ited to sixty days on the grounds that
all the ev ils of the state could be traced to the leg isla tiv e branch.

"If

we had no L egislatu re for the la st Twelve years we would now be a
happy and prosperous state. ” The m ost obvious exam ple of corruption

22

D ebates of Indiana, pp. 1459, 1501.
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was in the chartering o£ banks in opposition to the in terest of the
people. " The leg isla tu res w ere the instrum ents by which the bank
frauds w ere perpetrated.

Robert McClelland explained that the

people could not trust the leg isla tu re, because while its m em bers
w ere opposed to banks when "fresh from the people, " they underwent
som e unaccountable changes" in the course of the sessio n .

In this

way banks and paper money could be viewed as the source of all
political, so cia l, and personal corruption, Ma gangrene on the body
politic" that m ust be exorcised .

23

The D em ocratic denunciation of banks embodied m ore than
m oral condemnation.
unconstitutional.

It also a sser ted that state banks of issu e w ere

H ere the m ain argument was, as the Ohio Report

said, that "Gold and silv e r coin, the constitutional currency, has
been thrown out of circulation by the paper medium. " It was common
parlance for Dem ocrats in all the states to refer to the "Constitutional
currency" of gold and silv e r .

This was in line with the dogma of

str ic t construction which a sserted that because only gold and silv er
are m entioned in the Constitution, they were the currency dictated
by the Founding F athers.

This seem s to have been based on a con

fusion of sectio n s 8 and 10 of A rticle I.

The form er gives to C ongress

the power to coin m oney, and regulate its value; and the latter prohibits
the sta tes from em itting b ills of credit, and making anything but gold

23

Guaife, e d ., Convention of 1846, p. 85; Cole, e d ., Debates of
1847, p. 124; Debates of Michigan, pp. 582-83, 581.
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and silv e r legal tender. 2 4
The Ohio Report a lso included a m ore sophisticated argument
tha». was heard in the Illinois and Indiana conventions, and fully
developed in the Ohio convention.

Usually it was combined with the

strict constructionist view that saw specie as the only constitutional
currency.

The argument began from the position that bank notes

w ere b ills of credit, and as such, came within the scope of the Con
stitutional prohibition.

If the states them selves could not em it b ills

of credit, agen cies created by the states could hardly have this
power.

In this light the creation of banks of issu e by the states was

na derogation of the true intent” of the Constitutional prohibitions
against creating b ills of credit and making something other than gold
and silv e r leg a l tender.

This argument forced the Dem ocrats into

som e unusual positions for a party opposed to centralism .

To defend

the D em ocratic position, W illiam S. Groesbeck, a Cincinnati law yer,
appealed somewhat lo o se ly to "the opinion of /th e / eminent whig
judges, " John M arshall, Joseph Story, and John McLean,

While

this argum ent had nationalist overtones, Charles R eem elin declared
"the power over the standard value, belongs to the General Government,
and no other authority, " it was not a ca ll for "greenback" inflation but
rather a demand for a return to exclu sive use of the only "constitutional
currency, " gold and silv e r .
24

R eem elin, who went further than m ost

D ebates of Ohio, I, p. 707.
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Dem ocrats in the acknowledgement that Congress had som e control
over the value of gold and silv er, was fir st and forem ost a "hard
money" man.

25

A side from being unconstitutional and m orally dangerous,
the Ohio Report a lso a sserted , "The policy of a system of paper money
is condemned alike by sound principles of political economy, and by
the h istory of paper money banking in every country in which it has
been in use. . .."

Certainly the argument from experience and history

was one of the m ost powerful put forth by the Dem ocracy, and in the
states of the Old N orthwest could not have but fallen on fertile ground.
In every convention the long train of bank frauds and failu res was
detailed.

It seem ed to m o st of the Dem ocratic historians that the

periods devoid of banks w ere those of the greatest prosperity while
those which w itn essed the m ultiplication of banks of issu e were also
the periods of g rea test chaos and econom ic d istr e ss.

Most Dem ocrats

seem ed to agree with Scates who said he "had often heard of w ell
regulated banks, but he never knew one of that ch aracter. " His own
sta te’s experience with banks had been "fraught with ruin and disorder. "
However, these argum ents w ere lim ited to neither exclu sively state
nor A m erican ex p erien ces.

25

In nearly every convention som e reference

Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 251-2, 266, 274-76; Debates of
Indiana, p. 202; Debates of Ohio, IX* pp. 396, 404, 406, 525-33.
These are exam ples of the argument. The use of the phrase
"constitutional currency" occurs far too many tim es for citation.
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to til© Bank of the United States was made to b olster the argument from
experience, and ’'Whig paper m oney” w ere likened to the assignats
issu ed during the French Revolution and the ”Continentals” which
depreciated during the Confederation period.

In the M ichigan con

vention A. H. Hanscom declared ”all system s of banking are but
m odifications of the gigantic sch em es for swindling, /that are
revealed b y/ the h istory of the South Sea bubble, of John Law*s
M ississip p i banking sch em e, and the old bank of the United S ta te s.. . . ”
R eem elin argued that republicanism and ”hard m oney” went together
in Europe as the exam ple of Switzerland proved.

He also concluded

from his exp erien ce as a "merchant on two continents” that "those
of our m erchants who acted upon the hard m oney principles have
been the m ost su c ce ssfu l. ” He continued, ”1 know that our trade,
our b u sin ess, our wealth, our prosperity, our happiness and /th a t/
of the generation after us, is jeopardized by the creation and use of
paper m oney. ”

26

G enerally the "standard authors on political econom y” w ere
appealed to in order to ch astize bank monopoly and condemn all
relation betw een the state and banking system .

These authors were

also so m etim es called upon to attack paper money inflation.

In general

it was argued that paper lacking intrinsic value did not p o sse ss the

26

Debates of Ohio, I, p. 708; Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 88,
255-62, 268V Debates of M ichigan, pp. 569-70; Debates of Ohio,
II, pp. 795-800.
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stab ility and uniform ity n ecessa ry for a sound currency.
it tended to drive sound currency out of circulation.

In fact,

Rather than to

defend D em ocratic doctrine, these authorities w ere generally called
upon to "explode” the "fallacies" that paper currency was convenient,
that banks created capital, that an in creased amount of currency
stim ulated productivity, and that there w ere inadequate supplies
of gold and silv e r for a circulating medium.

The W isconsin Argus

clea rly enunciated the D em ocratic argument in defending total pro
hibition of bank currency,
But, says the advocate of bank paper, if you drive
these ones and threes and fives from circulation,
there w ill be just so much le s s m oney in circulation,
and farm ers cannot s e ll their wheat, no m erchants
their goods. Well, all we can at present say to
this is that the objection betrays a m ost lamentable
ignorance of the law s which regulate trade and
currency. Drive paper m oney or any portion of it
from circulation in W isconsin, and an equal amount
of sp ecie would as certainly take its place as that
water w ill seek its level; and a political econom ist
would as soon think of objecting to the navigation of
the ocean on the ground that water displaced by a
ship on its course would never clo se up as to raise
such an objection against the rejection of paper money. ^7
Since it was clea r to the Dem ocrats that the "standard authori
ties" counseled the prohibition of banks of issu e, they believed that
those who advocated banks and paper m oney w ere either "blinded by
in ter est or prejudice, or. . . sup erficial observers who looked only upon
the surface of things, and n ever examine into the philosophical principles

27

M adison W isconsin Argus, November 24, 1846, reprinted in Quaife,
e d ., The Struggle Over Ratification, pp. 155-56.
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by which they are governed. H R eem elin summed up the argument
against the supposed value of banks:
11Regulate the currency, “ should read disorder
the currency, --" c re a te capital” means destroy it,
"bank fa c ilitie s ” should be bank difficulties, in
fa cts short, banks bring about results directly the
r e v e r se of what is claim ed for th e m .. . 28
While just who these authorities w ere, is not always clear
at various tim es Dem ocrats referred by name to Gallatin, Gouge,
Cobbeit, M cCulloch, Say, Wayland, Macaulay and Smith.

It is not,

then, unusual that the opposition to banks should have been cast., in
la is s e z fa ire term s.

Everywhere banks w ere seen as Ha monopoly”

repugnant to the teachings of c la s s ic a l econom ic & The chartering
of bank© and the ownership of bank stock by the state w ere just the
kind of governm ental interferen ce that prevented the natural functioning
of the law s of trade.

In Illinois, B osbyshell in sisted that, ”The

regulation of currency and the regulation of credit are both affairs of
trade.

Men want no law s on the subject except for the punishment of

fraud.

They want no laws except such are n ecessa ry for the protection

of equal rights. n To him this m eant the com plete prohibition of all
banks of issu e and paper currency.

B ecause of the existen ce of the

State Bank of Indiana, the convention in that state involved a lengthy
debate over the w isdom of the affiliation between the state governm ent
and the Bank.

28

The m ost nrad ical” Dem ocrats equated the relation

D ebates of Ohio, I, p. 708, and II, p. 800,

168
between the two with the "union of Church and State. " As such it was
a danger to republican so ciety .

But m ore important:

All the ev ils that have heretofore flowed from the
b u sin ess of banking m ay be traced to one source:
that of governm ents interfering with the natural
law s of trade, by selectin g this b usiness out from
the ordinary occupations of mankind, and by
ch arters placing it above com petition with exclu 
siv e rights and im m unities not allowed to any other
b u sin ess, and of becom ing stock jobbers them 
se lv e s. 29
L a is s e z -fa ir e , anti-m onopoly argum ents led a few Dem ocrats
to advocate m erely the destruction of sp ecial charters, and the
im plem entation of general law s.

In some ca ses such laws w ere to be

a radical application of the principles of la is s e z -fa ir e to business
with the only checks on issu e to be unlim ited liability.

One plan

would have made banking free under general law s but allow the banks
to issu e notes on a dollar for dollar b asis in relation to specie in
their vaults.

In Ohio and Indiana, som e Dem ocrats joined with the

Whigs in advocating free banking on the m odel of New York.

The

argum ents put forth in defense of these plans were anti-m onopoly
argum ents that em phasized equal rights rather than the inflationary
asp ects of banking under general law s. 30
The m ost important aspect of these proposals was the violent
denunciation they received from m ost D em ocrats.

U niversally Dem ocrats

29

Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, p. 654; Debates of Indiana, p. 1481.
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Debates of Ohio, I, pp. 260, 158-62; Debates of Indiana, pp. HOO
TS, 1511-1517.
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agreed that the true policy o£ their party was the elim ination of all
banks of issu e be they estab lish ed by special charter or general law.
A fter G. Yolney Dorsey, an

Ohio Dem ocrat from a Whig D istrict

proposed that the constitution embody the free banking principle,
M. H. M itchell, from strongly anti-bank Knox county, "rose to add a
rem ark by way of protestation on behalf of the dem ocracy, against
the insidious and deceptive theory here put forth in the shape of a
dem ocratic theory. " He did not thinkM was n ecessa ry for Mr. Dorsey
to sustain the argum ent for "the gentlem en on the opposite side of the
House. " He later presented a petition signed by sixty-tw o of his
constituents which stated:
We are aware that certain m em bers of your body,
elected under the hard m oney issu e, are about to
prove recrean t to their constituents, or to their
duty. We beg leave resp ectfu lly to remind those
m em bers of the fate of Judas, and the doom of
Arnold.
In Illin ois the proposal of Mr. Sherman, a Chicago m echanic for
free banking m et sim ila r abuse.

His plan was chastized as "wild,

am biguous, and dangerous" and "the m ost consumate system for
swindling purposes that the ingenuity of the Convention could d evise. "
Mr. Davis b elieved it would be better to keep the old system of
sp ecia l ch arters than "allowing the creation of these m on sters all over
the state, leaving its im p ress on the properity of the people forever. "
Faced with a defection to free banking within Dem ocratic ranks during
the Michigan convention, A. H. Hanscom attacked the New York system
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of free banking as the w orst and m ost dangerous system ever
attempted! and he predicted it would end by "beggaring the people. n
Horace Carter told his colleagues in the Indiana convention that,
’The m ain difference between free banking and any other system is
that it only opens the door to le t the 'stealin gs, ' becom e general,
to fifty or one hundred m onopolies instead of fifteen or twenty. "31
In making this argument that was heard in the other con
ventions, Carter revealed the reason why a significant number of
D em ocrats in that state defended the State Bank's monopoly against
free banking.

The con servative p olicies of the State Bank, particu

la rly its general policy of lending to farm ers and produce and
stock d ealers instead of "merchants and speculators, " and its
lim ited expansion of note issu e , appealed to many Dem ocrats who
O O

feared the inflationary tendencies of free banking.
The Dem ocracy was split on the banking issu e, but the
m ajority stood solid ly opposed to banks in any form .

In every con

vention the D em ocrats proposed the com plete abolition of banks and
paper m oney.

Everywhere they charged that banks violated the basic

republican principle of equal rights, corrupted the leg isla tiv e p rocess,
conflicted with the Constitution, and stood in opposition to the dictates
of experience and "true philosophical princip les. "

31

Debates of Ohio, I, p. 162, 475; Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847,
pp. 654-56, 327-28; Debates of Michigan, pp. 569-70; Debates
of Indiana, p. 1442.

32

Ibid. , pp. 1440-44.

171
On many issu e s in these conventions, the Whigs were not
far separated from their opponents, but on the money question m ost
of the party defended paper m oney and banks.

Outnumbered in every

convention, they w ere much le s s vocal than their opponents, and they
tended to show m uch m ore unity on this question than the Dem ocrats.
A portion of the Whig argument in favor of banks and paper
m oney was defensive and designed to counter the argum ents of their
opponents.

In the Ohio convention where the question of the constitu

tionality of banks of issu e was d iscu ssed at length, John Green made
a point by point refutation of G roesbeck's argument.

At the sam e

tim e G reen represented a general Whig tendency to deny Dem ocratic
charges that the Whigs w ere the "bank party" and turn these on
their opponents.

A third asp ect of the Whig argument that was

directed at their opponents concerned the p ossib ility of the elim ination
of paper currency.

H ere, Whigs argued that experience showed that

sp ecie m oved to the financial centers through the course of trade
leaving the w estern areas without any currency to carry on day to
day affairs.

Since som e so rt of currency ^frould be n ecessa ry , the use

of "foreign" notes of the le a st trustworthy character and private
issu e s lik e "George Sm ith's money" would resu lt.

Prohibition could

not work and would in fact be an abdication of the governm ent resp on sib ility to protect its citizen s. 33
33

Debates of Ohio, II, 539-45, I, 708-709. The latter includes the
Whig M inority Report on Currency and Banking.
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This com plaint about the possible consequences of Dem ocratic
policy signaled a difference between the parties concerning the
proper function of the state.

The Dem ocrats tended to fear the state

as a danger to individual freedom and they took a negative view of
the functioning of the state.
the veto power.

This was typified in their em phasis on

Within lib era l thought there was a tendency toward

anarchism which conceived of the state as a n ecessa ry evil at best.
In political econom y this tendency led toward a radical la is s e z faire
that set its e lf against public education and even governm ent owner*
ship of the post office.

The Dem ocrats represented this tendency.

However, within the bonds of lib eral thought one might question an
absolute faith in la is s e z faire as, in fact, Adam Smith and many of
the ea rly c la s s ic a l econom ists did. 34

-

In general, it was this tendency within lib eral thought to
which m o st of the lib eral Whigs subscribed.

There was no denying

that governm ental power rep resen ted a threat to liberty.

In the Indi

ana convention W illiam Dunn argued that such powers w ere dangerous,
but all "useful powers" w ere dangerous in proportion to their value.
These d ecisio n s m ust be left up to the people, otherw ise the con sti
tution would "deprive them of the ex e r c ise of their free w ill. " Most

34

On c la s s ic a l p o litical econom y see the suggestive studies, Lionel
Robbins, The Theory of Econom ic P olicy in English C lassical
P o litica l Economy (London: MacMillan and C o ., Ltd;;, 1952)
and Jacob Viner, "Adam Smith and L a issez F a ir e , " in John
M aurice Clark, et a l. , A-dam Smith, 1776-1926 (Chicago: U niver
sity of Chicago P r e ss , 1928).
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Whigs agreed with Jam es Rariden that, "Vvre m ust delegate power to
guarantee individual rights and to protect public liberty. !T However,
Rariden feared free banking and it was m ore typical of his party to
see this idea as m ost com patible with free banking.

Hiram Allen

used alm ost exactly the sam e argument to defend free banking.

It

was the duty of the state governm ent to protect the rights and p riv i
leg es of the citizen s through the passage of "direct and wholesom e
law s. " Other than these few law s he would tru st to individual en ter
p rise .

One of the leading Whig advocates of free banking in Indiana,

John N iles, agreed that m en should usually be perm itted to follow
their own in ter ests, but "the b u sin ess of issu ing paper to circulate
as m oney is of a w idely different character, and m ust be govorned / s ic /
by stringent ru les. " Such laws which would insure secu rity to the bill
holder w ere the "indispensable prerequ isite to free com petition. "
Except in its details this argument v aries little from that of Adam
Smith, and in one of the few Whig appeals to authority, Orthniel
Clark argued that free banking was "demonstrated as the only true
system of banking by Adam Smith, who was the fir st expounder of the
true doctrines of p olitical economy. " Within the bounds of liberal
thought the Whigs em phasized the m ore positive functions of the
state in area where individual action would have been futile.

To see

them as Burkean con servatives or n eo -m erea n tilists, or for that
m atter advocates of the m odern w elfare state is to m isunderstand

1 74
4them.
*
35

In line with these ideas, they were as violently opposed to
monopoly as their opponents, but did not agree with the Dem ocratic
definition of a bank as a monopoly.

The Whigs defended free banking

as a republican sy stem which rests on "our notions of free govern
m ent and equal rights. ” Monopoly was seen as the source of fraud
and oppression.

"By making the system general, " .Mien stated,

"and extending to all the sam e rights under it, we not only obviate
this obvious odious feature, but we invite into the field the same
saiutory and w holesom e com petition in banking which now ex ists in
all the other departm ents of trade and occupations of life. " N iles
explained his opposition to the State Bank of Indiana so lely on the
grounds that:
It does give to a few citizen s exclu sive p rivileges
which are denied to others. Such m onopolies should
be created only on the ground of absolute n ecessity
for they are in con sisten t with the doctrine of equal
rights. And if it can be shown that another system
m ay com bine the principle of free com petition and
equality of rights with safety and u sefu lness, that
circum stance alone w ill be a strong argument in
its favor. 36
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Accepting the need for a paper currency and the resp on si
b ility of the governm ent to protect the rights of the citizen s, the
Whigs w ere faced with the decision of how to b est provide a safe
and adequate currency.

For m o st Whigs the price of monopoly was

too high to pay for secu rity if any alternative existed.

Most Whigs,

along with N iles d esired "to see / a sy sten i/ established which shall
combine the p rinciples of free com petition and of secu rity to the bill
holder. ” F ree banking with stock collateral to secu re the bill
holder seem ed to be such a system , and the example of New York
showed that such a sy stem might work.

37

Only in Indiana did any sizeab le group of Whigs argue for
the m aintenance of a single institution and then on the grounds that
this was the only way to provide a secu re currency and control the
’’m oney power” in the public in terest.

In Indiana, Jam es Rariden

a sserted , ”1 have no objection to allowing men of capital to associate
their wealth for banking purposes but I do not want them to acquire
a power paramount to the State. ”

38

The Whigs b elieved that this would be the resu lt of Dem ocratic
policy.

It was gen erally held by Whigs that under such a. policy the

’’power" of m oney would rule unchecked and that prohibition of banks
”would make the rich man m ore wealthy and the poor man poorer, and

37
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the debtor c la ss would be en tirely ruined. " "Hard money" would
m ean low p rices for the farm er and an economy in which the poor
man, lacking the fa c ilitie s of credit, could look only to continued
existen ce in the low er strata of society.

"In its way it would be like

dispensing with labor saving m achinery. 51 The "money power"
uncontrolled by the state would dominate the economy and make the
people " serfs and tille r s of the ground for the profit of others, . . . "

39

F ree banking seem ed the b est way to supply the currency
and cred it n ec essa r y for continued com m ercial growth and at the
sam e tim e a ssu re the b ill holders against lo ss .
Fortunately the votes on various issu es in these conventions
can give us som e idea of the relative s iz e of factions in the two
p arties on this question and serv e to underline the statem ents made
concerning the position of the parties on this question.

It is clear

from the voting in the W isconsin, E linois and Ohio conventions that
in th ese states nearly every Whig favored free banking, while a
m ajority of the Dem ocrats stood true to the party's "hard money"
position.

In W isconsin the D em ocracy broke ranks only after the

defeat of the fir st constitution at the polls.

As it was, the bank

a rticle in the 1848 Constitution passed by a slim m argin of five votes.
The "hards" in the Illinois convention w ere referred to as the "fiftyeight. " F ifty -th ree of these w ere D em ocrats, accounting for a little

39
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le s s than 60% of the party.

What is surprising in the light of generally

held view s is that of the rem aining 40%, all but an insignificant number
(le ss than 1% of the D em ocrats) w ere opposed to free banking.

By

the end of the convention tw o-thirds of this group w ere w illing to
join the ’’fifty -eig h t” original prohibitionists to send a "hard money"
article sep arately to the voters.

If they could hold their ranks

together and m aintain norm al attendance, they could carry the issu e.
But this is just what they failed to do.

The final attempt at prohi

bition was defeated by one vote, six ty-eigh t to sixty-nine.

On the day

of the vote ten of the "fifty-eight" w ere absent including som e of
the m ost vociferous anti-bank m en in the convention such as Davis
and Dement.

The Whigs carried the day by holding their troops

together and getting out the vote.

Prohibition was defeated by the

Whigs aided by a sm all group of Dem ocrats who either favored free
banks or w ished to retain the special charter system .

Among the

Whigs 75% of the party voted for free banks with about two-thirds
of the rem ainder favoring the old system , and a very sm all group
(about 7. 5% of the party) opposed to all banks.

One of the m ost

significant things about the Illinois vote was the degree to which "bard
money" sentim ent was confined to the southern and w est central parts
of the state.

This had a lso been true of W isconsin where the older

areas settled by Southerners such as the "lead region" and the counties
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on the M ississip p i supported the true Jacksonian dogma. 40
The geographic pattern in Ohio is not at all clear, but the
party positions are.

Again a large m ajority of the Dem ocrats stood

for prohibition and w ere beaten,by a combination of Whigs and "bank
Dem ocrats. " H ere, over 80% of the party voted to prohibit the
chartering of banks of any kind and w ere beaten in a tie vote.

The

Whigs voted solid ly (94%) for a proposal to allow the voters to choose
betw een free banking and "no banks. " The inflationary nature of the
Whig concept of free banking can be seen in their unanimous opposition
to a D em ocratic "free" banking proposal which prohibited bank notes
of le s s denomination than the m ost valuable coin issu ed by the federal
governm ent and failed to provide any other secu rity other than unlim ited liab ility.

41

The m o st com plicated situation was in Indiana where the
su c c e ss of the State Bank confused the party alignm ents.
w ere sp lit by the issu e .
ing of som e kind.

Both parties

With one exception the Whigs stood for bank

Slightly m ore than half of the party seem s to have

p referred a State Bank with a sizea b le m inority (47%) advocating free
banking.

The Dem ocrats w ere divided into three factions.

About half

40

Quaife, e d ., Convention of 1846, Appendix I, roll ca lls, 15, 17,
and 19; Milo M. Quaife* e d ., The Attainment of Statehood
(Madison, ‘Wisconsin: the State H istorical Society, 1928),
Appendix I, roll call, 108; Cole, e d ., Debates of 1847, pp. 101103, 808.
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D ebates of Ohio, II, 412-13, 423-24.
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of the party opposed all banks at the outset.

A sm aller group, p er

haps one-fourth of the party, favored a State Bank.

As the convention

p rogressed , the free banking elem ent grew to number slightly le s s
than a m ajority of the party.

When it appeared that no one faction

could carry its prin cip les, a com prom ise was worked out perm itting
both free banking and a State Bank with branches providing that the
state had no connection with it.

The only opponents of the com prom ise

"were two "hard m oney1’ D em ocrats, and a dozen Whig advocates of
a state owned State Bank.

While the d esire to produce a constitution

led to the com prom ising of Jacksonian dogma, the early votes revealed
a section al sp lit lik e that in Illinois.

The area from the national

road south --th e old est part of the state, settled m ainly by Southerners- produced 80% of the ’’hard m oney” votes.

42

The positions taken by the parties on the banking question
are usually explained as appeals to the cla ss in terests which form ed
the b a sis of the p arties.

The Dem ocrats w ere "the party of the

ordinary run of c itiz e n s ” and in the West received support from ”the
fron tiersm en and sm all fa rm ers. ” Their opponents "tended to be
townspeople of sub stan ce- -bankers, law yers and businessm en. ”
Some variant of this d ivision of the parties along c la ss and occupa
tional lin es is accepted by p ractically everyone who has w ritten on

42

D ebates of Indiana, pp. 1446-47, 1524, and 1526.
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the period and is used to explain the Whig adherence to banks and
paper money. 43
On an occupational rather than strictly cla ss b asis there is
an elem ent of validity to this.

Most bu sin essm en w ere probably

Whigs, particularly m erchants, m anufacturers and n on -sp ecialized
entrepreneurs.

But it is not so clear that this was true of bankers.

While there is no reason to doubt that m ost bankers w ere Whigs,
there is no good evidence that this was the case.

No system atic

study of the party allegian ce of bankers has been done.

At best,

historians have repeated the charges from the partisan p ress which

43

The above descriptions of the econom ic and occupational base
of the parties are from Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, pp.
92-93; and Emma Lou Thornbrough,, Indiana in the Civil War
Era 1850-1880, vol. Ill, The H istory of Indiana (Indianapolis,
Indiana; Indiana H istorical Bureau and Indiana H istorical
Society, 1965- ), p. 43. L iterally every book on the subject
accepts this c la ss explanation for party action, these exam ples
are given to show the acceptance of this by the m ost recent
scholarship. In all fa irn ess to m ost authors, it m ust be said
that they usually hedge, A lfred Holt says of the Whigs that
they w ere " essen tia lly con servative” and "generally m en of
w ealth and standing in their com m unities. " Except on the
questions concerning Negro rights, they were the party of the
"status quo. " However, he a lso says, "But not a ll m em bers of
the Whig party w ere reactionary. A large portion con sisted
of farm ers and day lab orers, and the party in its appeal for
support throughout the decade, had never lo st sight of the needs
of the common man. " ("Party P o litics in Ohio, " XXXVII, pp.
5 8 9 -9 0 ,)
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m ust be doubted until verified . 44
The standard contention, originating in New York to explain
D em ocratic lo s s e s in the late 1830’s and accepted alm ost com pletely
by h istorian s, is that growing ant:i*bank attitudes of the Dem ocracy
drove the bankers from the party and accounted for Whig su c c e sse s
in 1840.

Leaving asid e the im plicit adm ission that before 1847

bankers and their power w ere in the Dem ocratic party and, by
re v e r se lo gic, w ere responsible for the victory of Jackson and his
follow ers, one can doubt the im portance of this shift of the bankers.
Certainly som e bankers changed parties, but then, so did a great
number of people of all c la s s e s and econom ic groups.

P articularly

in the w est, party allegian ces were just forming in the late th irties,
replacing a personal politics and factionalism among Jackson backers
who w ere not actually a party in the m odern sen se.

44

L ew is E. Atherton, ’’The Pioneer Merchant in M id-A m erica, 11
The U niversity of M issou ri Studies, XIY (April 1, 1839), pp.
23-26; and Alexandra McCoy, ’’P olitical Affiliations of A m erican
Econom ic E lites: Wayne County Michigan, 1844, 1860, As a
T est Case, ” (Unpublished Ph. D. D issertation, Wayne State
U niversity, Detroit, 1965) are the only quantitative studies
concerning the affiliations of businessm en. An exam ination of
the law yers in the constitutional conventions shows a slightly
larger percentage of law yers among Whigs, but the difference is
too sm all to be at a ll m eaningful. Further study might show
that those law yers who m ainly dealt with busin essm en tended to be
Whigs while those who dealt with large land holders tended to be
D em ocrats. A sim ila r suggestion is made by Charles S ellers in
’’Who Were the Southern W higs?” Am erican H istorical Review,
LIX (January, 1954), pp. 335*46.
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In contrast to this traditional interpretation, there is a good
deal of im p re ssio n istic evidence to show that the Dem ocrats who
w ere involved in banking d eserted neither their party nor their
occupation.

In Indiana after 1843 the control of the State Bank fe ll

into the hands of the D em ocrats.
The only quantitative study to bear on this point tends to
contradict the traditional hypothesis.

Floyd S treeter's study of

M ichigan p olitics argues that the growing radicalism of the Michigan
Dem ocracy after 1837 alienated a large number of the state's "w ellto-do" m en. " He quotes as evidence for this a letter from John R.
W illiam s to W illiam Woodbridge.

The im p ression is left with the

reader that bankers and wealthy m en in general trooped into the
Whig party and helped account for the Whig su c c e ss of 1840.

While

this m ay have been true to som e degree, banker W illiam s was not
one of the d efectors, and he rem ained loyal to the D em ocracy for the
rem ainder of his life .

Alexandra McCoy's study would indicate that

this was a lso true of other bankers.

In her study of the econom ic

elite in 1844 she found m ore bankers among the Dem ocrats in her
sam ple than among the Whigs, and bankers made up a higher percentage
of the sam ple of D em ocrats.

It is important to note that in 1844 the

„ 45
M ichigan D em ocracy was violen tly anti-bank.
45

S treeter, P o litica l P a rties in Michigan, p. 20j John R. W illiam s
to Woodbridge, August C
1838, in the Woodbridge MSS;
McCoy, " P olitical A ffilia tio n s of A m erican Econom ic E lites, "
Chapter V, Chart 10, unfortunately her sam ple is extrem ely sm all.
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In this entire d iscu ssion there is a certain amount of p er
spective needed.

In the fir st place there were not very many bankers

in the Old Northwest in the 184G,s> and there is no good reason to
b eliev e that the Whig party was controlled by the bankers, even if
it could be shown that a ll the bankers w ere Whigs.

Among the party

lead ership there was little c la ss and occupational difference between
Dem ocrats and Whigs.

While the Whigs w ere le s s su ccessfu l at the

polls than their opponents, the base of their electoral strength was
sufficiently broad and plu ralistic to preclude the hypothesis of the
domination of banker in terests.

In the United States as a whole, the

Whigs and the splinter a n ti-sla v er y groups which were com posed
m ainly of ex-W higs received m ore popular votes than the Dem ocrats
in 1840, 1844, and 1848 (in this case the Whig elem ent of the Free
Soil party plus the Taylor vote made up a m ajority. ) The national
trend was m ir ro red in the Old Northwest.

Taking individual states,

one m ight cite Illinois as an exam ple of a state without the "corrupt
ing influence" of banks which retained its D em ocratic purity.

Yet,

he would s till have to explain how the Whigs managed to attain 49%
of the total vote in 1840 and 44% in 1844 in a state where there were
no banks.

He would a lso have to com e to term s with the fact that

Michigan, which was nearly denuded of banks in the depression and
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had none sound enough:to exert m uch of a ’’corrupting influence"
reflected the national trend.
In the conventions both Dem ocrats and Whigs appealed to
the sam e econom ic groups.

The Dem ocrats echoed the old Jack

sonian appeal to the "producing cla sses" who were the m ost hurt bydepreciation of bank notes.

However, they made exp licit appeals to

the m erchants and b u sin essm en on the grounds that a specie currency
was the only proper b a sis for a sound economy.

They violently

opposed any kind of inflation and assu red the farm er that his in terests
w ere b est serv ed by honest labor and beneficial effects of competition.
For their part, the Whigs prom ised the farm ers and the m erchants
higher p rices and econom ic expansion.

By providing adequate

currency and inexpensive credit the banking system worked to the
advantage of the farm er and the laborer as w ell as the businessm an.
The nature and scope of the Whig appeal can be seen in a s e r ie s of
rhetorical questions posed by the Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette:
The agricultural in terest is the great in terest of
W isconsin and this is which is suffering and w ill

46

Lawrence Howard Sabbath, "Analysis of the P olitical Leadership
in Wayne County Michigan, 1844, " (Unpublished M. A. T h esis,
Wayne State U niversity, Detroit, 1965). There is a need for quanti
tative studies of the political leadership in all states. The conclu
sions of Sabbath’s study conform with those of Lee Benson (Concept
of Jacksonian D em ocracy, pp. 64-85) and Grady Me Whine y ("Were
the Whigs a C lass Party in Alabam a?" Journal of Southern History,
XXHI /N ovem ber, 1957/, pp. 510-22). The election returns are
from W. Dean Burnham, P resid en tial B allots, 1836-1892 (Baltim ore:
The Johns Hopkins U n iversity P r e ss , 1955), pp. 246 and 248.
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continue to suffer m o st by such A'hard money"?
leg isla tio n as Mr. Ryan of Racine proposes to inflict
upon us. How many se ttler s are there now in our
territory who have been com pelled to borrow money
with which they bought their lands, at fifteen, twenty,
tw enty-five, aye fifty per cent in terest? Do they
think that m oney would command such exorbitant
rates if we had good banking institutions here and the
in crea se of capital which such institutions bring in
their train? How many farm ers are there who are
now daily com pelled to s e ll their wheat at three,
five, and som etim es ten cents a bushel below its
actual value because m oney is scarce and Wheat
buyers in order to get it m ust pay ten, twelve, or
fifteen per cent in terest? Does the wheat buyer suffer
by such a state of things ? Not he; for whatever rate
of usance he pays he takes good care to leave a
wide m argin in his dealings with the farm er. How
m any m echanics and workingmen are there in our
territory who have to take pay for their work in
trade or orders or who m ust put up with low wages
because m oney is sca rce and only to be obtained at
high rates of in ter est? Is it the m aster builder, the
m anufacturer, the m erchant, or the forwarder that
suffers m o st from this circum stance ? Not they;
for whatever the rate they pay for the m oney which
they m ust borrow from tim e to tim e to carry on their
b u sin ess, a proportionate reduction is made in
the rem uneration allowed to the m en in their employ.
Can it be n ecessa ry to m ultiply these illustration s to
show that this pretended war against capital and
currency is in fact a war upon labor ? That however
the m oney lender m ay profit by it, the m echanic, the
farm er, and the laborer are equally and deeply
injured? That is, in short, legislatin g for the rich
at the expense and to the detrim ent of the poor? Is
there anything just, w ise, or dem ocratic in such a
policy ? 47
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Debates of Ohio, I, p. 709, and H, pp. 795-800; Cole, ed. , Debates
of 1847, pp. 270-72, 274, 280, 653; Debates of Michigan, pp. 560,
569, 57 5-76, 691-92, 734; Debates of Indiana, pp. 689, 694,
995, 1440, 1452-53, 1456, 1471, 1490, 1503, 1525; Milwaukee Sentinel
and G azette, October 17, 1846, reprinted in Quaife, ed. , The
Struggle Over R atification, pp. 177-79.
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It would seem clea r that the parties made their appeal to
the sam e econom ic groups; and the available studies of voting
behavior indicate that ethno-religious factors rather than cla ss were
the prim e determ inents of party affiliation.

However, it is also

clear that the parties differed m arkedly on econom ic questions,
particularly the banking issu e .

This difference is revealed by

Glyndon Van Deusen;
In the Ohio V alley, the pushing, am bitious, go-ahead
bankers and b usinessm en, canal prom oters, land
owning in ter ests, law yers with an eye to the main
chance, and farm ers anxious for internal im prove
m ents w ere m ore apt than not to be found in the
Whig ranks.
The occupational groups described are unimportant since there is
little evidence that Whigs dominated any group other than businessm en,
and a great deal that "land owning in terests" tended to be Dem ocrats.
The way in which they are d escribed is important.

48

The Whigs w ere future oriented and appealed to those m en
who put their faith in econom ic p ro g ress, regard less of c la ss .

By

this they m eant the p rogress of com m ercialization of the society.
To the Whigs the Good Society was an expanding com m ercial society
in which agriculture, labor, and industry w ere alike benefited.

48

No

Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, p. 96. The studies of Benson,
McCoy, and Ron P. Form isano, "The Social B a sis of A m erican
Voting Behavior; Wayne County, Michigan, 1837-1852, As a T est
Case, " (Unpublished Ph. D. D issertation, Wayne State U niversity,
Detroit, 1966) c le a rly dem onstrate the im portance of ethno
religiou s factors.
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better exam ple of Whig com m ercial-m indedness than Thomas Corwin's
com plaint to "William Green about D em ocratic opposition to internal
im provem ents:
. . . as out Dem ocracy p refers to pay m oney for
blowing out brains, rather than for blowing up and
getting around rocks, that impede the p rogress
of the m ost efficien t c iv iliz er of our Barberous
r a c e —co m m erce—we m ust for the present submit. ^9
As M arvin M eyers has shown, the Jacksonians tended to be
agrarian-m inded, and they "wanted to p reserve the virtues of a sim ple
agrarian republic without sacrificin g the rewards and conveniences of
m odern cap italism . " To th ese agrarian-m inded D em ocrats, the state
was its e lf dangerous and was b est lim ited to a m inim um of police
functions in order that so ciety m ight develop in a "natural" manner.
To this way of thinking com m ercial and urban society was by its
nature corrupt.

Banks w ere sym bolic of the corruption of the virtuous

agrarian republic by com m ercial development.

The banking issu e

carried so cia l and psychological inferences that transcended sim ple

49

Corwin to Greene, June 16, 1846, reprinted in L. B. Hamlin, e d .,
"Selections from the W illiam Greene Papers I, " Quarterly
Publications of the H istorical and Philosophical Society of Ohio,
XIII (January-M arch, 1918), pp. 15-16. A sim ilar argument is
presented by Van Deusen in "Some A spects of Whig Thought and
Theory In the Jacksonian Period, " A m erican H istorical Review,
LXIII (January, 1958), pp. 305-22. The concepts of "com m ercial
m indedness" and "agrarian-m indedness" are developed by Lee
Benson in Turner and Beard (Glencoe, Illinois: The F ree
P r e s s , I960), pp. 214-28. I have used them like Benson not to
"denote c la s s e s , socioeconom ic status groups, or occupations- / b u t / . . . ways of thinking" (p. 216).

188
econom ic in terest.

It becam e the focal point for grievances directed

against the com m ercialization of A m erican life.

In a period of

sw ift econom ic and so cia l change, those groups lea st able to adapt
to new conditions and, thus, m ost threatened by change could direct
their animus toward the institutional sym bols of the type of society
which threatened their status.

50

The com m ercial-m in d ed Whigs took a m ore positive a tti
tude toward the function of the Good State in creating the Good
Society.

Government was conceived as a tool which the society might

use to create the n e ce ssa r y conditions for com m ercial--an d m o r a l-p ro g ress.

The banking issu e was much m ore a real and le s s a

sym bolic issu e for the Whigs.

50

Banks w ere an econom ic n ecessity ,

M eyers, Jacksonian P ersu asion , p. vii. The conception of
Jacksonian attitudes on econom ic affairs presented in this book
is sim ila r to what Richard Hofstadter calls "status p olitics, "
and su ggests that rather than periods when "status politics" is
dominent, certain iss u e s may be "status issu es" for one group
and "interest issu es" for another at the sam e tim e. On the con
cept of "status politics" see: Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid
Style in A m erican P o litic s and Other E ssays (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1965), and Daniel B ell, e d ., The Radical Right
(Garden City, New York: Double day and Company, In c ., 1963).
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providing the lubrication for the w heels of com m erce.

At the state

lev el, fr ee banking w as their key to econom ic p rogress and the
creation of a com m ercial society.

51
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Since the Whig party was built on a Y ankee-Protestant social
b ase, it is quite p ossib le that their w illin gness to have the
governm ent play a p ositive role in the econom y grew out of
the Puritan w illin gn ess to use the government p ositively in
religiou s and m oral affairs. Clifford S* Griffin, Their B rother’s
K eepers (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers U niversity
P r e s s , I960) sheds som e light on this question.

CH APTER V

FREE BANKING TRIUMPHANT,

1851-1852

In the early 1850's four of the states of the Old Northwest
passed fre e banking law s. Econom ic expansion required credit and
currency; and free banking was the way in which certain elem ents of
the community attem pted to answer these needs. In every state,
it was the Whigs who took the initiative in the fight to establish these
law s and solid ly supported them. The m ain body of the Dem ocracy
opposed them in line with traditional Jacksonian opposition to all
banks and paper m oney. However, a faction of the Dem ocrats joined
the Whigs and enabled the passage of these laws* Those Dem ocrats
who broke with party orthodoxy w ere generally from rapidly develop
ing areas inhabited by s e ttle r s from New England and New York
whose econom ic view s conform ed c lo se ly to those of the Whigs.

The period between the end of the se v e r e depression of the
late 1830*s and ea rly 1840's and the onset of econom ic troubles in 1857
was one of spectacular growth and expansion.

With the exception of

two tem porary setbacks in 1847-48 and 1854, each year brought
in crea ses in production and trade.

Although such rapid growth,

particularly in the c itie s, created new social problem s, the standard
of livin g in the country was risin g, and per capita real incom e was
on the in crea se.

A growing population, an im proved transportation
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and com m unications network, and a g erry —
built credit system
sparked this boom. ^
In the Old Northwest free banking becam e the predominant
credit and currency arrangem ent.

Despite its faults, it provided

adequate fa c ilitie s for an unprecedented boom.

It is both futile and

im m aterial to speculate about what might have been had som e other
system been adopted.

The A m erican people of the m id-nineteenth

century chose to place certain lim itations on their institutional
developm ent in this area.

Within these lim its, A m ericans of the day

struggled to estab lish institutions to answer the needs created by
econom ic change.
Probably no other section experienced such rapid growth as
the Northwest.

Nationally this period was one of a great boom in

railroad building.

By 1850 there w ere about 8, 500 m iles of track in

the United States.

In only seven years this had grown to nearly 24, 000,

and investm ent in railroads had rise n from $372, 000, 000 to approxi
m ately $1, 000, 000, 000.

The Old Northwest was the m ajor area of

X The general developm ent of the A m erican econom y in this period
is treated in Taylor, Transportation Revolution, pp. 345-351, and
Douglass C. North, The Econom ic Growth of the United States,
1790-1860 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, I n c ., 1966),
pp. 206-215. While Taylor (pp. 392-95) com m ents on 11Wealth
and Income, " an extensive an alysis is presented in Ralph Andreano,
"Trends in Econom ic W elfare, 1790-1860, " New Views on Am erican
Econom ic Developm ent, e d ., Ralph Andreano (Cambridge,
M assachusetts: Sehenkman Publishing Company, I n c ., 1965),
pp. 131-167.
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this expansion.

Although the le s s developed states in the area,

Michigan and W isconsin, ranked fourteenth and eleventh in m iles
of track in 1860, the older states Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana stood
fir st, second, and fifth.

In all c a se s the growth rate was phenomenal.

Ohio which had thirty nine m iles of track in 1840 had nearly 3,000 by
1860.

The population of the area went from four and a half, to nearly

seven m illio n during the decade of the 1850*8.

In that tim e Illinois,

which was a reasonably large state by 1850, m ore than doubled its
population to becom e the fourth m ost populous state in the Union.
By the end of the decade Illin ois, Ohio, and Indiana w ere three of the
top four corn producing states in the country.

Again Illinois led

this expansion with growth in output from 22, 634, 000 bushels in 1839
to 115,174, 000 b ushels in 1859. ^
Even Michigan, a rela tiv ely backward state, made extensive
advances.

Its population grew from 212, 267 in 1840 to 397, 654 by

1850 and 749,113 by 1860.

During the decade of the fifties its railroad

m ilea g e in crea sed from 349 to 779 m ile s.

At m id-century Michigan

farm ers produced 5, 500, 000 bushels of corn and slightly le s s than

2

Taylor, Transportation Revolution, p. 79, a table on "Railroad
and Canal M ileage by D ecades, 1830-1860;" Paul W. Gates, The
Farmer* s A ge, Vol. Ill of The Economic H istory of the United
States, e d ., Henry David, et. al. (10 v o l s .; New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, 1945 - ), pp. 156-199, and p. 171, the
table on ’’Corn Production in Leading States;" North, The Econom ic
Growth of the United States, pp. 135-156.
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5, 000, 000 bushels of wheat.

Oats, wool, potatoes, butter and

ch eese w ere all being exported in large quantities.

During the next

decade a copper mining boom, the fishing industry, and the begin
nings of the lum ber b u sin ess led Michigan, as W illis Dunbar would
3
have it, "Out of the W ilderness. "
Under these conditions, a ready supply of credit and
currency was n ec essa ry to m ove crops and provide in creased capital
fa c ilitie s.

The "revulsion against banks" of the 1840’s left the Old

Northwest without adequate legal sources of currency and credit.
M aurice R oss has com piled indices of the growth for capital stock,
discounts, notes issu e and has com pared this with the growth of
population, property evaluation, and im proved acreage.

These show

quite clea rly that in Indiana the legal circulating m edium did not keep
pace with the population growth and econom ic expansion.
sam e thing can be said for Ohio.

Much the

M ichigan rep resen ts an extrem e

exam ple of the dearth of legal local currency.

In 1850 the state's

four banks had paid in capital of $392, 530, or about $0* 98 per capita
for the state.

At the sam e tim e the per capita share of bank capital

in the whole nation w as $9. 37.
and d eposits.

The sam e is true of both circulation

The per capita share of notes in Michigan was $1. 57

and of deposits was $0. 67, both figures only fractions of the national

3

W illis Dunbar, M ichigan (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W illiam B.
Eerdm ans Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 349-391.
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averages.

Illinois was com pletely without banks of issu e. 4

A variety of unauthorized and extra-legal issu es filled the
currency vacuum.

Some of these, like "George Smith*s money"

which circulated throughout Illinois and W isconsin on a par with
sp ecie, w ere sound; but too often they w ere of dubious value.

These

conditions gave r ise to demands in all of the states of the Old North
w est for in creased banking fa c ilitie s that w ere leg a lly controlled and
to prohibition of unauthorized and foreign issu e s.
In the late fo rties Michigan had forced its few banks to supply
bond secu rity as collateral for their issu e, but the ea rlier experience
with free banking made Michigan le g isla to rs reluctant to enact
sim ila r leg isla tio n .

The intractable John Barry was again governor,

and his attitude regarding banks had not changed.

He praised the new

constitution for rem oving the monopoly status from banks and
attempting to insure the secu rity of their notes.

However, he d is

trusted fr ee banking as a schem e of the bankers who w ere biding their
tim e until there would be a shift in public opinion in favor of banks.
He continued to b eliev e that paper m oney would only aid the bankers
in their struggle to secu re wealth without labor.

The w orst aspect

of fr ee banking for Barry was that it perpetuated public debt.
If banks, then, in the failure of all other sch em es,
can have no safe foundation, but in the evidence of

4

R oss, "Com m ercial Banking in the State of Indiana, " pp. 57-58;
Huntington, "History of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " p. 346;
Gantz, "A H istory of Banking L egislation, " p . 74.

195
public m isfortu n es, traceable to their own pernicious
effects, it affords at le a st presum ptive evidence
that the ev ils of the banking system are so far in 
herent and inseparable, that little hope can be en ter
tained of resu lts m ore favorable in the future. 5
There is evidence that the opposition to banking, even in
Michigan, was weakening.

In 1851 the House of R epresentatives con

sid ered a free banking b ill, and enough Democrats joined with the
Whigs to bring it within a single vote of passage.
sonians" w ere fighting a holding action.

The "Old Jack-

In Michigan they held off

"progress, " but this was not so in the other states of the Old North
w est.

During the fir st two years of the decade Ohio, Indiana,

Illin ois, and W isconsin estab lish ed free banking laws.

6

While the Ohio constitutional convention was m eeting, p er
haps because it was b elieved that the convention m ight outlaw banks,
the leg isla tu re enacted a free banking law on March 21, 1851.

The law

Was, a typical free banking act, but it included a provision for 30%
sp ecie reserv e, and a unique com prom ise on the question of liability.
If there w ere few er than six stockholders, they w ere to be individually
liable; in other c a se s liab ility was lim ited.

This law was a product

of the w idespread demand for currency and credit, and it revealed
the sp lit among Dem ocrats on the banking question.

Although Jacksonians

5 Gantz, "A H istory of Banking L egislation, " pp. 67-69; Fuller,
M essa g es, II, pp. 180-206, the quotation is from p. 185.
6 Gantz, "A H istory of Banking L egislation, " p. 85.
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dominated the leg isla tu re, enough of that party voted with the Whig
m inority to secure passage of the bill.
a m inority of the D em ocratic party.

However, this was definitely

M ost of the Dem ocratic papers

in the state opposed the law and denounced it in typical Jacksonian
term s once it had passed .

The Stark County Dem ocratic Convention

cam e out for general law s, but opposed any kind of bank currency.
The D em ocrats who did not fight for a "Constitutional currency" w ere
ch astised along with the Whigs,

The leading "loco-foco" in the state,

Samuel Medary, would only accept free banking if it prohibited all
notes under $20,

When it passed without the provision, he attacked

it and a ssu red his readers that if the people voted on the law, "they
would have knocked it into a cocked hat. "7
The su c c e ss of the State Bank of Indiana did not keep that
state from experiencing the free banking mania anymore than the
K elley lav/ had held back Ohio.

Even before the charter of the State

Bank was to expire there was a w idespread demand in the state for
Ma new shuffle and deal concerning banks. " A free bank bill was intro
duced into the Senate on Decem ber 19, 1851; and a sim ila r b ill o r ig i
nating in the House finally passed.

The com m ittee reporting the b ill

fr e e ly adm itted that if was based on the ea rlier New York law and was
intended to provide adequate new fa cilities in the sa fest possib le
m anner.

7

In the debate on the b ill R. N. Hudson, a T erre Haute Whig,

Huntington, "H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 436-38;
Ohio Statesm an, March 3, 4, and 22, 1851.

197
used F illm o re ’s Report to argue that free banking was the sa fest way
to provide the sound, sufficient currency n ecessa ry to econom ic
p rog ress.

Lack of such fa c ilitie s, he believed, forced down p rices

and acted as a check on "growth and prosperity. "8
While the b ill was being considered* m eetings in Cass County
and Indianapolis called for a system of free banking to provide adequate
sound currency, b ecause the state was being flooded with unsound
"foreign" paper.

Many areas of the state not served by the State

Bank w ere co m m ercially held back.

A free banking system would

drive out spurious "foreign" notes, extend credit throughout the state,
and draw active b u sin essm en and capital to Indiana.

9

H istorians of Indiana have viewed this free banking law as a
product of Jacksonian opposition to bank monopoly.
lead s to quite a different explanation of this law.

A careful analysis

The Dem ocrats

clea rly placed th em selv es in favor of general law s.

Among the eighteen

D em ocratic principles s e t forth by the Indiana State Sentinel was: "No
grants of ex clu siv e ch arters and p riv ileges by special legislation to
banks. " A lso, the demands for additional currency w ere bipartisan.
Alexander F. M orison, a D em ocratic m erchant from Marion chaired
the Indianapolis m eeting of "businessm en and other citizens" to demand

8

E sarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 278-281; Indiana L egislature.
House Journal, 1851, I, pp. 803-808; Indiana Journal, February 27,
1852.

9

Indiana Jo u rn a l, F e b ru a ry 2 and 9* 1852.
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a free banking law at which the secreta ry was John D efrees, the Whig
editor of the Journal.

The com m ittee that reported the bill included

ten Dem ocrats and four Whigs.
of Dem ocrats voted for it.

When the bill passed large numbers

Finally, Dem ocratic governor, Joseph

Wright allowed the b ill to becom e law.

10

Yet, this hardly proves the contention that the b ill was a
product of anti-m onopoly D em ocrats.

In order to promote free

banking, which after all did create banking corporations which issu ed
paper currency based on governm ent debt, Dem ocrats had to violate
two of the State Sentinel's ’’principles'': "A gradual return from the
paper cred it sy stem , " and "No swindling corporations. " It was
D efrees who fir st introduced a free banking b ill during the 1851-52
sessio n , and his newspaper, the organ of the Indiana Whig party,
was a con sisten t advocate of free banking.
has been m isin terpreted .

A lso, the vote on the bill

M ost historians have followed Logan E sarey

who argued that the Senate vote showed a general tendency of Demo
crats to favor the b ill and for Whigs to oppose it.
than h alf-right.

Yet, he is le s s

A m ajority (twenty of thirty-four) of the Dem ocrats

did vote for the b ill in the Senate, but contrary to E sarey, the w oe
fully outnumbered Whigs did not oppose the bill.

10

Six out of the nine

E sarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " p. 281; R oss, "Com m ercial
Banking in the State of Indiana, " p. 59; and Roger Van Bolt,
"Indiana in P o litica l Transition, 1851-1853, " Indiana Magazine
of H istory, XLIX (June, 1953), p. 142; Indiana State Sentinel,
February 2, 1850; Indiana Journal, February 9* 1852; Indiana
L egislatu re. House Journal, 1851, I, p. 340, for com m ittee,
and II, p. 1058, for vote, and Indiana L egislatu re. Senate
Journal, 1851, pp. 1018-19, for vote.
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known Whigs voting favored the bill.

The house vote, ignored by

E sarey, d irectly conflicts with his view.

There the final vote showed

the Dem ocrats splitting with twenty-two favoring and twenty-four
opposing the bill.

On-the other hand twenty-five Whigs, or 86% of

the Whigs voting, favored the bill.

In the house where they had

significant strength to reflect party attitudes the Whigs provided an
absolute m ajority of the votes for free banking.

The Indiana, free

banking b ill was b a sica lly a Whig m easure supported by a large number
of D em ocrats in opposition to the party’s general position on banking.
The various arguments in favor of the law indicate that it was the
product of a d esire for an expanded supply of currency and credit
with som e guaranteed secu rity rather than anti-m onopoly agitation
against the State Bank. 11
It is in terestin g to note that the Dem ocrats who supported
free banking tended to com e from the northern and central counties
of the state which w ere settled by Ohioans, New Yorkers and New
Englanders and which w ere econom ically the m ost dynamic areas.
Eighteen of the twenty-two D em ocratic votes for free banking cam e
from this area while only nine of the twenty-four opposing votes did*
The demand for banks in the new state of W isconsin also
brought forth a free banking law that was overwhelm ingly accepted by

11

Indiana State Sentinel, February 2, 1850; Indiana L egislature.
Senate Journal, 1851, p. 320; Indiana Journal, January-April,
includes a number of ed itorials and a rticles favorable to free
banking.
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the people in November, 1851, by a vote of 31, 289 to 9,126.

As in

Indiana, the D em ocrats found that the old anti-bank position was now
hurting them in the rapidly developing areas of the state newly
settled by im m igrants from the northern states.

In 1852 a com bina

tion of bank Dem ocrats and Whigs acted together to give that trad itionally D em ocratic state a Whig governor.

12

The struggle for a free banking law in Illinois clea rly shows
the Whig lead ership of this m ovem ent and the nature of the coalition
of Whigs and Dem ocrats which brought su c cess.
Following the constitutional convention, the Illinois Dem ocrats
showed no sign of altering their orthodoxy concerning banking although
the convention revealed splits within their ranks.

In 1848 they renom i

nated Governor French, a known opponent of all banks.

That year

their platform declared "hostility" to all banks "authorized by either
general or sp ecia l law s. " French se t forth this position clearly
in his m essa g e in January, 1849.

He opposed flooding the state with

bank paper and b elieved that a few 5"foreign" notes "viewed with
prejudice" w ere a le s s e r evil.

He echoed old Dem ocratic fears that

bank paper would drive out sp ecie, and that banks would only aid the
few.

A state which was "mainly agricultural" did not need a paper

currency based on credit.

Experience had showed French that banks

w ere "wrong in principle" and led only to d isastrous fluctuations.

12

Wright, "Early L egislation Concerning W isconsin Banks, " p. 161;
and H ilderm an, National and State Banks, p. 109.
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French concluded this Jacksonian tour de force in typical fashion:
A currency resting upon credit, upon m ere prom ises
to pay, while it is the m ost seductive, as holding
out inducements to the idle, the cunning, and the
profligate to enrich th em selves without labor, is
lik ew ise the m ost uncertain fluctuating and fallacious
ever devised to cheat the toiling industrious m ass
of mankind out of the fruits of their labor, and,
next to the im m ediate interposition of Providence,
to thwart the expectations of industry, the m ost to
be shunned and deplored. 13
Although French represented the southern part of the state
and its agricultural in ter ests in contrast to the m ore com m ercial
northern half, he was joined in his opposition to banks by the editor
of the Chicago D em ocrat, John Wentworth.

Between 1846 and 1851

Wentworth led the anti-m onopoly, anti-bank agitation.

A side from

banks he attacked grain “m onopolists'1 and steam boat com binations.
He was a lso in the forefront of the opposition to land monopoly in the
early fiftie s.

Like French he em phasized agriculture and exaulted

the producer c la s s e s .

He identified his anti-m onopoly position with

the D em ocratic opposition to banks and associated banks and land
m onopolies with the Whigs.

In March, 184-8, Wentworth praised the

Specie C ircular, because, "It broke up the speculators, the land
m ongers, and drove them out of the country.

Banks are made for

specu lators, and not for the industrial c la s s e s . " By "industrial
cla sse s" Wentworth m eant producers, not w orkers in industry.

13

His

Illinois State R eg ister, May 5, 1848; Illinois L egislatu re. House
Journal, 1849, pp« 8-1? for F rench’s m essa g e.
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attacks on bankers, m onopolists, speculators and businessm en as
p arasites and robbers resem b led W illiam Cobbett's opposition to
industrial development in England.

It was part of a romantic

Jeffersonain a ssau lt on the developing industrial and com m ercial
world.

He b itterly attacked the rising cities and associated them

with the Whig p o licies of banks, tariffs, and m onopolies.

As his

biographer, Don E. Fehrenbacher, a sse r ts that Wentworth believed,
"Cities th e m s e lv e s ,. . .w e r e but Whig creations, where speculative
c la s s e s conspired to enrich th em selves at the expense of the country
side. " Wentworth in the north, and F rench and Ms follow ers in the
south represented a reactionary econom ic outlook that characterized
the Dem ocrats of the 1850's and was out of step with even their own
in terests.

14

Many, including D em ocrats, did not accept this reactionary
view .

They b elieved that expanding currency and credit resou rces

w ere n e c e ssa r y and, at the sam e tim e, saw their state as "overrun"
with "foreign" iss u e s of dubious quality.

Private currency was supple

m ented by Ohio "red backs" and Indiana " sh in -plasters. " Nearly a

14

Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly M ovements in Illinois, "
pp. 67-76; W eekly Chicago Dem ocrat, March 21, 1848 quoted in
Ib id ., p. 76; Fehrenbacher, Chicago Giant, pp. 73-74, the
quotation is from p. 73. Neither Wentworth nor French was a
poor man, and both w ere large land speculators. As F ehren
bacher notes (p. 112-113), "In the very period that the Dem ocrat
cried out m o st angrily against 'land m onopoly’, its editor was
laying the foundation of a large fortune by purchasing land for
speculative purposes. "
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half a m illion dollars issu ed by St. Louis banks circulated throughout
Illinois in 1S50.

George Sm ith’s wide flung in terests led to the circu 

lation of notes issu ed by his Georgia banks.

To these m en econom ic

p rogress was being sa crificed to outdated "scruples about banking.5,15
As soon as the constitution had been ratified by the people,
a com m ittee of the Chicago Board of Trade set out to draft a free
banking act in line with the requirem ents of the new constitution.
On D ecem ber 23, 1848, its suggestions w ere printed in the Chicago
Daily Journal.

The com m ittee recom m ended a standard free banking

law with p rovision for lia b ility of the stockholders for all debts and
a prohibition on the use of real estate as capital or as collateral for
loans.

A group of Chicago’s leading b usin essm en petitioned the

leg isla tu re at the sam e tim e for sound banking legislation . 16
A free banking bill was introduced on January 9, 1849, but
was defeated in the House.

The vote revealed the sam e sort of

sp lit in the D em ocratic ranks that had appeared in the convention,
a sp lit that would widen in the next few years.

The m ain backing for

the law cam e from the Chicago Daily Journal and the business
community of that city, although m ore conservative busin essm en
such as Walter Newberry feared the ideas of stock secu rity and indi
vidual liab ility.

When the bill was defeated, the .Daily Journal charged

15

Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 94-95.

16

Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-M onopoly M ovements in Illinois, "
pp. 77-79; P ier c e, H istory of Chicago, II, pp. 118-19.
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that the Dem ocrats w ere standing in the way of letting the people
vote on the bank issu e .

In the northern half of the state popular

sentim ent in favor of som e kind of banking lav/ w orried Dem ocratic
lead ers who hoped that the issu e would not split their party.

William

Reddick wrote French explaining the predicam ent of the Dem ocrats
in that area.

He claim ed that the situation was m ore difficult than

in the south b ecause the la r g est part of the population was from
states such as New York "where Banking is tolerated. " For p o liti
cal reasons he b elieved the Dem ocrats should at le a st allow this
to be voted upon.
There is the Whig party in a body for B anks--the
A bolitionists m ostly and about one fourth of the
Dem ocrats and if the Whigs up here could place
us as opposed to even perm itting a vote to be
taken on the bank question, I am sure we would be
defeated. . . . 17
Throughout 1850 the Chicago Daily Dem ocrat and the Illinois
State R eg ister attacked all banking plans as unsuited to agricultural
com m unities and charged with danger.

One of these petitions to the

leg isla tu re opposing such leg isla tio n argued,
We had thought our form er experience in banking
was sufficient to sa tisfy any citizen that banks
w ere a curse to the M echanic the Farm er and the
Labouring Man and that C apitalist / s i c / needed no

17

Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly M ovements in Illinois, "
pp. 79-83; W illiam Reddick to French, November 27, 1848, in
French MSS.
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sp ecial P r iv ileg es to bring them an Equality
with the r e s t of the community. That m oney had
sufficient influence to hide the m ost of the views
of its p o sse sso r without banding them together in
a so u lless Corporation. 18
However, many m ore petitions w ere received favoring a
free banking lav/ than opposing one.

The leading Whig papers in

the state pushed for a free banking lav/ during 1850 as the election
approached.

The Rock Island A dvertiser com plained that, "The p re

sent sy stem has driven cap italists from the state to in vest their
wealths elsew h ere, and dom estic en terprise hobbles about on crutches,
being forced to pay the unlicensed usurer twenty and tw enty-five per.
cent, in terest, for the poor privilege of moving at a snail's pace. "
The T azew ell M irror and the Illinois State Journal joined in the demand
that Illinois be allow ed to control circulation within its boundaries
and that lo ca l cap italists be perm itted to profit from it.

The Whig

convention to choose a candidate for state senator from Kane, Dekalb,
Lee and Ogle counties in the northwest adapted a resolution favoring
a free banking law.

A sim ila r Whig m eeting for McHenry, Boone and

Winnebago counties opposed "the wild destructive course" of the
Dem ocrats that had "cramped the en ergies of our industrious popula
tion, and driven capital into neighboring states. " As a consequence

18

E linois State R egister, June 27, 1850, in particular; petition
of W. C. Mathews and Theodore Grant quoted in Jones, "AntiBank and Anti-M onopoly M ovements in E lin ois, " pp. 86-87,
em phasis in the original.
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chey supported free banking in order to aid the ''rapid growth and
perm anent w elfare
to the b ill holders.

01

out otate" while providing adequate secu rity

In calling for the election of leg isla to rs who

favored a banking law the F r e e Soil Chicago Tribune summed up the
argument for a free banking lav/:
It is a m atter of deep regret, that while the
E astern c itie s have a good currency, and business
m en are supplied with tem porary loans at a fair
in terest, to m eet extraordinary em ergen cies,
our city and State labor under the m ost biting
stringency, have a currency com posed of rags
and shin p lasters, from every part of the Union
and Canada. We have heretofore adverted to
this and pointed out the rem edy in the organiza
tion of a F ree Banking system in our State based
on our State Stocks. 19
The new leg isla tu re was dominated by the Dem ocrats, and
Governor French m et the leg isla tu re with a standard anti-bank
m essa g e charging that the use of bonds to secu re the note issu e was
m erely "show" to cover up the "odious features" of the system .
".« . No good can follow the application of ill tim ed and unnatural
stim ulants -which may serv e to infuse into the sp irit of trade a tem 
porary, fe v er ish im pulse to be succeeded by a corresponding

19

Ibid. , p. 86; Rock Island A dvertiser in Illinois State Journal,
January 3, 1850; Tazw ell M irror in the Illinois State Journal,
October 12, 1850; Illinois State Journal, January 3, October 12,
November 23, D ecem ber 19, 1850; King, "East Years of the
Whig Party in Illinois, " p. 128; Chicago Tribune in Illinois
State Journal, October 12, 1850.
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depression. " Although he was in favor of general laws in m ost
c a se s, his banking view s rem ained unchanged. 2 0
Although the legislatu re had Dem ocratic m ajorities in
both houses, there were indications that those from the northern
part of the state would yield to the demands for banks.

The Peoria

D em ocratic P r e ss cam e out in favor of free banking in late December
as the only ’’way to regulate the currency. ” The paper m ainly
em phasized the need for sound currency rather than an expansion of
credit.

Along with the Illinois State Journal, the Peoria Dem ocratic

P r e ss attacked the governor's m essa g e.

Even Wentworth's Daily

Dem ocrat cam e to the position that if any banking law had to be
passed, it m ight b est be based on the New York free banking act.
E. W ilcox of Elgin wrote French that the Dem ocrats w ere being
" assailed at every corner" by people demanding a free banking law.
In his opinion it would be b est to let such a law go to the people if
p assed by the leg isla tu re so the Whigs could not say he was "interposing" h im self between the people and the ballot box.

21

The Illinois State Journal argued that the initiative lay with
the D em ocrats sin ce they controlled the legislatu re, and it was a
group of D em ocrats who steered the free banking b ill through.

Early

20

Illinois Governor, 1846-1853.

21

P eoria D em ocratic P r e ss in Illinois State Journal, January 3,
January 17, February 22, and March 17, 1851; Jones, "AntiBank and Anti-M onopoly Movements in Illinois, " p. 88; E.
W ilcox to French, January 27, 1851, in French MSS.
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in the s e ss io n Thomas Dyer engineered the election of Sidney
B re e se as Speaker of the House and was rewarded with the chairm an
ship of the Com mittee on Banks and Incorporations.

On January 14,

1851 he reported the b ill from com m ittee, and it was passed by the
House on February 8 and the Senate five days later.

However, the

b ill was returned to the leg isla tu re on February 15 with the govern or's veto.

22

French offered five reasons for returning the bill: there
was no sp ecific sp ecie rese rv e and thus gold and silv er w ere "virtually dispensed w ith”; there was not adequate liab ility of stock 
holders; it offered no safeguard against speculation; no check was
placed on foreign circulation; and no general election was to be
held in Novem ber, 1851, so the b ill could not com ply with the co n sti
tution.

He b elieved that in general free banking was a dangerous

experim ent, and had not been proved in New York.

23

With little change in the vote the b ill was passed over the
governor's veto on February 15.

An analysis of the vote, particularly

the House vote, on this b ill shows two things.

It was b a sica lly backed

by Whigs; and it found its g rea test support from leg isla to rs rep re
senting d istricts north of Sangamon County.

When the bill was before

22

Illinois State Journal, January 10, April 21 and 24, 1851; Jones,
"Anti-Bank and Anti-M onopoly Movements in Illinois, " pp. 8889; Illinois .Legislature. House Journal, 1851, pp. 62, 292-93;
Illinois L egislatu re. Senate Journal, 1851, pp. 330-31.
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Illin o is L e g is la tu re . House Jo u rn a l, 1851, pp. 474-77.
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the leg isla tu re, the Dem ocratic organ, the Illinois State R egister
attacked the law and the Whig Illinois State Journal supported it.
The parties sp lit rather evenly in the Senate, the Whigs in the House
supplied a m ajority of the votes favoring the law with m ore than
80% of that party voting for free banking.

The law passed because

a large m inority of the Dem ocrats in the House and a slight m ajority
in the Senate favored it.

Looked at section ally over 80% of the

northerners favored, and nearly 70% of the southerners opposed the
b ill.

Even avowedly anti-bank rep resen tatives from northern con

stitu en cies such as E. B. Am es and Peter Sweat supported the law
because of the demands of their constituents and the b elief that it
was p olitically m ore expedient to set the question before the people
than to allow it to divide the party.

24

The b ill enacted -was a broad free banking law allowing the
use of any state or federal bonds with a discrim ination against
Illinois stocks, no personal liab ility, and no sp ecific specie reserv e.
There was a bank com m ission and the banks w ere to publish quarterly
statem ents.

24

A provision which later caused som e problem s lim ited

Illinois L egislatu re. House journal, 1851, pp. 478-79; Illinois
L egislatu re. Senate Journal, 1851, p. 421; the exchange in late
February and early March between the Illinois State R egister
and the Illinois State Journal; Jones, "Anti-Bank and AntiMonopoly M ovem ents in Illin ois, " p. 91; King, "Last Years of
the Whig Party in Illinois, " p. 129; S. B. Am es to French,
April 12 and D ecem ber 16, 1851, and P eter Sweat to French,
Decem ber 22, 1851, in the French MSS.
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in terest to 7%. ^
The b ill could not becom e law until voted on by the people;
and as French pointed out, there was to be no general election in
1851.

To solve this objection a b ill was forced through the le g is 

lature rem oving a ll of the county treasu rers and requiring an
election to fill the vacancies on November 4, 1851.

26

During the sum m er and fa ll the banking question was
violently debated in the partisan p ress with the Whigs carrying the
fight for the law and the Dem ocrats opposing it.
com plicated the situation.
neutral.

Sectional splits

The Chicago Daily Dem ocrat rem ained

Wentworth explained that, ’’There is a perfect m ania in

this area for banks and the man who says a word against this is
bound to be run over. ” There is som e evidence that southern Whigs
supported the law le s s ardently than their northern counterparts.
The usually partisan Alton Telegraph rem ained neutral, and one of
F rench’s adm ittedly prejudiced correspondents a sserted that in
B elle v ille both parties opposed the b ill.

However, the opposition

was b a sica lly partisan com ing from ’’rad ical” Dem ocrats north and
south.

Speeches against the b ill w ere given by Sidney B reese,

W illiam H. B is se ll, John Reynolds, Gustave Koerner, Jam es Shields,
and Jam es C. Allen, all leading Dem ocrats.

R allies damning the

25

Dowrie, ’’The Developm ent of Banking in Illinois, ” pp. 135-38.

26

Ib id ., p. 138.
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b ill w ere held in eleven southern, but staunchly Dem ocratic,
counties.

The P eoria Dem ocratic P r ess continued to back free

banking, but other leading D em ocratic papers, the Illinois State
the Joliet oignal, the Galena Jeffersonian, the Benton
Standard, the Charleston Globe, and the B ellev ille Sun, rem ained
violently anti-bank*

The Rock Island Weekly Republican was form ed

to advocate a return to "a constitutional currency as the circulating
27
m edium . "***
In general these papers echoed the governor's veto and the
traditional anti-bank argum ents, assertin g that all bank "schem es"
inevitably led to "disastrous contractions* " As usual the Dem ocrats
a sse rte d that the passage of the bill was accom plished by fraud
and engineered by "the Chicago m oney oligarchy. " Uri Manly, a
southern Democrat* ch astised the Dem ocrats of the north for devoting
"them selves en tirely to the se rv ice of the Mammon God. " The
Benton Standard added a new tw ist to the old arguments by connecting
the free banking law with free so ilism .

27

It b elieved that the Dem ocratic

Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly Movements in E linois, "
pp. 90 -102; Chicago Daily Democrat, May 8, 1851, quoted in
Ib id ., p. 88, ftn. 66; Rock Island Weekly Republican, October
8, 1851, quoted in Ib id ., p. 91* W. H. Woodward to French,
May 7, 1851, in the French MSS. A side from the Illinois State
R eg ister and other papers m entioned by Jones, articles from
the Benton Standard, the Joliet Signal, and the Charleston Globe
reprinted in the Illinois State Journal, March 10 and 21, 1851,
show th ese papers opposed the law.
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party should be divested of:
Those Bank Mongers who have so far been a curse
to it, and. *. those who would destroy this glorious
Union, for the purpose of severing the relation
of m a ster and servant in the Southern States, and
we declare our increasing hostility to banks--to
freeso x lism and fr e e so il men, w herever and
whenever they p resent th em selves. 28
The argument, however, was b asically old and fam iliar.
It was co n cisely stated by the Galena Jeffersonian on the eve of the
election:
On the question to be subm itted to the people at
the next November election, *Banks or no Banks, 1
we shall assum e the old and safe Dem ocratic
ground, of opposition to the establishm ent of all
m oneyed corporations, having the power of loan
and discount. Our reasons are those that have
influenced us in the opposition we have carried
on against such institutions for years p a st-reasons that now hold good against this particular
form , nay all form s of banking, by leg isla tiv e
charter; and reason s, we think, that are im p reg
nable. We are opposed to Banks as wrong in
p rin cip le- -a s injurious to the in terests of the
m a s s e s - - a s favoring the accum ulation of capital
in a few hands, where it m ay be, and is, w ielded for
the oppression of the many. We oppose them as
a risto cra tic and anti-republican, in their tendencies
and purposes. They build up a favored and distinct
c la ss in the community. Those who com pose it,
without labor, live by legal, but not just p rivileges,
off the sw eat and to il of the unfavored many.
Banks add not a cent to the sum total of the
productive industry of the country. --T h ey produce
no wheat, they dig no m in eral--b u t furnish fa cilities
to the speculator to liv e from the wheat and lead
that others have reaped and dug.

28

Uri Manly to French, March 2, 1851 in the French MSS; Benton
Standard in Illinois State Journal, March 10, 1851.
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Banks derange the natural and universal
currency of the world, by giving a ficticious
value, or an unnatural depression, to the precious
m etals. By their expansions and contractions,
they hold the property and labor of the country at
their control. . . . They have no sym pathies with
the people. They are selfish , tyrannical, and
soulless. Banks are a c u r s e --a legacy that the
a risto cra tic tendencies of a by-gone age has left,
as a m eans to fill the place of baronial usurpation,
and feudal exactions. They are the engine of a
new form of oppression. They are the working
m achine of a new feu d a lism --a feudalism in which
bank notes serv e, instead of hired and m ercenary
cut-throats. . . . It is now the tyranny of capital
over la b o r --a tyranny that the aggregation and
m ultiplication of c a p ita l--its special im m unities
and ex em p tio n s--ca lled banking, is striving to
extend and perpetuate.
C ivilization has too far advanced, for the con
tinuance of the evil engendered and kept alive
by this m onstrous system . The Dem ocratic party
has fought it too long, not to recognize in the bill,
now under d iscu ssion by the people an old and
w ell known enem y. . . . 29
The advocates of the free banking b ill tried to picture the
question as a non-partisan one.

Judge W illiam Thomas wrote to the

Morgan Journal that no te st of Whig principle was involved and the
question was thus up to the D em ocrats.

The Chicago Daily Journal

rem inded its readers that the b ill was introduced by a "locofocon
com m ittee and p assed by a ’Tocofoco'1 legislatu re.

29

The Illinois

Galena Jeffersonian quoted in Jones, nAnti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly
M ovements in Illinois, ” p. 98, ftn. 88, em phasis in the original.
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State Journal referred to the law as the "D em ocratic Bank L a w ,1,30
There even seem s to have been som e vocal Whig opposition.
The Chicago C om m ercial A d vertiser revealed a strain of Whig
opposition to free banking that might be equated with the m inority
Whig view in Indiana that supported the State Bank.

This view which

does not seem to have been w idely accepted, represented conservative
d istru st of a bond secu red currency and the d esire for a return to
the old sy stem of banking on capital with adequate checks against
fraud.
Yet, for all this it is clear that the m ain argument in favor
of the law was carried by the Vfhigs.

Judge Thomas, an old line

Whig, was defending the b ill when he in sisted the Dem ocrats would
decide the question.

If the Alton Telegraph rem ained neutral,

m ain organs in the central and northern parts of the state, the
Illinois State Journal and the Chicago Daily Journal, did not.

32

30

Judge W illiam Thomas to the Morgan Journal in Illinois State
Journal, February 22, 1S51; Chicago Daily Journal in Illinois
State Journal, April 21, 1851; Illinois State Journal, August 7,
1851.

31

Chicago C om m ercial A d vertiser in Illinois State Journal, March 3,
1851.

32

Illinois State Journal, January-April and Septem ber-O ctober,
nearly ev ery issu e; two a rtic le s from the Chicago Journal in
the Illinois State Journal, February 22 and April 21, 1851;
two a r tic le s from the Morgan Journal in the Illinois State
Journal, March 18 and 19, 1851.

The argum ent in favor of the law included the usual
recrim inations and charges of m isrepresentation.

French's veto

m essa g e was rebutted, and the State R egister was attacked for
being unwilling to trust "the honest judgement of the people. " The
superior secu rity of the b ill and the fact that it gave local control
over the currency w ere em phasized in all the papers.
State Journal a fam iliar Whig theme appeared.

In the Illinois

The free banking

law would low er in terest rates by extending the supply of credit
thus enabling m echanics to com pete with wealthy m en in b u siness.
Expanded cred it and a reasonably sufficient m oney supply aided all
c la s s e s by providing for in creased b usiness and "healthy and rapid
growth. " Illin ois, the State Journal argued, had all the disadvan
tages of banks and none of their advantages.

In particular it

em phasized that free banking would make "the poor man equal to
the rich, by putting the cred it and enterprise of the one on par
with the m oney bags of the man of wealth, (true dem ocracy that). "
A s e r ie s of a r tic le s by "Mechanic" pointed out the ev il effects of
an inadequate currency and high in terest rates which he believed
would be alleviated by the free banking law.

This led to an exchange

with the editor of the Illinois State R egister in which "Mechanic"
argued that by stim ulating the econom y and making credit available,
banks extended opportunity.

In each of these a r ticles the self-m ad e

m an risin g from his position as a poor but industrious m echanic
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wag eulogized.

As the election cam e clo se r the State Journal took

on a m ore non-partisan stand, and defended the b ill as providing a
sound, w ell secu red currency. 33
Although a number of Dem ocrats predicted the b ill’s
defeat, and northern politicians assu red their southern com patriots
that they personally would vote against it, the free banking act was
carried by a vote of 37, 573 to 31, 321.

The northern Dem ocrats

who had broken with party orthodoxy seem to have represented the
w ish es of their constituents.

Only four counties north of Sangamon

turned in anti-bank m ajorities while in the southern part of the
state the law was overwhelm ingly opposed in all except traditionally
Whig strongholds.

F ren ch ’s correspondent in Chicago who assu red

him hardly anyone favored the ’’bank project" was indulging in
wishful thinking, for that area turned in m ajorities from 85% to
95% in favor of the law.

The Alton Telegraph explained the stand

of the southern counties in term s of their sparse population devoted
to agriculture "having little re lish or aptitude for speculation or
adventure" and not feeling the need "for banking fa cilities experienced
by those m en imbued with the sp irit of ’go-ah eaditiven ess.

34

33

Illinois State Journal, February 24, April 9, 11, 16 and 19,
September 11, 12, 13 and 18, 1851.

34

Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 96-97; Alton Tri-W eekly T e le 
graph, Novem ber 20, 1851, quoted in Jones, "Anti-Bank and
Anti - Monopoly M ovements in Illinois, " p. 105.
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M ost leading Dem ocrats from Stephen Douglas on down
opposed the law* but there seem s to have been a consensus among
northerners that p o litically it was b est that the question was out of
the way.

.Ames and Sweat warned French that the Illinois Dem ocracy

had to be careful not to be defeated "purely by the cursed bank
question, " and pointed to the exam ples of M issouri and W isconsin.
Douglas b elieved that the combination of Whigs and "bank-Democrats"
could pass any m easure, and, thus, it was p olitically inexpedient
to "carry the question into the next general election /an d / enable
the com bination to carry not only that m easure but the L egislature
and the state Government. "35
By the end of 1852 Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and W isconsin
had im plem ented fre e banking law s, and a sim ilar m easure was
defeated in the M ichigan House by a single vote.

In each ease these

law s w ere carried by a coalition of Yvliigs and D em ocrats.

While

h istorians have gen erally noted th is, they have overem phasized the
part played by the anti-m onopoly D em ocrats.

The concept of

"Agrarian Radicalism " which has served to connect the Jacksonians

35

Douglas to Charles H. Lanphier, Decem ber 30, 1851, in
Johann sen, e d ., L etters of Stephen A. Douglas, p. 235;
J. M cRoberts to K oerner, Decem ber 6, 1851, in Greene, e d .,
"Letters of Gustav K oerner, " pp. 241-43; Elam Rust to French,
Novem ber 27, 1851, E. B. Am es to French, Decem ber 2, and
D ecem ber 16, 1851, and P eter Sweat to French, Decem ber 22,
1851, in the French MSS.
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with the currency reform ers and opponents of monopoly in the late
nineteenth century has confused the interpretation of ante-bellum
m onetary con flicts.

C learly, this is a m isreading of the situation

influenced by subsequent events. ^
No faction within the D em ocratic party in 1850 was demand
ing inflation to aid the debtor in terests.

The party and its leading

spokesm en stood for quite the opposite and warned of the dangers
of risin g p rices induced by inflated currency.

The debtor was looked

upon as m o ra lly susp ect and a so cia l consequence of banks and
paper m oney.

In their policy toward in terest rates, the Dem ocrats

opposed "usury" laws which would set a legal rate of in terest as
vehem ently as they opposed inflation and attacked the Whigs for
advocating th ese p o licies.
The Dem ocrats w ere sp lit into two factions on the bank
question.

36

The m ajority of the party echoed the old Jacksonian

This is seen c lea rly in R oss, "Com m ercial Banking in the State
of Indiana, " p. 59. Typical exam ples of the use of som e form
of the "Agrarian R adicalism ' concept to connect the Jacksonians
with reform elem ents in the post war period are: Horace S.
M errill, Bourbon D em ocracy of the Middle West (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana: Louisiana State U niversity P r e ss, 1953); Frank L.
Klement, "Middle W estern Copperheadism and the G enesis of
the Granger Movement, " M ississip p i V alley H istorical Review,
XXXVIII (March, 1952), pp. 679-94; and Stanley L. Jones,
"Agrarian R adicalism in the Illinois Constitutional Convention
of 1862, !t Journal of the Illinois State H istorical Society, XLVIII
(Autumn, 1955), pp. 271-82, Chester McArthur D estler,
A m erican R adicalism , 1865-1901 (New York: Octagon Bocks,
1963 ed. ), m odifies th is, but connects the Jacksonians with
post war rad icalism .
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d istru st of banks and paper money.

Their fear of government debt

further caused them to oppose free banking laws at the sam e tim e
they favored free corporation laws in other areas.

A m inority

group in the party split with the m ajority to back free banking laws
as the sa fe st way to supply a sound w ell decured currency.

In

general, this group rep resented the m ore newly settled areas of
their sta tes and those with the greatest econom ic potentiality.

These

areas in contrast to the older ones, harbored populations heavily
from New England and New York; and the Dem ocrats found it
p olitica lly n e ce ssa r y to split with Jacksonian dogma concerning
banks.

N either group took a very dynamic view of the economy, but

a la rg e number of the no bank group w ere '‘agrarian" reaction aries
opposed to the industrialization, and com m ercialization of Am erican
life.

This antipathy was neither com plete nor ideological, but

represen ted a carry over of traditional Jacksonian rhetoric and
resentm ent of older areas that w ere being econom ically overshadowed.
The fight for free banking was carried on by the Whig p ress
and m o st of the votes for the law s cam e from Whigs, but the bank
question a lso sp lit their ranks.

H istorians have generally im plied

that the Whigs, sin ce they opposed the anti-m onopoly D em ocrats, m ust
have favored "monopoly. " Yet, this was hardly the ca se.

There was

a con servative m inority in the Whig party that opposed free banking
as a danger to econom ic stab ility and preferred to estab lish som e
kind of State Bank or return to the old system of leg isla tiv e charters.
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In the parlance of the day this made them m onopolists.
important about this group was how sm all it w as.

What is

While there is

no reliab le way to judge the size of this group among the rank and
file, the votes in the state leg isla tu res indicate that few er than
twenty per. cent, of the Whig politicians represented these view s.
This percentage was undoubtedly sm aller among the rank and file .
The vast m ajority of the party and the leading party organs in every
state stood solid ly opposed to ’’monopoly" and in favor of free
banking.

The view s of this m ajority group w ere m odernist and in

tune with the econom ic changes taking place at the tim e.

They

conceived of the econom y in dynamic, expansionist term s; and cast
their appeal to the benefits to be derived for all groups from this
expansion.
opportunity.

The keynote of their policy was equality of econom ic
While they w ere not pure and sim ple inflationists,

and em phasized the idea of convertability, it was this faction of
the Whig party which advocated increasing econom ic activity and
raisin g farm p rices by expanding the m oney supply.

On the question

of in ter est this group u sually advocated legal lim its, and one pow er
ful argum ent for free banking was that the com petition of new banks
would hold the rates down.

From this all em erged a positive con

ception of the role of governm ent that was in conflict with the view s
of m o st of their opponents.

CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS,

1852-1857

The panic of 1854 caused the advocates of free banking to
attempt, over the next sev era l y ears, to reform the system s in
order to alleviate the problem s brought forward by that c r is is . The
attem pts at such reform reveal a continuity between the Whigs and
Republicans on the banking question. The new party continued Whig
attem pts to supply adequate cred it and currency through the use of
free banking. It a lso took over the Whig em phasis on the creation
of opportunity through econom ic development. The Dem ocrats con
tinued their traditional opposition to banks of any kind.

The passage of the free banking laws brought neither the
financial utopia envisioned by their friends nor the d isaster fo r e 
told by their en em ies.

There were both su c c e sse s and failu res, but

the dominant note of the period between 1852 and 1857 was exp eri
m entation as each state m odified and altered its banking laws to
m eet its needs for credit and sound currency.
Entrepreneurs m oved quickly to organize new banks under
the free banking law s.

Twelve new banks appeared in Ohio during

1851 and another was organized in early 1852 before the attorney
general ruled that further organization would be of doubtful legality
under the new constitution.

Ninety-four free banks w ere organized

in Indiana in the three yea rs follow ing the passage of the new law.
To the w est, the p rospective bankers w ere slow to organize hoping
that their sta te ’s law would be lib era lized and the discrim ination
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against Illinois banks rem oved, but by the end of 1852 there were
seventeen new banks in the state.

Within two years this number had

grown to thirty-one, ten of which w ere located in Chicago.

With

W isconsin undergoing a sim ilar expansion, it is not surprising that
the years between 1852 and 1854 saw an in crease in econom ic activity
in the Old Northwest.

A careful student of econom ic trends during

this period, Thomas S. Berry, has w ritten, "It is not inaccurate to
say that capital was m ore abundant than any tim e on record. " In a
single year betw een 1853 and 1854 loans and discounts in the West
in creased 37%. ^
Unfortunately a great deal of currency and credit upon which
the expansion cam e was from illeg a l and ex tra -leg a l sou rces.

Private

bankers and brokers continued in b u sin ess, because of provisions
concerning m axim um in terest rates embodied in the free banking laws.
In line with Whig d esire to hold down in terest rates, Illinois free
banks w ere lim ited to charging 7% and Ohio banks w ere lim ited to 6%.
Neither figure coincided with the rates received by other institutions
or the ’’natural" rate determ ined by the m arket.

As a consequence the

free banks did not usually go into the discount b u siness and loaned
their entire issu e to private brokers who avoided the in terest ceiling
and taxes on discounts.

1

In Ohio a law pushed through by the Dem ocrats

Huntington, "A H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, ” p. 438;
Hammond, Banks and P o litic s, pp. 617-622; Jam es, Chicago Banks,
I, pp. 215-218; and B erry, W estern P r ic e s, p. 510.
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raised the m axim um rate of in ter est on special contracts to 10%.
This law, designed to draw capital into the state, undermined the
lim itations estab lish ed by the free banking law s, and led to an
in crease of private uncontrolled banks of discount.

Although the

branches of the State Bank could not be connected with these private
bankers and brokers, this was not the case with the free bankers.
By 1854 there w ere fifty three private banks in Ohio alone.

The

general resu lt was to undermine a sound currency as these brokers
search ed for the cheapest m oney available to lend at high rates.

2

In Michigan the need for added currency was m et with a
device which w as used to a le s s e r degree in the states with free
banking laws: the resu scitation of dormant institutions whose charters
had not expired.

F ive of the old chartered banks that had gone down

in the d ep ression of the late 1830‘s reappeared am id storm s of pro
te st in the 1850fs.

Thus brokers kept in terest rates up and drew in

questionable foreign notes w hile ex tra -leg a l and resu rrected in sti
tutions supplied an adequate but hardly stable or secu re currency.

By

1854 the number of free banks had grown, but it was apparent that
the condition of the currency had not m easurably improved.

3

Each state attem pted to co rrect the problem s of unauthorized
banking and untrustworthy foreign notes*

In Illinois a drastic m easure

2

Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 232-38; and Huntington, “A H istory
of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 443-446.

3

Gantz, “A H istory of Banking L egislation, ” pp. 79-82.
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m ade it a felony to issu e or receiv e on deposit any currency not
issu ed by banks leg a lly estab lish ed in Illinois or som e other state.
Sim ilar restrictio n s in Ohio w ere undermined by the 10% law, and
attem pts of M ichigan to r e str ic t unauthorized banking w ere flagrantly
violated.

J2ven le s s su c cessfu l was the Ohio law of 1854 which forbade

the circulation of all foreign notes under $10.

The advocates of free

banking tended to support the laws against unauthorized banking
w hile prohibition on sm all notes received the support of the Demo
crats and w as opposed by the Whigs. ^
Following the passage of the free banking law s, the Whigs
defended the new sy stem while the Dem ocrats w ere either silen t or
sharply critica l.

Dem ocrats from northern Illinois w ere generally

happy to have the issu e settled, but an active effort was made to
revive the no-bank issu e and repeal the free banking law.

Joel

M atteson receiv ed the nomination for governor in 1852 only after
assu ra n ces that he was rea lly opposed to banks.

The following year

the anti-bank D em ocrats pushed a repeal b ill through the Senate, but

4

Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 224-31; Huntington, "A H istory of
Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 446-447; and Gantz, UA
H istory of Banking L egislation, ” pp. 77-78.
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*
C
it was lo st in com m ittee in the House.
Indiana's Dem ocrats w ere skeptical about free banking.
Governor Wright predicted the law contained insufficient restriction s
against abuse.

He warned of the problem s of inflation and of business

fluctuations which aided speculators, but hurt the "producing c la s s e s . "
He b elieved that unless the law was m odified, a sound currency could
not be provided.

He would lim it the denominations to le s s than "five

or ten dollars, " create a bank com m ission and a special office to
control currency, lim it the secu rity to Indiana stocks or real property,
and require directors to be residents.

6

The D em ocratic attorney general of Ohio undermined the
state's free banking law in 1852 by ruling that the law was unconstitu
tional.

During the sam e period the bank question becam e involved

with the rev isio n of the sta te's tax system .

The Whigs had passed the

Revenue L.aw of 1846 over D em ocratic opposition so that "every citizen
/would pa^/ an equal share of the public burden in proportion to his

5

Elam Rust to French, November 27, 1851, E. B. Am es to French,
D ecem ber 2, 1851, and Decem ber 16, 1851, P eter Sweat to French,
D ecem ber 22, 1851, P. B. Wake (? ) to French, Decem ber 27,
1851, Sidney B re ese to French, January 5, 1852, and (?) to
French, January 21, 1852 in the French MSS; Douglas to Charles
H. Banphier, Decem ber 30, 1851, in Johansen, e d ., B etters of
Stephen A. Douglas, p. 235; J. Me Roberts to Koerner, Decem ber
6, 1851, in Greene, e d ., "Betters to Gustav Koerner, 1837-1863,"
pp. 241-243; Jones, "Anti-Bank and Anti-Monopoly M ovements in
Illinois, " pp. 121-124.

6

Indiana B egislatu re. Documentary Journal, 1852, Part I,
Document 2 /m isla b led Part II, Document TJ.
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ability to sustain i t . . . . " The Whigs claim ed it was a system of
equal taxation while the Dem ocrats saw it as aid to the hanks which
w ere based on state stock s.

Mr. Eger ton b elieved that state stocks

should be allow ed to depreciate "because the banks are based upon
7
those stocks, and if the State stocks go down so m ust the banks. "
The Dem ocrats continued to argue that the banks were
being favored in relation to other form s of property, and in their con
vention in 1850, the party favored taxing the banks in the same way
"the people" w ere taxed.

In 1851 and 1852 Dem ocratic tax laws were

p assed extending bank taxes to all form s of bank "property": notes
issu ed , b ills discounted or purchased at a profit, and average amounts
of m oney loaned.

The institutions w ere not allowed to deduct their

debts from their a s se ts.

The banks took the issu e to the courts

where they w ere upheld, and the law s of 1851 and 1852 w ere declared
unconstitutional.

While this litigation was in p rogress, a final

D em ocratic m easu re called the "Crow Bar Lav/” was enacted p e r 
m itting county trea su rers to break into the vaults of protesting banks
and s e iz e unpaid taxes plus penalties and incurred co sts,

8

Whigs, F ree D em ocrats, and a few bank Dem ocrats opposed
th ese law s.

They tended to view this as an attack on the banks rather

7

B ates, Alfred K elley, pp. 143-171, K elley is quoted on p. 153,
and Egerton on p. 151, em phasis in the original.

8

Ohio Statesm an, January 10, 1850; Huntington, "A H istory of
Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 459-461; and Roseboom,
The Civil War Era, pp. 136-137.
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than as a sy stem of ’’equal taxation. ” They did not oppose taxing
the hanks hut m erely the unconstitutional and overly-hard taxes
im posed by the .Democrats.

In 1850 the Whigs and F ree Soilers had

strengthened the provisions of the 1846 law and provided for taxing
banks on their capital and surplus.

The new Republican adm inistra

tion in 1856 enacted the K elley Bank Tax Law named for the author of
the 1846 act who had gone into the new party.

This taxed capital,

surplus, contingent fund, and undivided profits. ^
The fr ee banking sy stem received its fir st econom ic trial
during the b rief econom ic downturn of 1854.

The upswing of the early

years of the decade had featured an in creased investm ent in railroad
construction along with a general r ise in p rices.

This was aided in

1853 by a crop failure and the outbreak of the Crimean War.

However,

the war proved a shock to foreign investm ent, and the sale of both
railroad and state sec u r ities declined.

Since the railroads badly

needed construction capital, they entered the m id -w estern m arket
causing in ter est rates to clim b and a m oney stringency dampened
b u sin ess.

A continual r ise in the rates of New York exchange from

1853 until Novem ber of 1854 precipitated a run on the Ohio free banks
in May that soon spread to Illinois and Indiana.

At the sam e tim e,

eastern bank notes, which still com posed a large percentage of w estern
currency, w ere being withdrawn leaving only the w estern currency,

9

Huntington, "A H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 458,
462; and Roseboom , The Civil War Bra, p. 138.
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which was being undermined by declining stock p rices and the runs on
the banks1 coin supply.

In August the Cincinnati banks refused to

take Indiana free bank notes and confidence in the free banks was
shattered.
failing.

Indiana was sev ere ly hit with m ost of her new institutions

Ten of Ohio’s banks and eight of Illin o is’s new banks also

fe ll although the sy ste m s of the two states suffered the shock
reasonably w ell.

10

The Panic of 1854 was m ainly financial and rather quickly
gave way to a renewed boom from 1855 to 1857.

This boom was particu

la rly fe lt in the w est and demands for currency in creased amid a m ild
revival of anti-bank attitudes.

In all of the states credit fa cilities

had to be provided and alterations in the free banking system s had
to be m ade in the light of the experience of 1854.
The year 1854 brought not only a break in econom ic expansion,
but a lso a disruption of the party system which caused a realignm ent
of p o litical groups and in ter ests.

The new Republican party replaced

the Whig party which soon com pletely disappeared from the scene.
At the sam e tim e the Dem ocratic coalition was altered.

The p rocess

of party re-align m en t was not an im m ediate but an on-going one
during the m id-1850's.

Some early leaders quickly fell away; others

who would later becom e lead ers held back.

10

Som ers, ’’The Perform ance of the A m erican Economy B efore 1860,
pp. 334-35; M argaret G. M yers, The New York Money Market:
Origins and Development (New York: Columbia U niversity P r e ss,
1931), p. 140; and B erry, W estern P r ic e s, pp. 510-517.
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The two issu e s m ost responsible for this political upheaval
w ere the r ise p-f nativism and the question of the expansion of slavery
revived by the passage of the K ansas-N ebraska Act.

While both

parties w ere affected by both issu e s, it was nativism that "choked"
the Whigs, and the Nebraska question that splintered the Dem ocrats.
The Whigs had been losing steadily to an ti-slavery third parties
which bit le s s deeply into the Dem ocratic electorate.

Traditionally

the Whigs had been the party of native P rotestants, and the strange
combination of political reform and anti-for eignism which arose in
the early fifties appealed to many m em bers of the older party.

This

sp irit in creased after it appeared that ithe votes of im m igrants were
responsible for P ie r c e ’s victory of 1852.

11

In the Old Northwest nativism tended to be anti-C atholic
rather than an ti-foreign and, in this form , served to break som e

11

M ost suggestive on the rise of the Republican party are Andrew
W allace Crandall, The Early H istory of the Republican Party,
1854-1856 (G loucester, M assachusetts: P eter Smith, I960);
Henry C. Hubbart, The Older Middle West, 1840-1880 (New York:
R u ssell and R u ssell, I n c ., 1963), pp. 1-29, 88-116; Streeter,
P o litica l P a rties in Michigan, pp. 100-253; Roseboom, The
Civil War Era, 2 55-312; Tho mb rough, Indiana in the Civil War
Era, pp. 1-84; Charles Zimmerman, "The Origin and .Rise of
the Republican Party in Indiana from 1854 to I860, " Indiana
Magazine of H istory, XIII, (September and Decem ber, 1917),
pp. 211-269, 349-412; a s e r ie s of a rticles by Roger Van Bolt,
"Indiana in P o litica l Transition, 1851-1853, " Indiana Magazine of
H istory, XL.IX (June, 1953), pp. 131-160, "Fusion out of
Confusion, " Ib id ., XLIX (December, 1953), pp. 353-390, and
"The R ise of the .Republican Party in Indiana, 1855-1856, " Ibid. ,
LI (Septem ber, 1955), pp. 185-220; Cole, The Era of the Civil
War, pp. 101-152; and Don E. Fehrenbacker, Prelude to
G reatness: Lincoln in the 1850’s (New York: M cGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1964), pp. 1-47.
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Germans away from the Dem ocrats.

The nativist spirit was strongest

m Indiana and w eakest m Michigan and Wi s cons in.

A struggle

developed within the m ovem ent between the "Jonathans'1 who were
anti-C atholic and a n ti-sla v ery and the "Sams11 who tended to avoid
the sla v ery issu e and w ere m ore anti-foreigner.

While system atic

studies have not been done, im p ressio n istic evidence indicates that
m ost of the "Jonathans" eventually went into the m oderately nativist
Republican party.

The "Sams, " who were financed and exp loited --

in Illinois at le a s t--b y the Dem ocrats, served as a refuge for con
servative Whigs who eventually either joined their form er opponents
or dropped from the scene.

12

The Nebraska question took its m ain toll among the Dem ocrats
who sp lit with their traditional party for a variety of reasons.

Some

genuinely opposed slavery, but the m ajority w ere bothered m ost by
the p ro-southern a sp ects of the K ansas-N ebraska Act.

Either they

cam e from area s whose econom ic in terests on issu e s of land and
im provem ent leg isla tio n w ere being sa crificed by the "Doughface"

12

A side from the above m entioned books, the issu e of nativism is
treated in detail in S ister M. Evangeline Thomas, N ativism in
the Old N orthwest (Washington, D. C. : Catholic U niversity, 1936);
Carl Frem ont Brand, "The H istory of the Know Nothing Party In
Indiana, " Indiana Magazine of H istory, XVIII (1922), pp. 47-81,
177-206, 266-306; and John P. Senning, "The Know Nothing
Movement in Illinois from 1854-56, " Journal of the Illinois State
H istorical Society, VII (April, 1914), pp. 7-33. Don E. F eh reb ack er’s "Illinois P o litica l Attitudes, 1854-1861" (Unpublished
Ph. D. D issertation, U niversity of Chicago, 1951), is generally
helpful, esp ecia lly the pages on nativism , pp. 165-182.
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D em ocracy or they m erely resented the personal power and a rro 
gance of the Southern politicians in their party.

The Nebraska issu e

served as a rallying point for anti-Southernism in both p arties.

13

The bank question was not intim ately connected to these
iss u e s, and it could be e a sily assum ed that no continuities on this
m atter can be found.

C ertainly during the 1854-1857 period neither

party talked much about the banking question.
play down old, d ivisive iss u e s.

Both sid es wished to

The fir st Republican platform of

M ichigan favored "postponing and suspending all differences with
regard to p olitical econom y. " Sim ilar sentim ents w ere exp ressed
in the other states as the Republicans attempted to draw away anti
slavery D em ocrats; and the party of P ierce, Douglas, and Buchanan
tried to lure the m ore conservative elem ents of their form er oppon
ents.

This strategy, further, seem s to have confused the situation

as anti-N ebraska D em ocrats--m an y of whom w ere anti-bank
r a d ic a ls--w e r e given positions of power to draw support from their
form er fo llow ers.

It would seem that any party that included Salmon

Chase, Lyman Trumbull, John Wentworth, and K insley Bingham in
m ajor positions of power would a lso embody their opposition to banks.
13

The econom ic asp ects of this question are em phasized in Madison
Kuhn, "Economic Issu es and the R ise of the Republican Party in
the Northwest, " {Unpublished Ph. D. d issertation, U niversity of
Chicago, 1940), pp. 1-132. The anti-southern rather than anti
sla v ery asp ects of the K ansas-N ebraska Act are indicated by
Fehrenbacker in his biography of John Wentworth, as w ell as
the two works cited in footnotes 11 and 12.
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However, this was not the case.

The new party took over the

econom ic view s, including free banking, of the m ore p rogressive
Whigs.

This is clea rly revealed in the actions of the state le g is 

latures in their attem pts to cope with banking problem s in the
period of party transition. 14
The n early com plete collap se of the free banking system in
Indiana com bined with the expiration of the charter of the State
Bank in 1859 to make som e so rt of action im perative.

This n ecessity

eventually resu lted in the chartering of a new, privately owned Bank
of the State of Indiana and a reform ation of the sta te ’s free banking
sy stem .

While confused even m ore than usual by personal cupidity,

these actions tend to reveal a continuity of opposition to banks
among Dem ocrats and an extension of Whig attitudes through the
Fusion m ovem ent into the Republican party.
Indiana’s new constitution prohibited recharter of the State
Bank.

It® d irecto rs .were determ ined to wind up the Bank’s affairs

in lin e with the constitution, but a "syndicate*1 of politicians was

determ in ed to obtain a charter for a sim ilar institution to take the
place of the old State Bank.

If Hugh McCulloch’s m em ory is accurate,

this “syndicate” began working for its end in 1854 before the panic
undermined the free banking sy stem .

15

14

Randall, e d ., "Gubernatorial Platform s, ,r p. 113,

15

McCulloch, Men and M easures, pp. 127-28.
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A ccording to McCulloch the "syndicate” was made up of
a number of active and influential politicians of both parties. ”
However, while there w ere a few important 'Whigs in this group,
the "syndicate" was dominated by Dem ocrats with Judge Thomas
L. Smith as its m oving sp irit.

Of the seven m em bers of the "syn

dicate" serving in the leg isla tu re, five w ere Dem ocrats.

It appears

that the "syndicate" made careful use of the situation and a few w ell
placed "bribes. " V ery little effort was w asted on F usionists who
would probably have voted for an extension of currency and credit
in any ca se.

Of the thirteen "bribes" reported by Logan E sarey

ten w ere offered to Dem ocrats which accounts in part for the six
rep resen tatives and one senator from that party who opposed free
banks but favored the Bank of the State of Indiana.

Otherwise the

b ill was supported alm ost en tirely by F usion ists and opposed entirely
by D em ocrats.

Governor Wright vetoed the bill on the grounds that

it was dangerous and unnecessary, as w ell as unconstitutional, but
it was passed over his veto.

16

16

Ib id ., p. 128; E sarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 288-296,
trie s to unravel the question, but is unconcerned with the party
affiliation of the m en involved. The above conclusions resulted
from a check of the party affiliations of those he nam es as part
of the "syndicate" and his lis t of those to whom "bribes" w ere
offered. Some of the "bribes" w ere m erely p rom ises of a branch
for their d istrict or an extension of an opportunity to purchase
stock. Indiana L egislatu re. House Journal, 1855, p. 764, and
and Indiana L egislatu re. Senate Journal, 1855, p. 551, for the
votes. Wright’s veto is in the Senate Journal, pp. 713-716.
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Clearly, this was a straight business deal on the part of the
m em bers of the "synica.te" who allowed neither ideology nor ethics
to in terfere with their course.

Quickly the politicians cashed in

by sellin g their newly acquired stock to the stockholders and
directors of the old State Bank who assum ed the m anagement of the
new institution.

A ll in a ll the incident was a curious example of the

workings of A m erican politics and shows the degree to which politics
its e lf can be a b u sin ess.

The m em bers of the "syndicate” never

intended to becom e bankers, and probably they had thought to do
nothing m ore than "bend" the law, for they actually defrauded no one.
In the long run their actions w ere ea sily justified, because the new
bank continued the sound p olicies of its p red ecessor.

17

The reform ation of the free banking system dem onstrates
the continuity of ideas from the Whigs to the Republican party.
Although the panic had serio u sly undermined confidence in free
banking and even the Indiana Journal joined the State Sentinel in
opposing the system , a revision of the old law was carried through
the sam e F u sion ist leg isla tu re which created the Bank of the State
of Indiana. ^
17

E sarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " p. 297; and McCulloeh, Men
and M easu res, pp. 128-130.

18

Indiana Journal, February 7 and 17, 1855, shows a shift against
fr ee banking that may have reflected the new publisher’s attitudes
rather than a shift in party principle.
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After the onset of the panic, the state auditor called for
reform of the system .

He favored enforcing a permanent location

for each bank and uniform banking hours.

He explained that, "It is

suggested, as to location, to prevent the practice of selecting rem ote
and unknown situations, that no bank should be located at any point
which does not contain from two to three thousand permanent c itisen s. " He also suggested a sp ecie reserv e of 20% to 25% and a
universal redem ption center at the state capital.

19

Most D em ocrats took the opportunity to exp ress their
opposition to free banking in principle and make their bows to
traditional D em ocratic anti-bank rhetoric.

The editor of the State

Sentinel reaffirm ed that as, "a dem ocrat of the radical stripe we
have always opposed Banking on any b asis whatever. " Ke reminded
his read ers that the State Sentinel had stood against free banking
since the constitutional convention and had worked against the passage
of the law.

Governor Wright joined in the Dem ocratic chorus of "I

told you so, ,f and warned:
We shall always have revulsions, expansions, con
tractions, and derangem ent in the whole b usiness
of the country, so long as we foster any system
that m akes p rom ises to pay, money, instead of gold
and s ilv e r . If the inferior circulation w ere this
day withdrawn, I have no doubt we should find a
sufficient amount of constitutional currency among
our people for all ordinary purposes*
19

Indiana L egislatu re. Documentary Journal, 1854, Part I, Document
2, the quotation iS from p. 84.
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Yet, none of these Dem ocrats was w illing to do away with the system
and a ll called for reform along the lin es of the Auditor's suggestions.

20

The election of 1854 had produced a legislatu re with a
House controlled by the Fusion party and a Senate evenly divided
between the Dem ocrats and the new group.

As was so often the case,

the Fusion party carried the fight for free banking.

The ex**Whig

advocate of fre e banking, R. N. Hudson, introduced a new version
of the free banking law which provided for regular hours, a central
redem ption center in Indianapolis, and the establishm ent of banks in
towns of 1000 inhabitants to elim inate "wildcats. " It was e a sily
carried through both houses of the leg islatu re with opposition from
the Dem ocrats and a sm all group of F usion ists who preferred a
State Bank.

21

Wright decided that the bill did not conform to his suggestions;
and he vetoed it.

He combined his old criticism s of the law with his

b eliefs that free bank currency was le s s valuable than gold or silv er,
and that free banking sy stem s in general had lo st the confidence of the

20

Indiana State Sentinel, August 22, 1854; and Indiana L egislature.
Documentary Journal, 1854, Part I, Document 5, the quotation
is from p. 84.

21

E sarey, "State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 286-287; Hammond,
Banks and P o litics, p. 621; Indiana L egislature. House Journal,
1855, pp. 230-231, for introduction of bill and p. 614 for vote,
anc*
L egislatu re. Senate Journal, 1855, p. 616, for the
vote. In both houses tw enty-one Dem ocrats (40%) opposed banks
of any so rt and seven m ore opposed free banks but voted for
the Bank of the State of Indiana. Among the F usion ists five
(7%) opposed all banks and fourteen others opposed free banks
and voted for the Bank of the State of Indiana.
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people.

Although Wright’s argument m oved seven Dem ocratic

senators to change their votes, the legislatu re passed the b ill over
his veto.

Date in the se ssio n an attempt to repeal the free banking

law failed.

The vote revealed m uch m ore clearly than the ea rlier

vote a D em ocratic tendency to oppose free banking*

Seventeen

F u sion ists (80%) and nine Dem ocrats (40%) favored free banking with
four F u sion ists and thirteen Dem ocrats opposed.

22

Once the 1855 rev isio n of the 1852 free bank law had been
p assed m ost Dem ocrats accepted it.

Even Governor Wright told the

leg isla tu re in 1857 that he was convinced that the changes in the
law am ply secu red the currency and entitled the bill to the people's
confidence.

T ypically he found the freedom from monopoly the m ost

noteworthy feature of the law.
Ohio D em ocrats held tenaciously to their anti-bank stand in
the face of demands for in creased banking fa c ilitie s.

Charles

R eem elin 's report to the governor on "The Condition of the Ohio
Stock Banks” w as b a sica lly a hard m oney, anti-bank document although
it accepted the ex isten ce of the sta te's banks.

It took a strong stand

against a ll paper currency as ”one of the two great social and political
ev ils of the republic, " and ch astised the banks for failing to provide
a sound currency.

22

R eem elin's report opposed free banking and praised

E sarey, ”State Banking in Indiana, " pp. 286-287; Indiana D eg islature. Senate Journal, 1855, pp. 721-24, for veto, and p. 720,
for vote to table repeal of free banking. The party affiliations
of two m en opposed to free banking are not known.

238
the attorney gen eral’s opinion on the constitutionality of the 1851 law.
He saw no need for m ore bank capital and the scarcity of currency
could be attributed to bank paper which drove specie out of the country.
The report concluded with tw elve recom mendations to patch up the
law s.

They included the traditional D em ocratic demand for prohi

bition of all notes under twenty dollars, and a recommendation
that the in terest laws be made r e a listic.

Governor W illiam M edill

praised the R eem elin report in his m essa g e to the legislatu re in
1856 and warned that "the opinion was fast obtaining ground that
23
neither com m erce or cred it is benefited by leg isla tiv e interference. "
The new Republican party did not turn its back on demands
for in creased banking fa c ilitie s.

Hidden beneath m ore volatile

iss u e s in the gubernatorial campaign of 1855 w ere Republican
p rom ises for better banking fa c ilitie s.

The new governor, Salmon

P. Chase, had ea rlier favored "free principles, in land, currency,
trade, £c m en. " In his inaugural address he clarified his view s.

He

b elieved the b est currency would be one of coin and large b ills,
but that the variety of state law s made such a currency available only
through C ongressional action.

To answer the public demand for

in creased fa c ilitie s, he proposed a law that provided for convertible
currency, guarded against abuses of power, and extended its benefits

23

Documents. . . of the State of Ohio, 1853-1854, Document 9, and
D ocu m en ts.. . of the State of Ohio, 1855-1856, Document 1.
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to "all who w ill give the ample secu rities and guarantees which you
w ill doubtless require. " Chase made it clear that his position was
c lo se r to that of the form er Whigs than the Dem ocrats and in sisted
that he did not object to a convertible currency but ''mere paper
m oney sy stem s. " He fravored free banking and a lowering of in terest
rates.
The Republican leg isla tu re provided a law sim ilar to the
K elley law designed "to in crea se the number of banks, " but it
failed to receiv e a m ajority of votes cast in the election of 1856.

25

The problem of added banking fa cilities was alleviated by
the State Supreme Court which ruled in 1856 that contrary to the
ea rlier opinion of the attorney general, the new constitution did not
abrogate the free banking act of 1851.

This led Chase to recom m end

the use of the 1851 act rather than the passage of a new law.

Again

he argued that federal action was n ec essa ry and in sisted that any
banking law should offer the "most lib eral extension of the franchise,
with such restrictio n s upon its e x e rc ise as w ill effectively protect

24

Roseboom , The C ivil War Era, p. 310; Chase to Mr. Sutliff,
D ecem ber 20, 1850, in "Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P.
Chase, " Annual Report of the A m erican H istorical A ssociation
for the Year 1902 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1903), II, p. 226; D ocu m en ts.. . of the State of Ohio, 1855-1856,
Document 4.

25

Roseboom , The Civil War Era, p. 314; and Huntington, "A
H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " p. 465.
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the community against a. m ere paper m oney currency.
The need and d esire for banking fa cilities in Michigan
fin ally led to the passage of a new law in the original home of the
"wildcats. " The dearth of currency led to a variety of unauthorized
banks and a resu scitation of a number of dormant institutions.

An

1853 law lim ited unauthorized banking, but the problem of a currency
com posed of the issu e of "foreign" banks over which Michigan had
no control s till plagued the state.

The governor reported in 1853

that of the $4,100, 000 in circulation in the state $3, 000, 000 was
supplied by banks outside the sta te ’s jurisdiction.

As in the other

states of the Old Northwest, a bipartisan m ovem ent spearheaded by
the W hig-Republican Daily A dvertiser arose demanding a free bank
.law. 27
D em ocratic governor Robert M cClelland made his bows to
the anti-bank wing of his party in his m essage in 1853, but he did
note that the constitution provided for a w ell secured general law.
Perhaps such a law would be better than the "flood" of dubious
"foreign" currency.

He added that at le a st if local banks were

estab lish ed the state could tax them.

28

26

Ib id ., pp. 465-66; and D ocu m en ts.. . of the State of Ohio, 18561857, Document 10.

27

Gantz, "A H istory of Banking L egislation, " pp. 77-78, 85; and
F u ller, e d ., M essa g es, II, pp. 238-39* Detroit Daily A dvertiser,
Decem ber 15 and 16, 1852, January 6, 1853, and January 1, 1855.

28

F uller, e d ., M essa g es, II, pp. 221-242.
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Although a number of Dem ocratic papers, including the
F ree P r e s s , favored free banking, acting governor Andrew P arsons,
who was serving out M cClelland’s term , gave notice in 1855 that
anti-bank sentim ent s till dominated the party.

In old Jacksonian

rhetoric* he warned that experience showed that even stock secured
currency was not en tirely safe.

The b est suggestion he could offer

to solve the sta te’s problem s was a prohibition of all notes under $5

SO that such w o rthless " tra s h ” would not drive specie "beyond the
reach of our producing c la s s e s . ” If all the states adopted such a
provision, "over bank iss u e s, expansions and contractions in the
m oney m arket, would to a great extent be checked, and the raging
and dangerous sp irit of speculation so common to the people of our
29
country, be much guarded against. "

Many of the sam e sentim ents w ere exp ressed in the inaugural
of the new Republican governor K insley S. Bingham who had been a
leading "loco-foco. ” Both past and present h istory argued Bingham,
proved that banks w ere responsible for depreciation of the currency
and w ild fluctuations that bore m ost heavily on the laboring c la ss e s .
Thusfar M ichigan had luckily escaped the free banking m ania which

29

D etroit F ree P r e ss , May 27, 1853 and April 25, 1854; Lansing
Journal in the D etroit F ree P r e s s , April 30, 1854; Ionia Gazette
in the Detroit F ree P r e ss, May 3, 1854; and F uller, e d .,
M essa g es, II, pp. 281-301.
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grasped Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and W isconsin and which had p ro
duced such disastrous resu lts in Indiana*

He too believed that specie

would spread through the country if sm all notes w ere prohibited.
Yet, the idea of a free banking law was not com pletely rejected by
Bingham; and there w ere indications that a properly secured law
would receiv e his approval. ^
Evidently the law passed by the 1855 legislatu re did not
m eet the governor's standards, and he vetoed it.

At the time he did

not w rite a veto m essa g e, but in his m essage to the legislatu re in
1855 he explained that he s till w orried that the establishm ent of banks
in rem ote p laces and the p o ssib ilities of failure and fraud, endangered
a sound currency.

He suggested that banks be forced to pay out only

their notes so that quick redem ption was assu red and circulation
would be lim ited to the lo ca l area, and that sm all notes be prohibited.
He b elieved that the C alifornia gold would make this possib le.

Under

such a sy stem the "poorer c la sses" would be protected from lo s s e s
b ecause of depreciated paper, and the b u sin ess c la s s e s would secure
the benefits of banks.

31

During 1856 and early 1857 p ressu re mounted for a free
banking law.

The M arshall Statesm an and the Monroe C om m ercial

joined with the .Daily A dvertise

30
31

in demanding such legislation .

F u ller, e d ., M essa g es, II, pp. 281-301.
Gantz, "A H istory of Banking L egislation, " pp. 85-86; and
F u ller, e d ., M essa g es, H, pp. 302-321.

The
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new leg isla tu re was m et with two petitions from B errien County
including seventy-nine nam es, and a m onster petition sponsored by
C. A. Trowbridge of Detroit which included three hundred and
fo r ty -six names*

The m ain opposition to the law cam e from Dem o

cratic papers that feared a repetition of Michigan’s previous
experience with free banking.

32

Republicans J. B. Beebe and L». G. B erry sponsored another
free banking b ill in 1857 which was passed by the Republican le g is 
lature.

The House votes showed 75% Republicans favoring the bill

with a m ajority of Dem ocrats opposing it.

In the Senate an even

larger percentage of the Republicans w ere joined by four of the six
Democrats*

Bingham signed this b ill and later praised it as one of

the important m ea su res of his adm inistration although it included
neither a prohibition of sm all notes nor a provision forcing banks to
pay out Gnly their own notes.

The people approved the b ill by a vote

of 41, 006 to 19# 865 in an unspirited contest.

Although the vote does not

lead to an ea sy party interpretation, heavily Republican counties such

32

D etroit Daily A dvertiser, November 26, 1856; Monroe Com m ercial
in the Detroit Daily !Advertiser, Decem ber 22, 1856; M arshall
Statesm an in the JDetroit Daily A d vertiser, Decem ber 25, 1857;
M ichigan L egislatu re. Senate Documents Accompanying Journal,
1857, Documents #2, #15, and #16; Ann Arbor Argus in the Detroit
F r e e P r e s s , D ecem ber 15, 27, 1856. While it cannot be called
conclusive evidence a com parison of the nam es on the "monster"
petition and the m en liste d in M rs. McCoy’s study yield s the
p olitical affiliations (for 1860) of thirty-four of the signers;
twenty-tw o Republicans, six D em ocrats, one Constitutional Union,
and five no-party men.
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as Branch, Calhoun, H illsdale, Kalamazoo, .Kent, Lenawee, St.
Joseph and Washtenaw voted for the b ill with ratios sim ilar to those
9 9

seen in the vote for governor at the sam e election. J

Illin ois, whose free banking system survived the Panic of
1854, a ltered and perfected her system during these years.

Following

the Panic, the bank com m ission er had suggested the abolition of the
7% ceilin g on in terest in order to draw m ore capital to the free banks
and to d iscourage the unregulated brokerage houses which the provision had spawned,

fife

also suggested that a specified sp ecie

r eserv e be required for redemption.

Dem ocratic governor Joel

M atteson, busy organizing the la rg est banking chain in the state,
p raised the sy stem and suggested that the legislatu re consider the
co m m issio n er’s recom m endations.

Although two m inor b ills w ere

p assed during the se ssio n , there was no m ajor revision of the system
in 1855.

In the following year the system was expanded to include

sixty-on e banks with a total circulation nearly twice that of two years

33

M ichigan L egislatu re. House Journal, 1857, pp. 339, 512-13;
M ichigan L egislatu re. Senate Journal, 1857, pp. 25, 248; Fuller,
e(** * M essa g es, II, p. 340; and Gantz, "A H istory of Banking
L egislation, Mpp. 142-143, lis ts the vote for governor and on
the banking law. It should be noted that two D em ocratic counties,
G enesee and Wayne, turned in large votes for the b ill. G enesee
w as gen erally Whig and then Republican although it turned in a
m ajority for D em ocrat Charles Stuart in 1858. Wayne was the
m ost rapidly developing com m ercial area and becam e a Republi
can county in I860. For the long run affiliations of the counties
see: W. Dean Burnham, P resid ential B allots, 1836-1892
(Baltim ore; The Johns Hopkins P r e ss , 1955), pp. 191-193.
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ea rlier.

34

The election of 1856 brought the new Republican party to
power in the state.

W illiam B is se ll, the new governor, was an

anti-H ebraska Dem ocrat who had opposed the free banking law when it
was fir st passed.

His new a ssociation had m oderated his view s,

and his inaugural p raised the law.

At the sam e tim e he argued

that amendment of the b ill could strengthen the system and add to the
secu rity of the note holders.

The Republican legislatu re com plied

with B is s e ll1s request by a m ajor revision of the law.

To elim inate

true nw ildcats, " the law provided that b usin ess could only be tran s
acted at the office sp ecified in the certificate of incorporation and
that the office had to be in a community of over two hundred people.
The act made provisions concerning capital and the redemption of
notes m ore stringent and rem oved the prejudice against Illinois bonds.
Finally, the m axim um leg a l in ter est rate was raised to ten per cent.
Each of these changes which m irrored suggestions in other states
helped stab ilize the free banking system , but further defects would
be revealed in the years of econom ic chaos that preceded the Civil
35
War. J
34

Jam es, Chicago Banks, 1, pp. 238-39; Dowrie, "Illinois Banking,"
pp. 144-45; and Illin ois. Governor, 1853-1S57.

35

Illin ois. Governor, 1857-1860; Dowrie, "Illinois Banking,"
pp. 148-149; and Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 241-43.
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The continuity of em phasis on credit and currency expansion,
and, in particular, the advocacy of free banking from the Whigs to
the Republicans can be explained ea sily.

In the fir st place m ost

people who had been Whigs becam e Republicans.

Lincoln estim ated

in 1856 that, "Nine tenths of the anti-N ebraska votes have to come
from old Whigs. H Although historians have denied the validity of
this estim ate, an exam ination of voting percentage shifts tends to
confirm Lincoln’s estim ate.

Such an exam ination also shows that

in the sta tes of the Old Northwest 80% of the Whigs went into the
Republican party in 1856 and that by 1860 w ell over 90% of the Whigs
had joined the new party.

Further, it appears that the m ost con

servative m em bers of the older party avoided the new organization
un less their religiou s and ethnic background determ ined an in terest
in reform ism .

Lincoln saw this tendency in Illinois; and studies of

Illin ois, Indiana, and Ohio argue that the m ost conservative Whigs
clung tightly to the Native A m erican party in 1856 and either becam e
p olitically inactive or joined their form er opponents at the end of the
decade.

The sy stem a tic study of the econom ic elite of Wayne County,

M ichigan shows an in crease in non-participation among this group.
When M rs. McCoy’s findings are com pared with general voting shifts,
it is clear that the percentage of '’elite" Whigs who went into the new
party was somewhat lower than the percentage of form er Whigs from
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the entire voting population who joined the Republicans. 36
Examinations of the leadership of the new party also show
continuity between the Whigs and the Republicans.

In the form ative

years of the party the old Whigs took b asically backstage roles
making the m ost stra teg ic use of the Dem ocrats who joined the new
organization to draw voters from the old party of Jackson.

They

con sciou sly avoided con troversial issu es; but, as the party grew,
played an in creasin gly dominant role in policy making.

The p olicies

instituted by the new party, particularly in its 1860 platform, w ere
cle a r ly an extension of the p o licies of the m ore p rogressive elem ents
of the Whig party.

37

The Republican party in its support, its leadership, and its
p o licies was much m ore a continuation of the Whig party than h is 
torians have been w illing to admit.

It found its greatest strength in

econom ically dynamic areas and among the New England and New York

36

See: Appendix on "Voting in the 1850’s. "

37

See esp ecia lly two e ssa y s by M ildred C. Stoler, "The Dem ocratic
Elem ent in the Republican Party in Illinois, " Papers in Illinois
H istory and T ransactions for the Year 1942 (Springfield, Illinois:
Illinois State H istorical Society, 1944), pp. 32-72, and "The
Democra.tic Elem ent in the New Republican Party in Indiana* ”
Indiana Magazine of H istory, XXXVI (September, 1940), pp. 185207; and Van Bolt, "The R ise of the Republican Party in Indiana, "
p. 209. Orth to Colfax, July 4, 1854, and Orth to Colfax,
November /_
1854, in J. Herman Shauinger, ed. , "The
le tte r s of Godiove S. Orth, H oosier Am erican, " Indiana Magazine
of H istory, XL (March, 1944), pp. 54 and 56, give som e insight
into Whig attem pts to rem ain in the background at fir st without
giving up control.
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"Yankees. " N early every county in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio which
shifted from Dem ocratic to Republican could be distinguished by its
econom ic dynamism and the "Yankee" rather than Southern origins
of its population.

Quite the opposite was the case in the few Whig

counties that becam e D em ocratic.

In the fights for free banking it

was the areas such as northern Illinois and central Indiana where
Dem ocrats w ere pushed behind these laws by their constituents. The
"Yankee elem ent gave to these areas an acceptance of com m ercialism
and a quest for "improvement" that was le s s prevalent in the older
areas dominated by Southerners.

The Ohio State Journal believed

"the m ost enlightened and enterprising" portion of the state backed
the Republicans.

Samuel B rim blecom of Ogle County in Northern

Illinois wrote Eiihu Washburn:
When we m ove into a territo ry and find people
there from P en n a ., Indiana, Ohio, or New York,
we find a c la ss which joins us in making all the
im provem ents of those states. We build school
houses & churches, educate our children, build
railroads and in a thousand things consult the com 
fort of a ll people, and soon draw around us society
congenial to our habits and tastes. But what is our
condition, if we find the working population Slaves,
labouring under the taskm aster ? The white popu
lation is so sca rce that we cannot combine for the
establishm ent of a general system of education,
and make the various im provem ents n ecessa ry to
our com fort and happiness; our society is
lim ited ;--p erh ap s we lie under the ban of society,
being non-slaveholders; --o u r children grow up
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in ignorance; and* from association with a race,
degraded by force of unequal law s, and kept
ignorant from policy, --b eco m e vicious. 38
The contrast in the in terest in "improvement'1 can be seen
in the illitera cy rates for Indiana and Illinois that show these sk ills
m ore w idely spread in "Yankee" areas.

It seem s that these were

39
the areas with "go-aheaditiveness. "

The new Republican party was the party of reform as w ell
as "improvement. " It was, as its opponents said, the party of " ism s, "
and one that should have been included was "boosterism . " It took
over the econom ic attitudes of the m ost p rogressive Whigs and accepted
with them a dynamic conception of the economy.

Key to this had been

the notion of expanding econom ic opportunity and the prom ise of
su c c e ss.

The sym bolic center of their appeal was not the yeoman

farm er but another kind of self-m ad e man who worked his way from
lowly origins to a position of power in the new com m ercial-in d u strial

38

Burnham, P resid en tial B allots, pp. 176-80 and 208-10, on
voting shifts of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio counties; the Ohio
State Journal, November 24, 1856; and Samuel A. Brim blecom
to Elihu B. Washburn, January 24, I860, quoted in Kuhn,
"Economic Issu es and the R ise of the Republican Party in the
Northwest, " p. 30.

39

E sarey, A H istory of Indiana, II, pp. 604-608, and Richard Lyle
Power, Planting Corn B elt Culture (Indianapolis, Indiana:
Indiana H istorical Society, 1953), pp. 40-42, on literacy rates.
The Power book which is subtitled, "The Im press of the Upland
Southerner and Yankee in the Old Northwest, " is extrem ely
suggestive, but is m arred by an unclear definition of "Yankee"
and by the author's refusal to try to verify his im p ression s.
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world.

Henry Clay had originated the phrase "self-m ade" man,

and h is d iscip le, Abraham Lincoln exploited it to draw the laboring
man into the Republican coalition.

The idea of free banking con-

tinned to fit into this general fram e of reference.

40

40

Griffin, Their Brother*s K eepers, pp. 219-41, adds a dim ension
to understanding Republican attraction to the I'isms. " A m ost
insightful e ssa y by Richard Hofstadter, "Abraham Lincoln and
the Self-M ade Myth, " in the A m erican P olitical Tradition,
pp. 93-136, has helped m e form ulate m y interpretation of the
Whigs and Republicans.

CHAPTER VII
CRISIS, 1857-1862

The period between 1857 and 1862 saw two econom ic c r is e s
which forced further rev isio n of the free banking law s. The fir st
of th ese w as stric tly financial. The second was precipitated by the
p olitical situation of 1860 and se c essio n . The free banking system s
of the Old Northwest weathered the storm of 1857 in much better
fashion than m ost historians have supposed, but they collapsed
during the 1860-61 c r is is . The Dem ocrats attempted to use these
c r is e s , particularly that of 1860-61, to reconstruct their party around
the traditional Jacksonian issu e s and refused to participate in con
structive reform . The Republicans continued to try to provide a
sound and adequate currency through reform of the free banking laws
and, after I860, the establishm ent of state institutions like that of
Indiana.

By 1857 the situation seem ed to be stabilizing.

Although

M ichigan’s law still had to be ratified by the people, all of the states
of the Old Northwest had accepted free banking as the solution to
m oney and cred it problem s.

The experience of 1854 had pointed out

the needs for certain restrictio n s im plem ented by Illinois and Indiana
who altered their laws to elim inate the ’’w ildcat” elem ent from free
banking.

A lso the p olitical situation was becom ing clear.

The

Republicans em erged from the chaos of the m id -fifties as the opponents
of the Dem ocrats for state and national power.

In the econom ic sphere

the new party carried on in the Whig tradition supporting free banking
while the Dem ocrats rem ained split on the issu e.

However, the

im p ressio n of stab ility that early 1857 seem ed to convey proved
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illu sory, and the period from 1857 until 1862 was one of continued
econom ic and political c r is is .
The tremendous boom of the 1850's had been an international
phenomenon spurred by the output of the California m ines after 1849,
and the d ep ression that cam e in 1857 had international roots.

The

Crim ean War ad versely affected the French econom y which, at the
sam e tim e, suffered from the twin ev ils of over-population and low
agricultural production.

The situation forced the Bank of France to

draw sp ecie from the Bank of England, resulted in a high bank rate
in London, and, in turn, ad versely affected B ritish investm ent in
A m erican se cu rities.

Frauds in railroad m anagement and the fa il

ure of many roads to produce hoped for returns combined with the
risin g bank rate to bring about a rev ersa l in the flow of B ritish
capital and a subsequent decline in the m arket for Am erican stocks
and bonds in 1856 and 1857.

This decline undermined the a sse ts of

many A m erican banks and financial institutions weakening their
ability to withstand any strong shock.

The entire banking system

lacked overall policy and even prim itive cooperation between banks.
The dominant position of New York as the m oney m arket caused
"county1 banks" to keep d eposits in New York*

These deposits rep re

sented the "county banks" r e se r v e s in case of em ergency while the
New York banks used this m oney in the call loan m arket.

In good
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tim es this was advantageous for ail involved, but during the c r is is
of 1857 it proved extrem ely dangerous. ^
The season al drain of funds from New York precipitated
the c r is is .

Without warning one of the nation's leading financial

concerns, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, closed its
doors on August 24.

As the banks scram bled to fortify their position

and se cu rities p rices plummeted, other failu res followed.

Continual

runs on the banks eventually resu lted in the suspension of specie
payments in October.

By this tim e com m erce and industry w ere at

a stan d still, and unemployment mounted.
The financial c r is is passed quickly, but the depression hung
on.

During this period which lasted in som e areas until 1860, the

Old Northwest was particularly hard hit.

The suspension of naviga

tion during the winter of 1856-57 led to a r ise in the rate on Eastern
exchange.

Throughout 1857 the m oney m arket rem ained tight, and a

continuous stream of sp ecie flowed eastward.

The flow of capital

into the W est which had supported the boom of the m id -fifties was
reversed .

According to Thomas S. Berry, "The backbone of sp ecu 

lation was broken in 1857, judging from the fact that p rices of

1

U nless otherw ise noted the m aterial on the Panic of 1857 is from:
George W. Van Vleck, The Panic of 1857 (New York: Columbia
U niversity P r e ss , 1943); Charles Franklin Dunbar, Econom ic
E ssa y s, e d ., O. M. W. Sprague (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1904), pp. 266-294; and Taylor, The Transportation
Revolution, pp. 345-351.
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com m odities and sec u r itie s failed to .respond fully to the prevailing
ea sin ess of m oney and cred it /a fter 1857/ . " The downturn of that
year was preceded by exten sive land speculation geared to the ex

pansion of the supply of m oney and credit.
the land bubble burst.

With the drain of funds

A w estern correspondent of the New York

Herald w rote, "Nine-tenth 8 of our people owe, and have no Immediate
way to pay*

2
.Everything in the shape of property is low. "

The farm ers faced a combination of bad crops and extensive
debt.

Crops w ere poor in Michigan in 1856, and the sev ere winter of

1856*5? hit at the livestock .

The three season s from 1857-1859

brought crop failu res throughout the whole Northwest.
o scilla ted between extrem es.

The weather

“Overabundant rainfall and rot in 1858,

drouth and burning in 1859, winter killing and frost, blight and the
arm y-w orm , each made their contribution toward low yields which
farm ers experienced at the clo se of the decade. " Still, in 1859, an
Illinois paper could com m ent that "There is not grain enough in the
country to pay debts contracted b efore the hard tim es com m enced. "
Many farm ers had overbought land, and tax sa le s in creased during
these y ea rs, but a lso many had speculated in railroad secu rities.

The

W ashington County (W isconsin) Dem ocrat reported, "It is said that
Z

B erry, W estera P r ic e s, pp. 517-529; Kuhn, "Economic Issues
and the R ise of the Republican P a rty in the Northwest, " pp. 133154; and. S treeter, P olitica l P arties in Michigan, pp. 257-261,
deal with the econom ic im pact on the Old Northwest. The
quotations a re from Berry* p. 528; the New York Herald,
January 4, 1858, quoted in Van Vleck, p. 84.
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from 2, 000 to 3, 000 farm s are thus m ortgaged to railroads in
W isconsin, that the railroads cannot pay, and to relea se their farm s
w ill strip nine-tenths of them of the hard earnings of many years. H
In northern Michigan there w ere even ca ses of starvation reported.

3

In the citie s b u sin ess failu res and the decline in capital
reso u rces led to w id e-sp read unemployment.

The Grand Rapids

Enquirer and H erald reported that in Detroit "Most of the large
establishm ents have discharged their em ployees, by which a larger
number of persons are thrown out of em ploym ent than at any form er
t im e .. . the sm a ller m echanics have been com pelled to reduce their
force of op eratives, and their m erchants have cut down their force
of clerk s to the low est p ossib le number.

At a low estim ate there

are five thousand persons out of em ploym ent in the city at the present
tim e. " In Chicago alone 204 failu res w ere recorded in 1857.

Only

Cincinnati among the c itie s of the West seem ed to escape the ravages
of depression.

4

In the face of this the perform ance of the banking system
was better than m ight be expected or than historians have often believed.

3

Kuhn, "Economic Issu es and the R ise of the Republican Party in
the Northwest, ” p. 134; the Bureau County Republican, September,
15, 1859, quoted in Kuhn, p. 134; and the Washington County
Dem ocrat, Decem ber 20, 1857, quoted in Van Vleck, Panic of
1857, p. 84.

4

The Grand Rapids Enquirer and Herald, December 16, 1857,
quoted in Streeter, P o litica l P arties in Michigan, p. 260; and
Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, p. 207.
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Bray Hammond’s statem ent that the Indiana free banks w ere "choked
off" by the Panic of 1857 is contradicted by the evidence of Governor
Ashbel P. W illard who in 1859 praised the 1855 amendment to the
free banking law whioh had perm itted only one failure in four years.
The Bank of the State of Indiana, of course, proved itse lf one of the
nation’s stron gest banks during the c r is is , and was one of the few
not to suspend sp ecie payments.

5

A sim ila r situation existed in Ohio where the failure of the
Ohio L ife Insurance and Trust Company had its greatest impact.

That

institution was so intim ately connected with the state governm ent and
the State Bank that George W. Van Vleck ca lls it, "The nursing
m other to all the financial institutions of Ohio. " The collapse,
precipitated by the em bezzlem ent of nearly its entire a sse ts by its
New York ca sh ier, staggered the State Bank and left it in a shaky
condition in late 1857*

However, the State Bank soon managed to

stab ilize itse lf, and throughout 1857 the banks of Ohio along with those
of Indiana did not form ally suspend specie payments during the c r is is .
Taken together only seven of Ohio's authorized banks including the
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company closed their doors, and of
those two failed before the panic and two had not been active since 1854.
Governor Chase noted in his m essa g e of January 4, 1858, that Ohio

5

Hammond, Banks and P o litic s , p. 621; and Indiana L egislature.
Documentary Journal, 1859, Part II, Document 5.
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had fifty-four functioning banks.

6

Although in late August the Illinois banks suspended sp ecie
payments to all but a few favored custom ers, the free banks of
that state cam e through the c r is is reasonably w ell.

Six banks out

of fifty-four failed and of these all but one fully redeem ed their
notes.

The c r is is was b rief and recovery nearly com plete by the

opening of 1858.

In January, 1859 the Bank C om m issioners praised

the fre e banking sy stem for its perform ance during two years of
financial c r is is and depression.

Governor B is s e ll joined in the

p raise of the sy stem which had lim ited lo s s e s to "a m ere trifle. ”

7

The free banking system s of the Old Northwest had stood
up fa ir ly w ell during the Panic of 1857, and m ost of the failu res
w ere unauthorized private banks or old banks such as those of
M ichigan and the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company which
ex isted under sp ecia l charters p assed before the free banking era.
If the c r is is caused the failure of only a few banks it did
reveal a seriou s w eakness in the sy stem ’s inability to maintain
currency at par.

In mid-1857 the notes of Indiana's free banks began

6

Van Vleck, Panic of 1857, pp. 64-66, the quotation is from p. 65;
Huntington, nA H istory of Banking and Currency in Ohio, ”
pp. 471-77; Documents. . . of the State of Ohio, 1857, Document 8.

7

Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 100; Dowrie, ’’The Development
of Banking in Illinois, " pp. 151-54; Illinois Governor, 1857-1860.
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to go a t a discount, and the c ris is accentuated th eir depreciation.
Illinois and W isconsin experienced sim ila r difficulties.
m en tal problem was the quality of se c u ritie s.

The funda

N early half of

Illinois cu rren cy was secu red by the bonds of the state of M issouri
which declined a fte r early 1857.

The W isconsin Bank C om ptroller

explained the predicam ent faced by the bankers which accounted for
larg e holdings of the le s s safe se c u ritie s:
It is obvious that the sa fest bonds, via: of states
that a re in the m o st prosperous financial condi
tion, and rela tiv e ly the le a st encum bered with
debt, do not secu re the highest ra te of in te rest,
and if lib e ra l in te re s t is paid on them they can
not be bought at low p rice s. No banker, th e re 
fore, buys TJ. S ., New England or New York
bonds as se cu rity for his circulation, but m ainly
such as a re in fact m ore or le s s depreciated,
confiding in his own good luck and in the future
development of the re so u rc e s of the States of
which he has becom e the c re d ito r .. . As the law
stands we effectually encourage the bankers to
buy as secu rity the le a s t safe class of bonds or
stocks, and put obstacles in the way of p u r
chasing the best.
This problem went unsolved in the period following the Panic of 1857,
and rem ain ed the g re a te s t weakness of the free banking system s of
the Old N orthw est.

8

i860 was a very good y e ar for the fa rm e rs of the Old N orth
w est and the economic situation began to rig h t itself.
8

The la s t years

B erry , W estern P ric e s , p. 521; Jam es, Chicago Banks, I,
pp. 264-268; W isconsin Bank C om ptroller, Report, 1860, quoted
in M erk, Economic H istory of W isconsin, pp. 190-191; and
Dunbar, Economic E ssay s, pp. 322-324,
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of the 1850's had w itnessed an in crease in the num ber of banks and
c re d it was easily available in m ost states.

While M ichigan's free

bank law produced only one new bank, the West as a whole in creased
its banking fac ilitie s by twenty p er cent.
hundred four banks.

By 1860 W isconsin had one

Its southern neighbor, Illinois had gone from

th irty -n in e banks in 1858 to seventy-four by I860 and one hundred four
by 1861.

In the p eriod between the Panic of 1857 and the economic

c ris is of 1861 the total circulation of Illinois doubled. 9
In the states of the Old N o rth w est--p articu larly Illinois and
W isco n sin --free banking m ade possible this in cre ase in c re d it and
circulation.

The situation was, however, a dangerous one, because

inadequate refo rm m e a su re s had been instituted concerning the
quality of stocks which backed this currency.
The uneasy political situation paralyzed business and p r e 
cipitated a decline in the value of southern se cu ritie s which stru ck
at the b a sis of fre e cu rren cy .

Between July and Decem ber of I860,

the p rice of the bonds of se v era l southern states declined 20 to 25%.
M isso u ri bonds fell from eighty to sixty-one.

During October the

se c u ritie s of V irginia, North C arolina, and T ennessee averaged an
8% drop.

The bonds of these states w ere widely used in the Old N orth

w est to secu re the fre e bank currency, and the decline in their value
9

Dowrie, "The Development of Banking in Illinois, " p. 155;
Jam es, Chicago Banks, II, pp. 270-72, Tables V and VII,
pp. 259-60; Gantz, UA H istory of Banking L egislation, " p. 90;
and Dunbar, Econom ic E ssays, pp. 296-298, 316.
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. .

p recip itated a banking c ris is .

10

In general, Ohio and Indiana suffered le ss than either
W isconsin or Illinois.

M ost of Ohio's banks w ere branches of the

State Bank ra th e r than free banks.

The free banks of Indiana w ere

forced to m ake good the loss through the M issouri and Louisiana
bonds, and as a re s u lt a sm all num ber w ere forced to suspend,
while sixteen w ithdrew th eir circulation entirely.
The situation in Illinois and W isconsin was one of u tte r
collapse.

Two th ird s of the bonds used by Illin o is' banks to secure

th e ir cu rre n cy w ere obligations of southern sta te s.

As p rice s began

to sag, the Bank C om m issioners called on the banks to deposit
additional se c u ritie s to support th eir note issu e s.

In November a

sim ila r demand resu lte d in the liquidation of seventeen banks. Chicago
b ankers began to refuse country bank notes based on southern bonds.
By 1861 faith in Illinois bank cu rren cy had cracked and the notes of
only tw en ty -th ree banks w ere accepted at par*
notes m ade the situation in tolerable.

Hoarding of the good

In A pril, 1861 the Chicago banks

refu sed to accept the notes of any country banks, precipitating a
sectional fight among the bankers and m erchants of the state.

A month

la te r an attem pt was m ade by Chicago m erchants to stabilize the situ 
ation by an ag reem ent to accept a t par all notes of banks on the lis t
10

"The C risis of 1860" is discu ssed a t length in Dunbar, Economic
E ssay s, pp. 294-314.
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drawn up by Chicago bankers.
failed.

This and se v era l other attem pts

By the sum m er of 1861 the Bank C om m issioner d eclared a ll

but seventeen banks insolvent.
Scam m on's M arine Bank.

Things got w orse with the failu re of

The circulation of Illinois banks had

fallen from $12, 000, 000 to $3, 000, 000 in October, 1861 and finally
to $566,163 by the end of 1862.

The collapse of free banking in

Illinois was com plete and the state was left with hardly any currency.
W isconsin faced m any of the sam e problem s.

11

Of the

$5,133, 565 of se c u ritie s which supported the cu rren cy of W isconsin's
fre e banks* $3, 658, 000 w ere in bonds of M issouri, Virginia,
T ennessee, N orth C arolina, and L ouisiana.
obligations of M issouri.

Most of these w ere

As in Elinois, the bank co m p tro ller had to

forbid fu rth e r deposit of these bonds as th eir p rice s fell in 1860.

As

the bonds d ep reciated the banks w ere forced to add new se c u ritie s.
By A pril 1861 th ree such levies had been m ade, and at that tim e
th irte e n banks w ere unable to comply.

The value of W isconsin

c u rren cy was fu rth e r h u rt by the action of the Chicago bankers in
A pril who refu sed to receive the notes of forty W isconsin banks.
Milwaukee soon followed suit resulting in discrediting $1, 000, 000 of
paper cu rren cy .

A ttem pts by the B an k ers's A ssociation to stabilize

the situation led to dropping eighteen additional banks and the d is
crediting of another $1, 000, 000 of currency.

F o r a tim e fu rth er decline

11 Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 277-85; and Cole, E ra of the
Civil War, pp. 361-62.
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was fo resta lle d by the action of the B anker’s A ssociation which
Supported seventy of the sta te 's banks.

However, another levy to

rep lace stocks that continued to depreciate found eighteen of these
unable to respond of which ten w ere in a state of com plete in 
solvency.

By m idsum m er the situation had so degenerated that

Milwaukee becam e the scene of a bank rio t by Germ an la b o re rs who
w ere paid in depreciated notes.

F re e banking in the Old Northwest

had reach ed its nadir. 12
No one could argue that during these y ears the banking
question again attained the prom inent spot in the political a ren a
which it held in the 1840's.

More fundam ental and im portant issu es

form ed the m ain concern of the p arties on the eve of the Civil War.
Yet, the econom ic situation forced consideration of banking problem s
and the p a rtie s rev ealed distinctly different attitudes on this question.
The Panic of 1857 and the subsequent depression produced
renew ed c ritic is m of banks and a re ite ra tio n by the D em ocrats of a
Jacksonian stand.

This re tu rn to the faith had perhaps m ore

political than econom ic overtones.

It began in the late fifties and

gained m om entum following the debacle of 1861. A sm all m inority of
R ep u b lican s--the m o st prom inent of which was the old foe of banks,
John W entw orth--joined in the renew ed attacks on banks; and, like
the Whigs of the late th irtie s , many becam e c ritic s of the action of the
12

M erk, JSconomic H istory of W isconsin, pp. 191-200.
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batiks..

Even the m ore m oderate Chicago Tribune said, in August,

1861,; "We wash our hands of the whole business*

If the fa rm e r will

sell a d o lla r's w orth of his produce for the p ictures of any bank
w hatsoever which does not redeem its issu es at some convenient
place in the State at p a r, he lo ses his share of his ju st earnings. . . all
banks of issu e a re a curse to the community. " 13
The m ain th ru st against banks came again from the Demo
c ra ts.

While they had won the presidency in 1856, it was c le ar that

in the Old N orthw est the party of Jackson was in danger of losing its
m ajo rity statu s.

Enough votes w ere being drawn away by the new

coalition to shift the scales in this trad itio n al D em ocratic stronghold.
The Decompfcon question and the economic policy of the Buchanan
A dm inistration fu rth e r com plicated the problem s of the D em ocrats.
It was hoped that a re tu rn to the old issue could pull the feuding
factions together and draw recen t converts to Republicanism back to
the fold.

At the sam e tim e attem pts to pacify the South w ere m ixed

with appeals to the conservative business in te re s ts .

The widely read

New York H erald told its re a d e rs to forget "Nigger Agitation" and
rally the governm ent to the re lie f of business.
13

Once the war cam e,

The Chicago Tribune, August 8, 1861. The Tribune, as will be
seen in Chapter VIII, was in the vanguard of demands for a
national banking system and had little use for the state banks.
Yet, on January 30, 1862, it called on the Illinois constitutional
convention to c o n stru ct a sound banking system fo r the state
"by which labor can avail its e lf of the im m ense a ssista n ce of
accum ulated capital. "

2 64-

anti-bank agitation in cre ased and was tied with the highly emotional
’’peace" issue. 14
Unfortunately for the student of the period,the D em ocratic
position was n eith er universally held nor without am biguity and can
b e st be d escrib ed as a "c e n tral tendency. ” The ambiguity of the
position is c le arly revealed in Buchanan’s M essage to Congress in
late 1857.

The P re sid e n t opened that m essage with a lengthy d is

cussion of the banking question.

The passage fcegins, ends and is

dom inated by Jacksonian orthodoxy.

His in terp retatio n of the nature

of econom ic ’’rev u lsio n s” had not been a lte re d in two decades.
It is apparent that our existing m isfortunes have
proceeded solely from our extravagant and
vicious system of paper currency and bank c red its,
exciting the people to wild speculations and
gambling in stocks.
He also attacked wild speculations, paper inflated p rices that varied
from "tru e values, ” and extravagant im portations.

T here w ere also

intim ations of the neo-orthodoxy of Benton and Jam es Guthrie who
had advocated in the m id -fifties that Congress tax all of the state bank
notes out of existence in o rd er to bring the cu rren cy of the country to
a tru e specie b a sis.
If experience shall prove it to be im possible to
enjoy the facilities which w ell-reg u lated banks
14

The g en eral rea ctio n to the Panic of 1857 is analyzed in Van Vleck,
Panic of 1857, pp. 80-104, and Samuel .Rezneck, "The Influence
of D epression Upon A m erican Opinion, 1857-1859# n The Journal
of Econom ic H istory, II (May, 1942), pp. 1-23, the quotations
fro m the New York H erald a re in Rezneck, p. 5.
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might afford wichout at the sam e tiroe suffering
the calam ities which the e x c e s se s of the banks
have hitherto im licted upon the country, it
would then be far the le s s e r evil to deprive them
altogether of the power to issu e paper currency
and confine them to the functions of banks of
deposit and discount. 15
Yet, lo 57 was not 1837 and there w ere also tinges of h eresy
in Buchanan*s m essa g e.

He accepted "the existen ce of banks and

the circulation of bank paper. . . /a-s/ so identified with the habits of
our people that they can not at this day fee suddenly abolished without
much im m ediate injury to the country. M He seem ed to condone specie
paying banks; and he even gave a very lim ited endorsem ent to stock
backed currency as "doubtless w i s e .. . / but/ no adequate security
against o v e r issu e s, . . /and./ it m ay be perverted to inflate the
16
c u r r e n c y ."
The revival of anti-bank sentim ent of which the Buchanan
speech w as a part, was injected into the politics of Ohio and Illinois
in late 1857 as demands for control of state issu e s by the federal
governm ent spread.

Such demands w ere distinctly negative supporting

Benton's suggestions of a tax on paper money that would bring a

15

Richardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the P resid en ts, V,
pp. 436-441, the quotations are from pp. 437 and 441.

16

Ib id ., pp. 441 and 438. Interestingly enough Buchanan also
praised a p olicy of the Bank of England, that of keeping a special
r e se rv e of one-third of lia b ilities (p. 438). Any favorable
m ention of the Bank of England twenty years ea rlier would have
ca st in doubt the sin cerity of Buchanan’s "Democracy. ,r
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return to an ex clu siv ely "constitutional currency. " This however
sm acked of central authority and led many "radicals" in the Old
Northwest to advocate state action.

17

Although such action was spoken of in Illinois, only in
Ohio did the opposition to banks produce any tangible resu lts.

In

1857 the Ohio Statesman again led the fight against banks and paper
m oney and drew the traditional Jacksonian m oral lesso n s from the
panic.

R eferring to the law prohibiting the circulation of "foreign"

notes under $10, the Statesman w rote, "While the law was in force,
there was sp ecie enough in use to answer every demand.

But the

Black Republicans repealed this law, and in le s s than thirty days,
the State was flooded with petty rags, many of them on banks the
location of which it was im p ossib le to trace out on any map yet
published. " In line with the suggestions of Howell Cobb, Buchanan's
Secretary of the Treasury, the Dem ocrats called for a State sub
treasu ry plan.

The failure of the Ohio Trust and Life Insurance

Company which had been a depository made this idea popular; and
the state treasu ry scandal seem ed to give substance to Dem ocratic
connection of the free banking system and financial instability.

To

com plicate the situation and add to the Dem ocratic advantage, the
Republicans w ere sponsoring a bill for extension of banking fa c ilitie s.
Both the bank question and its sponsors w ere defeated and the le g is -

17

Illinois State R eg ister, November 2, 1857; and Jones, "Anti
bank and Anti-m onopoly M ovements in Illinois, " pp. 132-133.
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lature fe ll into the hands of the Dem ocrats, although Chase managed
to hold on to the Governor’s chair.
With the tacit agreem ent of Chase this legislatu re enacted
a state sub -treasu ry law and displayed its anti-bank nature by
reviving the sev ere tax m easu res of the early fifties which had been
declared unconstitutional.

The following year they revived the old

’’Crow Bar Law. " According to the Statesman the Dem ocrats hoped
in this way to seek a rev ersa l of the ea rlier decisions.

In the plat

form the state su b -treasu ry and bank taxation w ere featured parts of
the D em ocratic program . 19
The Indiana Dem ocracy, which controlled the government in
the H oosier State, and which had aided in establishing the free bank
ing sy stem , chose not to rock the boat with an anti-bank attack that
m ight alienate som e of the conservative Whigs who had been drawn
into their party.

In 1859 Governor Willard praised both the free

banking sy stem and the Bank of the State of Indiana as "highly bene
ficial" to the in terests of the state.

But with a nod toward Jacksonian

orthodoxy he qualified his rem arks:
If the rule could be uniform throughout the United
States, it would perhaps be better that no paper

18

Ohio Statesm an, August-O ctober, 1857; the quotation is from
October 10, 1857; and Roseboom, Civil War Era, pp. 325-29.

19

Roseboom , Civil War E ra, pp. 139-140; Huntington, "A H istory
of Banking and Currency in Ohio, " pp. 462-63; and Ohio S tatesman, February 11 and 14, 1859, and May 27, 1859.
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currency was circulated. But, inasmuch as that
uniform ity is p ractically im possible, I think
Indiana has estab lish ed as safe system s of bank
ing as any other State in the Union, giving her
people as high secu rity for redemption of the
notes of the banks as any other State. 20
During the campaign of 1860 the Dem ocracy warned against
view s on banking and tariff of the ’’fanatical abolitionized, canting,
h ypocritical New England States. ” Following the p olitical defeat
and the com m ercial c r is is , Abram Hammond, who served out
W illard’s term , attacked the free banking system and called on the
state to esta b lish a " sub-treasury sy stem ” and deal only in sp ecie. ^
The m ost extensive revival of anti-bank thought took place
in Illinois where these sentim ents culminated in the proposed con
stitutional prohibition of banks in 1862.
The panic of 1857 caused demands in Illinois for the prohi
bition of all banks or im plem entation of the Benton-Guthrie plan.
However, such journals of "radical” Dem ocracy as the Illinois State
R egister refu sed to follow the centralizing tendencies of the latter
plan, and the m ain thrust was in the direction of local prohibition.
20

Indiana L egislatu re. Documentary Journal, 1859, Part II,
Document 5.

21

Kenneth M. Stampp, Indiana P o litics During the Civil War
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana H istorical Bureau, 1949), pp. 3167; the quotation is from the New Albany Weekly Hedger, November
28, I860, quoted in Stampp, p. 54; and Indiana .Legislature.
Documentary Journal, I860, Part I, Document 3. This can be
follow ed in the Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel from July, 1860
to March, 1861, but esp ecia lly October 17, 1860.
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The Republican opposition was by no m eans stabilized when the
econom ic c r is is o£ 1857 hit, and Illinois Dem ocrats hoped to revive
their declining popularity by reverting to orthodox positions on banks,
tariffs, and corporations in order to take advantage of disunity among
the Republicans-

Hopefully, if they w ere forced to deal with these

questions the dominant ex«Whig elem ent would force on the new
party p ro -ta riff and bank view s that would alienate the form er Dem o
crats in their ranks.
In this fight the Dem ocrats received aid from one of the
m ost outspoken opponents of banks, John Wentworth, who had gone
over to the new party.

He and a number of ex-D em ocrats w ere un

happy with the dominance of form er Whigs in the new party and feared
they m ight graft their econom ic view s on the Republican platform .

He

w rote in the Daily Dem ocrat in mid-1860:
We se e great efforts to turn this Republican party
which is founded altogether on opposition to slavery,
into a second edition of old b lue-ligh t fed eralism and
Whiggery. We see efforts made to lug high pro
tective doctrines into it} to ring in a lot of old
fo s s il know-nothings and old whigs into it by bribery
of good fat o fficers, and influential positions, while
old free s o ile r s are left shivering out in the cold.
Bye and bye, we m ay expect to see efforts made to
have a national bank plank added to the platform, and
then the party w ill have em erged from its ch rysalis
condition into a full blown federal, whig party. If
this is the intention of som e of our so called Republicans
they m ay count us out.
About six months la ter im m ediately after the reform of the free banking
system p assed through the leg isla tu re, Wentworth complained, "Men
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who w ere sound on the banking question were rotten on the negro
question* and m en who w ere sound on the negro position were
22
rotten on the banking question. "

Wentworth’s attacks on the bankers in creased with the
c r is is of 1860-61.

In traditional Jacksonian rhetoric he called on the

laboring c la s s e s to "arouse" against the "Wild Cat aristocracy of
Chicago. 15 While Wentworth led the way m ost other Dem ocratic
papers, including the two m ajor party organs the Illinois State
R egister and the Chicago T im es took up the old Jacksonian stand.

As

1861 wore on and the final collap se of the free banking system was
clear, this becam e a w idely held position.

The leading student of

anti-bank thought in Illinois, Stanley Jones, has concluded that "by
1862 a m ajority of the Dem ocratic party was again pledged to a program
to wipe out the banking sy stem of Illinois and to drive paper m oney
23
of a ll kinds from the state. "
The D em ocrats got the opportunity to im plem ent their views
on the currency question in the constitutional convention which con
vened in early 1862.

The growth of the state had rendered the 1848

document obsolete and in the election of 1860 the votes decided in

22

Fehrenbacher, Chicago Giant, pp. 188-95, the quotations are
from the Chicago Daily Dem ocrat, July 2, 1860 and the Chicago
P ost, February 20, 1861, quoted in Fehrenbacher, pp. 191*92
and 193.

23

Jones, "Anti*.bank and Anti-m onopoly Movements in E linois, "
pp. 161-176, the quotation is from p. 176.
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favor of calling convention with the northern sections of the state
yielding the la r g est m ajorities.

While in its origins this was a non

partisan m ovem ent, by 1861 the Dem ocrats saw the convention as an
opportunity for reviving their party by building on discontent with
the war and the econom ic c r is is .

The Urbana Weekly Democrat

advised its readers:
U nless we revive our party on issu e s as far as
regards state and local election s, it m ay be ex 
pected that we w ill have to w itness in silen ce the
overth row .. . of Dem ocratic principles.
Throughout the sum m er the Illinois State R egister made clear that
a revival of "Dem ocratic principles'* m eant a return to orthodox
Jacksonian dogma including a "constitutional currency. "
While the leading Republican papers agreed that there should
be reform to elim inate "Wild Cats, " they generally paid little attention
to the electio n and called for the election of non-partisan candidates.
In a light turnout the Dem ocrats won an overwhelm ing victory com 
p letely controlling the convention.

F orty-five of the candidates w ere

Dem ocrats and ten w ere Union Dem ocrats who voted with the Demo
crats on econom ic questions.

24

Of the twenty Republicans, John Wentworth

O. M. D ickerson, "The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, "
U niversity Studies: U niversity of Illinois, I, #9 (1905), pp. 3-6;
the Urbana Weekly Dem ocrat, August 24, 1861, quoted in Dickerson,
p. 6; and Illinois State R egister, July 20, 27, August 13, 16,
October 3, and Novem ber 17, 1861.
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and Alexander Campbell w ere ardent opponents of banks. ^
With the aid of the Republican Wentworth, the Dem ocrats
w rote a thoroughly Jacksonian document which in its banking pro
v isio n s prohibited the creation of any banks in the state and provided
for the com plete elim ination of paper circulation.

In this as other

questions the Dem ocrats voted solid ly as a party, and defended their
actions on thoroughly Jacksonian grounds. 2b

25

Illinois State Journal, November 23, 1861; Dickerson, "The
Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, ” pp. 7-9; Cole, Era of
the C ivil War, pp. 266-67; and Stanley L. Jones, "Agrarian
R adicalism in M inais' Constitutional Convention of 1862, " Journal
of the Illin ois State H istorical Society, XLVIII (Autumn, 1955),
pp. 274-75; While Wentworth rep resented an old Jacksonian
attitude toward banks, this is not the case with Campbell. He
w as an old Whig and from the sm all m inority of that party which
favored a national currency and opposed the financial in terests
which robbed the workingman through charging in terest. These
m en advocated a flexib le, paper currency issu ed by a national
agency. Cam pbell's ideas are ex p ressed in his "Report on
T reasu ry N otes” in Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the
State of Illinois Convened at Springfield, January 7, 1862 (Spring
field, Illinois: H. Danphier, Printer, 1862), pp. 181-187. Although
there is no doubt that he opposed local banks (see vote in Ibid. ,
p. 355), he neither voted on the bank article in the constitution
(see votes in Ib id ., pp. 662-63, 938) nor signed the final document
(see vote to accept in Ib id ., pp. 1114-15).

26

Dickerson, "The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, "
pp. 15-17, 41-48; Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 268-69; New
Constitution of the State of I llin o is .. . With an Address to the
People of Illin ois (Springfield, Illinois: Charles Lanphier,
P rinter, 1862), pp. 23, 27-28, 53-54; and Journal of the Constitu
tional C onvention.. . 1862, pp. 10, 143, 662-63, and 938. Went
worth w as on Com m ittee on Banks and Corporations (Ibid ., p. 45),
and gen erally agreed with a rticle. However, he did submit a
m inority report arguing that issu e should be subm itted to the
people and if they are in favor of banks a guarded free banking
sy stem should be provided for (Ibid ., pp. 144-146).
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The partisanship of the convention, in particular the
apportionment arrangem ent, and the q u asi-legislative functions it
attempted to perform led to a bitter attack on the new constitution, by
the Republicans.

The Illinois State Journal which had ea rlier praised

the delegates as "able" m en, later described the convention as
’’revolutionary” and "a m ere m achine for resuscitating and r e 
organizing the Dem ocratic party of the State. ” From this latter
b a sica lly accurate appraisal, the Republicans m oved to attacking it
as the "Copper Head Convention” and charging its m em bers with
disloyalty.

27

Most of the attacks on the document took this tack, and
em phasised the apportionment question.
connected to econom ic questions.

However, this was ea sily

"Shall the manufacturing, a g r i

cultural and com m ercial in ter ests of northern Illinois be put into
Egyptian bondage?" asked the Aurora Beacon.

The whole of the sta te’s

econom ic p ro g ress seem ed to be challenged by the new document.

The

Chicago F ost stated the Republican position on the econom ic questions
posed by the constitution:
We are a great com m ercial State. This Constitution
fetters com m erce; cuts off the avenues of trade;
blocks up the channels of communication with other
states; discourages the investm ent of capital; drives

27

Cole, Era of the Civil War, pp. 269-70; Dickerson, "The Illinois
Constitutional Convention of 1862, " pp. 48-52; and the Illinois
State Journal, January 7, and 14, 1862.
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away manufacturing; stops internal im provem ents;
p aralyzes en terp rise, turns away from us the tide
o£ im m igration, and scandalizes us before the
world. 28
While this was hardly the ca se, the banking provisions were
im practical and reactionary.

Some Dem ocratic papers recognized

this, but m ost of them chose, as Jones w ell ex p resses it, to "play
on new frustrations with old form ulas. " In this Wentworth took the
lead in the northern part of the state contributing a rtic le s to the
Chicago Tinaes and attacking the banking system at Dem ocratic m ass
m eetin gs.

In the south, the ■Illinois
*— ' -• ■ —State Rnegister
^ -r— defended the con-

stitution as the product of a "People’s Convention, " and a bulwark in
defense of the people’s in terest against the intrusion of corporate
p rivileg e.

The P eoria Union argued;

Well it m ay be called the "poor m an’s constitution, "
for it px’Otects him against chartered m onopolies and
m onied a r isto c r a c ie s, chartered privileges and
sp e cia l legislation , peculations and plundering; it
Puts all m en upon an equal fo o tin g .. . By it the
m echanic is secu red for his labor, the poor man Ms
hom estead and a ll their just .rights allowing no one
sp ecia l p riv ileg es to the exclusion of others, 29

28

R linois State Journal, March 27, 1862; the Havana Battle Axe in
the Illin ois State Journal, April 4, 1862; the Aurora Beacon,
April 24, 1862, in Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 269; and Chicago
P o st in the R linois State Journal, June 16, 1862.

29

Dickerson, "The Illin ois Constitutional Convention of 1862, " p, 17;
Jones, "Anti-bank and Anti-m onopoly Movements in R linois, ”
p# 177; Fehrenbacher, Chicago Giant, p. 195; Cole, Era of the
Civil War, p. 70; the Illinois State R egister, May 8, 1862; and the
P eoria Union in the R linois State R egister, May 16, 1862.
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This was old Jacksonian fare, but it still had appeal.

While

the banking provision, which was voted on separately, was defeated,
it was by a narrow m argin.

The voting pattern was not nearly so

section al as it had been ea rlier.

In Cook county which had strongly

been for free banking, businessm en, farm ers, and, laborers combined
to vote against "Stumptail" currency.

By 1862 the issu e of G reen

backs by the federal governm ent had com pletely altered the currency
question.

30

In the four years after 1856 the Republicans gained strength
but as the state election s of 1858 showed, they were s till a m inority
party.

They depended for the v icto ries they had and what future

v icto ries they m ight obtain on the Dem ocratic elem ent of their party.
Yet, during these years the old Whigs openly took control of the new
party as can be seen by comparing the form er affiliations of the governors
nom inated in 1860 with those of 1856, when Republican Governors w ere
a ll form er D em ocrats.

Four years later all the nom inees w ere form er

Whigs, and their presidential candidate was a long-tim e Whig p oliti
cian.

30

In som e areas this m eant a slightly m ore conservative outlook,

Dickerson, "The Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1862, "
pp. 23-24; Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 271; Jones, "Agrarian
R adicalism in Illin o is’ Constitutional Convention of 1862, " pp.
281-82, Although it is just a gu ess, the shifts in voting in
traditionally anti-bank areas m ight be accounted for by the
changes in growth fostered by the railroad which altered the
pattern of population and wealth. See North, Economic Growth
of the U nited States, pp. 135-155, esp ecially the maps on pp. 147
and 149.
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and everyw here an open reversion to Whig econom ic ideas.

In the

lake d istricts and the northern parts of the Old Northwest, this
position on econom ic questions served to draw a few Dem ocrats,
disgusted with Buchanan’s pro-southern econom ic p olicies and eager
for governm ent protection of their in terests, into the Republican fold.
However, banking was s till a highly emotional issu e, and the new
party had to handle it gingerly.

B asically, they m oved in the direction

of reform of the free banking sy stem s which fit w ell in their general
econom ic thinking.

The c r is is of 1860-61 forced them to act m ore

vigorously and the position they assum ed was not unlike that of the
Whigs during the p ost-Jack son econom ic c r is is .

Their m ain goals

seem to have been a safe currency and adequate credit.

Their fir st

attem pts w ere to try to secu re these through a reform of the free
banking sy ste m s.
Im m ediately following the Panic of 1857 Ohio’s governor
Chase called upon a D em ocratic legislatu re to reform the free bank
ing sy stem in order Mto secu re the in terests of the m a sse s of the
people. ” He p raised the general working of the system but b elieved
that sp ecie r e se r v e requirem ents should be raised, the rates of
sec u r itie s to circulation should be increased, and only Ohio and
United States bonds should be accepted as collateral.

These reform s

seem ed dictated by the w estern experience with free banking and w ere
typical of the direction in which Republican thought was m oving.

Each
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of th ese would have been a constructive alteration in the law* but
none was enacted by the succeeding D em ocratic leg isla tu res. 31

W isconsin's Republican governor* Alexander Randall was
som ewhat m ore su ccessfu l in obtaining his suggested reform s.

In

1858 he com plained of the lax requirem ents concerning paid in
capital and the establishm ent of banks in often rem ote and in accessib le
p la ces.

Since banks located in large cities w ere apt to have their

notes presented constantly for redemption, the m ajor cities often
found their bank fa c ilitie s languishing while the number of banks in
general w as on the r ise .
in the lum ber region,

In 1860 Eau C laire, W isconsin, isolated

had banks with a total circulation of $536, 764.

At the sam e tim e the circulation of Milwaukee banks was only $86, 521.
The leg isla tu re acted that year in a half-hearted manner to rem edy
the latter problem by forbidding banks in towns with few er than two
hundred inhabitants.

32

In I860 the governor again complained about the problem of
redem ption and the bank com ptroller introduced the problem of the
quality of se cu rities on which the currency was based.

Finally, under

the prodding of the se c e ss io n c r is is , W isconsin's Republican le g is 
lature p assed an adequate bank reform law in April, 1861.

This new

D ocu m en ts.. . of the State of Ohio, 1857, Document 8. Chase also
called for a D em ocratic reform , the elim ination of sm all notes.
32

Merk, Econom ic H istory of W isconsin, pp. 188-90.
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law attem pted to solve the problem s that all free banking system s
faced by lim iting secu rities to those of W isconsin and the United
States in sistin g on a bona fide cash capital of $15, 000, lim iting note
issu e to three tim es the paid in capital, and requiring every bank to
m aintain a central redem ption office in Milwaukee or Madison.
A sim ilar pattern of reform evolved in Illinois.

33

The reform

of 1857 had made the free banking law in that state one of the b est,
but there w ere s till m ajor flaw s in the system .

The slump of 1857

revealed that som e attention should be paid to the quality of bonds on
which the currency was based.

While the ea rlier reform tried to

elim inate banks in in a ccessib le p laces, nearly all of the banks
created in the expansion after 1857 w ere in sm all towns and none was
estab lish ed in Chicago.

Finally, the sp ecie reserv es of Illinois

banks w ere low er than any others in the country.

As a consequence

Illinois currency circulated at a discount outside the state.

In 1859

Governor B is s e ll p raised the system , but pointed to som e of these
problem s and suggested the legislatu re consider reform ing the system .
The only sp ecific recom m endation he made was that som e central
redem ption center be established.

The Bank C om m issioners further

asked that Illinois bonds be given in preference, and that their power
to enforce sm a ll note p rovisions be in creased .

33

Ib id ., p. 209.

The legislatu re which
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was dominated by Dem ocrats refused to act on these proposals. ^
P r essu re to reform the system came from the Chicago
Tribune ea rly in 1860 before the se c e ssio n c r is is oecured.

Chicago

had only one com m ercial bank, and the paper felt reform was
n e c e ssa r y to obtain satisfactory currency.

As bond p rices slackened

and the threat of s e c e ssio n in creased , the Tribune’s demands, and
the demands of Chicago's b u sin ess lead ers for reform increased.
John Wood, a staunch Republican who served out B iss e ll's term
called for reform in ea rly 1861.

He suggested a lim itation of secu rity

to stocks of Illin ois and the United States.

In this way he believed

the leg isla tu re could b est carry out the system favored by the people.
The election s of 1860 resulted in a resounding Republican
triumph that ca rried Richard Yates to the governorship with a
solid ly Republican leg isla tu re to support him.

While the banking

c r is is was not the m ost important problem before the new governor,
he faced it squarely and called vigorously for reform of the system .
He saw it as a "troublesom e question, " and showed a general disgust
for "speculators, stock brokers, and panic m akers. " In general,
he favored the free banking system which had perform ed w ell; and he
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Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, p. 272-74; Illinois Governor, 18571860; and Dowrie, "The Development of Banking in Illinois, "
pp. 150-53, 158-60.
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Jam es, Chicago Banks, I, pp. 274-75; P ier ce, H istory of
Chicago, II, pp. 127-129; and Elinois Governor, 1860-61.

280
cautioned against radical change that would do m ore harm than good.
However, he made five sp ecific suggestions: stabilization of the
sy stem through a central redemption agency; lim itation of secu rity
to the stocks of Illinois and the United States; quarterly or s e m i
annual exam inations of the quality of secu rities; tighter restriction s
on tran sfers and rem ovals of bonds; and exp licit personal liability.
The leg isla tu re which had been petitioned to reform the
free banking sy stem acted reasonably quickly on the governor’s
request.

An old Whig advocate of free banking, Mr. Hurlbut, from

strongly Republican Boone county, introduced the bill and wrote a
sp ecia l report to the leg isla tu re which, echoed Y ates’ suggestions.
The resu lt was an excellen t b ill which m et little opposition in either
house.

It lim ited secu rities to those of Illinois or the United States.

Redemption cen ters w ere estab lish ed in Springfield and Chicago.
The b ill lim ited circulation to three tim es capital, and gave the
Auditor further power to check the actual paid in capital.

Finally, no

bank was to be established in a town of le s s than one thousand inhabi
tants.

The only m ajor reform not included concerned a m inim um on

sp ecie r e s e r v e s.

Unfortunately reform in Illinois cam e too late, and

the banking situation deteriorated before the reform s could be
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Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 200; and Illinois le g is la t u r e .
House Journal, 1861, pp. 84-103.
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im plem ented.

37

The c r is is of 1860-61 had made som e sort of banking reform
n e c e ssa r y and not all Republicans w ere convinced that reform of
free banking would be adequate.

At the sam e tim e that these r e 

form s w ere being im plem ented other alternatives w ere being con
sidered.

During the c r is is of 1860-61, while the free banking system s

of Indiana, Illinois and W isconsin w ere crumbling, the Rank of the
State of Indiana stood solid ly as an exam ple of sound, conservative
banking.

This exam ple was not lo st on the other states of the Old

Northwest.
Ohio’s State Rank had shown its e lf to be strong during the
c r is is , and was one of the la st banks to suspend sp ecie payments.
Efforts had been m ade in the m id -fifties to in crease the capital of
the State Bank and extend its corporate life.

In January, 1861,

Republican Governor W illiam Dennison praised the State Bank and
renew ed suggestions that its capital should be in creased and its
ch arter--w h ich was to expire in 1865--be renewed.

Banking capital

in the state, he believed, was insufficient; and "so long as the supply
of circulating notes issu ed by our banks, is insufficient for the tran s
action of b u sin ess of the State, it w i l l .. .b e in vain to attempt, by
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Illin o is L egislatu re. House Journal, 1861, pp. 115, 371, 473-79*
“and 536; Illinois L egislatu re. Senate Journal, 1861, p. 383; and
Dowrie, "Development of Banking in Illinois, ” pp. 164-65. The
vote was 21-4 in the Senate and 59-12 in the House.
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leg isla tiv e enactment, to expel the issu e s of foreign banks. 11 The
following year Dennison again brought the State Bank before the
leg isla tu re.

The c r is is had shown the weakness of free banking and

the use of state bonds as secu rity for note issu e.

To his mind the

Ohio system , which provided that branches of the State Bank be
m utually liable for all is s u e s and accept the notes of all other
branches at par, had proved the b est way to secure the value of
paper currency.

However, Dennison was leaving office, and the new

governor, David Tod, the old anti-bank Jacksonian, counseled the
leg isla tu re to wait on the question until the federal government had
acted on C hase’s suggestions for a national banking system .

38

In Michigan, desperation as much as anything e lse led to
the attem pt to esta b lish a State Bank.

The free banking law had not

succeed ed in the hoped for expansion of credit and currency.

Believing

that the lia b ility provisions established by the constitution held back
banking development, the .1859 Republican legislatu re proposed an
am endment to the Constitution lim iting liab ility to the extent of the
individual’s stock holding which was accepted by the voters in the
election of 1860.

Although the Republicans continued to try to reform

the fre e banking sy stem to assu re a safe abundant currency, they
did not lim it th em selves to any sin gle method in achieving this goal.
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.Docum ents.. . of the State of Ohio, 1860, Part I, Document 39;
and Documents. 7. of the State of Ohio, 1861, Part I, Documents
26 and 35*
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The onset of the war dampened the impact of these changes, and
early in 1861 a m ovem ent to reliev e the state's financial problem s
through the establishm ent of a State Bank sim ilar to those in Indiana
and Ohio was begun by the D etroit Daily Advertiser*

This required

an alteration in the constitution which lim ited the legislatu re to the
creation of banks by general law s.

In the Senate, the Committee

on Banks and Incorporations reported favorably on the establishm ent
of a State Bank and the leg isla tu re asked the people to amend the
constitution in order to make this p ossible in the election of 1862.
While this was passed, a State Bank never becam e a reality because
of the creation of the national banking system .

39

The sam e s e ssio n of the Illinois legislatu re which reform ed
the free banking law in 1861 also created the Union Bank of Illinois
which was to be a State Bank of thirty branches with a total capital of
$10, 000, 000,

Only in the Senate did this receive much opposition.

There the opposition was predom inately from Dem ocrats som e of whom
had voted for reform of the free banking system .

40
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Gantz, "A H istory of Banking L egislation, " pp. 91-92; Fuller,
e d ., M essa g es, II, pp. 403 and 430-31; Detroit Daily A dvertiser,
February 7 and 8, 1861; and Michigan L egislatu re. Senate Docu
m ents Accompanying Journal, 1861, Documents 8 and 18.

40

Dowrie, "Development of Banking in Illinois, " pp. 165-66; Illinois
L egislatu re, House Journal, 1861, p. 543; and Illinois L egislature.
Senate Journal, 1861, p. 478. The vote was 15-9 in the Senate
and 58-7 in the House.

284According to the Illinois constitution the b ill for the Union
Bank of Illinois had to be ratified by the people at the November,
1861, election .

By that tim e the com plete collapse of the free banking

system had in creased anti-bank feeling.

At the sam e tim e the

constitutional convention was about to m eet.

Under these conditions

the Union Bank b ill was defeated by a large majority*
While a State Bank, as such, was not established in W iscon
sin the governm ent of that state becam e thoroughly enm eshed with
its banking sy stem after the c r is is of 1860-61.

In the sum m er of 1861

the W isconsin banking sy stem was in a chaotic state.

The con struc

tive reform of the fre e banking sy stem passed by the Republican
leg isla tu re in A pril would not go into effect until it was acted upon
by the voters in the November election.
reform : too little , too late.
bank feelin g.

It seem ed like the Illinois

The c r is is had revived sagging anti

M ass anti-bank m eetings w ere held and agitation for

the repeal of the free banking law increased.

The situation was

com plicated by the sta te’s inability to float a war loan in the New York
money market*

The congruence of the two problem s suggested a

single solution for both.

In m id-M ay Alexander M itchell, a Milwaukee

financier, proposed just such a solution to Governor Randall.

Over

the opposition of the D em ocrats, arrangem ents w ere made between
the state and the bankers.

The bankers would purchase $800, 000 of

W isconsin bonds and deposit these with the com ptroller to take the
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place of the depreciated bonds which he held.

The bankers were

also to work to keep W isconsin money at par and redeem the notes
of a number of d iscredited banks.

This connection with the state,

the reform of the free banking law which was accepted by the people
at the electio n in 1881, and the responsible action of the W isconsin
Bankers A ssociation combined to give the state a sound banking
sy stem throughout the war years.
By 1862 a ll of the states in the Old Northwest w ere troubled,
in varying d egrees, by inadequate credit fa cilities and a fluctuating,
unstable currency.

Yvrisco n sin had m oved a long way toward solving

her problem s, and the State Banks in Indiana and Ohio w ere b asically
sound insitutions, but the situation in Illinois and Michigan was
chaotic.
The period from 1857 through the c r is is of 1861 saw a
general tendency on the part of the Dem ocrats to revert to the old
Jacksonian form ula of ano banks and a "Constitutional currency. ”
The Republicans w ere responsible for the alteration of the free bank
ing law s lim iting banks to towns of a certain siz e , tightening capital
requirem ents, restrictin g the quality of secu rities used, and in sistin g
on central redem ption centers in order to avoid the e x c e s se s of the
"wildcats. " Experience had taught that these lim itations on the freedom
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of action m ight be n ec essa r y in order to insure security under an
open sy stem .

The Republicans* basically, w ere searching for ways

to provide a sound and adequate currency and to expand the supply
of m oney and credit; and they w ere not tied wholly to the free banking idea.

The sam e Republican leg isla tu res that attempted to reform

the free banking laws often encouraged the establishm ent of State
Banks sim ila r to that of Indiana.

There is no good reason to b elieve

that m ost Republicans differed from Governor Dennison of Ohio who
told the le g is la tu r e in 1861;
The subjects of banking and currency, address
th em selves with equal force and dii-ectness to the
people of the State. Whatever th eories we m ay
entertain on these subjects; whatever ingenious
and beautiful v ision s of a people without banks
and gold and silv er their only currency, the
p olitical rea litie s are before us: —We have
banks; we have paper m oney. 42
The real question was what system would b est provide
adequate credit and a sound secu re currency.

In the face of the

experience with depreciating stocks in the c r is is of 1860-61 one
might wonder not that proposals to follow the su ccessfu l m odel of
Indiana w ere entertained, but that the idea of free banking held on
so tenaciously and reform was attempted in the face of the Demo
cratic demand for com plete abolition of the sy stem s.

42

Documents. . « of the State of Ohio, 1860, Dart I, Document 39,
p. 548.
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B a sica lly the attitudes on the banking system s shown by
the two contesting parties during these years represent a continu
ation of view s form ed in the party struggles following the destruction
of the Bank of the United States.

As such, these w ere differences

about state policy in the absence of federal action.
The Dem ocrats in 1862 held the sam e ground they had
occupied twenty years ea rlier fighting for "hard money, H sim ple
governm ent, and constitutional purity.

They stood solid ly against

centralism ; and even at the state lev el, feared positive government
action.

Growing out of the Yv?hig tradition, the Republicans w ere

com m itted to securing an adequate and sound currency.

They feared

neither banks nor governm ent activity and were w illing to use both
to secu re their ends.
For over two decades the m oney question had been a local
issu e .

The Civil War changed this, and elevated it once again to

the national sta g e .

The violence of the debates and the way it had

becom e woven into the fabric of party conflict dictated that the old
argum ents and attitudes would be carried into the new arena.

CHAPTER VIII
THE WEST AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF FREE BANKING

The C ivil War made federal action on the money question
n ecessa ry . On the one hand se c e ssio n precipitated an econom ic
c r is is which sev erly undermined the existing system . On the other
hand, the expenses of war caused a financial c r is is within the
governm ent itself. In 1862 and 1863, the Thirty Seventh Congress
authorized the issu e of the legal tender notes called Greenbacks
and took the fir s t step toward the establishm ent of the national
banking sy stem . W estern Republicans played key roles in the enact
m ent of this legislation ; and both the Greenbacks and the national
banking sy stem received their solid support. In contrast, the
w estern D em ocracy unanimously opposed both m easu res. These
D em ocrats continued to mouth Jacksonian rhetoric and offer little
in the way of constructive answ ers to the problems facing the govern
m ent and the econom y. The Republicans showed a w illingness to
em ploy the governm ent in a positive fashion to solve these problem s.
The Greenbacks w ere an em ergency m easure, but the national
banking sy stem was conceived as a fundamental reform of the
nation's currency sy stem . It was built on the m odel of the free
banking sy stem s which had been erected in New York and the w estern
states, and embodied the types of restriction s which w estern ers had
found n e ce ssa r y in their experience with free banking at the state
lev el. In order to im plem ent this system , Secretary Chase, the
w estern Republicans, and their a llie s had to overcom e the opposition
of the ea stern bankers as w ell as that of the w estern Dem ocrats.
When the new Lincoln adm inistration assum ed office in 1861,
it faced not only a rebellion, but also a h op elessly garbled financial
situation.

S ecessio n had disrupted the interregional balance of trade

and had precipitated a wave of com m ercial failu res in the East which
assu m ed greater proportions than the Panic of 1857.

Over $300, 000, 000

owed by the people of the South to Northern m erchants was a total lo ss .
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In the West the currency based on the bonds of southern states
depreciated rapidly, leaving the whole area of the Old Northwest
with hardly any m eans of exchange.

In addition governm ent credit

was in such a shaky state that Buchanan's la st Secretary of the
T reasury was forced to negotiate $15, 000, 000 in loans at the rates of
10% and 12%.1
The magnitude of these problem s dictated a radical shift
in the nation's financial policy.

Since the tim e of Jackson, currency

and banking m atters had been decentralized and the powers of the
federal governm ent lim ited.

Faced with the n e c e ssitie s of war a

nationalist adm inistration rev ersed this policy.

With the passage of

the legal tender acts and the establishm ent of the national banking
sy stem , the p ro cess of nationalization was extended to the nation's
currency.
The Old Northwest played a significant role in this le g is la 
tion and one that can be m isunderstood if the debates of the post war
decades are read back into the w artim e situation.

The conflict over

this leg isla tio n is much clea rer if viewed as culm ination of the
m onetary debate begun by Jackson's veto of the Bank of the United
States.
1

Dunbar, "The C risis of I860;'1 E m erson 0 . Fite, Social and
Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War (New York:
F red erick Ungar Publishing C o ., 1963 ed. ), pp. 105-14.
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The new Secretary of the Treasury, m ore responsible than
any other man for these alterations, was a w esterner, Salmon P.
Chase.

He was from the D em ocratic elem ent of the Republican

party and appointed to the Cabinet for p olitical reasons.

He had

little experience in financial m atters and was hesitant to take the
job because he had been chosen as Senator from Ohio.

When he

decided to accept the Cabinet post, he wrote to Governor Denison:
. . . the P resid en t has thought fit to call me to another
sphere of duty, m ore laborious m ore arduous and
fu ller far of perplexing resp o n sib ilities. I sought
to avoid it, and would gladly now decline it if I
might. I find it im possible to do so, however,
without seem ing to shrink from cares and labors
for the common good, which cannot be honorably
shunned. 2
Chase, like m ost m en in 1861, underestim ated the cost and
length of the war.

At fir st he hoped that an in crease in the tariff

and an issu e of T reasury notes could finance suppression of the
rebellion.

In 1860 he wrote to Henry Wilson: "It is clear that som e

m easu re m ust be adopted to revive the sinking credit of the nation;
and this b ill /th e M orill T ariff/ w ill certainly contribute to that result.
A T reasu ry note b ill without a Tariff b ill is a dangerous experim ent.
3
The two together m ay answ er a good purpose. "

2

Chase to W illiam Denison, March 6, 1861, reprinted in J. W.
Schuckers, The Life and Public S ervices of Salmon Portland
C h a se .. . (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), pp. 207-208.

3

Chase to Henry W ilson, D ecem ber 13, 1860, reprinted in "Diary and
C orrespondence of Salmon P. Chase, " pp. 293-95.

291
The M orill b ill was passed and included an authorization
for the Secretary of the Treasury to issu e $10, 000, 000 in bonds and
T reasury notes.

When revenues lagged behind C hase's expectations,

he made use of this power and an ea rlier authorization to borrow
the n e c e ssa r y m oney to finance the war.

In July, Chase requested

the power to borrow an additional $240, 000, 000 to cover the in crea s
ing expenses of the war.

He s till seem ed to b elieve that tai'iff

revenues would in crea se, and he was hesitant to institute an adequate
program of taxation because of the "tem porarily deranged" econom ic
conditions.

4

In July and August, C ongress authorized the Secretary to
borrow, through the use of various kinds of sec u r itie s, $250, 000, 000.
The la r g e st portion of this was in the form of T reasury notes which
w ere sold with the aid of the banks of Boston, New York, and P h ila
delphia.

However, as the year continued revenues lagged and

expenses rapidly in creased .

At the sam e tim e, the currency situ 

ation in the West w orsened.

It was clear to Chase that som e m ore

4

Senate Executive Docum ents, 37th C ongress, 1st Session, No. 2.
This is sum m arized b riefly in Robert P. Sharkey, Money, C lass,
and Party: An Econom ic Study of the Civil War and R econstruc
tion (B altim ore: The Johns Hopkins P r e ss , 1959), pp. 16—20;
and Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, Vol. VI of
The Econom ic H istory of the United States, e d ., Henry David,
et. al. (10 v o l s ., New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1945--),
pp. 13-15; and in somewhat m ore detail in W esley C. M itchell,
A H istory of the Greenbacks with Special R eference to the
Econom ic Consequence of Their Issue (Chicago: U niversity of
Chicago P r e ss, 1903), pp. 3-43.
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perm anent refo rm of the currency was n ecessary . ^
During the 1840’s two plans for a national currency had
appeared which w ere discussed at that tim e and then revived after
the Panic of 1857.

Both w ere penned by Whigs, and received, th eir

g re a te s t support in that party.
The plan which s tir r e d the m ost in te re s t was that proposed
by M illard F illm o re in his widely read re p o rt as New York State
C om ptroller in which he suggested that if Congress would authorize
the state bank notes ''se c u re d by the stocks of the United States to be
rec eiv e d for public dues to the national tre a su ry , this would give
such notes a u n iv ersal credit, coextensive with the United States,
and leave nothing fu rth er d e sired in the shape of a national currency. "
In essen ce this would be a national fre e banking schem e based on the
existing state banks, but W estern D em ocrats looked on it as a "F ed 
e ra lis t schem e.
Edw ard Kellogg advanced a m ore rad ical plan which p ro 
posed a kind of national land bank in which the governm ent established
5

The handling of these loans is tre a te d in detail in Redlich,
A m erican Banking, II, pp. 85-95.

6

F ran k H. Severance, e d ., "M illard F illm o re P a p e rs, Volume One, "
Publications of the Buffalo H isto rical Society, X (1907), p. 282;
Illinois State R eg ister, October 30, 1849. The relatio n between
the F illm o re re p o rt and the national banking system is given in
g re a te s t detail in Redlich, A m erican Banking, II, pp. 101-102.
On the reception of this plan in Illinois, Jones, "A nti-Bank and
Anti-Monopoly M ovements in Elinois, " pp. 80-81.
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branches of a national institution in each state to lend governm ent
c re a te d legal tender on re a l estate m ortgages.

The details of

K ellogg’s plan a re less im portant than his insistance on the idea
that the in te re s t charged by bankers and money lenders robbed labor
of its product.

He contended that this could be alleviated by a

*
7
national c u rren cy issued on the cre d it of the nation.

Kellogg did not receive the hearing accorded to F illm ore,
although an e d ito rial in the Racine W isconsin Advocate probably
re p re se n ts the view of contem porary D em ocrats.

The a rtic le

describ ed Kellogg’s C u rren cy : The Evil and the Remedy as an
exam ple of the "cu rren cy tinkering /w hich/ seem s to be the besetting
m ania of a portion of the people of this country. . .. "

His plan was

a wild idea which would do "injustice som ew here and in the end
everyw here. " "To us it seem s evident that no panacea will ever
again find favor in this country.

The precious m etals m ust sooner

or la te r becom e the c u rren cy and exchanges be m ade by m ercan tile
e n te rp ris e and depended upon m ercan tile cred it for the c re d it of
7

The m o st com plete presen tation of Kellogg’s ideas is Edward
Kellogg, A New M onetary System , e d ., M ary Kellogg Putnam
(New York: Rudd and Carleton, 1861) which is a la te r edition
of his .Labor and O ther Capital which f ir s t appeared in 1849.
His plan is discu ssed in referen ce to post w ar agitation in:
C h ester Me A. D eatler, A m erican R adicalism , 1865-1901 (New
York: Octagon Books, In c., 1963), pp. 50-77; Irwin Unger,
The Greenback E ra: A Social and Political H istory of A m erican
Finance, 1365-1879 (Princeton, New Je rse y : P rinceton U niver
sity P r e s s , 1964), pp. 95-97; and Sharkey, Money, C lass, and
P arty , pp. 187 -91.
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p aper. " The a rtic le rep eated the standard D em ocratic argum ent
that u su ry laws w ere wrong in principle.

"We still think that if the

cu rren cy w ere once regulated by not being regulated at all, the
p rotection against usury would be much less needed, if it w ere
needed at all. " 8
As governor of Ohio, Chase had asked Congress to reg u 
late the cu rren cy, but he had not form ulated any distinct plan.
R ather he worked to reform, the fre e banking system in his own state.
He was m ainly opposed to bank m onopolies and supported a con
v ertib le curren cy, but he was n o t--a s usually n o te d --a rad ical
opponent of all paper money. 9
R acine Advocate, July 21, 18 6, rep rin ted in Quaife, e d ., The
Movement for Statehood, pp 286-89# the book under review was
Godek Gardwell /Kellogg?, Currency; The Evil and the Remedy
(New York: 1844). Although the Advocate certain ly re p re se n ts
a position in line with standard D em ocratic orthodoxy, some
D em ocrats m ay have been in te re ste d in this plan. See: a le tte r
fro m Don Eaton to Augustus C. French, January, 1831, in the
F ren ch MSS, which req u ests F ren ch to sign a petition sim ila r
to those circulating in other w estern states to have Congress
e stab lish a national paper cu rren cy based on the c re d it of the
United States. E aton's political affiliation rem ains a m y stery
to m e and from in tern al evidence he could be eith er a Whig or a
D em ocrat. Interestingly, Eaton re fe rs for authority not to
Kellogg but "A lison the h isto rian . " This is a referen ce to
A rchibald Alison, the Scottish h isto ria n of the F rench Revolution,
whom Unger connects with the ideas of Henry Carey (The G reen
back E ra, p. 51, ftn. 42).
9

Documents. . . of the State of Ohio, 1855-56, Document 4. See
above C hapter VI. He was hardly a "prim itive bullionist Demo
c ra t" as Unger d escrib es him in The Greenback E ra, p. 14.
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In 1861 Chase receiv ed suggestions recom m ending both
these plans.

After Kellogg died in 1858, Alexander Campbell, the

W hig-Republican m ayor of Ea Salle, Illinois, took up the Kellogg
plan with som e important m odifications.

He suggested to Chase in

June that the governm ent issu e noninterest-bearing T reasury notes
m denominations from $5 to $500 to replace the state bank currency
which had degenerated to ’’w orthless trash. " Other W esterners
appraised Chase of the n e ce ssity of som e currency in that area.
W isconsin Senator Jam es Doolittle proposed that all bank notes
under $20 be taxed out of existen ce and replaced by T reasury notes.
Joseph M edill, whose Chicago Tribune strongly favored a national
bank currency, offered a sim ila r solution.

1Q

Chase seem s to have been m ore im p ressed by a plan sub
m itted to him in August by Orlando B. Potter.

E ssen tially a revival

of the F illm ore suggestion, it would:
Allow the banks, and bankers duly authorized in
the loyal states, to secu re their b ills by deposit
ing with a superintendent appointed by the Govern-

10

Andrew M cFarland Davis, The Origin of the National Banking
System (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910) pp. 44-51,
g ives sum m aries of numerous letters in the Chase papers. On
Cam pbell’s influence, see: Sharkey, Money, G lass, and Party,
pp. 191-95; D estler, A m erican R adicalism , pp. 8-9, 60, 61, 76.
Unger, The Greenback Era, pp. 97-101. For his ideas at this
tim e see: Jouxuial of the Constitutional Convention of the State
of Illin ois... . 1862, pp. 51, 181-187. While he clea rly opposed
C hase's suggestion of a national banking system , his m ain in terest
was to defend the issu e of legal tenders as a better method of
financing the war than the Gallitin plan put forth by the bankers
of Boston, New York and Philadelphia.
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m ent Unite dState8 stocks at their par value in the
sam e way that the hanks and bankers in New York
secure their circulation by depositing New York
State and United States stock with the State, thus
making the stocks of the United States a b a sis of
banking on which alone a national circulation can
be secured. 11
C hase’s annual report, issu ed December 9» 1861 considered
the entire problem at length.

After reporting his negotiations with

the bankers concerning the loans and a dism al review of the revenues
and expenses of the government, the Secretary outlined the problems
of the currency.

He called on Congress to a sse r t its authority in

this area to rationalize the chaotic situation of m ore than 1600 banks
chartered under a variety of inconsistent state law s.
Under such a sy stem , or rather lack of system ,
great fluctuations, and heavy lo s s e s in discounts and
exchanges, are inevitable; and not infrequently
through failu res of the issuing institutions, con
siderable portions of the circulation becom e
suddenly w orth less in the hands of the people. The
recent experience of sev era l States in the valley of
the M ississip p i painfully illu stra tes the ju stice of these
observations; and enforces the m ost cogent p racti
cal argum ents the duty of protecting com m erce and
industry against recurrence of such disorders. 12
He offered two plans for the consideration of the Congress.
The fir st follow ed Cam pbell’s suggestion to withdraw the bank issu e s

11

O. B. Potter to Chase, August 19* 1861, reprinted in Davis,
Origin of the National Banking System , pp. 45-48.

12

Report of the S ecretary of the Treasury on the State of Finances
for the Year Ending June 30, 1861 ('Washington: 1861), pp. 7-29,
the quotation is from pp. 17-18.
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of the nation and replace them with Treasury notes.
notes would insure their withdrawal.

A tax on bank

The people would have the

advantage of a uniform national currency and the government would
have a loan without the burden of in terest.

Chase b elieved that is

such currency could be kept in line with the ’’real needs of the
people” and at par with sp ecie this would be a good plan.

However,

he feared inflation and a depreciating currency; and to his mind,
’’these p ossib le d is a s t e r s .. . far outweigh the probable benefits of
the plan. ”

13

The S ecretary much p referred a second plan suggested by
P otter.

The circulation of notes would be placed under a common

authority which would hold United State’s stocks as secu rity against
notes issu ed .

This plan would make use of the already existing

State banks, which would also be required to hold sp ecie r eserv es
adequate for prompt redem ption of their issu e .

In this way the

people could be given a uniform national currency effectively s a fe 
guarded against depreciation and lo s s to the noteholder.

This method

would a lso help fa cilitate governm ent loans, and aid the general
b u sin ess conditions by low ering in ter est charges "without risking
the p erils of a great m oney monopoly. ” Chase reminded his readers
that the plan w as one that had been tested in New York and other
14
states ’’and has been found p ractical and useful. "

13

Ib id ., p. 18.

14

Ibid., p. 19.
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Designed to strengthen the Union by increasing the common
in terest in its preservation, this plan had nationalistic overtones.
It was m ore than an em ergency war m easure.

Chase also argued

that it would aid the war effort, but he made it clear that he was
advocating a b asic reform of the entire m oney and banking structure
of the nation m such a way as to combine safe circulation and con*
vem ence. 15
The House referred Chase's report to a subcom m ittee of the
Ways and Means Com mittee under the direction of Buffalo banker
Elb ridge G erry Spaulding.

When he discovered that Chase had not

drawn up a b ill, Spaulding drafted one based on the New York F ree
Banking L»aw.

While w riting the bill he "came to the conclusion,

that it could not be p assed and made available quick enough to m eet
the c r is is p ressin g upon the Government for m oney to sustain the
Arm y and the Navy. " As a consequence he added to the bank b ill a
sectio n providing for the "issuing /o f / legal tender notes direct
from the T reasury while the bank b ill was put in operation throughout
the country. " Thus, as originally conceived the "Greenbacks" and
the national bank notes w ere to be com plem entary with the legal
tenders providing for im m ediate n e c e ssitie s and the b asic reform to

15

Ib id ., pp. 13-19; Chase to J e sse Baldwin, May 18, 1864, r e 
printed in Robert B. Warden, An Account of the P rivate .Life
and Public S ervices of Salmon Portland Chase (Cincinnati, Ohio:
W ilstack, Baldwin and C o ., 1874), pp. 409-10.
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be in tbe form of an altered banking system . ^
The economic situation changed d rastically in late December
and forced an alteration of these plans.

During the sum m er and fall

the banks of the m ajor seaboard c itie s had acted in essen ce as
underw riters for $150, 000, 000 in government loans.

They had

hoped that Chase would m ake use of an alteration in the Sub-Treasury
Act to use them as governm ent d epositories, but the Secretary chose
to construe this act rigidly and demand specie from the banks.

While

this was probably a blunder, the flow of sp ecie was sufficient to
enable the banks to handle the three payments to the government.

How

ever, this cy cle of borrowing depended on continued confidence in the
governm ent.

This confidence was shaken in December by the S ecre

tary’s gloom y report which showed revenues lagging behind his July
estim a tes and expenditures increasing at a m ore rapid pace.

At

about the sam e tim e the Trent Affair threatened to erupt into a war
with Britain and sp ecie went into hiding.

With their r e se r v e s falling

precipitously, the Hew York banks decided to suspend sp ecie pay
m ents on Decem ber 28.

The situation was grim .

As Spaulding put it:

No m ore gold could be loaned to the Government,
except in sm all and wholly inadequate amounts*
because it was not to be had. State bank b ills
could still be obtained, but the banks having s u s 
pended sp ecie paym ents, this currency was

16

E. G. Spaulding* H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money
la sued During the Great R ebellion . Being a Doan Without
Interest and, a National Currency (Buffalo, New York: E xpress
Printing Company, 1869), pp. 1-12.
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depreciated, and had only a local character
and credit*-not being much known out of the
Mates where the banks w ere located. Hesitancy
and delay, with the expenses of the war running
at an average of $2, 000, 000 per day, would be
fatal. 17
Since Spaulding had been warned that the bank b ill would
m eet with opposition he made the legal tender section into a separate
b ill to answ er the needs of the c r is is .

With the only alternative

being a plan advocated by Jam es Oallatin and supported by the leading
bankers of New York, Boston and Philadelphia which did not provide
for any kind of national banking system .
the legal tender m easu re.

Chase reluctantly backed

18

While prominent ro les w ere played by Spaulding and Samuel
Hooper of M assachusetts, C ongressm en from the Old Northwest
took an active part in the debate.

Among the w estern ers who spoke

in the debate there was a division along party lin es with Dem ocrats
b itterly opposing the b ill and Republicans generally advocating its

17

Ibid.,} p. 14. Concerning C hase's decision to demand specie,
Redlich (pp. 92-93) tends to defend the Secretary, while he is
condemned by Bray Hammond in Banks and P o litics, pp. 720-721,
and "The North’s Empty P urse, 1861-1862, " A m erican H istorical
Review, LXVII (October, 1961), pp. 1-18. Sharkey (pp. 21-23)
is c lo se r to Redlich than Hammond.

18

Spaulding, H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money, 12-13,
18-21, 27. Among the sev era l letters reprinted herein is one
from Chase to Spaulding, January 22, 1862 exp ressin g his view s.
See a lso Chase to W. C. Bryant, February 4, 1862, reprinted
in Warden, Life of Chase; and the Report of the S ecretary of the
T reasury on the State of Finances for the Year Ending June 30,
1862 (Washington: 1863), p. 8.
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passage.
Although eastern Republicans like Roscoe Conkling and
Justin M orrill opposed the b ill, the m ain opposition came from
those doyens of the w estern ‘‘P rogressive" Dem ocracy, Clement
Vallandigham and George Hunt Pendleton.

They made standard

"hard money" argum ents based on a strict construction of the Con
stitution.
tra cts.

Pendleton argued it would impair the obligation of con

Vallandigham was w illing to support an issu e of T reasury

notes, but denied "the right of the Federal Government to provide a
paper currency intended prim arily to circulate as m o n ey .. . . "
E ssen tia lly he would reso rt to Treasury notes, sanctioned by Jackson
ian experience, but opposed the leg a l tender provision which would
"banish gold and silv er from circulation. " If this w ere accepted,
"there would be no end to the legion of paper devils which shall pour
forth from the loins of the Secretary. "19
In the House three w estern Republicans spoke against the
b ill showing fea rs of its constitutionality and the danger of an incon
vertib le currency.

However, the m ain body of w estern Republicans

who spoke advocated the b ill’s passage.

John Bingham of Ohio,

W illiam Kellogg of Illinois, H arrison Blake of Ohio, and Samuel
Shellabarger of Ohio all spoke in favor of the bill.

19

The debate in the

C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 2nd S ession, pp. 630-31
(M orrill), 633-36 (Conkling), 614-15 and Appendix 42-46
(Vallandigham); and 549-51 (Pendleton).
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Senate was dominated by w estern ers led by John Sherman; and to a
man the Republicans urged passage of the legal tender provision.

20

The b a sic argum ent presented was that of n ecessity.
Sherman told his fellow Senators, HI am authorized--nay req u ired -to vote for all law s n ec essa ry and proper for executing these high
powers (to uphold the G overnm ent/. . . This is not the tim e when
I would lim it those pow ers.

Rather than yield to revolutionary force,

I would use revolutionary fo rce. "

21

A side from the argument from n e cessity there was exp ressed
a great deal of anti-bank sentim ent in these speech es.

Bingham

p rotested that!
I cannot keep silen t when I see efforts made. . .
to lay the power of the A m erican people to control
their cu rr en cy --a power essen tia l to their
in te r e s ts --a t the feet of brokers and of city
bankers, who have not a title of authority, save
by the a ssen t or forbearance of the people, to
deal in their paper issu ed as money.
I am here today to a s se r t the rightful
authority of the A m erican people, as a nationality,
sovereignty, under and by virtue of their C onsti
tution.
The Speaker, K ellogg, attacked those who would send six hundred
thousand young m en to war and then say "the great in terests of capital,

20

C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 2nd Session, pp. 663-665
(Horton, Ohio), 684-85 (Riddle, Ohio), 691 (Hovejoy, Illinois),
636-40 (Bingham), 679-81 (Kellogg), 685-86 (Blake), 690 (Sheila
barger), 771-75 (Sherman), 774 (Chandler, Michigan), 796-97
(Howard, Michigan), Appendix, 51-56 (Howe, W isconsin), and
Appendix, 56-58 (D oolittle, W isconsin).

21

C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 2nd Session, p. 775.
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of currency, m ust not be touched. 51 "We are not legislating for
the m on ey-sh avers who oppose this bill, n argued H arrison Blake,
oo

"but for the people, the so ld iers, and the laboring c la s s e s . ’*

With the aid of Chase's endorsem ent, the b ill was finally
brought to a vote, and the crucial legal tender provision narrowly
p assed the Senate, 22-17.
m argin, 95-55.

In the House this was passed by a wider

The b ill in its final form gained the votes of ninety-

three rep resen tatives and thirty senators.

23

An an alysis of the b ill on a national lev el shows m ost Demo
crats voting against it, with m ost Republicans favoring it although a
sizea b le segm ent of the party joined the opposition.

The votes of

the con gressm en of the Old Northwest show a greater unanimity.
In the Senate, the only D em ocrat from this area, J esse Bright of
Indiana did not vote, nor did the two Republican Senators from Illinois.
The other seven Republican Senators all voted for the bill.
House vote is even m ore revealing.

The

Of the thirteen Dem ocrats from

the Old Northwest who voted, everyone opposed the legal tender act,
while among the Republicans from this area tw en ty-six favored the

22

Ib id ., pp. 636, 679, and 686.

23

Ibid., pp. 695, 800.
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b ill and three opposed it* ^
“While Chase was forced to ask for an additional issu e of
leg a l tenders, he had not given up on his plan for permanent bank
ing reform .

It seem s that, while they supported Chase’s demands,

m ost w estern Republicans continued to look toward a fundamental
change in the banking structure.

M ost of them probably agreed with

Samuel Hooper who, urging passage of the fir s t legal tender act,
adm itted "the proper inauguration of the new banking s c h e m e .. . w ill
require tim e. " Certainly in the minds of m en like Sherman and
Zachariah Chandler of Michigan the legal tenders w ere a stop-gap
m easu re until rea l reform could be completed.
Throughout the debate on legal tenders Chase continued to
urge action on a banking system .
not pushing hard enough for it.

He was upset that his a llies w ere

He wrote to Spaulding that he attached

m uch m ore im portance to "the Banking as a m easure of r e lie f” than

24

There was no change among w estern senators on the two votes.
The House figu res are on the final vote. Riddle who spoke
against the b ill voted for it on the final vote. An Indiana Demo
crat, Knapp, voted for retaining the legal tender provision and
against the bill. Sharkey (p. 42) seem s to have m iscounted the
w estern votes in his an alysis.

25

Spaulding, H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money, pp. 154-63;
C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 2nd Session, p. 617; John
Sherman, R ecollection s of Forty Years in the House, Senate and
Cabinet (New York: The Werner Company, 1895), I, pp. 282-85;
W ilmer C. H arris, Public Life of Zachariah Chandler, 1851-1875
(Lansing, Michigan: The Michigan H istorical C om m ission, 1917),
p. 71. Sherman voted against the in crease in Greenbacks.
Chandler spoke against it, but ended up voting for it. Both actively
championed the national banking system .
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did the New Yorker.

Later in the year he recorded in his diary his

unhappiness with the use of legal tenders and the seem ing refusal
of "the P resid en t and his counsellors" to contemplate reform ,

in

October he explained to John B igelow in P aris the advantages*:of his
plan:
/T h e adoption/ of this sy stem w ill furnish all the
money that is needed at reasonable rates* and in 
sure an ea rly return to sp ecie payments without
and seriou s b u sin ess convulsion. Even should the
war be unhappily protracted beyond the current
financial year* the adoption of this system* by
uniting the capital of the country with the credit
of the governm ent, w ill probably avert'- great
d isa ste rs otherw ise to be apprehended. 26
Hooper had introduced a banking b ill in 1862, but it was tied
up in com m ittee by Thaddeus Stevens.

Chase saw this as a sign that,

”A m ajority of both House and Senate Financial Com m ittees w ere
incredulous or h ostile, ” but he was encouraged by the support of
Hooper and Robert J. Walker, the ex -S ecretary of the Treasury.

27

In D ecem ber, Chase received the support of the nation’s
m ost powerful w estern Republican, the President.

Lincoln praised

the leg a l tender acts for answering "the lo n g -felt want of an uniform

26

Chase to Spaulding, January 30, 1862, reprinted in Spaulding,
H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money* p. 46; "Diary and
C orrespondence of Salmon P. Chase* " p. 76; and Chase to
Bigelow, October 7, 1862* reprinted in Warden, Life of Chase,
pp. 501-504.

27

Davis, Origin of the National Banking System* pp. 56-57;
Chase to Trowbridge, reprinted in Schuckers, Life of Chase*
p. 292.
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circulating m edium , saving thereby to the people im m ense sum s
in discounts and exchanges. 11 However, he doubted that such a
currency could “be perm anently, usefully, and safely maintained. “
To secu re “the great advantages of a safe and uniform, currency, "
he suggested ’’the organization of banking associations under a
general act of C ongress, w ell guarded in its provisions. “ Such a
system would offer numerous advantages to the government and
28
“protect labor against the ev ils of a vicious currency. "

Several days later Chase review ed the financial legislation
of 1862 and again suggested a national banking system .

It was his

b elief that the suspension of sp ecie payments created an em ergency
situation that left the governm ent a choice between state bank currency
and leg a l tenders.

He preferred the national currency and on the

whole thought it had perform ed w ell.

He w orried about inflation

which he ascrib ed to the in crease of state bank issu ed , and he
proposed a m oderate tax on these notes.

He also feared that the

lega l tenders would becom e the permanent currency of the nation
and to avoid this he urged a national banking system to estab lish
"one sound uniform circulation, of equal values throughout the
country, upon the foundation of national credit with private capital. "
He a lso a ssu red the le g isla to rs that his was not a “m ere paper m oney
schem e, “ and it would facilitate the return to specie paym ents.

29

28

Richardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the P resid en ts, VI,
pp. 129-30*

29

R eport of the S ecretary of the T r e a su r y .. . 1862, pp. 1-30.
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Although Stevens s till was hostile toward the Hooper b ill,
he reported it out of com m ittee.

When it hit rough sledding in the

House, the initiative on the banking b ill shifted to the Senate.

On

January 7, Chase appealed to the Finance Committee of the Senate:
No m easu re, in m y judgement, w ill m eet the
n e c e s sitie s of the occasion, and prove adequate
to the provision of the great sum s required for
the suppression of the rebellion, which does not
include a firm support to public credit through
the establishm ent of a uniform national circu lation, secu red by bonds of the United States. 30
Ten days later Lincoln sent a special m essa g e to Congress
urging a tax on state bank circulation in order to curb inflation,
and the establishm ent of a uniform currency through a national bankmg system . 31
The m an who took charge of the b ill in the Senate, and to
whom "more than any other person Mr. Chase owed su ccessfu l
p assage of the bill" was John Sherman.

Chase sent Henry Cooke,

Jay’s brother, to influence Sherman to take up the b ill.

There

seem s little reason to doubt that since his entrance into Congress
Sherman had d esired a reform of the currency system .

However, he

wanted to alter C hase’s plan by "restricting the charter (which at

30

Chase to F essenden, January 7, 1863, reprinted in Spaulding,
H istory of the Legal Tender Paper Money, p. 182.

31

R ichardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the P resid en ts, VI
pp. 149-50.
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p resent is perpetual) to twenty years, /an d / to prevent inflation

1J®YJ lim iting the amount of circulation to be issu ed and apportion it
32
among the States. "
On January 26 he introduced the plan with m odifications and
stoutly defended it with a "powerful and effective" speech,

Sherman

presented arguments detailing the advantages to the governm ent and
the people.

On the fir st count he echoed Chase that the b ill would

furnish a unifoi*m currency, create a m arket for bonds, furnish
d ep ositories for public funds, and supply a m eans for payment of
public dues.

With much m ore vigor than the Secretary, Sherman

extolled the nationalistic aspects of the plan.

Some years later he

wrote, "The policy of this country ought to be to make everything
national as far as p o ssib le.

If we w ere dependent upon the United

States for a currency and a m edium of exchange, we would have a
broader m ore prosperous nationality. " The want of such nationality
was resp on sib le for the rebellion.

33

32

Davis, Origin of the National Banking System , pp. 75-81. The
lette rs which Davis quotes from Henry Cooke to Jay Cooke,
January 23 and February 12, 1863, are reprinted in E llis Paxson
O berhoitzer, Jay Cooke, Financier of the Civil War (P h ilad elphia; George W. Jacobs and Company, 1907), I, pp. 332-33.
Sherman’s actions in 1862 give no reason to discount his explana
tion in Sherman, R ecollection s, I, p* 284.

33

C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 3rd Session, pp. 504,
820-26, 840-46, 874-77; Sherman, R ecollections, I, 298.
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Sherman directed the other half of Ms argument toward the
advantages of a national currency over state bank iss u e s.

JLlke

Chase he d ecried the sy stem of 1, 642 banks chartered by twentyeight different states whose "laws w ere as d iv e r s e .. . as the human
countenance. " This m ultiplicity of banks made a national currency
im p ossib le.

He called for a common regulator to control them and

harm onize their actions in order to secu re a sound currency to all
areas of the country.

He a lso made som e distinctly w estern com 

plaints about the New England currency in that section and the lo ss
"of exchange from w est to ea st on local currency* " These argu
m ents, along with the idea that the new currency would be le s s
ea sily counterfeited, appealed to w estern ers, but w ere le s s readily
accepted in the eastern and m iddle states "where their banking system
had been so im proved that bank failu res w ere rare, and bank b ills
w ere protected by mutual guarantees. " Chandler supported Sherman,
appealing to w estern needs;
In m y judgement very little demand w ill a rise
in the eastern States for this circulating medium.
It w ill be different in the Vvrest. In the West, our
circulation having been destroyed virtually, as it
was based upon southern bonds, at the com m ence
m ent of the war, there w ill be som e demand.
The bill, he believed, would provide a better currency with better
secu rity than lo ca l banks.

Jam es Doolittle of W isconsin added that

the sy stem would have none of the objections of ea rlier national banks

310
i

. . .

because it did not create a monopoly.

34

In these debates few er people spoke than the year before,
and two w estern Republicans who had voted for the legal tenders
joined Justin M orrill and Jacob Collamer the leading .Republican
opponents of the b ill.

John Gurley of Illinois defended the Green

backs and cautioned against further experim entation particularly
with a type of banking that had failed in the w est "most d isastrously
/f o r / all c la s s e s . " Richard H arrison of Ohio joined in these fears
that the new sy stem would be a recreation of the w estern "wildcats. "

35

In the debate on the legal tenders Vallandigham had attacked
C hase’s proposal for a national banking system as a "magnificent
National Paper M ill. " While only one w estern Dem ocrat spoke in
the debate on the national banking act, he echoed Vallandigham and
predicted, that "like all great paper m oney sch em es, it is fraught
with many e v iis. "3 6
The vote on Sherman’s bill, which was very close in both
houses showed the b ill to be a Republican m easure, but with a sizeable

34

C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 3rd S ession, pp. 840-46
(Sherman), 877 (Chandler), and 881-82 (Doolittle).

35

Ib id ., pp. 296-97 (M orrill), 869-74 (Collam er), 341-42
(Gurley), 1117 (Harrison).

36

C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 2nd Session, Appendix,
p. 43; C ongressional Globe, 37th C ongress, 3rd Session, p. 1143,
em phasis in the original.
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number of that party joining the Dem ocrats in opposing the bill.
However, the party division among w esterners was much clearer
than the debate would indicate.

Hyman Trumbull, who also opposed

the legal tenders, was the only w estern Republican to vote against
Sherman*3 b ill.

In the House all thirteen w estern Democrats opposed

the bill, and Daniel V oorhees who was absent noted he would have
voted with them.
voted lor the bill.

Twenty-three of tw enty-seven w estern Republicans
37

In line with the prediction of Chandler, the West showed a
greater tendency to join the new system during its fir st year.

In

the fir st report of the Com ptroller of the Currency seven ty-th ree
of the one hundred and thirty-four banks in the new system were
located in the Old Northwest.

Ohio with thirty-eight such banks had

alm ost tw ice as many as any other state in the Union.

The com p

tro ller, Indiana banker Hugh McCulloch who later becam e Secretary
of the T reasury, commented:
The rapidity with which national banks are being
organized in the w estern states, and the high

37

Ib id ., pp. 897, 1148. Trumbull didn’t vote on the fir st legal
tender act, but voted against the second. Either his Jacksonian
background or in creased p ressu re from Illinois Dem ocrats who
had just replaced O rville H. Browning with Dem ocrat William
A. Richardson m ust have influenced him. Unfortunately his
la te st biographer (Krug, Lyman Trumbull) doesn’t deal with his
attitudes on the financing of the war.
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character of m ost of the stockholders thereof,
indicate the popularity of the system in that
part of the Union. 38
Certainly this popularity is not hard to explain,

The free

banking sy stem s of Illinois and Indiana w ere discredited, and the
charter of the Ohio State Bank was about to expire.

The sm all

number of new banks in W isconsin and Michigan can be explained
by the new state sy stem in the form er and a conflict concerning
leg a l in terest requirem ents in the latter.

In the C om ptroller’s

report of 1864 there w ere one hundred and eighty-four national banks
in this area, and Michigan and W isconsin each had fifteen. 39
At the end of 1863 Chase, Lincoln, and McCulloch all
p raised the new system , but the opposition from eastern bankers
kept it from fulfilling expectations.

McCulloch, who had gone to

Washington as a state banker to oppose the system , becam e convinced
that a national currency was an absolute n e cessity and accepted
C hase's appointment as com ptroller.

In his fir st report he suggested

a rev isio n of the law to make the banks as w ell as the currency
truly national.

Chase incorporated his suggestions into his report

and a new national banking act was passed by Congress June 3, 1864.

38

"Report of the Com ptroller of the Currency, H in Report of the
S ecretary of the T r e a su r y .. . 1863, pp. 49-61.

39

Rediich, A m erican Banking, H, p. 108; Merk, Econom ic H istory
of W isconsin, pp. 213-214; "Report of the Com ptroller of the
Currency /N ovem ber 25, 1864/11 in Report of the S ecretary of
the T r e a su r y .. . 1864, pp. 46-55.
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This added a large numbei’ of new banks to the system , but It was
not until the prohibitive tax on state bank notes, long urged by
w esterners, was passed in March, 1865, that the new national bank
notes along with the Greenbacks gave the United States a totally
national currency.

40

Although there was hesitancy in som e areas, the w estern
Republicans solid ly supported the currency legislation of the
Civil War y ea rs.

A side from the nearly unanimous action of Repub**

lica n con gressm en from this area, the leading party organs such
as the Chicago Tribune and the Detroit Daily A dvertiser, advocated
and encouraged C hase’s p o licies.

In 1862 the legal tenders w ere

defended, and a year later, when the fir st national banking b ill was
p assed , it receiv ed enthusiastic support.

Although a tax on state

bank notes was not enacted until 1865, this policy had been con
stantly agitated both in and out of Congress by w estern Republicans.
Everyw here the Republican p ress praised the legislation that was

40

Report of the Secretary of the T r e a su r y ., . 1863, pp. 1-27?
Richardson, e d ., M essages and Papers of the P residen ts, VI,
p. 183; ’’Report of the Com ptroller of the Currency AHovember
28, 1863/*'; McCulloch, Men and M easures of a Half Century,
pp. 163-70; Davis, Origins of the National Banking System ,
pp. 88-104.
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the b a sis for "the universal prosperity o£ all c la ss e s .
These p o licies w ere in line with w estern econom ic needs,
particularly the d esire for a sound uniform currency.

Since the

destruction of the Bank of the United States, the Whigs and Republi
cans had m aintained the goal of a sound currency adequate to b usin ess
needs.

The nationalisation of the currency finally allowed them, at

le a st m om entarily, to achieve that goal.

In the end they fought

against the state bankers who they so often supported and who form ed
a powerful lobby against the national banking system .

Both the

leg a l tender acts and the national banking acts w ere m oves to
r e a sse r t som e degree of national control over the currency of the
country, and they rep resented a new era of econom ic nationalism .

42

In line with their argum ents of three decades the Dem o
crats of the West stood solid ly against such "centralizing" tendencies
and m onetary h e r e s ie s.

Even before the fir st legal tender b ill was

enacted the Chicago Tim es charged that the Republicans w ere failing
41

Ib id ., pp. 17-18, 25-26, 44-53, 63-66, 69-70, 98] Jam es,
Chicago Banks, I, pp. 307, 315, 329, 338-367] Joanna Elizabeth
Schneider, "The Reaction of Michigan Republicans To Civil
War Financial L egislation, " (Unpublished M. A. T h esis, Wayne
State U niversity, Detroit, 1963), pp. 55-71; the Chicago Tribune,
January 2 and February 8, 1862, and February 7 and 13, 1863;
Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 9, 1864.

42

Illinois Governor, 1861-1865 (for Yates* m essa g e of January 5,
1863); McCulloch, Men and M easures of Haif a, Century,
pp. 167-70; Detroit A dvertiser and Tribune, January 10, 1863;
Sherman, R ecollection s, I, pp. 289-90, 298*300.
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in their sin gle duty to p reserv e the credit of the nation.

The sam e

paper predicted "that they w ill substantially fail in the perform ance
of this duty* and that they w ill aggravate the failure by legislation
which w ill be as w icked as / i t i s / injurious. ” Subsequently, as
each new m easu re was enacted, D em ocratic organs like the
Indianapolis State Sentinel, the Detroit F ree P r e s s , and Samuel
M edaryfs The C risis detailed its w ickedness and prophesied irrep a rable injury to the republic.

43

Although eventually many w estern Dem ocrats would stand
for nGod and Pendleton’s p la n ,,T the original issu e s of Greenbacks
w ere m et with Dem ocratic h ostility.

The Detroit F ree P r e ss

attacked them as w orse than the Mw ild -ca tn currency, and predicted
that they would "em barrass /IJhe government and . . . beggar the
people. " The Indianapolis State Sentinel attacked the leg a l tenders
as !,An Irredeem able Paper C urrency--T he High Road to Financial
Ruin. ” A side from the usual argum ents that irredeem able paper
would bring a wave of speculation followed by a depression, the
Sentinel charged that cred itors would be unjustly injured.

Dem ocratic

Judge Samuel S . Perkins ruled that leg a l tender legislation should

43

Chicago T im es, in the Indianapolis State Sentinel, January 11,
1862; Stampp, Indiana P o litics During the Civil War, pp. 189-91,
266-68; Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War F ra, pp. 194-96;
Frank L. Klement* The Copperheads in the Middle West
(Chicago; U niversity of Chicago P r e ss , I960), pp. 73, 83-84.
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be invalidated because it ’'operated as a fraud on the public cred itors”
and amounted to confiscation of private property without com pensa
tion*

Sucha paper m oney system stood in contrast to all the

Jacksonian Dem ocrats had struggled for in the past twodecades* ^
However, if the legal tenders seem ed a departure from the
tested w ays of sound finance the national banking system becam e
”a sym bol of the com plete abandonment of Dem ocratic doctrines* ”
The Cincinnati Enquirer told its readers:
The enorm ity of this b ill is sufficient to make
General Jackson who killed the old Bank of the
United States, turn in his c o ffin .. . the design is
to destroy the fixed institutions of the States,
and build up a central m oneyed despotism* 45
The new system w as nothing m ore than a return of the old
’’m oney monopoly” and would give r ise to an a ristocracy ten tim es
w orse than the ’’sla v o cra cy ” which would ’’dom ineer over white men. ”
P articu larly Medary em phasized the argument that the ’’m onstrous
Bank B ill” subverted the in terests of the w estern farm er to those of
44

The Detroit F ree P r e ss , January 11, 1862, Indianapolis State
Sentinel, January 30, 1862; Perkins is quoted in Thornbrough,
Indiana in the Civil War Era, p. 195* The Detroit Free P r e ss,
February 8, 1862, did in sist that the legal tender clause was
n ecessa ry to keep the county from being "surrendered, bound
hand and foot, to the m oney speculators. "

45

Stampp, Indiana P o litic b During the Civil War, p* 190; Cincinnati
Daily Enquirer, February 24, 1863, quoted in Klement, Copper
heads in the Middle West, p* 84.
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the eastern capitalist.

To Dem ocrats who had cut their political

teeth on the opposition to the '*Biddle centralizers" this new national
ism of m onetary affairs clea rly undermined the purity of the Con
stitution.

In 1865 the Indianapolis State Sentinel exp ressed doubt

that "the old standard orthodoxy*1 of the Constitution could ever be
regained.

46
The Civil War brought to a close the debate over banking

begun in the wake of the Panic of 1837.

The n e c e ssitie s of war had

forced the Republicans to innovate on a wide sca le in m atters of
finance.

To solve the p ressin g needs of the government the G reen

backs w ere issu ed as an em ergency m easure in 1862.

The following

year the national banking sy stem was created on the m odel of the
free banking sy stem s of the states and embodying restriction s which
the le sso n s of experience dictated.

While these changes bore a

distinct relation to the past, the institutional structures which grew
out of the war ushered in a new era of m onetary debate in the Old North
w est and the nation as a whole.

The old issu e s concerning state bank

ing which had occupied the political arena for thirty years w ere no
longer relevant, and the concepts and clich es used by the parties had
to be transform ed to deal with new econom ic and political situations.

46

The Indianapolis State Sentinel, October 27, 1863, and May 12,
1865; The C r is is , March 4 and 18, 1863, and July 6, 1864; the
Detroit F ree P r e ss , January 11, 14, and 17, 1863; the Milwaukee
Daily News, in the~lndianapolis State Sentinel, April 29* 1863.
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APPENDIX A
Voting in the 1850*3

The b elief that the Dem ocrats form ed a numerous and
dynamic elem ent of the Republican party in the 1850’s is defended
by W illiam O. Lynch in his article, "The Convergence of Lincoln
and Douglas* " in which he made a pioneering attempt to m easure the
number of ex*»Democrats and ex-W higs in the new party*

He u ses

only the election s of 1852 and 1856 and m akes no effort to divide up
the "Free Soil" vote of 1852 into ex-W higs and ex-D em ocrats.

I

have used the sam e method which Lynch em ployed but over a longer
period.

I have assum ed that the total Liberty vote cam e from the

Whigs, the total A m erican vote cam e from ex-W higs, and the total
Breckinridge vote cam e from D em ocrats.
The Old Northwest
1844
Dem.
W-R
Other

306, 029
293,073
17,239
616, 341

49%
47%
4%

1856
Dem.
W-R
Other

500, 054
515, 889
90, 361
1,106, 304

1852

1848
330, 998
299, 503
SO, 190
710, 691

46. 5%
42%
11. 5%

1860
45%
46* 6%
8. 4%

593, 085
717, 473
27,726
24, 068
1,362, 352

43. 5%
52. 6%
2.1%
1. 8%

418, 579
353,073
64, 422
836, 074

8%
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The statem ents about the econom ic elite are drawn from a
com parison of the total vote of Wayne County, Michigan, using the
above assum ptions and Lynch’s method, and the data given by
Alexandra McCoy in her d issertation.
Wayne County, Michigan
1844
Dem.
W-R
Other

1848
52%
44. 4%
2. 6%

2 ,7 3 6
2, 346
192
5, 247

3, 305
2, 540
421
6, 266

1856
Dem.
W-R
Other

52.7%
40. 5%
6. 8%

4, 680
3* 402
368
8,450

55.3%
40.2%
4. 5%

1860
52. 4%
46. 8%
. 8%

5,777
5, 250
205

1852

1 1 ,2 3 a

6, 701
7, 325
102
139
14,267

47%
51.3%
. 8%
«9 %

The jSconomic JSlite of Wayne County
1844
Dem.
W-R
Other
No

28
60
5f 4
9T

29%
62%
5%
4%

I860
48
58
4■
25
135

35. 5%
43%
3%
18. 5%

The general figu res for the election s com e from Burnham,
P resid en tial B allots.

Those for the section as a whole are on p. 248

and those for Wayne County are on p. 532.
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A B ibliographical Note
In rec en t years th ere has been a g reat deal of in te re s t in
the political aspects of m onetary questions and a num ber of excellent
books have appeared.

The older cla ssic studies of Ralph C atterall

on the Second Bank of the United States and Wesley M itchell on the
G reenbacks have been supplem ented by the works of W alter Smith,
A rthur Schlesinger, J r . , Thomas Govan, R obert Sharkey, and
Irw in Unger.
of the Bank.

Smith has unwound the com plicated economic affairs
Schlesinger has presen ted the Dem ocratic view of

that institution? and Govan has ably defended Nicholas Biddle.

Sharkey

and Unger, although they differ slightly, have brought a fre sh p e r
spective to the financing of the Civil War and the m onetary problem s
which followed it which com pletely re v ise s the traditional views
defended by Howard Beale and Mathew Josephson.

Two excellent

studies of banking by B ray Hammond and F ritz Redlich have added
im m easu rably to our understanding of A m erican m onetary h istory
in the nineteenth century.

However, these m ainly concentrate on the

Bank War and the post Civil War period leaving the in terim relatively
untouched.

Thus, th ere is a gap in banking h isto ry of about twenty-

five y e a rs.
The decentralized nature of the problem in these y e ars has
m ade it difficult to study and has rendered generalizations dangerous*
M ost h isto ria n s have unfortunately used in terp retativ e fram es derived
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from e ith er the Jacksonian struggle with the Bank or the so called
"A g rarian C rusade" of the late nineteenth century to stru ctu re their
analyses.
Our understanding of the reaction to m onetary questions in
the states is weak even for the y ears in which national policy is
well covered.

This w eakness shows up clearly in the period when

the national governm ent was quiescent.

The b e st studies of the

political aspects of banking in a state a re those on free banking in
New York by Redlich, Hammond, and Lee Benson in his book on
New York politics.

A llusion is m ade to the extension of free banking

into the w est, but only M ichigan receives m uch attention.

H ere

n e arly every author leans heavily on the nineteenth century a rtic le s
by Thomas Cooley and Alpheus Felch.

Individual states a re tre a te d

in the older studies by W illiam Graham Sumner and John Jay Knox,
and in the com prehensive little book by L eonard H elderm an.

Unfortu

nately, Sum ner and Knox a re both unreliable and ra th e r apolitical;
and H elderm an, while reliab le, is very sketchy.

Much m ore detail

is given in the studies of state banking by Logan E sarey, C. C.
Huntington, George Dowrie, M aurice Ross, and F. Cyril Jam es.
The book on Chicago banks is a m odel study relating local questions
to the la r g e r national and international situation.

W illiam H arding’s

old e ssay on the State Bank of Indiana is also excellent.

The other

state stu d ies, while useful, tend to be ped estrian and to p re ss events
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into in terp retatio n s derived from national politics.

The confusion

this causes is seen c le arly in R oss’s d issertation.
These state studies form the b asis for political h isto ries
of the states and h isto rie s of the region.

The studies of F ran cis

W eisenburger, Eugene Roseboom, A lfred Holt, Theodore P ease
and C harles Cole a re all helpful in placing m onetary problem s in
the p ro p er political context and add to the above state banking
studies.

The region is excellently tre a te d by F re d e ric k Jackson

T u rn er and R. C arlyle Buley, but both books a re weak on m onetary
questions.

The b est attem pts at synthesis a re the chapter in George

R ogers T a y lo r's econom ic h isto ry of the period and Ham mond's
a rtic le on w estern banking which lays down an outline for the study
of the question at variance with the view developed in this study.
One of the b e st studies of banking in the Old Northwest or any section
is C a rte r G olem be's d issertatio n , but it covers only the period from
1830 to 1844 and concerns m ainly the functions of banks.

It se rv es

to dispel a g re a t num ber of illusions and provided this study with
som e of its basic assum ptions.
One final book that should be m entioned is M arvin M eyers'
study of Jacksonian thought.

It is not a study of banking, but cle arly

deliniates the sym bolic nature of the m onetary issu e and thus effected
this study m easurably.
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